IMPERIAL NEIGHBORS: EMPIRES AND LAND ALLOTMENT IN THE ANCIENT MEDITERRANEAN WORLD

A Dissertation
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Cornell University
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

By
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May 2018

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Cornell University 2018

This dissertation is a comparative history of imperial land allotment in the ancient Mediterranean world. Living in a profoundly agrarian world, the Athenians c. 510-413 BCE, Syracusans c. 483-380, and Romans c. 396-264 each created imperial territories by dividing up, or "allotting," land they confiscated in war. They also experimented with forms of republicanism: as citizens, they participated in popular assemblies, fought together, and shared access to imperial land. By exploring the historical links between land allotment and shared governance, I reconstruct how the citizen communities at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome developed alongside new ideas about imperial territory, mobility, and the value of labor.

Because land allotment moved people to and from confiscated land, and in and out of each republic, it also reorganized, concentrated, and displaced people within each empire. However, the way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land had drastically different effects on how people moved across the three empires: the Athenians went to great lengths to keep their citizen lotholders at home in Attica, whereas the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syracuse to become citizens, and the Romans sent their citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. I develop a new heuristic model for historians to explain why each group allotted land as they did by drawing on recent trends in Francophone political geography and the macroeconomic concept of human capital. By reframing historical texts with archaeological case studies, I show how each group collectively

drew lessons from their own political culture to imagine their imperial territory, and then how they used land allotment to find their citizens' place within it. As such, land allotment was a means to an end, more self-reflexive than aimed at imperial control: instead, I argue that the three patterns of land allotment can be distinguished, first and foremost, in the way each community valued and accumulated human capital.

Comparing the three approaches to land allotment allows us to confront and turn on its head the consensus among historians that people in antiquity allotted land primarily as a state-strategy of imperial control. Altogether, it recaptures some of the many ways people in antiquity reconciled empire with citizenship and, in doing so, how land allotment helped shape the political and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Tim was born and raised in Eugene, Oregon. He received his B.A. from Oregon State University in 2010 and wrote a thesis on the historiography of the Bronze Age systems collapse in the eastern Mediterranean. He completed an M.A. in Classics with a specialization in Ancient History at Stanford University in 2011. His Master's thesis explored the economic world of foreigners at Athens in the fourth century BCE. In 2011, Tim entered the Ph.D. program at Cornell in History, receiving an M.A. in 2014. During his research, he excavated at archaeological sites in Italy and Greece. At Cornell, he taught courses on a range of topics in history, including empires in the ancient Near Eastern and Mediterranean worlds, Greek political philosophy, war and democracy in Greece and Rome, and the history of science. He now lives in Portland, Oregon, with his wife Tori.

For Tori

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At every step of researching and writing this dissertation, I have been very fortunate to have a wonderful community of family, friends, advisors, teachers, and colleagues. It is my great pleasure to be able to acknowledge them here and express my sincere and humble gratitude to everyone who helped me along the way.

I will forever be indebted to the four members of my dissertation committee for their patience, guidance, and thoughtfulness through the entire process. They have all held me to high standards, while also being tremendously generous with their time and expertise. From my first visit to Ithaca back in 2011, Barry Strauss has been a truly model committee chair, mentor, and friend. It is hard to put into words just how grateful I am to him for his endless dedication, enthusiasm, and kindness. He continually renewed my enthusiasm for history, while also teaching me lessons about professionalism and humility that have made me a better person. I learned from him to think big and comparatively, to be ambitious but always unassuming. I could not have done any of this without him. Eric Rebillard has been a steadfast and invaluable mentor, unfailing in his patience, prompt feedback, and keen eye for detail. With clear and rigorous insights, Eric's advice was instrumental in clarifying my ideas and strengthening my arguments. Robert Travers offered calm and thoughtful counsel, reminding me to be patient with my work and sharing his passion for history and teaching. From our many conversations about imperial history and political philosophy, he has enriched my project in innumerable ways and expanded my field of vision. Sturt Manning guided me to think about the ancient Mediterranean world from new angles, helping me through many tough questions

and introducing me to fruitful comparisons. I am also indebted to him for his invaluable feedback on my dissertation's framing and for sharing his archaeological expertise. All four moved mountains to make my path easier, and I truly cannot thank them enough.

I consider myself extremely fortunate to have worked in so vibrant and friendly community as Cornell. From my first day of graduate school, I have had the pleasure to navigate the program alongside an exceptionally talented and warm cohort of historians in the Department of History, including Fritz Bartel, Jack Chia, Joe Giacomelli, Jacob Krell, Sujin Lee, Max McComb, Matt Reeder, and Brian Rutledge. From the nights we spent at Chapter House to their words encouragement in the basement of McGraw, and even our soccer games against undergrads who were way more in shape than us, getting to work with them has been the privilege of a lifetime. My friends in Classics, especially Jenny Carrington, Jake Nabel, Katie Jarriel, Katie Kearns, and Jeff Leon, have been terrific colleagues and even better friends. Every year, the intellectual communities at the History and Classics colloquia have done so much to help me mature as an historian, author, and colleague. My year as a fellow at the Judith Reppy Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies also opened many doors to critical engagement and fields of research beyond my own.

The faculty at Cornell have been an endless source of inspiration and support: I cherish the many conversations shared with Annetta Alexandridis, Ben Anderson, Caitlin Barrett, Anne Birien, Charles Brittain, Judith Byfield, Duane Corpis, Ray Craib, Mike Fontaine, Durba Ghosh, Sandra Greene, Lori Khatchadourian, Mary Beth Norton, Hayden Pelliccia, Pietra Pucci, Hunter Rawlings, Jeff Rusten, Aaron Sachs, Adam Smith, and Rachel Weil. I owe each and every one of them a great debt of gratitude for the kindness, warmth, and opportunity they have shared with

me all these years. A special thank you to the incredible staff in History and Classics, Linda Brown, Barb Donnell, the late Katrina Neff, and Judy Yonkin, whose patience and assistance kept me organized and on track. At Cornell and Oregon State University, I have had the great pleasure to teach and mentor many remarkable students, all of whom came to the study of the ancient world with different preconceptions of antiquity, its relationship to the modern world, and to themselves. They reinvigorated me and constantly challenged me to consider my own work from fresh, new perspectives. They helped me through this process more than they will probably ever know.

While developing the dissertation, I also greatly benefitted from conversations with Nate Pilkington, Nicholas Purcell, John Ma, Jeremy McInerney, Dan-El Padilla Peralta, Jen Trimble, and Alex Walthall, whose expertise helped me think through many difficult problems. I would also like to thank the members of the Roman Peasant Project, especially Kim Bowes, Cam Grey, Stephan Collins-Elliot, Astrid Van Oyen, and Rhodora Vennarucci, for welcoming me into such a lively intellectual community at a critical time in my dissertation development. Also, my advisors at Oregon State, Gary Ferngren, Lisa Sarasohn, and Ben Mutschler, and at Stanford, Josh Ober and Ian Morris, who helped me find myself through the study of history.

While researching and writing my dissertation, I received generous financial support from many sources, not least the Graduate School, the Departments of History, and the Department of Classics at Cornell. I was able to carry out summer research in Greece and Italy thanks to the Department of History's Bradley Fund for Research in Ancient History. When it came time to draft chapters of my dissertation, the Society for the Humanities at Cornell funded two dissertation writing groups: first, with my friends in History, Mark Deets, Max McComb,

and Jackie Reynoso; and second, with my friends in Classics and Art History, Liana Brent and Kaja Tally-Schumacher. I am so fortunate to have such gifted and curious friends to read my work, push me to strengthen my arguments, and cheer me through many revisions. Finally, I was able to fully edit and complete my dissertation thanks to a Mellon/ACLS Dissertation Completion Fellowship. Thank you to Matthew Goldfeder at ACLS and Elias Muhanna for all their kindness and advice at the DCF seminar.

Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my friends and family. Writing a dissertation can be a lonely and isolating experience, but when I think back on the last seven years I am humbled by how lucky I was to have such great friends. To Andrew Amstutz, Fritz Bartel, Dave Blome, Liana Brent, Jenny Carrington, Mark Deets, Ryan Edwards, Perri Gerard-Little, Joe Giacomelli, Katie Jarriel, Katie Kearns, Jeff Leon, Max McComb, Jake Nabel, Jackie Reynoso, Brian Rutledge, Sam Sanft, Scott Sorrell, and Connor Wiktorowicz: your friendship has meant the world to me. To my extended family in Virginia: thank you for making Tori and I feel at home when Oregon felt so far away. To Mom, Dad, Andrew, and my in-laws, Becky and Wayne: thank you for believing in me all these years. I never would have had the courage to move across the country and continue through graduate school without your love. To my wife Tori, my dearest friend, partner, and all-around sweetest gal: thank you for being with me at every breakthrough and breakdown. Most of all, thank you for being you.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

Mediterranean empires before the Hellenistic period were not much to look at. Among the Greeks, empires were relatively small, short-lived, and lacked the bureaucratic reach that modern historians often associate with empires. Yet like the Romans in the mid-Republic, the Athenians and Syracusans were unique in the pre-modern world in how they tried to balance their conquests abroad with shared governance at home. Living in a profoundly agrarian world, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans created their empires by dividing up by lottery, or "allotting," confiscated land. All three groups also lived in city-states and experimented with forms of republicanism: their members were citizens who participated in popular assemblies, fought together in war, and shared access to imperial land. "Land allotment," as historians like to call it, was the most common way for citizens living in republics to share in their empires. Greek and Latin authors from Classical Athens to the high Imperial period at Rome added to the sense of shared history by drawing from the same vocabulary to describe Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotments. For them, the terms *klēros* and *ager divisus* referred to something so common, so understood, that they needed no further explanation.

The history of empires in the ancient Mediterranean world before the Hellenistic period was thus, in many ways, a history of land allotment. As an imperial institution, land allotment was the act of confiscating land from another group and dividing it up among new landholders. As a cultural institution, land allotment was also at the heart of Greco-Roman political culture. Classical authors like Aristophanes and Ovid saw power, above all else, in the division of land:

ἥκω παρ᾽ ὑμᾶς—γεωμετρῆσαι βούλομαι τὸν ἀέρα / ὑμῖν διελεῖν τε κατὰ γύας.[1]

I have come to you—I want to survey the plains of the air for you and to divide them into lots.

Communemque prius, seu lumina solis et auras / cautus humum longo signavit limite mensor.[2]

And the land, which up to that point had been a common possession like the sunlight and the air, the careful surveyor now marked out with long boundaries.

In Aristophanes' satirical empire in the sky, the surveyor hoped to divide up the air just as he might the land: his power over nature made the "plains of the air" fair game for allotment. For Ovid, the surveyor signaled the final stage of human decline from the peaceful Golden Age, as he saw it: the surveyor conquered the land with the same force and regularity that an army might defeat its enemy. Both authors wrote with a similar ideology of allotment in mind, one that joined the power to confiscate land with the willingness to share it. Citizens fought together to confiscate land from the people they defeated in war, then came together again to divide it up.[3]

For most modern historians, too, land allotment brings to mind imperial power. But historians of Greco-Roman antiquity often have in mind a very particular kind of power: the power to control a territory. As we will see, historians tend to treat land allotment as an instrument of control in service of a central state. In this approach, historians like to take imperial success as their object of inquiry, explaining how land allotment helped certain states control the land within their imperial territory better than other states. Whereas the Athenians and Syracusans pieced together empires that soon floundered, the Romans achieved a form of durable

[1] Aristoph. *Birds* 995. In this scene, Meton, a famous Athenian geometer, arrives with surveyor's tools and interrupts Pisthetairos.

[2] Ovid, *Metamorphoses* 1.135-136. Ovid described the fourth and final stage of human existence, the "ruthless and hard" Iron Age.

[3] It is no wonder that the republics of the ancient Mediterranean produced some of the strongest legal traditions for property rights in the pre-modern world, see Horden and Purcell 2000: 279. For the legacy of Greco-Roman imperialism in medieval and early-modern Europe, see Pagden 1995; Muldoon 1999.

imperial stability that lasted, in one way or another, for a thousand years. Consequently, historians tend to impose a sort of retroactive coherence on the Romans' empire that presupposes its ultimate success in central Italy and beyond—a sense that Roman land allotment made the Romans uniquely prepared to become an imperial power long before it was clear that they were on a path towards Mediterranean empire.

In contrast, a student of Greek history could easily forget that far more Greeks experienced Athenian and Syracusan land allotment than Socrates' intellect or the splendor of the Parthenon. Even though land allotment was common to all three empires, historians have shied away from comparing the three institutions because they assume that Roman imperialism was successful because it emerged as a different species of empire. The problem of comparative empires is itself ancient: already in the first century BCE, Dionysius of Halicarnassus wrote in the introduction to his *Roman Antiquities* that "it is not appropriate to compare the Greek powers to those just mentioned, since they gained neither magnitude of empire nor duration of eminence equal to [the Romans]."[4] This problem has made it so we really have no idea why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land the way they did: we simply assume that the Romans had a different way of doing it because they were better imperialists.

The problem, however, is not one of success and failure, but rather periodization. If we explore how each group allotted land during corresponding periods of their imperial development we begin to see how all three were variations on a particularly rare species of empire in world history that was unique to the Mediterranean: empires in which the imperial

[4] Dion. Hal. 1.3.1. It is worth noting, however, that this kind of teleological approach made sense for a historian with Dionysius' historical interests, since he wanted to show his audience why the Roman empire at the time he was writing was so unique in history.

community was both a city-state and a participatory republic. Of course, the Roman empire at its height was unique among ancient empires in its durability and geographical extent. But the Romans' long-term success does not change the fact that their initial transition to empire had more in common with the Athenian and Syracusan empires than any other in world history. Rather, a more appropriate comparison would be the three empires just during their transitions from city-states to empires, not at their "greatest extents." [5]

In broad terms, the periods of imperial transition for the Athenians in the Aegean *c.* 510-413, the Syracusans in Sicily and Kalabria *c.* 483-367, and the Romans in central Italy *c.* 396-264 all followed similar, though certainly not identical, patterns. Beginning with comparable citizen populations, each state set out on an initial phase of conquest, briefly set back after an exogenous shock to its main urban center, and resulting in political experimentation at home and territorial gains abroad in areas with no prior history of imperial landownership. The Athenians began allotting confiscated land at the end of the sixth century in the excitement of the new democracy, prevented for a time by two Persian invasions into Attica, only to take off again after Ephialtes' reforms for the rest of the fifth century until they failed to take Sicily. The Syracusans first allotted land under the Deinomenid tyrants, though the pace of allotment slowed after the democratic coup, stopped when the Athenian besieged their city, and then accelerated after Dionysios I's military reforms until his death. Shortly after the Romans first allotted confiscated land at the beginning of the fourth century, they too were set back when an army of mercenaries ransacked Rome, though they set out again across central Italy after a series of popular reforms until the First Punic War. From then on, the Romans were

[5] For recent comparisons of ancient Greco-Roman empires at their greatest extents, see Bang 2008; Scheidel 2009; Bang and Bayly 2011.

transitioning again to something that the Athenians and Syracusans never created: a Mediterranean-wide empire.

But despite all they had in common in their transitions, each group allotted land in their own distinctive ways. Because they were the first empires in their regions to systematically confiscate land, they could not build on any existing imperial institutions in the places they allotted land, as the empires that came after them often did.[6] Instead, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, had to be creative when they allotted land: the twin dynamics of shared-governance at home and land confiscations abroad led the three imperial republics to experiment with how to divide up land. Of course, land allotment was not unique to ancient republics. Far from it. In fact, nearly every empire in world history has allotted land in some capacity: from Achaemenid Persia in Mesopotamia to the Inca in the central Andes; from Ithaca in upstate New York to Senegal in western Africa. But, as we will see, it was much more difficult for republics to pull off: citizens made a strong distinction between themselves and those outside their immediate political community, even as the movement of the new landholders and the people they dispossessed blurred the lines between one community and another. Only by exploring land allotment within the highly specific context of city-state republics, I argue, can we see why each group allotted land the way they did. From a broader historical perspective, we also get to see in high relief how the development of republican institutions in the ancient world went hand-in-hand with a very specific kind of imperialism.

Central to all three patterns of land allotment is what I am calling "imperial neighbors," an historical shorthand to focus our attention on the people of land allotment, their movement, and

[6] For land tenure in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt, for example, see Monson 2012a; 2012b. For British India, see Travers 2009; Stern 2011.

the relationships between settler and dispossessed. The term plays on two levels of what it means to be a "neighbor." First, land allotment physically drew people together in new ways as the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans confiscated land in "neighboring" territories. It is in this sense, of imperial landowners becoming "neighbors" to the people they dispossessed, that the fourth-century BCE author Duris of Samos used the Greek word *paroikos* as a term of contempt to describe the Athenians: in his view, the proverbial "Attic neighbor" referred to the unwelcome arrival of Athenian lotholders.[7] Second, and in a more structural sense, the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman states grew up alongside, in contact with, and sometimes fighting one another. The imperial histories of the three states and their citizens were intertwined, connected in ways that will become clearer with each chapter. Together, the view of "imperial neighbors" concerns the personal and human quality of land allotment, its mutability, and the wider Mediterranean world in which all three empires emerged.

At its heart, then, this dissertation is a story about historical difference in a highly connected world. By comparing imperial transitions rather than imperial success, the story is less concerned with ranking outcomes than understanding why three imperial republics allotted land the way they did. Such a story can offer a rich, new perspective on how republics became empires in antiquity by recapturing how their transitions were contingent, often unplanned, emerging from crisis only later to take on some semblance of coherence. But before the story of imperial neighbors can begin, we need to pause and consider what exactly the three empires had in common.

[7] Duris, *FGrHist* 76 F 9, with Moreno 2009: 215. For similar uses of the word, see also Craterus *FGrHist* 342 F 21; Arist. *Rhet.* 1395a18. Duris (b. 350) lived on Samos in the second half of the fourth century, when Athenian cleruchs still occupied the island, see Cargill 1995: 17-21.

1.1. *Comparative Empires*

For ancient historians, the term "empire" says too little and too much: too little because it is a monumentally imprecise term, and too much because it evokes assumptions about size, control, duration, and success. Though modern historians commonly use "empire" to sort and classify states, the term carries with it a great deal of modern baggage that would have been unfamiliar to the Greeks and Romans. It should come as no surprise that the Greeks did not have a word for empire as modern historians treat it: the Athenians and Syracusans referred to what we call the Athenian empire and the Syracusan empire as their *archē*. For the Greeks, *archē* literally meant "the first place of power" or "rule," but it encompassed a wide continuum of state-based exploitation, as we will see. The Greeks liked to distinguish between *archē* and *hegemonia*, which implied "leadership" in a *summachia* (or "alliance"), because *archē* was more heavy-handed and unchecked. The Romans also had a word for the power to rule over other people: *imperium* originally referred to the command given to a general, but by the mid-Republic it also came to mean the actual area of operations in which that military command held authority. Hence the extent of Roman command was the *imperium Romanum.* Still, for all their cultural significance, the terms *archē* and *imperium* do little to advance our comparative understanding of what the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were doing when they were creating their empires.[8]

Instead, as a point of departure I use Michael Doyle's definition of empire that is widely used among ancient historians. Doyle argued that an empire is "a system of interaction between two political entities, one of which, the dominant metropole, exerts political control over the

[8] For a discussion of the words *archē* and *imperium* and how they differed in use and meaning, see Finley 1982: 41-42; Pagden 1995: 11-28.

internal and external policy—the effective sovereignty—of the other, the subordinate periphery."[9] In this view, empire emphasizes the relationship between two or more groups of people, a relationship that is necessarily rooted in organized violence and an asymmetry of power.[10] In our case, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans used that power more often than not to confiscate land. Thus, their empires consisted of territories only insofar as the people at the center had relationships with the people they subjected within that territory. As Lori Khatchadourian recently put it, empires "are not themselves things," fixed in time and space: we should never lose sight of how empires are human creations, always in a state of becoming.[11] This lesson is important for how we study ancient empires: the twenty-five hundred years that separate us from the early days of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires make it all too easy for us to reify and romanticize what they were when they first started out.

Even more, the ancient Mediterranean world was home to a historically rare kind of empire: an empire in which the central state was both a city-state and a republic. Generally, ancient city-states were known for their close link between people and place: a community, a main urban center, and its surrounding territory.[12] One step further down the city-state's taxonomy were city-state republics, or what Walter Scheidel has aptly called "citizen-city-states," in which members considered themselves citizens.[13] Though most republics in antiquity

[9] Doyle 1986: 12. For discussions of empire in the ancient world, see Doyle 1986: 19-51; Morrison 2001; Goldstone and Haldon 2009; Scheidel 2013: 27-30. For a recent textbook on ancient empires that uses Doyle and social-scientific theory, see Cline and Graham 2011.

[10] The sources of that power can be, as Michael Mann has shown, ideological, economic, military, political, or any combination of the four. The four sources of power work together to form the unique qualities of a particular imperial relationship, see Mann 1986: 22-28.

[11] Khatchadourian 2016: xxxviii, with Stoler and McGranahan 2007: esp. 8-9.

[12] For a synthetic study of the city-state, see Hansen 2000: esp. 19; 2002. For city-states in world history, in later periods, and outside of the Mediterranean and, see also Griffeth and Thomas 1981; Burke 1986; Molho *et al*. 1991; Nichols and Charlton 1997; Parker 2004.

[13] For the typology of the ancient "citizen city-state," one form of the "micro-state," see Scheidel 2006b: esp. 6; 2013: 30-32; *forthcoming*.

were city-states, not all city-states were republics.[14] What set apart city-state republics were their political institutions—in particular, popular assemblies where citizens could meet, vote on important decisions, and elect officials to carry out the day-to-day business of the state. In practice, they could be popular democracies or even restricted oligarchies, just not hereditary monarchies.[15] Though the term republic as we know it today was a creation of early modern political philosophy, not antiquity, I use it here instead of city-state republic or citizen-city-state for the sake of simplicity.[16] In keeping with the original meaning of *res publica*, I use republic to refer to states in which members shared a strong sense of citizenship and participated in a form of shared-governance. We can think of citizens living in republics as being shareholders who could reasonably expect land as their dividends. Republics also liked to distinguish between citizens, who could receive land, and everyone else, who often could not: republics were thus, by necessity, divided societies. Even though a fairly wide range of different political regimes in world history fit these criteria, there were few in antiquity that could, and fewer still that went on to form empires. Given that Athens, Syracuse, and Rome can be characterized by these criteria, I call them republics with no further ado.

On the list of republics in world history that started out as city-states and went on to form empires, to Athens, Syracuse, and Rome can only be added Carthage, Genoa, and Venice.[17] The list is quite short, in my view, because republics made for unusual imperial neighbors. On the one hand, city-states were naturally suited to exploit the people they conquered because they already

[14] For a comparison of city-states in world history, see the publications of the *Copenhagen Polis Centre,* esp. Hansen 2000: esp. 611-614.

[15] Sealey 1987: ix. As he put it simply, the category of republics "excludes the arbitrary rule of a despot," with no popular recourse.

[16] Typically when historians refer to republicanism, they use it in contrast to liberalism in early-modern Europe to mean the civic virtues that privilege the common good over individual rights. For an overview of republicanism in modern political thought, see Nadon 2009.

[17] There were, of course, other city-states in antiquity that made empires like Ur during the Third Dynasty and Hammurabi's Babylon.

had an urban center that could become an extractive imperial center, and a critical mass of citizens who could become an imperial elite. The Republic of Venice in Italy, for example, owned land in faraway places like Corfu and Crete, but allotted it to citizen landholders as their own personal fiefs.[18] On the other hand, as I explain in Chapter 2, the transition to empire was particularly difficult for republics because they made such strong distinctions between the community of citizen landholders and the people they dispossessed, even as land allotment blurred the lines between the two. Consequently, comparing Athens with Syracuse or Rome would not be the same as comparing Athens with Achaemenid Persia, where soldiers received land because they fought, not because they were members of any particular citizen community. Though the Achaemenids also allotted land, they did not make much of a distinction between the soldiers who got land and the people they dispossessed, they allotted land in areas with a long history of imperial land tenure going back at least to the Neo-Assyrians, and those areas were not connected in the same ways because they did not border the Mediterranean Sea.

Still within the Mediterranean basin, the Carthaginians and the Spartans seem equally well suited for comparison with the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. Both were famous even in antiquity for their republican institutions and their imperial conquests. But for the Carthaginians, who had colonies spread across the western Mediterranean, we have virtually no evidence for how, or to whom, they actually allotted land.[19] Despite recent advances in rewriting Carthaginian imperial history using Punic inscriptions and archaeological sources, Carthaginian

[18] For Venetian imperialism, see Lane 1973; O'Connell 2009; Crowley 2011. For Venetian land allotment, see Gasparis 2014.

[19] For a recent reinterpretation of Carthaginian history that draws mostly from Carthaginian, not Roman, sources, see Pilkington 2013. The only source for land allotment is Aristotle (*Pol.* 6.1320b5-9), who mentioned that the Carthaginians were "always sending out some of the *dēmos* to the surrounding territories and so make them wealthy." He may have been referring to land allotment nearby in Libya.

land allotment remains a total mystery. And the Spartans, whose land allotments in Messenia have likely received more interest than any other land allotments in world history, showed no signs of ever wanting to confiscate more land beyond the southern third of the Peloponnese. Spartan land allotment, for all of its infamy, was less of a transition to empire than a one-off process of Archaic state-formation.

For comparative historians, then, the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires stand apart in antiquity. All three shared the highly specific imperial contexts and republican criteria for comparing like with like. Even so, no historian has ever compared them, much less their patterns of land allotment, despite them being the three best-documented empires before the Hellenistic period. In all likelihood, this is because historians and political thinkers since the early Renaissance have given special treatment to the Athenians and Romans, considering them unique in their contributions to the Western canon. Machiavelli, who probably spent more time than anyone else in world history thinking about imperial republics, made no mention of the Syracusans in his *Discourses* except to express his disapproval of their tyrants. Instead, he used Athens, Rome, and Sparta to derive "principles of political action," as Maurizio Virioli put it, that could help his native Florence become a successful empire.[20] The rapid rise and fall of Athens, in his view, was a foil to conservative republics like Sparta and more successful imperial republics like Rome: the Athenians, like his fellow Florentines, were too heavy-handed so they made too many enemies, the Spartans did not expand so they were doomed to be conquered, but the Romans made allies out of enemies so they were successful in the long run.

[20] Virioli 2000: 184. For Machiavelli's *Discourses* and ancient republics, see also Bock *et al.* 1990; Hörnqvist 2004; Andrew 2011: 18-26.

The way Machiavelli compared and categorized ancient republics remains popular to this day. For example, J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, whose research program mobilized a generation of intellectual and political historians, traced the genealogy of republican ideology from its origins in Sparta, Athens, and Rome, through Machiavelli's Florence, all the way up to Thomas Jefferson. For Pocock and Skinner, it was worth going all the way back to antiquity, just as Machiavelli did, because they wanted to recapture the full range of historical possibilities for achieving "political liberty."[21] But their specific interest in this concept of political liberty, as opposed to the history of popular institutions, meant that they also ignored examples like Syracuse, where popular institutions could coexist with tyrants. Consequently, normative arguments for republicanism, which are just as central to Anglophone political thinking today as they were when Pocock and Skinner were writing, have made it difficult for us to compare imperial republics by limiting our field of vision.

Machiavelli and his intellectual heirs, for all of their brilliant historical insights, too easily dismissed the Syracusans. True, tyrants were in charge at Syracuse for most of its imperial history. But Dionysios' military consolidation not preclude the existence of popular institutions and shared-governance: though Dionysios held more power at Syracuse than Pericles ever did at Athens, we would do well to remember that Pericles' hold on power did not undermine his city's democratic institutions.[22] When Dionysios came to power at Syracuse in 406, Syracusan democratic institutions had been in place for two full generations; afterward, the Syracusan popular assembly under Dionysios presided over the city's finances, used sortition to

[21] See especially Pocock 1975; Skinner 1978. In doing so, they were also pushing back on the Whiggish interpretation of political thought that, as Nadon (2009: 529-530) put it, "understood it as a progressive march toward greater and more secure individual rights and liberties."

[22] After all, Pericles was often portrayed in Athenian popular culture as a tyrant figure, especially in Old Comedy, see McGlew 2006.

fill public offices, and took pride in Syracusan citizenship.[23] This is not to say that Syracusan citizens enjoyed the same kind of broad political enfranchisement as the Athenians. But then again, neither did the Romans. As far as land allotment is concerned, at least, the Syracusans faced the same kind of difficulties as the Athenians and Romans.

For that reason, I think that Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment are best studied together. Taking a comparative approach that includes the Syracusans not only broadens our historical field of vision, it also challenges long-held assumptions about Athenian and Roman imperialism. Because Athens and Rome have, since antiquity, been the two best-known imperial republics, their imperial histories are often understood in opposition to one another. As ancient historians often teach it today, the story goes that the Athenians were driven by their exclusive citizenship to segregate their empire whereas the Romans championed a kind of "open society" to create an integrated, stable one.[24] In other words, the difference between the two empires came down to the difference between Athenian *autochthones* (literally, "born from the earth") and the Roman tradition of cultural heterogeneity. The Athenians believed that they were the direct descendants of Erichthonios, who was born from the soil of Attica and raised by Athena herself.[25] The Romans, however, considered their society to be mixed from the very beginning, going all the way back to the legendary rape of the Sabine women.[26] In this view, the Athenians were unwilling to integrate the people they defeated, so

[23] Diod. 13.94.5–95.1, 15.20.6, 19.1.4. The Syracusan assembly elected Dionysios I "*stratēgos autokratōr*," the city's only general. For popular institutions at Syracuse under Dionysios, see Caven 1990: 159-161. For citizen identity under the democracy, see Thatcher 2012.

[24] For Athenian and Roman imperial ideology in opposition, see Champion 2009. For "open society," see Ampolo 1970-71; 1976-77.

[25] For Athenian autochthony, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1993: esp. 1-21; 2000: esp. 13-27, 115-118; Hall 1997: 51-56. For autochthony in Athenian history and drama, see Thuc. 1.2.5, 2.36.1; Eur. *Ion* 29, 267, 543, 589–90, 737, 1000, 1057–60, 1466; Aristoph. *Wasps* 1071-1078.

[26] For Roman imperial identity, see Dench 2005. For the rape of the Sabine women, see Livy 1.13.4–8; Dion. Hal. 2.46.2–3; Plut. *Romulus* 19.7.

Athenian land allotment was doomed to never work as an instrument of imperial control. Conversely, the Romans were used to integrating new people into their society, so Roman land allotment was a way for them to create stable communities with the people they defeated.

But those standard narratives are not as convincing if we take a comparative approach. Other Greek societies, like the Arcadians, also had traditions of autochthony, so it is unclear if the Athenians created the empire they did just because they were Greek and *polis*-life made them path-dependent. It is also unclear if the Romans privileged heterogeneity just because they were better imperialists, as many historians would lead us to believe. This is why the Syracusan case is so important. The Syracusans lived in a Greek *polis*, but treated citizenship much more in the vein of Roman open society than Athenian autochthony. Herein lies the advantage of studying the three empires comparatively: the three patterns of land allotment share just enough in common that historians can find meaning in their differences. So instead of getting caught up in the very real differences in their political cultures, I hope to show that we should revel in them. A comparative history of Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment can go a long way in rethinking, and ultimately clarifying, our standard narratives of how republics became empires in the ancient Mediterranean world.

1.2. *Historiography: Problems and Prospects*

Though modern historians have shied away from comparing Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment, they tend to think about each individual case in remarkably similar terms. By and large, historians treat land allotment as purely instrumental to the imperial state. Treated this way, it is tempting to imagine that the citizens of those states allotted land to serve the best

interests of their empires, that their control was strategic. The temptation is even stronger for empires that achieved some degree of stability, like the Roman empire. Hence modern historians take for granted why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land because they assume it must have been all about controlling imperial territory. Accordingly, historians tend to focus on how land allotment enabled certain kinds of control rather than asking what land allotment was really doing in each case or how one case might have been different from another.

The prevailing view among historians is that land allotment acted as a projection of force against another group of people and therefore the recipients of allotted land guarded the unruly frontier of their imperial territory. Russell Meiggs wrote in *The Athenian Empire* that the Athenians established "cleruchies," the colloquial term for a group of Athenian land allotments, "to act as garrisons and maintain security" throughout their empire.[27] For the Syracusans, Sebastiana Consolo Langher argued in *Un imperialismo tra democrazia e tirannide* that land allotments gave the Syracusans "influenza diretta sulla Magna Grecia" (direct influence over Magna Graecia).[28] In his highly influential *Roman Colonization under the Republic,* Edward Togo Salmon maintained that the Romans allotted land to citizens who settled in colonies to protect Roman territory: "All these sites were skillfully chosen, and defense considerations were uppermost in their selection. All of them were militarily useful… They formed a network of fortresses."[29] In all three views, people allotted land to control their imperial territory.

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[27] Meiggs 1972: 124. Similarly, Nicoletta Salomon (1997: 121) argued that Athenian cleruchies served a purely military purpose: "la funzione militare, che si concentra nella garanzia della φυλακή dei siti in cui i cleruchi sono inviati, è una prerogativa costante."

[28] Consolo Langher 1997: 234. Furthermore, he argued that ""Il risultato fu la graduale edificazione di una struttura politica unitaria, che stava al di sopra delle comunità sottomesse e che rappresenta sostanzialmente 'il primo Stato territorial di impronta greca.'"

[29] Salmon 1969: 43.

Meanwhile, three separate historiographical approaches complement the idea that land allotments served as imperial projections of force. First, cultural historians tend to see land allotment as an ideology of power, where orderly land divisions were emblematic of civic republicanism and an imperial identity. Second, other historians prefer to focus on the ways that land allotment created new forms of state-sponsored economic exploitation and agricultural intensification. A final approach uses land allotment to think through political conflict within the state in an attempt to understand how garrisoning the frontier could also be a populist masterstroke that lifted the urban poor from poverty and provided relief from demographic overload. For all their variety, however, all three approaches adhere in one way or another to a fairly rigid instrumentalist tradition that treats land allotment as a state strategy of imperial control.[30]

But taking this kind of approach makes it hard to explain any differences in the way three different states—much less three different republics—experimented with land allotment. As we will see in Chapters 3-5, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment had drastically different effects on how, and indeed where, people moved across each empire. The Athenians, for their part, went to great lengths to keep their citizen landholders at home in Attica, whereas the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become citizens, and the Romans sent their citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. In our current understanding of land allotment, it is difficult to explain the different patterns that created these movements because the instrumental approaches all assume, but never show, that the

[30] For land allotment as an ideology of power, see Lomas 2006; Torelli 1999. For land allotment and economic exploitation, see Moreno 2007; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Harris 1979. For land allotment as a political masterstroke, see e.g., Pais 1923; Berve 1967; Figueira 1991.

Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had the same thing in mind for their imperial territory: to control territory. It is easy to see, then, why historians tend to focus on the impact of Roman power during the mid-Republican conquest of Italy and then to emphasize the shortcomings of Greek political culture as a vehicle for imperial control. Therefore, one of the central problems preventing a comparative history of land allotment is that ancient historians too often fall back on the assumption that land allotment worked in similar and fairly predictable ways.

This view is understandable given the refractory evidence we have to work with and the inescapable lens of modern empires through which we interpret the evidence. Only in the last generation or so have developments in urban excavations and rural archaeology allowed us to test and reexamine the limited written sources we have for such a broad subject. As we will see in each chapter, ancient authors writing about empires and land allotment took a lot of historical details for granted. Besides, those authors often drew from the same imperial vocabulary: within a single history, the first-century BCE historian Diodorus Siculus referred to Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment using only the term *klēros* and its cognates.[31] With a similar vocabulary for each case, it is easy to assume a similar imperial logic. For modern historians writing since the Second World War, our experience with modern empires and global struggles through decolonization has only reinforced the idea that empires are chiefly about controlling territory in faraway places.[32] And they are, without a doubt. But not every part of an empire is necessarily about control.

[31] See, for example, Diod. 12.55.10; 11.49.1; 14.102.4, for references to Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment, respectively.

[32] Though this kind of modernism is often more implicit than explicit, it is seldom difficult to find. For example, Edward Salmon used the Allied advance up western Italy during the Second World War to think about Roman strategy, see Salmon 1956: 99 n. 2.

In fact, in recent years, ancient historians and archaeologists have begun to chip away at this very idea. A leading trend in ancient imperial studies over the last decade has been to decenter power and innovation, emphasizing local variations to imperial power as a way to challenge the reach and intentions of the central imperial state. By focusing on historical difference, this trend has gone a long way in deconstructing the old dichotomy between imperial control and subjugation, between settler and dispossessed. Roman archaeologists, in particular, like Nicola Terrenato, Jeremia Pelgrom, and Tesse Stek, have begun to rethink the role of the state in Roman imperialism, downplaying its importance: they emphasize the local variations to colonial and rural landscapes as a way to challenge the idea that the Romans exported a single "*dirigiste*" model of imperial power across their empire in Italy.[33] But those advances have also left historians empty-handed: it remains unclear what land allotment actually meant to those societies, if it was not simply instrumental to the imperial state. Still, for historians of empires in the ancient Mediterranean world, this trend has been an important reminder that empires do not appear out of thin air, one day a city-state the next day an empire. For republics that confiscated land in areas with no prior history of imperial landownership, especially, it also reminds us just how much citizens experimented with their imperial institutions while they were transitioning to empire.

Seen this way, the Mediterranean basin becomes a new space for comparing empires. As we will see in Chapter 2, the Mediterranean's natural environment made land allotment an especially common institution in the region. But even though Mediterranean conditions put a premium on allotment, there was still a great deal of room for people to experiment with

[33] For example, see Terrenato 2005; Pelgrom 2008; Stek 2009.

allotting land in different ways. Therefore, the Mediterranean becomes a space not just for studying similar and interconnected activity, as Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell did so well in *The Corrupting Sea*, but also for understanding historical difference—in this case, for understanding why three imperial republics within the region allotted land in such different ways. The answer, I hope to show, can be found by shifting our attention to the people of land allotment and what the citizens at the center of it all hoped to get out of their imperial territory. By focusing more on the people of land allotment than the land itself, this dissertation offers a new way of studying how republics became empires in the ancient Mediterranean world.

1.3. *Argument and Roadmap*

What follows, then, is a story about three imperial republics and their citizens deciding what exactly they valued in a citizen. In this dissertation, I argue that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans used land allotment to model their respective empires on what they valued in their own republics. Land allotment, therefore, was more about creating and managing opportunities for people at the center than controlling land on the frontier. As such, land allotment was a means to an end, more self-reflexive than aimed at imperial control. Through four chapters, I show how each group drew lessons from their own political culture to imagine their imperial territory, and then how they used land allotment to find their citizens' place within it. But because land allotment moved people to and from confiscated land, and in and out of each republic, it also reorganized, concentrated, and displaced labor. Therefore, I argue that the way the three imperial republics allotted land can be distinguished, first and foremost, in the way each accumulated and organized human capital.

In Chapter 2, I set out by arguing for a theoretical shift in how we study imperial territory and, thus, compare different patterns of land allotment. To do so, I draw on two new heuristics from political geography and macroeconomics. First, I draw on the Francophone concept of *territoire*, which tries to understand the different ways people conceive of imperial land rather than assuming that they treated imperial land as something that needs to be directly controlled. In other words, *territoire* prompts us to deconstruct the idea of imperial land allotment by focusing on the political, social, and cultural processes through which people interacted with the land they took through war. In doing so, it draws our attention to each republic's relationship with the land it confiscated so we can determine what its citizens may have hoped to get from the land.

Second, I draw on the concept of human capital as a way to distinguish one pattern of land allotment from another. Unlike *territoire*, which pushes us to question our standard narratives about imperial territory, human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry and directs my attention to new sources. Human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft, and specialization, which give labor economic value. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans treated human capital, I argue, can tell us how, and in what ways, they were committed to land beyond their own hinterland because it helps us track the movement of settlers and dispossessed. Human capital also invites us to use material evidence that historians studying land allotment have neglected: with archaeological evidence for the production and movement of economic goods, I use carefully selected case studies to test what was unique and what was not so unique about land and landowners across each empire. In other words, human capital invites me to see the landowners in all their economic complexity. Together, the concepts of *territoire* and human capital help us scale and compare the three empires.

In Chapter 3, the story begins in the eastern Mediterranean with the Athenians, who went to great lengths to keep their citizen landholders at home in Attica. This was because, I argue, the Athenians saw imperial territory as a way to distance themselves from the people they dispossessed so they could preserve their closed citizen society. The Athenians had developed such an integrated political community and such an active export market by the time of their imperial expansion that they were more interested in the money they could extract from land allotments than controlling the people living on it. Consequently, they created a centralized tax structure that allowed lotholders to collect their own private rent while still living in Attica. Cleruchies, as an alternative to settler colonies, became desirable to elite and entrepreneurial citizens who wanted to benefit from the perks of Athens' markets and metropolitanism. They had the added benefit of helping Athens stay the metropolitan center it had become by maintaining a critical mass of human capital in Attica and taxable land to fund the navy. Hence the Athenians wanted their citizens to live in Attica so that their private entrepreneurialism could support metropolitan life in Athens.

In the Athenian case, human capital helps us see how land allotment reinforced the Athenians' sense of political insularity while simultaneously extending the reach of their markets in the western Mediterranean and beyond. On Lemnos, for example, excavations at Hephaistia and rural settlements show an abrupt shift from indigenous material culture to Athenian imports and imitation wares after allotment to Athenian settlers. Security stones from sacred land reserved for Artemis show how new temple banks could have helped settlers on Lemnos and lotholders living in Athens coordinate their investments on the island with capital back in Athens. On Euboea, excavations at Karystia and Eretria show a shift to ceramic imports from Athens

mixed with local imitation wares, though there is no evidence that any Athenians garrisoned or even lived on the island as settlers—except at Histiaia, which was the only forested and fertile part of the island. Meanwhile, economic activity moving in and out of Piraeus continued to grow as the Athenians garrisoned the outer reaches of Attica with naval stations at Rhamnous, Oropus, and Atalante. From them, the Athenian navy protected the distribution of Athenian goods to places like Lemnos and Euboea, and ensured the regular payment of taxes back to lotholders living at Athens. In the end, Athenian land allotment was a vehicle for metropolitanism and private enrichment.

In Chapter 4, the story moves westward to Sicily, where the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become citizen landowners. This was because, I argue, the Syracusans saw imperial land as external to their state so that the people of their empire could become internal to their state. For the Syracusans, human capital, not taxable land, was the most valuable commodity, which is why they gave away imperial land and concentrated imperial labor. Syracusan territory had long been an underpopulated frontier economy, which meant that there was more available land than people to work it. The Syracusans were also open to political synoikism, if it meant that they could internalize an empire's share of human capital without disrupting the idea of the state. Consequently, the Syracusans repeatedly allotted land to the people they dispossessed back at Syracuse with citizenship, and then allotted the land they left behind to foreign mercenaries and allies. Hence the Syracusans valued their citizens' contributions to production and manufacturing for Syracusan markets, so they required that their new citizens to move within Syracusan territory.

In the Syracusan case, human capital directs our attention to the concentrating effects of land allotment. At Naxos, for example, the kilns and workshops at the kerameikos went out of use after allotment, at the same time as evidence for imports from all around the Mediterranean at the harbor disappears. At Katane, which had long been a center of distribution for Athenian wares, there is no evidence for economic activity after allotment, despite the thousands of imported ceramics from the eastern Mediterranean at the temple of Demeter from before. At Leontinoi, all evidence for local production of ceramic, terracotta, and metal wares cease after allotment. In Kalabria, the Syracusans allotted land to their Lokrian allies only after transferring the region's human capital to Syracuse. Meanwhile, at Syracuse, evidence for the city's first workshops start to show up during the period when Dionysios was going to great lengths to invest in military production and the Syracuse was becoming one of the Mediterranean's leading economic centers, rivaling Athens and Carthage. Thefore, land allotment became a vehicle for the Syracusans to concentrate people from around their empire within Syracusan territory.

In Chapter 5, the story crosses over into Italy, where Roman citizens, unlike their Greek counterparts, mostly moved away from their metropole. This was because, I argue, the Romans who hoped to receive land allotments saw imperial territory as an escape from the elite economy at Rome, where economic opportunity and access to land remained limited to a narrow elite even after a series of popular reforms at Rome. By the mid-Republic, Rome's competitive political elite of old patrician families and upwardly-mobile plebeians came to distinguish themselves among their peers above all by their achievements in war and, by extension, the land they confiscated. They learned that land outside of Roman territory was expendable but soldiers were not, so they gave away land further from Rome as long as the settlers moving away from Rome would still

show up to fight for them. Over time, Roman land allotment became a compromise between Rome's generals, who had a lot to gain in political prestige at Rome from the act of confiscating land, and the plebeians, who hoped to make more money by moving away from Rome's elite economy. The Roman citizens who received land allotments moved out into a network of communities that shared a kind of commercial citizenship. When they moved out across Italy they hoped to make more money with their labor than they could at Rome by taking advantage of existing networks of exchange and economic structures. Hence the Romans valued their citizens' commitment to fight for Rome, even as they moved away from it.

In the Roman case, human capital shows how Roman land allotment, unlike Athenian and Syracusan land allotment, reoriented regional economies around Roman hubs instead of concentrating human capital at the metropole. At Fregellae and Interamna, for example, surveys show that most landowners lived in agricultural villages among the existing communities of the Liri Valley. Though neither city was built to house or defend all the landowners, each had a massive forum well suited to act as a business center for regional trade of goods produced in the valley. At Paestum and nearby Roccagloriosa, the sites went from being a major center of Mediterranean trade and non-agricultural production before allotment to centers of regional agricultural exchange so the settlers could specialize what they were growing. At Cosa, evidence for the thriving wine export industry at nearby Vulci and Doganella in the Albegna Valley disappeared after allotment; trade at Vulci and Orbetello was instead directed towards the landowners at Cosa, who slowly took over the wine industry. Over time, Roman land allotment created an intensive form of decentralized imperialism because Roman human capital became entrenched all across Italy.

Taken together, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment offer a rich perspective on how ancient republics became empires. The implications for a comparative history of land allotment are numerous and far–reaching, with resonance for issues as diverse as the development of empires and republics, Greco-Roman political culture, and Mediterranean economic history. In sum, what we see is that imperial republics did not allot land just to maximize their control over the people they dispossessed; rather, their citizens modeled their empires on their own experience with republicanism. Hence land allotment was a very human, and indeed very creative, process. By understanding that process, we can also see how it shaped the political and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world. And thanks to a wealth of new archaeological material, we can even see how these models played out materially in the production and movement of economic goods. But before we can do that, first we need to develop a new methodology for comparing the three patterns of land allotment.

Chapter 2

LAND ALLOTMENT

The Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had a lot in common: they lived in and around city-states, they came together in popular assemblies, they took pride in farming, and they sailed the Mediterranean Sea. The same goes for their empires: they confiscated land from the people they defeated in war, they divided the land into lots, and they shared the lots among each other. All three were imperial republics, but the lotholders in each group moved to and from their land in remarkably different ways. The Athenians went to great lengths to keep their citizens in Attica, whereas the Syracusans brought the people they dispossessed back to Syrakousai to become citizens, and the Romans sent their citizens away from Rome, all across central Italy. The ancient Mediterranean world was home to more imperial republics than anywhere else in world history, but among imperial republics there was still a great deal of variation in how they allotted land. For historians, therefore, it remains unclear how we should compare different patterns of land allotment within a region known for its shared qualities as well as its internal divisions.

This is because the Mediterranean is itself a paradox: it demands but also defies comparative history. Like so many other regions, the Mediterranean basin is a zone of contact and conflict, of perpetual exchange where economic, cultural, and political currents meet. To many historians, the Mediterranean is also a protagonist, an active agent in human history. Since Fernand Braudel pioneered the view of Mediterranean unity, in which human history is really geohistory, there has been no shortage of historians and archaeologists looking to show how Mediterranean geography and climate shaped human behavior and decision-making

within the region.[1] For most ancient historians, though, *The Corrupting Sea* has pride of place. For Horden and Purcell, the Mediterranean helps us explain human behavior within the region because, in their view, it is uniquely fragmented but also uniquely connected across the central sea: the region is broken up into ecological micro-regions in such a way that people exchange with one another across great distances to offset risks, like crop failure.[2] Seen as a bold lesson in historical agency, *The Corrupting Sea* created a cottage industry of historians and archaeologists devoted to finding evidence for connectivity and comparable behavior in every corner of the basin.[3] At the same time, Mediterraneanism has made it easy to lose sight of the historical differences that distinguished individual patterns of land allotment within the region if those differences can be explained away by Mediterranean-wide trends and conditions.

That is to say, Mediterraneanism can help us explain why all sorts of people allotted land within the region, but it is less helpful when it comes to explaining why those people used allotment in such different ways. Horden and Purcell argued to great effect that the Mediterranean's natural environment was fundamental to land allotment within the region. They showed how the combination of fragmentation and connectivity pushed Mediterranean powers to diversify, overproduce, and exchange—a productive logic that encouraged allotment: "The

[1] Purcell 2014: 3-4. Braudel's timeless "Mediterraneanism" has since evolved along disciplinary lines, as globalization destabilizes traditional geographic frameworks, as transnationalism sees everything as "entangled," and as post-colonialism de-centers agency and innovation. Some historians now prefer to talk about comparable processes of "Mediterraneanization" within the region; others point to a number of "Mediterraneans," like the Caribbean and the Sea of Japan, that seem ripe for comparison with the Mediterranean world. For the process of "Mediterraneanization," see Morris 2003. For the many "Mediterraneans," see Abulafia 2005.

[2] It is worth noting that Mediterranean historians are not the only ones to notice this kind of economic behavior. Similar arguments have been made for other regions outside the Mediterranean, like the monsoon regions of the Indian subcontinent, see Washbrook 2007.

[3] For increased interest in the Mediterranean, see Morris 2003; Alcock 2005. See also Harris 2005; Abulafia 2011a; Broodbank 2013; Concannon and Mazurek 2016; De Souza and Arnaud 2017; Manning 2018. Purcell (2014) recently warned against treating the Mediterranean as a "flag of convenience," a plea for relevance when an argument has little to do with the region's natural environment.

division and maintenance of property are indeed linked with the need to control extraneous landscapes, places at a distance, resources to which control can only be extended by virtue of the connective Mediterranean."[4] In their view, the only way big groups of people living in micro-regions could get by was to redistribute resources from around the Mediterranean; elites did this by assigning shares of whatever land they might have, even in faraway places, to laborers. Horden and Purcell called this redistributive strategy "structural absenteeism." In their view, allotment was therefore a logical response to fragmentation: by controlling production in multiple places, elites could redistribute surpluses back to themselves to protect against grain shortages in whichever micro-region they happened to live in.[5] This helps explain why land allotment was so common in the Mediterranean as populations ballooned during the first Millennium BCE and states tried to offset the risk of crop failure.

But almost every empire in world history has had some form of land allotment, even in regions with nothing in the way of Mediterranean fragmentation and connectivity. In Mesopotamia during the sixth and fifth centuries BCE, for example, Achaemenid kings regularly confiscated land from their enemies and then allotted it to their soldiers as payment for military service; two millennia later, the Inca in the central Andes awarded land to people from all over their empire so the landowners could support themselves while also working on state farms.[6] Consider also the early history of the United States, when Congress confiscated land from the Cayuga Iroquois in upstate New York and divided it among veterans of the

[4] Horden and Purcell 2000: 278, with 278-287. Earlier in *The Corrupting Sea*, they argued (2000: 254) that "The landscape of the micro-region is a landscape of power." In other words, people are powerful insofar as they are able to control and rework microregions.

[5] Horden and Purcell (2000: 279-280) argued that "Redistribution, whether of things or people, is the ultimate Mediterranean strategy."

[6] For the Achaemenids, see Stolper 1985. See also the discussion in Chapter 3, Section 3.2. For the Incas, see D'Altroy 2015: 392-408.

American Revolution.[7] The list goes on. Though land allotment was clearly a mainstay of the Mediterranean, it is unclear how historians should compare what appear to be three variations on a Mediterranean phenomenon when that phenomenon was not unique to the Mediterranean. So the question remains: how should we compare different patterns of land allotment?

On the one hand, the Mediterranean view of land allotment, as important as it may be, is too broad to meet the challenge. Though Mediterranean conditions may have helped shape imperial behavior within the region, those conditions cannot begin to explain the differences between empires. The Mediterranean view holds that every micro-region was different, and that people used land allotment to rework those micro-regions to suit their needs, but it does not ask why people reworked them the way they did. On the other hand, the instrumentalist view we saw in the Introduction is too narrow. It assumes that people used land allotment as a tool to control their imperial territory, so it is only really interested in how different patterns of land allotment were more or less controlling, and thus more or less successful at running an empire. Whereas Mediterraneanism privileges structure over difference, the rigid instrumentalism we saw earlier only seems values historical difference insofar as it can help explain success. In neither case is there room for a comparative history of land allotment.

Rather, the Mediterranean should be treated more as a heuristic: it is only as helpful as historical questions are good. For ancient historians, Mediterraneanism is still tremendously important because it draws our attention to the remarkable connectedness of peoples living in the Mediterranean basin and how those peoples exerted power on their neighbors in ways that

[7] For the Military Tract of 1792, see *The Balloting Book and Other Documents relating to Military Bounty Lands, in the State of New York.* For land divisions in early American history more broadly, see Price 1995.

cannot be explained by simple reference to endogenous state institutions—that is, to the assumption that the intentions of central state actors alone can explain imperial behavior. In doing so, it challenges us to question the instrumentalist approaches by showing just how mutable and porous ancient empires actually were. Mediterraneanism also prompts historians to think through the many layers of historical causation behind land allotment, and therefore it puts the intentions of state actors in proper perspective. Most importantly, it helps ancient historians decide who to compare: whereas the structural conditions for the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were roughly similar because they all lived within the same region, the same cannot be said for the Achaemenids, Incas, or New Yorkers. Horden and Purcell's view of Mediterraneanism was the crucial first step because it opened up a field of vision for historians to study land allotment as a common institution. Since they were not focusing on the history of imperialism, it is understandable that they presented land allotment as a fairly stable and interchangeable institution. But for historians of empire, the differences between and within the three empires require our attention. As helpful as Mediterraneanism is as a first step, it is not a theory of comparative history.

Quite the opposite: Mediterraneanism presents an exciting historical problem that any study of land allotment must confront, but requires new theoretical tools to help solve it. If conditions were roughly similar for the various groups living within the region, and those conditions put a premium on allotment, why did those groups experiment in such different ways with allotment? Was it because particular locations were naturally suited to have surpluses in certain kinds of resources but ill suited for other kinds of resources, so people allotted land in ways that reflect their ecological context? Or was it about certain kinds of labor, or some kind of

combination of resources and labor? But to explain imperial land allotment solely in terms of ecology or manpower assumes that decision-makers chose to maximize their ability to overcome the natural environment, that culture played little to no role at all. Perhaps people acted in ways that were actually at odds with their ecological context, because particular political, social, or cultural traditions demanded otherwise. Unfortunately, there are no easy answers to any of these questions, nor are the tools to answer them readily available. As a result, ancient historians are left empty handed without a comparative theory of land allotment.

This chapter offers a new way for historians to compare the three patterns of land allotment. In order to make a genuine historical comparison, I argue for a theoretical shift in how we study the territoriality of land allotment, a new way of interpreting how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about imperial land and the relationships they formed with the people already living on that land. To do so, I draw on two new heuristics from political geography and macroeconomics. First, I draw on recent trends in Francophone geography, which try to understand the different ways people conceive of their *territoire* rather than assuming that imperial territory and state strategies of control are one and the same thing. In other words, *territoire* prompts me to deconstruct the idea of imperial land allotment by focusing on the political, social, and cultural processes through which people interacted with the land they took through war. In doing so, it draws my attention to each republic's relationship with the land it confiscated so I can determine what its citizens may have hoped to get from the land.

Second, I draw on the concept of human capital as a way to distinguish one pattern of land allotment from another. Unlike *territoire*, which pushes me to question our standard

narratives about imperial territory, human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry and also invites me to use material evidence that historians studying land allotment have neglected. Human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft and specialization, which give labor economic value. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans valued human capital, I argue, can tell us how, and in what ways, they were committed to imperial land because it helps us track the movement of settlers and dispossessed to and from that land. For example, depending on how a particular community valued things like non-agricultural production and economic specialization at their metropole when they were allotting land in faraway places, that community might try to centralize human capital by limiting movement to allotted land. In effect, human capital is the conceptual link that connects ideas about imperial land, the movement of people to that land, and economic change in a highly connected world.

To explore the historical links between ancient Mediterranean empires and land allotment, this chapter is divided into five sections. Section one explores the Francophone concept of *territoire* to rethink the role of imperial territoriality and deconstruct the reach of ancient imperial states. To begin unpacking what territory meant in each of the three imperial republics, section two looks at the relationship between land and property ownership in ancient republics, and theorizes how relatively small differences in that relationship greatly affected the way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about their imperial territory. Section three then explores the concept of human capital as a way to connect ideas about territory to the actual movement of people to and from imperial land. Drawing on what we learned from *territoire* and human capital, section four charts a methodology for comparing empires of allotment. Finally, section five offers a hypothesis to explain why people moved to and from land allotments the way they did.

2.1. *Territory and Territoire*

The concept of territory reminds us to think about how humans act on physical landscapes. For social scientists, and historians in particular, territory can be a useful tool because it gives logic to those actions—it emphasizes the relationships people have with land and the people living on that land.[8] At first glance, the concept of territory is fairly straight forward: when a group makes a claim on a certain region or piece of land, that group is also giving meaning to what would otherwise just exist in the abstract sense of "land."[9] In other words, land becomes territory when a group makes a claim to it. For example, when the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land outside of their own hinterland, they were asserting their collective ownership of that land. The act of allotment meant that the dispossessed owners no longer had legitimate claim to the land; the Athenians, Syracusans, or Romans could then claim the land as part of their own collective territory. In this sense, "territory is a bounded meaningful space," as David Delaney recently put it.[10] Territoriality, then, is what the territory signifies, what the land means to a group. When it comes to imperial territory, the land often signifies the power and asymmetric relationships that created it in the first place. In fact, imperial territory is often a stand-in term for the all the land controlled by a central power. For many students of history, imperial territory brings to mind the old nineteenth century British maps showing a third of the world shaded red, or the partition of Africa at the Berlin Conference, with colonial borders traced in bold.

[8] For the concept of territory and social science, see Knight 1982: 517; Paasi 2003: 110; Ozouf-Marignier 2009: 34; Del Biaggio 2015: 43.

[9] For the "social translation of space as an abstract category into territory," see Vaccaro *et al.* 2014: 2. See also Delaney 2005; Storey 2012.

[10] Delaney 2005: 15.

So when historians refer to territory, more often than not they really mean state territory. Or so it would seem given the fusion of territory with state interests and central institutions in so many Anglophone histories. In the last two generations, Anglophone social scientists interested in territory have mostly focused on how states use territory as way to control land and the people living on it.[11] The fusion of territory with state control can be seen most prominently in Robert Sack's *Human Territoriality.* In what has become one of the seminal texts on historical geography, Sack emphasized how states tend to assert their power over other people or another state by surveying and partitioning the landscape for private ownership. For him, territory and territoriality are first and foremost instruments of power—they are strategies of control. According to Sack, territoriality is "the attempt by an individual or a group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships, by delimiting and asserting control over geographic area."[12] In a similar vein, Peter Taylor has described the territory of modern states as "containers" of power, enclosed spaces that produce wealth, among other things.[13] Altogether, the prevailing sense is that state actors create territories so they can organize, and then put into effect, institutions of control over people and their land.

Though no ancient historian studying land allotment has ever directly engaged the literature on territory, it is easy enough to see its impact on studies of ancient empires. In fact, Sack's definition of territoriality could be mistaken for a loose definition of land allotment: territoriality is how one group of people controls land to form a relationship to another group of

[11] Klauser (2012: 110, cit. in Del Biaggio 2015: 36) argued that Anglophone social scientists have been "concerned, predominantly, with the study of geopolitical strategies of control / defence of space and with the resulting political-territorial arrangements."

[12] Sack 1986: 19. In *Human Territoriality,* Sack was very explicit that territoriality is a strategy that must involve an attempt at control.

[13] Taylor 1994; 1995.

people. Because Sack showed how mundane acts like land surveying and partitioning are part and parcel of territoriality, and territoriality is really an act of control, then land allotment also becomes an act of control. This logic lies at the heart of the military explanations of land allotment that are so common in histories of ancient Mediterranean empires: state actors allotted land so that the recipients of that land would guard against an unruly frontier and, collectively, the new landholders were a projection of force. The same logic is perhaps more implicit, but certainly no less essential to, the other instrumentalist approaches to land allotment. For all their variety, the instrumentalist approaches to land allotment have adhered in one way or another to the idea that Mediterranean states wanted to control the people living around them by confiscating and then allotting their land. However, at no point has it ever been clear whether or not the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had a different kind of control in mind, or if they even thought about territory in terms of control.

In my view, ancient historians rely too much on territory: by giving the concept so much explanatory power, we have shifted the burden of explanation onto a remarkably empty term. Even though the evidence for ancient empires is messy and refractory, the reality of doing ancient history does not mean that terms like territory and territoriality should do much of our explaining for us. Instead of assuming that the state and state control were the referents of Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperial territory, it is the historian's job to explore what imperial territory variously meant in each case. What would it mean, for example, if the central state had little to do with imperial land after the moment of allotment? Or what if central state actors never actually intended to defend the land they allotted outside of their own hinterland? The complications do not end there: as we saw in the Introduction, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans each created

a historically rare kind of empire, an empire with a city-state republic at its center. Unlike most other states in world history that went on to form empires of allotment, ancient republics were rare in their emphasis on citizenship, political participation, popular military mobilization, and access to imperial land. In fact, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans all would have denied that the state was even something distinct from society. Popular institutions ensured that authority within the state was dispersed across multiple layers of decision-making bodies; it also ensured that there was never a single authority in charge of controlling people outside of the state. And as pre-modern states, Athens, Syracuse, and Rome never had the kinds of compartmentalized bureaucracies or monuments to state control that supported the British fiscal-military state, for example. Hence it is not all that clear what territorial control even means for ancient republics. Ancient historians have a territory problem, it seems.

Still, the territory problem is a problem of theory, not of evidence. Since the 1970s, Francophone geographers have taken a drastically different approach to the concept of territory. Whereas Anglophone geographers like Sack and Taylor used territory to think through state sovereignty, a generation of Francophone geographers has tried to understand how people conceive of *territoire*—to deconstruct the political, social, and cultural processes through which people interact with land. In the Francophone tradition, *territoire* is still a bounded space, but not necessarily a state-bounded space: it does not start and end with the state.[14] *Territoire* is messy, multi-layered, and infused with cultural and symbolic meaning. But in that messiness is a new theoretical space to think through alternative approaches to land allotment. What emerged since the 1970s is an epistemological split between Anglophone territory and Francophone *territoire.*

[14] For a recent historiographical review of what distinguishes the Anglophone and Francophone traditions, see Del Biaggio 2015.

For several decades, Claude Raffestin and Bernard Debarbieux have been at the vanguard of Francophone geographers claiming *territoire* as a new frontier for the social sciences. For Raffestin, *territoire* was ultimately about people's relationship to the world around them, a relational concept he drew heavily from Heidegger's "theory of the real" and Lefebvre's "social production of space."[15] As a social theorist, Raffestin was less interested in geography as a field of scientific research than as a field of spatial ontology, how people form ideas about the material world in everyday life. And as a Foucauldian, Raffestin also saw in territory a theory of everyday power.[16] He was interested in how people immerse themselves in ideas and information—what he called the "semiosphere"—and then use those ideas and that information to organize the space around them into *territoires*. This led him to argue that *territoire* is "produit à partir de l'espace par les réseaux, circuits et flux projetés par les groupes sociaux" (produced from space through the networks, circuits, and flows projected by social groups).[17] And when people project meaning onto the material world, they often contradict how other people project meaning onto the same material world. In this sense, the production of *territoire* is also an act of power. *Territoire* was a way for Raffestin to close the conceptual gap between people and the material world.

More recently, Debarbieux has argued that people create *territoires* when they infuse geography with social symbols, like political and economic value.[18] According to Debarbieux, social symbols, unlike physical geography, are not tied down to actual space. So depending on which social symbols people attach to a particular space, that space will have a very different

[15] For *territoire* as a relational concept, see Raffestin 1977; 1980; 1986; 1989. See also Heidegger 1977; Lefebvre 1991, with Klauser 2012.

[16] Raffestin 1980: 44-56, with Foucault 1990; 2007. For *territoire* and the social sciences, see Alphandéry and Bergues 2005; Douillet 2003.

[17] Raffestin and Turco 1984: 45, cit. in Del Biaggio 2015: 41.

[18] Debarbieux 1995a; 1995b; 1999; 2003. For a more recent reiteration of *territoire* as a fundamentally social action, see also Giraut 2008. Paiis (2003: 110) recently summarized the view of *territoires* as "social processes in which social space and social action are inseparable."

meaning or a very different value. He argued that "La relation entre spatialité symbolique et espace géographique devrait plutôt être conçue sur le mode de l'ajustement interactif" (the relationship between symbolic space and geographic space should rather be conceived of as an interactive adjustment).[19] And because every social group has different social symbols, every social group thinks about how they relate to physical geography in different ways. Hence, in his view, there is no single way that people think about land and their relationship to it. Though this single insight is unlikely to surprise many historians today, it stands in stark contrast to the Anglophone conception of territory that animates so many histories of ancient imperialism. For both Raffestin and Debarbieux, *territoire* is a collective project, a process of applying the social world to the material world. Most fundamentally, a move from territory to *territoire* means that we cannot take the state for granted: though in many cases the state figures prominently in a group's *territoire*, it is seldom ever the only referent. Rather, it is the historian's job to explore and unpack the many layers of meaning that a group gives to their *territoire* and then what actions they take on behalf of those meanings.

In a particularly insightful example of *territoire* in action, Marie-Cristine Fourny showed how several European countries recently constructed a sense of economic *territoire* based on the natural environment rather than the nation-state. The story goes that the eight Alpine countries came together at the Alpine Convention in 1991 to encourage economic cooperation, sustainable development, and tourism. To help create a network of Alpine cities, an organization called la Communauté de Travail des Villes Alpines promoted a new territorial identity, "l'alpinité." By tracking the growth of *l'alpintité*, Fourny argued that the Alpine cities began to situate

[19] Debarbieux 1995b: 110. The symbolic sense of *territoire* marked a major break from Anglophone territory, see Del Biaggio 2015: 41.

themselves within two different *territoires*: their national *territoire* and the more symbolic Alpine *territoire*. What was important for Fourny was how the convention members invested in the territoriality of the Alps just as they were investing in the territoriality of their own nation-states. Even as the eight members countries had their own national territories, they also saw themselves as part of an economic territory, a different kind of territory that gave new meanings to the cities. Fourny argued that "Les villes se perçoivent dans une situation géopolitique nouvelle où le fondement n'est plus l'État, la hiérarchie institutionnelle, mais où des concurrences nouvelles (Europe, métropoles), leur donnent ou redonnent une position mineure" (the cities see themselves in a new geopolitical situation where the foundation is no longer the State, the institutional hierarchy, but where new competitors (Europe, metropoles) give or restore to them a minor position).[20] For the eight member countries, land outside of each of their own national *territoires* had economic value because, together, the countries were more marketable. That land had a particular value because the member countries infused it with *l'alpinité*—the Alpine *territoire*.

Of course, a world of difference separates the Alpine Convention from the ancient Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires. Still, the example of *l'aplinité* has much to offer ancient historians. Instead of treating imperial land simply as proxies for state power, it is possible to see each empire as a series of creative projects with their own networks of land and people. *Territoire* is useful because it does not presume a certain role for the state or a certain type of power. Historians can learn a great deal about a society by studying its *territoire* because it gives us more room to see the layers of relationships, meaning, and power connecting people to their land.

[20] Fourny 1999: 179.

Because the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans differed so drastically in how they exchanged land and people across their empires, and they all did so by allotting land, then they may also have differed in their conceptions of *territoire*. In other words, land allotment may well have been *territoire* in action. Practically speaking, this means that we need to pay more attention to the people of allotment, what kind of relationships they had to land at the time of allotment, and what they hoped to get out of their land, both collectively and individually. For this reason, in each of the three following chapters I reconstruct each pattern of land allotment only after deconstructing each group's imperial "prehistory" to understand how particular political, social, and cultural traditions helped shape what they thought about imperial land. To do so, we can begin by thinking broadly about what kind of relationships people living in ancient city-state republics had to their land.

2.2. *Imperial Republics and the Construction of Territoire*

For the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, the state was really nothing more and nothing less than a community of citizens. The problem that all three republics faced during their transition to empire was how to treat the link between community and citizenship, as one community conquered others and then confiscated their land. This was especially problematic because all three republics were also agrarian societies, where a citizen was a citizen partly because he could own land and participate in assembly debates about how to divide up land confiscated in war. It is easy to see, then, how land allotment could destabilize the foundational institutions of ancient republics. On the one hand, land allotment blurred the lines between one community and another, as land traded hands and landowners moved from one place to another.

On the other hand, the citizens "inside" citizen-city-states often made a strong distinction between themselves and those "outside" their immediate political community. The Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans projected certain kinds of meaning on conquered people and their land because of the way they thought about their own community and citizenship. In other words, they drew from their experiences with community and citizenship when they were developing their sense of *territoire*. So it is here, at the intersection of community, citizenship, and land, that any discussion of imperial *territoire* must begin.

Like empire, the term "community" refers to a central arena of social interaction in antiquity but it often does more work than it should: even though each community experience is unique in many ways, the term tends to give a false sense of coherence and familiarity. To many modern readers, community paints a rosy picture of unity and cooperation, a far cry from the bitter infighting and sprawling populations of Athens, Syracuse, and Rome. In recent years, revisionists like Edward Cohen and Greg Anderson have pushed back against the romantic idea that ancient city-states like Athens were face-to-face societies, arguing instead that Athens was much more permeable, diverse, and mobile than we often imagine.[21] In that sense, to say simply that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were communities would betray the remarkable complexity of ancient societies.

But the term community remains an invaluable historical tool, as anthropologists continue to show. Jason Yaeger and Marcello Canuto, for example, have pointed to the "interactional"

[21] Cohen 2000; Anderson 2003. Cohen argued that Athens was more like what we think of as a nation than a *polis*: it was too large and too open to horizontal and vertical social mobility to be considered an ideal-type Aristotelian *polis.* In a very different tack, Anderson argued that by the beginning of the Classical period the Athenians constructed a broad sense of political community, though they only did so by underwriting all the local-and economic-based self-identities beneath that sense of Athenian community.

sense of community which, they explain, "focuses our attention squarely on the relationship between the interactions that occur in a given space and the sense of shared identity that both fosters and is fostered by these interactions."[22] So just as empires are not themselves things, the same can be said about communities: they are interactions, never one single thing fixed in time and space. Hence we can only study instances of community, like going to war or trial by popular jury. The one instance of community that probably would have been familiar to nearly everyone living in the ancient Mediterranean was, of course, land allotment. As we will see, for the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, in particular, land allotment was a central part of their community experience.

In fact, it could be said that land allotment was a central part of what made the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman communities into states. Over the last generation, ancient historians have gone back and forth over whether or not we should refer to Greek *poleis* and the Roman *civitas* as proper states. Anderson, for one, has argued that our experience of modern states, with all of our freestanding government institutions, has tricked us into thinking that the Greeks and Romans also saw communal action in the same way—that there was something called the "state" that was somehow separate from "society."[23] Perhaps a better way of thinking about it is to say, as Ian Morris did, that "the community was the state."[24] In other words, there was no structural differentiation between the community of citizens and those citizens coming together in an assembly to debate, make laws, decide to go to war, and so on.

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[22] Yaeger and Canuto 2000: 6. See also Varien and Potter 2008, who emphasize the "social actions" and interactions that make community.

[23] Anderson 2009, with refs; 2015: 798; cf. Scheidel 2006: 6-7; 2013: 30-32. Scheidel (2013: 32) described Greek *poleis*, like Republican Rome, as having "only weak horizontal and lateral insulation for citizens, strong insulation for slaves, and peripheralization of aliens. Stratified military, administrative, and clerical classes were absent."

[24] Morris 1987: 5. For similar interpretations, see also Osborne 1995: 7-8; Ober 1996: 163-164; Manville 1994: 24; Cartledge 1998: 468.

During the Classical period, at least, citizen volunteers at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome took turns governing according to the principles debated in the popular assemblies: the state was thus, in a very real way, whoever showed up. In practice, of course, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans differed greatly in who actually had the opportunity to govern. Still, Athens, Syracuse, and Rome were all states only insofar as their citizens participated in self-governance and in doing so created a sense of commonality, a political community.[25] Living in agrarian societies, citizens in all three communities made that sense of commonality—that sense of "the state"—especially pronounced when they came together to divide up land into allotments: there were few decisions people living in an agrarian society could make that impacted their daily lives more than decisions about land.[26] In this regard, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were members of citizen communities because they shared access to the same confiscated land. Land allotment, therefore, helped define the boundaries of the citizen community.

At the same time, land allotment could also transform the citizen community. When the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans confiscated land, there was no set strategy for what to do next. Rather, the way each community allotted land had a lot to do with how its members saw the relationship between their own citizen community and land ownership. The Athenians had a very strong sense of autochthonous citizenship, in which only citizens could own land in Attica. They also almost never gave citizenship to foreigners. As we will see, this meant that the Athenians only allotted land to Athenian citizens, except under very special circumstances; it

[25] For the role of citizenship in the creation of community, see Staehli 2008. See also Mann 1986b, who argued that the state is essentially an "arena" that a group of people, a political community, has agreed on so they can pool resources and generate power.
[26] In ancient republics, like in modern ones, citizenship was more than just access to certain legal rights and privileges. Citizenship was also an act: Isin 2002; Ehrkamp and Jacobson 2015: 154-155.

also meant that the new communities of imperial landowners were entirely made up of Athenians who gave up their citizenship. The Syracusans, who were themselves colonists, did not have a tradition of autochthonous citizenship like the Athenians, but still seem to have required all landowners in Syrakousai be citizens. This meant that they would allot land within Syracusan territory to foreigners, so long as they also gave those foreigners citizenship; likewise, land allotments outside of Syrakousai often went to people from all over the Greek world. The Romans also had a long history of granting citizenship to foreigners, but land at Rome was in short supply. As a result, the Romans often allotted land to mixed groups far away from Rome. So even though land allotment was fundamental to all three communities, it could also transform them in very different ways.

Of course, it was individuals who actually benefitted from land allotment. But even then, land allotment was never as easy as simply transferring property from one private owner to another. The act of allotment presupposed that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans collectively took ownership of the land before dividing it back up among new landowners. Hence land allotment created private property insofar as a community decided to delegate authority to individuals to earn their own "private" wealth from the land. Consequently, allotted land also carried with it all the relations and symbols the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman communities attached to land and citizenship.[27] As we will see, each community delegated authority in very different ways—with different taxes, different obligations, different citizen statuses, and different kinds of access to the metropole and its institutions. Depending on how the community delegated

[27] In his anthropological approach to property, Chris Hann (1998: 5) put it this way: "The word 'property' is best seen as directing attention to a vast field of cultural as well as social relations, to the symbolic as well as the material contexts within which things are recognized and personal as well as collective identities made."

authority, and then where the landowners actually lived after taking ownership of their allotments, those landowners could either extend or even restrict the reach of the community that allotted the land in the first place. For example, landowners who could lease their land allotments from back at the metropole would have a very different impact than landowners who lived in the same village as the people they dispossessed.

Any history of land allotment must take into account the entire web of the interactions within each community and also with the people whose land was confiscated. For each case, this involves untangling the web and organizing it in a way that can be compared to the other cases: first, Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman ideas about community, citizenship, and land before the period of imperial transition; second, how those ideas fed into the development of an imperial *territoire*; and third, how land allotment affected the movement of people within it. By organizing the web in this way, we can begin to reconstruct how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans may have thought about their *territoire*—for example, the extent to which they were committed to preserving or expanding the original community, to attaching economic value to the land itself or to the people living on it, or to defending imperial land as a collective effort or as an individual responsibility. This is important because the way each group conceived of their *territoire* affected how people and things moved within and beyond it. The next step, then, is to see how exactly the different approaches to land allotment could have affected the movement of people and things.

2.3. *Peopling the Land*

Historians too often forget about the people who received land allotments. Some historians, like Hugo Jones and Nathan Rosenstein, have studied how the recipients of land

allotments could make enough money from the land to afford the arms and armor required for infantry service, and therefore make popular military participation worthwhile.[28] Others, like Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz and Alfonso Moreno, have taken a more post-colonial perspective to see how land allotment could create new forms of exploitation and slave-like labor, which afforded the new landowners much greater profits.[29] Both lines of inquiry have greatly expanded our appreciation for land allotment as a republican institution, but neither can account for what it meant for large groups of people to move from one place to another at a time when local and regional economies had relatively small labor forces and a finite number of merchants, craftsmen, and specialists. Not only could land allotment destabilize republican institutions, it also shuffled, reorganized, concentrated, and displaced labor.

It is worth recalling that small-scale farmers in the ancient Mediterranean world were never only agriculturalists: they also had "part-time occupations," as Horden and Purcell called them, like leatherworking, wool-spinning, and even ceramic production.[30] For example, the *Roman Peasant Project* recently found in their excavations at Marzuolo that Roman smallholders living in rural Tuscany during the Imperial period had a sizeable ceramic workshop that produced enough pottery to sell at urban markets.[31] It seems, then, that the actual movement of people and their labor must also factor into *territoire*: when the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans came together as communities to decide how and to whom they should allot land, they also had to consider what it would mean for so many people to move from one place to another.

[28] Jones 1957; Rosenstein 2004.

[29] Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Moreno 2007: esp. 87-143.

[30] For the "part-time occupations" of farmers, see Horden and Purcell 2000: 268-271. See also Garnsey 1988: 43-68; Grey 2011: 25-46.

[31] For the *Roman Peasant Project,* the Marzuolo site, and evidence for non-agricultural production, see Bowes *et al.* 2013; forthcoming.

Depending on how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans each valued community compared to economic centralization or specialization, for example, they might be more or less willing to see their own citizens move away from the metropole. In other words, if their view of *territoire* put a premium on keeping their community closed to the people they dispossessed, but they also valued a centralized economy, they might find a creative way for citizens to get an allotment but not have to move away from the metropole.

For historians to understand why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land the way they did, therefore, we need to start "peopling" the land.[32] This involves seeing the landowners themselves as productive agents instead of focusing so much on the land as a natural resource to be exploited. Land can be owned, confiscated, divided up, and worked to produce wealth. But what about the people who worked the land? What happened to the group of people who confiscated land when part of that same group moved away to work it? As we have seen, the act of allotment was always political because the movement of people acted against ideas about community. It was also economic because land traded hands and there was money to be made. It remains to be seen, however, how the movement of people was itself economic.

One way of thinking about the movement of people is with the concept of human capital. As the term suggests, human capital is a form of capital, a primary factor of production alongside land and labor. Capital refers to the goods that people use in the production of other goods. Nearly two-and-a-half centuries ago, Adam Smith recognized that capital could be fixed and realized in a person. In his *Wealth of Nations*, he distinguished between four different types

[32] For the idea of "peopling" agriculture, see Erickson 2006. He argued that historians tend to take a "political-economic" approach to ancient agriculture, which assumes a central state pushes intensification so farmers passively produce surpluses that can be exploited.

of fixed capital which afford "a revenue or profit without circulating or changing masters": the machines that help people work, the buildings where people work and store their goods, the improvements people make to their land, and then the people themselves:

> [Fixed capital consists] of the acquired and useful abilities of all the inhabitants or members of the society. The acquisition of such talents, by the maintenance of the acquirer during his education, study, or apprenticeship, always costs a real expense, which is a capital fixed and realized, as it were, in his person. Those talents, as they make a part of his fortune, so do they likewise of that of the society to which he belongs. The improved dexterity of a workman may be considered in the same light as a machine or instrument of trade which facilitates and abridges labour, and which, though it costs a certain expense, repays that expense with a profit.[33]

Unlike other forms of capital, human capital refers to the intangible resources, like craft and specialization, which give labor economic value. Human capital is fixed because a person's skills are inseparable from the person him-or herself. But the person can also move from one place to another, bringing their skills with them.

Since the late 1950s, leading economists in the Chicago School of Economics like Jacob Mincer, Theodore Shultz, and Gary Becker have drawn on Smith to show how human capital is fundamental to economic change.[34] They were reacting to the brand of Neo-Classical growth models that privileged physical capital over skilled labor, and therefore could not account very well for why certain kinds of labor could be more profitable. This was because those models treated labor as a fairly uniform input. In a pioneering study of the subject, Shultz took a political economic approach to labor markets, showing how firms invest in human capital to stimulate economic growth. In a similar tack, Becker focused on how education and job training

[33] A. Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,* 2.1.17. By using the term fixed capital, he was distinguishing between it and what he calls "circulating capital," which covers all kinds of operating expenses like wages and the price of materials.

[34] For some notable examples, see Mincer 1957; Shultz 1961; Becker [1964] 1993. For the first use of the term human capital, see Pigou 1928.

affect a person's wages and aggregate economic growth: he showed that earnings tend to rise with a person's level of education and training; firms also tend to do better in the long run when their employees have skills that allow them to adapt and be more productive with the same time, equipment, and resources. Modern firms recruit people they think will supply them with the best human capital: in theory, an investment in human capital can lead to greater, or more marketable, output in the future. Large firms often choose to pay a new employee's moving expenses so they can hire the best people regardless of their geographic location. It is no wonder that human capital remains an important topic as globalization and the Internet make new links between firms, information, people, and mobility.[35]

Human capital is also a valuable concept for thinking about land allotment because it helps us move from labor and land as static inputs to labor being a dynamic, fluctuating variable reliant up the movement of certain people and their skills to and from confiscated land. But it is not without its limitations. Some critics have argued that the concept of human capital covers up how and why people decide to invest in education, training, and learning certain crafts: the idea of an investment seems to presuppose economic motives when various cultural motives may also be at work.[36] Other critics have argued that the expression and the concept itself are demeaning because, as Margaret Blair put it, "they reduce human experience to a type of commodity."[37] For antiquity, a period for which historians have precious few descriptions of economic life, we cannot escape the fact that we know very little about how or why certain people became specialized, skilled, or trained in a craft—it is only too easy to commodify human behavior.

[35] For a recent synthesis of the enormous body of economic and historical work on human capital, see Burton-Jones and Spender 2011.

[36] Blaug 1987. He argued that the expression "investment in human capital" covers up the actual reason for education and training.

[37] Blair 2011.

Consider the so-called Lentini Painter from fourth-century Sicily: using the name given to him by art historians, economic historians have fused the artist with his craft and the local market that distributed his vases. True, the name is concise and it does a good job identifying the artist's defining attributes: where most of his vases were found and that he was a vase painter rather than, say, a metallurgist. But we hear little about the growth of a "Lentini *technē*," the story about a group of artists from around the western Mediterranean who came together to train, produce, and innovate. Instead, ancient historians often focus on production and distribution because that is what most of our evidence represents—things like pottery distribution, ceramic wasters, and shipwrecks.[38] We have enough trouble working out patterns of production and distribution, much less the motives and context behind a person's ability to produce or distribute a certain good.

Still, keeping these limitations in mind, human capital can serve as the conceptual link that connects how the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about land to the people moving to and from that land. Human capital opens up new avenues of inquiry by carving out human agency from totalizing discourses of power and control. By focusing more on the people of land allotment and how they moved across each empire, we can see how investments in certain skills and decisions about where to live had very tangible effects on imperial development. In other words, small investments and decisions could have been just as important in the long run as grand strategies. Human capital also invites us to use material evidence that historians studying land allotment have neglected: with archaeological evidence for the production and movement of

[38] For example, production and distribution feature prominently in recent influential works like Scheidel and Von Reden 2002; Scheidel *et al.* 2007; Monson and Scheidel 2015. The recent emphasis on quantification was largely a response to Finley [1973] 1999.

economic goods, we can see what happened when land allotment shuffled, reorganized, concentrated, and displaced people. By drawing our attention to the people receiving the land allotments and how they fit into metropolitan and local economies, human capital is well suited to help historians think through an ancient Mediterranean world known for its connectivity, citizen landowners, and part-time occupations.

More specifically, human capital can help us distinguish what set apart one conception of *territoire* from another. As we will see in each chapter, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were committed to human capital in different ways. Some went to great lengths to concentrate certain crafts and specializations near their metropole whereas others allowed them to diffuse away from it. Yet others preferred something of a middle ground between the two approaches. In all three cases, they used land allotment to do the shuffling, reorganizing, concentrating, and displacing. Herein lies a crucial insight into what may have distinguished the three empires from one another. The way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans treated human capital can tell us how, and in what ways, they were committed to land beyond their own hinterland—for instance, the extent to which they were willing to find ways to let landowners stay at the metropole; or to give imperial land away to foreigners in exchange for the actual people dispossessed from imperial land; or to streamline the movement of citizens away from the metropole to imperial land. In each case, the decision-makers were infusing imperial land with cultural, economic, and political values in very different ways.

Practically speaking, this means that we need to pay more attention to how land allotment moved human capital across each empire. In his widely influential *Coercion, Capital, and European States,* Charles Tilly explored how European cities developed depending on how

people accumulated and concentrated physical capital. He argued that processes that accumulate and concentrate capital, like manufacturing and banking, benefit from proximity to each other, hence the development of cities. He also argued there are degrees of accumulation and degrees of concentration: "The form of urban growth depends on the balance between concentration and accumulation. Where accumulation occurs quite generally, but concentration remains relatively low, many smaller centers develop. Where a single concentration of capital emerges, urban population concentrates around that center."[39] In other words, depending on how a group centralizes capital at one place or lets it accumulate across a region affects the growth of cities and, over time, the capacity of one of those cities to exert its power over others.

Recently, Mark Dincecco and Massimiliano Onorato have reworked Tilly's framework to focus more on human than physical capital. They argued that constant warfare in pre-modern Europe pushed people to move to cities where they could protect their capital, which led to the accumulation of human capital at centralized hubs—many of which later became Europe's capitals. The centralization of human capital was important because it drove regional economic development: proximity made it easier to exchange ideas, invest in specialization, and move goods to market.[40] Where land allotment is concerned, centralization is also important because it draws our attention not only to the movement of people from one place to another, but also what kind of proximity they had to each other, the metropole, and the people they dispossessed. Land allotment, therefore, could create different types and degrees of

[39] Tilly 1990: 17-18. For Tilly, capital includes "any tangible mobile resources, and enforceable claims on such resources. Capitalists, then, are people who specialize in the accumulation, purchase, and sale of capital. They occupy the realm of *exploitation* [his emphasis], where the relations of production and exchange themselves yield surpluses, and capitalists capture them. Capitalists have often existed in the absence of capitalism, the system by which wage-workers produce goods by means of materials owned by capitalists."

[40] Dincecco and Onorato 2017. For human capital in cities, see also Mokyr 1995; Acemoglu 2009: 380-382; Glaeser and Joshi-Ghani 2015.

centralization depending on how members of political communities and their human capital were shuffled, reorganized, concentrated, and displaced.

In sum, what we have seen already is that, for people living in the ancient Mediterranean, imperial *territoire* was a continuum. On one end, land allotment could accommodate very insular views of *territoire*, where decision-makers reinforced cultural, economic, and political barriers between them and imperial land. On the other end, land allotment could accommodate very expansive views of *territoire*, where decision-makers made cultural, economic, and political bridges between them and imperial land. Across the continuum, land allotment allowed each group to explore different ways of giving away land and interacting with the people of empire. And as we saw earlier, the state could play very different roles. Land allotment could involve a heavy-handed approach to demographic engineering. It could also involve something resembling a diaspora. This is not to say that any large movement of people away from the metropole was a diaspora. Rather, land allotment could create a diaspora by providing an escape for marginalized citizens who might then maintain actual and imagined connections to their community of origin. As many historians of early modern imperialism now recognize, diaspora has been one of the most historically common forms of imperialism—the early colonial history of North America shows this clearly enough.[41]

If we allow ourselves to entertain different approaches to imperial *territoire*, Mediterranean land allotment takes on a whole new life. By thinking through all the layers of community, citizenship, and land, and then reconciling those layers with the full economic significance of the actual people receiving the land, we can begin to see substantial differences

[41] For diaspora, see Dufoix 2008: 21; Quayson and Daswani 2013: 3-4. For a recent use of diaspora in Roman history, see Eberle 2014.

in the way the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought about imperial land. The final step, then, is to articulate a comparative methodology that sets the stakes for why historians should care about this kind of historical difference.

2.4. *Comparative Land Allotment*

At its heart, comparative history pushes ancient historians to move outside of their own chosen corner of the Mediterranean basin, outside of their hyperspecialization. As Walter Scheidel put it recently, "Comparison defamiliarizes the deceptively familiar… By observing alternatives, the characteristics of one's 'own' case becomes less self-evident, and appreciation of what is possible increases accordingly."[42] Comparative history forces us to see familiar material in a new light, drawing our attention to other forces at work that we may not have recognized had we not taken the time to do comparative history. Crudely put, comparative history helps us see the forest for the trees. But once we have been defamiliarized, what are we supposed to do with our new appreciation? To start with, the reason for doing comparative history is not merely to find differences or analogies in historical experience. Rather, comparative history takes historical difference and analogy only as its starting point.

In what has become one of the best-known works of comparative history in recent years, Jack Goldstone's *Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World* articulated a comparative history "manifesto." In it, Goldstone compared early modern political revolutions in Europe

[42] Scheidel 2013: 2. He also wrote that hyperspecialization in ancient history is "the great bane of modern professional scholarship." Elsewhere, Scheidel (2015: 8) argued that the study of empires often generates "questions that cannot be (well) answered by looking at any one empire, by judging variable A or variable B to have been 'important' just because it happens to be conspicuous in the record or has received a lot of attention by experts in the applicable area of academic specialization."

and Asia, hoping to figure out what triggered each revolution. He argued that what sets comparative history apart from other forms of history is that it is necessarily case-based—it uses several carefully chosen case studies that share something in common, like a common situation or a common institution. For Goldstone, it was political revolution. After identifying which cases are comparable, the historian's job is then to identify the differences among those cases that call for explanation:

> Given that historical variation reveals both continuity and change, comparative history proceeds by asking which elements of the historical record were crucial. Thus to study merely the history of two cities, or of two countries, is to practice parallel, but not comparative, history. The latter depends on identifying some key difference between the cases and asking which of the many distinct elements in these cases were responsible for the particular difference in question.[43]

In the case of ancient Mediterranean empires, land allotment was common to the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. As we have seen, each group likely accumulated and concentrated human capital in different ways. This was because each group had a web of distinct elements that helped form a unique approach to community, citizenship, and land. Distinct elements could be things like poor ecological conditions, a frontier economy short on manpower, an insular political culture, or little investment in non-agricultural production. Though they may seem tangential or even superfluous details to the history of land allotment, those elements are the reason historians can say one case is different from another (why the Athenians are not like the Syracusans) or, at a more basic level, why one case is the way it is (why the Athenians did the things they did). To paraphrase Scheidel, historians get from description to explanation by thinking through contrasts.[44] So how should ancient historians find contrasts in land allotment?

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[43] Goldstone 1991: 52.

[44] Scheidel 2013: 2. He noted "When Weber asked why capitalism arose in Europe, the question was also, Why did it not arise elsewhere?"

The obvious way is to mine the written and epigraphic sources for evidence of land distribution, political policy, and economic exploitation. But a strictly literary-empirical approach is disappointing for three reasons. First, ancient authors only rarely developed a technical vocabulary for land allotment: alas, most authors moved freely among a variety of nonspecific terms—though this has not kept historians from torturing the semantic field for meaning. For those historians, the technical vocabulary gives a false sense of uniformity to land allotment among the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. Second, such an approach only works on the assumption that a particular state's use of land allotment developed in isolation, mirroring endogenous institutions according to the intentions of its citizens. But Mediterranean connectivity gave rise to all kinds of peer-polity interactions and entanglements that complicated whatever intentions central state actors may have had. Third, as we have seen, land allotment was never only about the actual land, but also involved movements of people and human capital. Not surprisingly, the written sources say very little about changes in production and exchange. What we need is a mixed toolbox of evidence that incorporates written with archaeological sources.

As we will see in each chapter, the written sources for land allotment are essential, but only get us so far. On the one hand, historical sources like Thucydides, Diodorus, and Livy provide scattered accounts of land allotment that, when assembled, can give a useful framework and chronology. On the other hand, the fact that our information about land allotment comes almost exclusively from scattered accounts means that we are recreating patterns of imperial behavior from circumstantial and possibly even unrepresentative evidence. Perhaps more troubling, most of the authors who wrote about land allotment did so many centuries removed from their subjects. The main outlier is Thucydides, but he was not at all systematic in his

treatment of land allotment anyway. So when we read the written sources for contrasts in land allotment, we should not get too hung up on what they had to say about the motivations and intentions behind land allotment. Rather, the written sources help modern historians know where to look for land allotments and who received them. They also help us see what institutional roles land allotment played in the creation of imperial territory: as we saw earlier, we can tell a lot about a community's sense of territory by the way it delegated, protected, taxed, and invested in imperial land—all the things from the web of interactions. Hence we find in the written sources contrasts in institutions, but not necessarily contrasts in experience.

This is where archaeological evidence can help us ask different questions about land allotment. Using written sources to identify the known cases of land allotment, we can then develop case studies for sites where archaeologists have added a critical mass of material evidence. Whereas the written sources may only preserve one or two cases with any kind of detail, and therefore we cannot tell whether they are representative or outlier cases, the amount of excavated and survey material from relevant sites is growing to the point now that we can see distinct trends in imperial behavior from the material evidence alone. As Carla Sinopoli argued some two decades ago, archaeology is well suited to test the internal complexity and local variability of empires, which, by their very nature, exist on a large scale.[45] In many cases, archaeology can help move the discussion of ancient imperialism beyond top-down questions of control and impact towards more mundane—though no less important—questions about how people lived and worked on the land at any given site. As Lori Khatchadourian put it, "Empires are reproduced not only through the actions and institutions of kings and other 'Great

[45] Sinopoli 1994; 2001. For what archaeology can offer the study of empires, see also Alcock *et al*. 2001; Stein 2005; Khatchadourian 2016.

Men,' but also through daily practices in towns, villages, and centers of power within provinces of the empire."[46]

Then again, this is not to say that material evidence for land allotment offers easy solutions to historical questions. Far from it. For example, without the context we get from historical and epigraphic sources, we would have no way to tell what land was allotted and what was not. We also would have little way of knowing what a particular community's relationship was to the land or what its members hoped to get from it. A good example of this is Carthaginian land allotment: we know it must have existed given the proliferation of Punic colonies in northern Africa and the western Mediterranean, but it is hard to make much of the institution with the limited written evidence we have. For the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman cases, at least, it is in our best interest to make use of the full range of sources wherever they can enrich our understanding of land allotment.

After exploring the institutional and political context of land allotment with the written sources, we can then test what we know about the institution against archaeological evidence from allotted land. Most importantly, using material sources we can get a better idea of what kind of relationship land allotment may have had with changes in human capital. One way of doing this is to see how the movement of people to and from imperial land may have affected local production or reoriented regional trade networks. For example, by looking at changes in ceramic types and distributions over time at a given site, we can see how the arrival of the new landowners may have affected trade and economic activity.[47] From kilns, ceramic wasters, and

[46] Khatchadourian 2008: 455.

[47] For distribution of ceramic types, sources of supply, and the identification of sources of supply, see Orton and Hughes 2013: 235-245.

identifiable typologies, we can also see if the movement of landowners had any effect on local production, workshops, and specialization.[48] From settlement patterns, we can get a better sense of whether or not the arrival of new landowners also created new kinds of sites or affected distribution and density. Another way of exploring the significance of land allotments is by the extent to which landowners protected their land, either individually or collectively. For example, we can track the development of defensive architecture that may suggest an effort to garrison the area. With each added element, we get closer to finding out what was unique and what was not so unique about the land and the landowners at any given site.

Only by integrating written evidence for institutions with archaeological evidence for experience can we move from description to explanation. Once we determine what distinguished the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman cases from one another, we can then make historical arguments to explain the different outcomes. Of course, because the historical sources can be so refractory, and the archaeological evidence can be so varied from one site to another, the comparison is fundamentally interpretive. Still, such a comparison puts the study of all three empires on an equal footing. In this regard, it holds a comparative advantage for a region that so often defies comparative history.

2.5. *Conclusions*

As we have seen, the point of a comparative history of land allotment is to call into question the assumptions and premises we take for granted about land allotment for each

[48] For modes and scale of ceramic production, archaeological evidence for specialization, and ways of organizing non-agricultural production, see Rice 2011.

individual case, and then to resolve some of the problems associated with them. It also helps ancient historians gain an appreciation for why the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans thought of land and allotment the way they did. Indeed, the point of the comparison is not to decide which empire was more successful with all the benefits of hindsight or to settle scores between Hellenists and Romanists. Instead, comparative history helps us see patterns of imperial behavior.

To begin with, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans seem to have built their empires to exchange people and their land. This may not have been exactly what they thought they were doing when they first went to war beyond their borders, but it is probably what came to mind when most people in the Greco-Roman world thought about *archē* or *imperium*—at least during the initial transition to empire. In fact, during periods of transition, the exchange of people and land was so common probably because the reach of the state was so often limited. Instead of folding imperial land into some central state institution, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans delegated authority to individuals to earn their own private wealth from the land. Afterwards, the movement of people to and from that land was itself economic because changes in human capital affected production and exchange. And depending on what kind of value decision-makers gave to their imperial territory, they could use land allotment as a way to centralize human capital or allow it to become more diffuse. Clearly, we can learn a lot about a particular community's use of land allotment by paying more attention to *territoire* and human capital. We also learn that there was no single form of land allotment or even imperial territory in the ancient Mediterranean. Rather, the history of ancient Mediterranean land allotment was a history of one form, Roman land allotment, enduring long past its rival forms.

Altogether, there was room for so much variation in land allotment for two likely reasons. First, as Horden and Purcell articulated so well, redistribution was so common in the ancient Mediterranean world because the region was so connected and also so fragmented. Though land allotment was perhaps the most common form of redistribution, communities could use it as a vehicle to exchange other goods between regions: each community could also use land allotment to redistribute labor through relocations, wealth through property taxes, and military force through levies of landowners. Second, centralized communities were probably able to redistribute land in a way that more immediately benefited people living at or near the imperial center. As we will see, the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans were politically and economically centralized in vastly different ways, despite all being agrarian republics. Each state differed in how its decision-makers developed a strong sense of political community, allowed for producers and merchants to be vertically integrated with decision-makers, concentrated production at the imperial center, and occupied a central hub for regional economic activity. Each community might also be more or less centralized because of its political, social, or cultural traditions. Taken together, the different types and degrees of redistribution and centralization give reason to believe that each community had very different projects in mind when it allotted land.

It remains to be seen how these two factors actually played out among the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans. But based on what we have learned about the broader significance of land allotment, it seems that the following hypothesis should hold true: in the ancient Mediterranean world, the more politically and economically centralized a community was at the time of its imperial transition, the more likely it was to concentrate human capital at the imperial center. This would mean that a centralized community would tend to allot land in a

way that allowed skilled laborers to stay at, or even required them to move to, the imperial center. In other words, land allotment would not become a force for economic diffusion or regionalism. A kind of centralized redistribution, however, would probably be more likely to create networks of exchange based on power rather than profit, conditions of subsistence in frontier regions, and little political or economic cooperation among conquerors and dispossessed. Of course, it becomes more complicated if a community was more politically centralized than economically centralized, or vice versa. As we saw earlier, this is why we need to pay attention to the types and degrees of centralization.

This hypothesis can be tested, and potentially falsified, by working through the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman cases in turn. It can also be retested when future archaeological projects in the Aegean, Sicily, and central Italy produce new evidence for other cases of land allotment. Though the Mediterranean may have been fundamental to land allotment, with each case we will see just how contingent, crisis-driven, and creative a process land allotment actually was—a process that nevertheless shaped the political and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world.

Chapter 3

THE ATHENIANS

Let us begin the story of Athenian land allotment where it almost ended: in the fields north of Athens, at a time when no Athenian could any longer call himself an imperial lotholder. A generation after losing their empire, the Athenians in 377 worried that they might also lose their metropolis, famous in its day for being the economic and cultural center of the eastern Mediterranean. In the spring of that year, a Spartan general named Sphodrias led his army under the cover of darkness to capture the Athenian harbor at Piraeus. Ten years had passed since the Athenians agreed to the King's Peace of 388/7 with Sparta, and Sphodrias intended to spoil the détente.[1] But at daybreak, the Spartan army was still miles outside of Athens, exposed in the Thyrian plains. The Athenians now ready to take the field, Sphodrias lost the element of surprise and abandoned his campaign.

Though the raid failed before the Spartans ever reached Athens, the plot was evidence enough to the Athenians that they were still recovering from their defeat in the Peloponnesian War.[2] When the Athenians assembled at the Pnyx later that spring, Aristoteles took the speaker's podium and pled for his audience to resist the growth of Spartan power.[3] He hoped that the Athenians would dare to revisit their fifth-century alliances, lost a generation earlier

[1] For Sphodrias' failed raid on Piraeus in 378/7, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.4.20-34; Diod. 15.28-29. Sphodrias was the Spartan governor (ἁρμοστήν) of Thespiai to the north of Leuktra in Boeotia. For the Peace of Antalkidas, or the "King's Peace," of 388/7, see Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.29-31.

[2] In 378/7, the Athenians were still rebuilding the Piraeus fortifications, which the Spartans ordered torn down at the end of the Peloponnesian War. For the new walls, see *IG* II² 1656-8 (with commentary, Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 46-49); *IG* II² 1658-64; Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20-23; 4.8.9-10.

[3] For the prospectus for the Second Athenian League, *c.* 378/7, see *IG* II² 43; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 92-105. For Athens' political and economic recovery after the Peloponnesian War, see Strauss 1987a; Burke 1990; Badian 1995; Whitby 1998; Moreno 2007; Sorg 2015.

after a long and hard-fought war. With the Athenians at the helm of a new defensive coalition, his proposal staked Athens' leadership on the promise that none of the most detested practices of the Delian League would be renewed.[4]

When the first summit of the Second Athenian League convened at Athens, the Athenians' imperial legacy hung in the balance. Prospective members of the new league read in simple terms that the Athenians would no longer set up garrisons, send out imperial officials, require tribute from members of the alliance, or hold land in allied territory. Yet among all the grievances addressed in the prospectus, Aristoteles took care to describe in detail the final prohibition against Athenian property in allied territory—the detested allotments of confiscated land.[5] The recognition of this last grievance was a political move aimed to restore Athenian accountability and bury the memories associated with the Athenians' fifth-century empire. Therefore, to most Athenians, the prospectus for the Second Athenian League meant that a coercive imperial income was a thing of the past. Meanwhile, the allies were eager to check the Spartan advance, so long as the Athenians respected the territorial integrity of each member *polis*.

Aristoteles' gamble paid off. Within a year, the defensive alliance had the support of nearly sixty member *poleis*, and first moved to secure the island of Euboea with an allied fleet under Athenian command.[6] The Histiaians, mindful of the Athenian conquest seventy years

[4] In 384/3, the Athenians made a defensive alliance with the island of Chios (*IG* II² 34), followed by several others minor treaties such as Thebes in 378. Cargill (1981: 190) suggested that the Second Athenian League brought these alliances together into a formal *sunedrion.*

[5] *IG* II² 43, *ll.* 25-44: "For those who make alliance with the Athenians and the allies, the people shall renounce whatever Athenian possessions there happen to be, whether private or public, in the territory of those who make the alliance.... From the archonship of Nausinicus, it shall not be permitted either privately or publicly to any of the Athenians to acquire either a house or land in the territory of the allies, either by purchase or by taking security or in any other way." Trans. Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 92-99. See also Diod. 15.29.8.

[6] *IG* II² 43 lists 58 members. At the league's height, Diodorus (15.30.2) mentioned a total of 70 members, and Aeschines (2.70) mentioned 75. For the expedition to Euboea, Skiathos, and Peparethos, see Diod. 15.30. The league elected the Athenian general Chabrias as commander.

earlier, were stubborn in their opposition and assured a Spartan foothold on the island's northern shores. But after suffering a second defeat, the Histiaians agreed to the terms of the prospectus and joined the league.[7] Though the Athenians were careful not to disrupt the terms of the alliance, they soon set out on a new path to empire—one that put a premium on maintaining consensus among member states while simultaneously confiscating land from states outside of the league.[8] The years after the creation of the Second Athenian League were crucial in the imperial recovery of Athens: in what followed, the Athenians began to reimagine the league as a vehicle not just of Aegean defense, but of a revived, albeit redirected, form of territorial empire. To do so, the Athenians drew lessons from what they considered to be the failures of the Delian League. At the center of their political reimagination was the memory of their fifth-century land allotments.[9]

The Athenians of the fifth-century empire lived two imperial lives. First, they commanded an anti-Persian coalition of 250 or so Greek states. An alliance born out of fear and matured through coercion, the defensive network pooled membership dues and demanded loyalty.[10] In return, the Athenians defended the conditions for peaceful trade in the eastern Mediterranean. Second, they individually held allotments of confiscated land as imperial landowners and rentiers. Only when a member state failed to appreciate the true asymmetry of

[7] *IG* II² 43 lists Skiathos and Peparathos on *ll.* 85-86, and Histiaia on *l.* 114.

[8] Sorg 2015: 70-72. The Peace of Antalkidas at the end of Corinthian War had included the provision that the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were to remain Athenian possessions. As a result, the three islands never appear as participating members in the prospectus for the league. For Athenian *klērouchoi* on Lemnos, see *IG* II² 30. During the mid-fourth century, the Athenians also confiscated land from Samos, Poteidaia, and the Chersonesos. For Samos, see *IG* II² 1609.89; 1952; Philoch. *FGH* 328, F 154; Diod. 18.18.9; Nepos, *Tim*. 1; Dem. 15.9; Aesch. 1.53; Strabo 14.1.18. For Poteidaia, see *IG* II² 114. For the Chersonesos, see Diod. 16.34.4; Philoch. *FGH* 328, F 158.

[9] Badian (1995: 90-1) argued that the "ghost of the fifth-century empire" was never quite shaken off in the fourth century. Because exploitation had been one of the main reasons for empire in the fifth century, the Second Athenian League sought new forms of income.

[10] Strauss (2009: 215) explained that Athens had reason not to count on cooperation: "of the hundreds of Greek city-states in the Aegean basin, only thirty-one poleis had united against Xerxes in 480 BCE. As many Greeks fought for the Persians as for the Hellenic League."

the league did the two lives intersect, coming together at the business end of a revolt. The Athenians frequently decided to punish members of the unruly ally by confiscating a portion of their land, which then became the property of the Athenian state. Afterwards, the Athenians cast lots for who among them would receive a share of the confiscated land. The Greeks had a name for this kind of land: they called it a *klēros*, and a community of individual *klēroi* was a *klērouchia* (or "cleruchy"). Imperial *klēroi*, most simply put, were plots of land taken through conquest from other *poleis* and divided up by lot among Athenian citizens.

The Athenian practice of allotting confiscated land went back to the end of the sixth century in the excitement of the new democracy. Around 506, and still a generation before the formation of the Delian League in 479, the Athenians' first voted to allot imperial land at Chalkis and on the islands of Salamis, Skyros, Lemnos, and Imbros—together making an expressway to the grain-rich Black Sea. During the course of the fifth century, the Athenians allotted land on over twenty occasions (see Table 3.1, with Maps 3.1-2). For many Athenians, land allotment became the League's *raison d'être*. Land allotment was also why, in no uncertain terms, their allies came to hold Athenian leadership in contempt: at each confiscation, the Athenians undermined the Greek ideal of property ownership and the autonomy of the dispossessed community.[11]

Table 3.1. ***Dates and locations of Athenian land allotments in the historical sources***

Date	**Location**	**Main Sources**
506	Chalkis	Hdt. 5.77.2, 6.100.1
510-500	Salamis	*IG* I^3 1

[11] For Classical Greek ideas about property ownership, dispersed authority, and personal wealth, see Ober 2015: esp. 45-100; Miller 2005.

c. 500	Lemnos, Imbros, Skyros (?)	Hdt. 6.137-140
476	Skyros	Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. *Cim.* 8.3-7
465	Ennea Hodoi	Thuc. 1.100.3; 4. 102. 2; Diod. 11. 70. 5; Plut. *Cim*. 8. 2
452-446	Chalkis, Eretria, Histiaia, Karystos (?)	Diod. 11.88.3; *IG* I^3 39-41; Thuc. 1.114.2–3, 7.57.2; Aesch. 2.175; Plut. *Per.* 23.4
448-446	Chersonesos, Naxos, Andros, Thrace, Sybaris	Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175; Plut. *Per.* 11.5; 19.1
446	Thurii	Diod. 12.9 *ff.*; Plut. *Per.* 11.5
445	Brea	*IG* I^3 46.9
437	Amphipolis	Thuc. 1.100.3, 4.102.2; Diod. 11.70.5, 12.68.2-3, 12.32.2
430s	Sinope	Plut. *Per*. 20.1-2.
430s	Amisos	Theopomp. fr. 389 *apud* Strabo 12.3.14
430s	Atakos	Strabo 12.4.2
431	Aigina	Thuc. 2.27, 8.69.3; Diod. 12.44.2; Plut., *Per.* 34.1; Strabo 8.6.16
430	Potidaea	Thuc. 2.70.4; Diod. 12.46.7
427	Lesbos	*IG* I^3 66; Thuc. 3.50.2; Diod. 12.55.1, 12.55.10, 12.72.2
427	Kolophon	Thuc. 3.34.1–4
421	Skione	Thuc. 5.18.7-8; 5.32.1; Isoc. 4.100, 109
416	Melos	Thuc. 5.116; Plut. *Alc.* 16.5-6; [Andoc.] 4.22.

It should come as no surprise that the allies in the Second Athenian League wanted assurances that the Athenians were done confiscating land. Even so, the allies' memory of such a common grievance took for granted what exactly was so detestable about Athenian imperialism in the fifth century. Most historians today assume it was because land allotments were a

projection of imperial power much like Roman colonies in Italy. Though the Athenians were certainly using their monopoly on violence to confiscate land, ancient historical sources are notoriously thin on what the Athenians actually did after allotting it. In fact, the only thing our sources for the Athenian empire really agree on is that the Athenian imperial project failed at the end of the fifth century, despite all the land the Athenians confiscated. It is easy to see why cleruchies have since taken on an enigmatic position in Athenian history, known more as failed predecessors to the Roman colonies of the mid-Republic than as an imperial institution in and of themselves. For that reason, modern historians tend to think about cleruchies only in instrumentalist terms, remaining prisoners to narratives of success and control.

In this chapter, I show that questions about success and control are the wrong questions to ask about Athenian land allotment. This is because, I argue, the Athenians never intended for land allotment to serve as a projection of force. Rather, the Athenians went to great lengths to keep their citizen lotholders at home in Attica. This chapter shows how, over time, the Athenians found ways to allot land in order to reinforce their sense of political insularity while simultaneously extending the reach of their markets. To do so, they created a centralized tax structure that allowed lotholders to collect their own private rent without moving across the Aegean. Cleruchies, as an alternative to settler colonies, became desirable to elite and entrepreneurial citizens who wanted to benefit from Athens' markets and metropolitanism. They also helped Athens stay the metropole it had become by maintaining a critical mass of human capital in Attica and taxable land to fund the navy, which ensured the regular flow of taxes and trade to and from Athens. Through this process, the Athenians saw their imperial territory as a vehicle for metropolitanism and private enrichment.



Above: Map 3.1. The western Aegean. *Below:* Map 3.2. The eastern Mediterranean.

This story of Athenian land allotment requires us to rethink our standard narratives of Athenian imperial history. First, we see that, when it came to land allotments, the Athenian state pursued the private interests its citizens because there was little interest in controlling an imperial territory. But because public equality in democratic Athens never meant economic equality, private interests allowed land allotment to become a source of private inequality, a holdover of Archaic elite competition after Kleisthenes' reforms in 508/7. Second, land allotment often lacked the appearance of the state because Athenian power was more economic than political: Athenian land allotment was so disruptive not only because it undermined the sovereignty of native communities and displaced people from their land, but also because it helped create a monopoly on human capital in the Aegean. By creating new markets for Athenian goods at settler colonies, and transferring wealth to Athens with cleruchies, land allotment helped centralize the productive potential of the Aegean at Athens.

I have divided the story of Athenian land allotment into six sections. After deconstructing the sources and historiography of Athenian land allotment in section one, section two surveys the Archaic prehistory to Athenian land allotment to understand why the Athenians developed an alternative to settler colonialism. Building on Athenian ideas about private wealth and metropolitanism, section three shows how they developed an approach to imperial territory that privileged political insularity over imperial control. Section four then explores how this approach helped the Athenians accumulate human capital at Athens and expand their markets in the Aegean. Two final sections use recent archaeological evidence from the islands of Lemnos and Euboea to track the movement of people and economic goods to and from Athenian land allotments.

3.1. *Sources & Historiography*

Allotments, or *klēroi*, did not only refer to the division of land. In fact, the act of allotment was central to Greek political culture. In Homeric epic, for example, justice and honor meant that elites took turns taking lots, or *klēroi,* to lead the charge into battle, and then afterwards they divided the spoils of war.[12] Essentially, the *klēros* signaled membership to a political community, and as such it referred to a member's own share of that community. In this sense, a *klēros* could also become a form of inheritable property.[13] For the Spartans, a *klēros* of Messenian land was the mark of citizenship: the land freed each citizen to participate in community life, and it passed from one generation to the next as the family's share of Spartan society. The same culture of shareholding held true in democratic Athens. For much of the Classical period, popular sovereignty meant that citizens took turns in shared governance: individuals ruled and were ruled in turn.[14] Because most government officials were selected by lot, not by election, a broad cross-section of citiznes got to try their hand at some sort of civic administration—as a magistrate, a member of the *Boulē,* a juror, and so on.[15] Allotment was the political institution that ensured popular participation. For the courts alone, hundreds of lots were drawn each day the juries sat. Each lot became an invitation to share in public life and, by the 460s, earn a public wage.[16]

Just as the *klēros* was fundamental to Athenian political life, so too was it part and parcel of Athenian imperialism. For the Greeks, the foundation of a colony began with a division of

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[12] Hom. *Il.* 3.316, 7.175-205, 23.351-354. For ideas on equality and political thought in Homer, see Raaflaub 1988; 1997; Balot 2006: 16-37.

[13] For *klēros* as property, see Hom. *Il.* 15.499; Hes. *W&D* 37, 341. For property laws and inheritance, see Plato, *Laws* 923d; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 9.2.

[14] For popular sovereignty, see Ostwald 1986. For the democratic politics of "going on together" and citizen unity, see Ober 1987; 2005.

[15] For Aristotle (*Pol.* 1273b40-41, 1294b7-9), elections were undemocratic because they favored the elite. For sortition in democratic politics and sociology, see Hdt. 3.80; Headlam 1933; Finley 1973a: 19; Ober 1987: 7; Taylor 2007. For the sortition process, see Dow 1930.

[16] For the public wage, or *misthos,* in Athens, see Loomis 1996: 9-31. Public wages were paid in cash, which stimulated monetization.

land by lots, and each recipient was known as a *klērouchos* (or "lotholder"). The Athenians freely used the same terminology for the allotment of confiscated land. The *klērouchos* shared in Athenian imperial life through his share of the confiscated land. If a lotholder decided to live on his allotted land or become member of a new *apoikia* (or "colony"), he was also called an *apoikos* (or "settler"), literally someone who lived outside of Attica and no longer "at home."[17] The *klēros* was central to Greek political culture, but the idea of allotment behind Athenian cleruchies was also fundamental to, and indeed cognate with, the democratic institution of sortition: political life at Athens seemed to parallel the division of imperial benefits abroad.

Yet despite the importance of allotment to Athenian culture, the ancient historical evidence for Athenian land allotment leaves much to be desired. As far as we can tell, not a single ancient author ever wrote more than a few sentences in a row about Athenian land allotment. Instead, we are left with a mixed bag of isolated stories, fragmentary decrees, off-hand remarks, and tantalizing anecdotes—some probably more representative than others. Still, the evidence for Athenian land allotment is actually uniquely good for the Classical period, compared to Syracusan and Roman land allotment. In large part because of their empire, the Athenians in the fifth century enjoyed a remarkable period of cultural efflorescence with an incredible output of historical writing, political theater, and oratory. Scattered throughout were references to land allotment. What really set apart the Athenians was that even at the beginning of their empire they had an "epigraphic habit," a habit of inscribing in stone all the things they were up to at Athens and elsewhere in the Aegean.[18]

[17] As Brunt (1993: 115) put it, for the Athenians, "the same persons could from different standpoints be called *apoikoi, epoikoi,* or *klerouchoi*."

[18] For Athenian political culture and the comparative wealth of epigraphic evidence, see Meritt 1940; Mattingly 1992; 1996; Hedrick 1999.

Even so, a strictly empirical approach to the historical evidence for Athenian land allotment can be misleading. Though historical writing first developed as a distinct genre at Athens to document the rise and fall of empires, Athenian historians were not all that interested in writing about land allotment. Modern historians working on Athens, as opposed to Syracuse and Rome, are fortunate to have access to contemporary authors like Thucydides and Herodotus who were actually alive for part of the period they wrote about. But they both took a lot of important details for granted. Thucydides (*c.* 460-400), for one, was an Athenian general at the height of the empire and must have participated in countless assembly meetings when the Athenians discussed land allotment. But in his monumental history of the Peloponnesian War he only once described land allotment in any detail, though he hinted at it several other times in his whirlwind account of Athenian imperial history between the Greco-Persian and Peloponnesian Wars in Book 1 (the *Pentekontaeteia*). If we can take him at his word, Thucydides was just interested in useful history, or history that Athenian decision-makers could actually think with, so he was incredibly selective: in fact, he seems to have avoided redundancy in favor of exemplary cases that he could use to showcase human behavior.[19] Like Thucydides, Herodotus (*c.* 484-425) also took Athenian land allotment for granted. In his history of the Greco-Persian wars we only get a single mention of land allotment, buried in one of his many digressions on Athenian democracy at war. For Thucydides and Herodotus, land allotment was a symptom of Athenian democratic energy, a narrative detail probably so well known among

[19] For Thucydides' selectivity, see De Romilly 2012: 2-3, 178-179. For example, Thucydides used the single example of Corcyra to showcase the effects of *stasis* in the Greek world more broadly. That way, he could describe something like *stasis* only once instead of describing it every time *stasis* came up in his history. For Thucydides and useful history, see also Rawlings 2016. For Thucydides' use of technical vocabulary, see Ehrenberg 1952; Jones 1957: 175; Brunt 1993: 115; Welwei 1996, *contra* Figueira 1991.

their contemporary readers that they could describe it once and move on. Thucydides and Herodotus are invaluable for modern historians because they described in great detail the world around Athenian land allotments, but we must check their isolated descriptions of the institution itself against other sources.

Whereas Thucydides and Herodotus were heavy on historical context and light on institutions, inscriptions found during excavations at the Athenian Agora have a lot to say about the institutions governing land tenure and imperial taxes but with little context. From the thousands of published inscriptions from fifth-century Athens, several dozen of them focus on confiscated land, imperial taxes, and dispossessed landowners. Most important for the study of land allotment are the imperial decrees, lease agreements, and *horoi* (or "boundary markers"). From inscriptions like the Chalkis Decree and the *Athenian Tribute Lists* we get a sense of what kind of legal and economic securities the Athenians imposed on defeated people who lost some if their land to Athenian lotholders. From lease agreements we can see how the Athenians taxed different kinds of property. And from the *horoi* found out in the fields we can learn who may have actually owned the land. Altogether, the epigraphic material gives detail to the institutions that the historical sources often took for granted. But because they were state documents, they only really show the intentions of the state: we never really get a sense from the inscriptions of what land allotment actually did, only what the Athenians intended to do from Athens. As such, the inscriptions give the impression that democracy was deeply implicated in empire.

The link between democracy and empire is further reinforced by contemporary political theater and oratory. Aristophanes (*c.* 446-386) animated his comedies with all kinds of jokes about imperial land, surveyors, and taxes—the kinds of subjects his fellow democrats knew

well. As Russell Meiggs explained, "His primary purpose was to please his audience and win the prize, but his audience expected topical comment and were not disappointed."[20] For that reason his plays offer an unparalleled look into the political culture of land allotment: his jokes play on the Athenians' motivations, anxieties, and even disappointments in land allotment. In doing so, he portrayed land allotment as symbolic of democracy in all of its contradictions. The speeches of popular orators like Antiphon, Andocides, and Isocrates also situated Athenian land allotment within democratic discourse. Like Aristophanes, they wrote their speeches for popular audience so the stories they told about land allotment relied on popular justifications. Unlike Thucydides and Herodotus, the orators told stories about actual people who received and also lost land in a rare level of detail. But because most of their extant speeches came after the Peloponnesian War, the impressions they gave of land allotment were often memories shaded by defeat and loss. Still, the evidence from Aristophanes and the orators goes a long way in humanizing Athenian land allotment.

During the fourth century, a time when the Athenians were reinventing their imperial legacy in the Aegean, a number of political theorists drew lessons from fifth-century land allotment and political culture. Xenophon (*c.* 430-354), for example, included in his Socratic dialogues several anecdotes of wealthy Athenians who had to give up their land outside of Attica at the end of the Peloponnesian War. In another series of Socratic dialogues, Plato (*c.* 428-348) explored Athenian political life during the final quarter of the fifth century. Though he never discussed land allotment explicitly, Plato offers a glimpse—albeit a tendentious one—into the values of metropolitan and civic life at Athens that may have affected where people chose to

[20] Meiggs 1972: 2. For Aristophanes' audience, see MacDowell 1995: 7-26.

live. Sometime after 330, Aristotle (*c.* 384-322), or one of his students, wrote a political and institutional history of the Athenian state. The *Athēnaiōn Politeia* described in great detail things like the number of imperial officials during the fifth century, how the Athenian state collected taxes, and how private citizens leased land. Taken together, the details help us interpret the epigraphic material from the fifth century by showing how the institutions may have actually worked. But because it was so thorough, and so focused on state institutions, it gave coherence to a phenomenon that may not have been so strategic at the time.

A final group of sources for Athenian land allotment come from much later Greek authors writing during the Roman period. Written some four centuries later, Diodorus Siculus's *Bibliothēkē Historikē* preserves the only continuous narrative history of the fifth century. Diodorus was writing a "universal history" that united the Greek and Roman pasts into a single narrative, so his chronology sometimes broke from fifth-century authors like Thucydides, much to the chagrin of modern historians. Still, where Thucydides was selective, Diodorus was thorough: he often recorded the events leading up to land allotments that Thucydides left out. Another century later, Plutarch (*c.* 46-120 CE) wrote a series of parallel biographies of famous Greeks and Roman statesmen, including one on Pericles. Plutarch intended for his *Lives* to educate his contemporary Roman audience in the qualities of a good statesman, so he used a rhetorical strategy to emphasize the similarities between Greek and Roman history. On several occasions, Plutarch explained why Pericles allotted land in the way he did, but those motivations often shared a great deal with the motivations behind Roman land allotment at the time he was writing. Drawing on centuries of Roman political discourse, Plutarch saw Athenian land allotments in functional and moral terms: confiscations of land provided demographic relief to Athens' urban center, gave a

sense of purpose to the poor, and established garrisons beside unruly coalition states. Because Diodorus privileged narrative over historical difference, and Plutarch privileged moral lessons over historical reconstruction, they both saw land allotment as a story about Athenian statesmen strategically building an empire.

Even though the historical sources for Athenian land allotment are diverse in their purpose and level of detail, they share a common theme: land allotment united democratic and imperial politics. This is not surprising since the Athenians were, after all, a democracy for much of the time that they had an empire. Because Thucydides and Herodotus took land allotment for granted, and the inscriptions and later authors all somehow implicated democracy, it makes sense to explain Athenian imperial institutions as democratic institutions—or, rather, as state institutions. Since the historical sources tend to point towards an instrumentalist approach to Athenian imperialism, modern historians have understandably followed suite.

Drawing on the close connection between democracy and empire, modern historians tend to see Athenian land allotment as a political masterstroke that served the interests of the Athenian state: it was a populist handout that appeased the masses and provided imperial stability abroad. For much of the twentieth century, this standard approach depicted the Athenian empire emanating outward from Athens and forced on its subjects as forms of political control and economic exploitation. Arnold Gomme, in his monumental commentary on Thucydides, argued that the Athenians expected cleruchs to fulfill their military service by living on their new land, and therefore cleruchies served as garrisons on the frontier. Similarly, Russell Meiggs and the editors of the *Athenian Tribute Lists* drew from fragmentary epigraphic evidence to suggest that the Athenians were dependent on cleruchies to exert control over

members of the Delian League, but they were willing to give compensation in the form of tribute reduction to those communities who lost their land. This model of a "citizen-garrison" became the standard explanation for Athenian cleruchies.[21]

But Athenian narratives that stress the political motivations of the state have brought with them their own conceptual problems. Victor Ehrenberg has emphasized the limitations of positivism in Athenian imperial history, showing how Thucydides' use of technical vocabulary—especially for *apoikiai* and *klērouchiai*—cannot be mapped onto epigraphic sources. Consequently, Hugo Jones suggested that when historical sources spoke of the Athenian state "sending out" lotholders to their new land, we should not necessarily assume a form of settler colonialism. Instead, Jones offered an alternative explanation: the problem in Athens was essentially demographic, and traditional colonialism would have drained the democracy of its participating citizens. Therefore, *klērouchoi* often rented out their lots from back at Athens as "absentee landlords," and the rent raised them to hoplite status—a form of social mobility for citizen-soldiers. In a similar tack, Alexander John Graham argued that the basic difference between *apoikoi* and *klērouchoi* was that *apoikoi* became members of a new political community and thus lost their citizenship, whereas *klērouchoi* retained their citizenship and upheld their civic and military obligations to Athens.[22]

For Jones, Athenian democracy was not implicated in imperialism. The initial critiques of the citizen-garrison model tried to show how the Athenians could profit economically from

[21] For the historiographical shifts in Athenian imperialism in the early twentieth century and after the Second World War, see Kallet 2009. For the standard explanation for Athenian cleruchies, see Gomme 1945: 344-347, 373-380; Meritt *et al.* 1950: 286-297; Meiggs 1972: 261-262. For recent textbook uses of the citizen-garrison assumption, see Pomeroy *et al.* 2011: 237; Morris and Powell 2010: 284.

[22] Ehrenberg 1952; Jones 1957; Graham 1964.

imperial markets and land allotments, but empire itself was not a necessary condition for democracy at home. Returning to the instrumentalist premises of Gomme and Meiggs, Moses Finley argued that control of the Aegean was an instrument of *Machtpolitik*, not *Handelspolitik*: the Athenian state was never concerned with private profits, and there was never anything approaching a political economy like early-modern mercantilism. The allotment of confiscated land, therefore, did not directly benefit the democracy. For Jones and Finley, land allotment remained a story about imperial and military control. Since then, Thomas Figueira, Peter Brunt, Nicoletta Salomon, and Christophe Pébarthe have continued to add layers of complexity, but their commitment to the instrumentalist approach has done little to advance our understanding of land allotment beyond the intentions of the Athenian state.[23]

In the last decade, historians have begun to take a more post-colonial perspective, looking at how cleruchies created on new forms of exploitation. Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz showed how historical sources portrayed cleruchs making an easy profit using dispossessed people as slave-like leaseholders, working the same land they used to own. Alfonso Moreno expanded on this view, and suggested that cleruchs were mostly elite Athenians who made a fortune by controlling the flow of rents and grain back to Athens, becoming tremendously wealthy in the process. To do so, he argued, they had to rely on a dense network of garrisons to control and coerce the people they dispossessed in frontier regions. By focusing on the

[23] Finley 1981: 41-61. Figueira (1991), in an exhaustive study of historical and epigraphic evidence, made a strong distinction between *apoikoi* and *klērouchoi.* He argued that cleruchies were important to the defense of the empire not because they acted as garrisons, but because they increased the size of the Athenian army; *apoikoi* were independent political communities. Brunt (1993) argued that, unlike *apoikoi*, *klērouchoi* settled in areas where the original community was allowed to remain autonomous. Salomon (1997) assumed a single model for the fifth and fourth centuries, and argued that cleruchies were rotating garrisons settled on public plots of land. Pébarthe (2009) argued that cleruchies served as instruments of imperial control by ensuring that the elite of subjugated *poleis* could not amass large amounts of territory. For further debate on various technical issues about Athenian land tenure, see Gauthier 1973; Erxleben 1975.

exploitative nature of absenteeism, both Zelnick-Abramovitz and Moreno treated colonies and cleruchies as fundamentally different phenomena. But for Moreno, absenteeism was still backed up by a strong, centralized Athenian presence: the relationship between the Athenians and the dispossessed communities was still essentially a relationship between states.[24]

Recent interest in global and economic history has prompted some historians to go so far as to question the very idea of the Athenian imperial state. Ian Morris has looked to cleruchies and the confiscation of land as a sign that the political boundaries of the Greek *polis* were breaking down, and the Athenian imperial project was nothing more than state formation taking its natural course across Aegean markets—creating along the way a "Greater Athenian State." For Josiah Ober, cleruchies were symptomatic of larger economic processes at play. By harnessing agricultural surpluses and market connectivity, land allotment was a vehicle for broad economic growth. Athenian imperialism triggered an economic efflorescence, but the Athenians were not the only ones benefitting from it. Morris and Ober both placed Athenian land allotment within regional developments, but left unquestioned the reality of imperial land allotment: Morris equated economic integration with political integration, whereas Ober assumed that economic rationality offset the need for imperial control.[25] In both cases, it is unclear why the Athenians allotted land the way they did in the fifth century.

Though the study of Athenian land allotment has inspired a wide range of interpretations, the citizen-garrison model is still the standard explanation. Because no single ancient historical source discussed Athenian land allotment in much detail, the evidence is

[24] Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004; Moreno 2007: esp. 87-143. For Moreno, *klērouchoi* were mostly elites who monopolized the grain trade.

[25] Morris 2009: 148-149. Ober 2015: 198-206. Both authors noted the ambiguities in the sources, but did not bring into question the standard explanation.

inconclusive at almost every turn: the historical sources do not offer any definitive answers to even the most basic historical questions. Consequently, most historians return to the familiar approach popularized by Gomme and Meiggs. Land allotment remains tethered to, and a tool of, the state, not an institution on its own terms.

This chapter offers a new way forward: through a combination of historical, epigraphic, and archaeological sources, it moves beyond traditional instrumentalist approaches by de-centering the Athenian state as the primary agent of empire. Far from serving the aims of the Athenian state, land allotment was driven by the private interests of its citizens. As we will see, in Athenian decision-making, there was no single policy towards land allotment and there was no single "Athenian imperialism"—land allotment never mapped neatly onto decisions of the Delian League. The *andres Athenaioi* who assembled each month were surely concerned about the welfare of the *archē*, but this did not mean that individual cleruchs then became representatives of the Athenian state, nor did it meant that the Athenians saw land allotment as a matter of imperial governance.[26] Instead, land allotment was an opportunity for both mass and elite to individually pursue a new source of wealth. The main issue that the Athenians could agree on was that they wanted to find a way to keep a critical mass of citizens in Attica so that Athens would remain the economic and cultural center of the eastern Mediterranean. For that reason, they advanced their private interests by creating new markets for Athenian goods produced in Attica, collecting taxes from lotholders and tribute from settlers, and accumulating human capital at Athens.

Through conquest, the Athenian military provided an opportunity for private citizens to make money from land confiscated from an unruly state. But the deal essentially ended there.

[26] For concern about the *archē,* Thucydides' speeches are particularly descriptive. The *archē* is also a recurring topic in Aristophanes.

Afterwards, when those who received a land allotment became either a settler or a lotholder, the Athenian navy only played a supporting role. Land allotment was thus a compromise between public equality and private inequality. Publically, each citizen could weigh in on decisions about the *archē;* but privately, the Athenians competed for a limited supply of imperial land.[27] And since land allotment was open to all members of Athenian society, the elite could continue to increase their personal wealth within the institutional framework of the democracy.

By reconstructing what the Athenians thought about imperial land rather than imposing on them a Roman model of success and control, this approach can accommodate the local variations suggested by archaeological evidence on Lemnos and Euboea. As we will see, Athenian views on imperial territory had little to do with the state precisely because they had deep roots in the Archaic period, a prehistory that had more to do with elite initiatives than state programs. By tracing the story of Athenian land allotment back to its origins in the Archaic period, we see that the Athenian empire threatened so many in the Greek world not just because it was so disruptive or so coercive in everyday life, but because it was so old, a vestige of the way elite competition used to play out in the Archaic period.

3.2. *The Archaic Origins of Athenian Land Allotment*

For much of the Archaic period, the residents of Attica looked on as spectators to the expansion of Phoenicia and Lydia: unlike their neighbors in Euboea, Corinth, and Megara, they did not establish many overseas trading posts or settler colonies. Instead, the Athenians focused

[27] For public equality and private inequality, see Ober 1989: 192-204. In Athens, there were far more citizens than recipients of *klēroi,* see Morris 2009: 148. Roughly 15,000 to 20,000 Athenians received land allotments, at a time when the total a citizen population of 30,000 to 40,000 in any given year.

their efforts inwards on the intensification of agriculture within Attica by putting regional demographic growth to work on the land. Like most Greek communities at the time, the Athenians struggled to form a common identity; what set them apart, however, was that their *chōra* (or "countryside," owned and worked by the citizens of the *polis*) was extraordinarily large by contemporary standards, at roughly 2,500 km^2.[28] Consequently, the Athenians' Archaic history was a period mostly of "internal colonization" of the Attic countryside, whereby elites exploited members of their own community by limiting access to property rights.[29] But as the Athenians began to experiment with land allotment at the end the sixth century, their experience of the Archaic world helped shape how they came to think about land outside of Attica. As we will see, Athenian ideas about imperial land came to focus on the private enrichment of citizens, a trend that privileged political insularity and economic centralization at Athens over any effort to collectively control people and land outside of Attica.

In Attica, the development of an Athenian citizen community was the turning-point that pushed elite members to look beyond it for new sources of wealth. As demographic growth in the seventh century drove down the value of labor, Athenian elites were able to take advantage of subsistence conditions to bind indebted Athenians in serf-like conditions. But faced with internal strife, Athens' ruling coalition of elites chose reform over collapse. In 594, Solon—armed with an elite mandate—made it so citizens could no longer be held in debt-bondage and extended property rights to all Athenians.[30] Solon's reforms had a profound effect on Athenian labor

[28] Anderson (2003) showed that the Athenian political community was not fully integrated in Attica until the end of the sixth century.

[29] Internal colonization was a process in which elites exploited members of their own community by limiting access to property rights.

[30] For Solon's reforms, see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.2, 4.4, 6.1, 9.1; Plut. *Solon* 13.4, 15.2. For Athenian state-formation, debt, and slavery, see also Hammond 1961; Gallant 1982; Harris 2002; Morris 2002; Ober 2006: 144-153; 2015: 147; Zurbach 2013; 2017.

because, even with the steady expansion of slave labor during the late Archaic period, the costs of labor kept increasing as citizens made higher wages.[31] The changing labor market, in turn, helped shape the early history of Athenian imperialism. At a time when elites were already competing for land in Attica, and citizen labor could no longer meet elite demand as before, some wealthy Athenians began to look abroad. In what followed, the first Athenians to confiscate land were elites acting on their own private initiatives, competing among each other to find new sources of wealth.[32] For example, Miltiades took over the Gallipoli peninsula in the mid-540s with his own private army, and the harvests from his new estates, worked by locals, he sold on Aegean markets to become immensely wealthy.[33] He also rewarded his recruits with their own land. Beyond just enriching himself, Miltiades showed how imperial sources of private wealth did not have to rely on a commitment from the entire political community at Athens—Miltiades' imperialism was more elite opportunism than state-sponsored colonialism. After Miltiades, elite initiatives were also responsible for confiscations of land at Elaious and Sigeion by the Peisistratids, and later on the islands of Lemnos and Imbros, under the Kimonids.[34]

Meanwhile, the growth of an Athenian market economy offered an alternative to elite opportunism, as Athens became a desirable place for merchants, craftsmen, and free laborers to

[31] For economic inequality and greed after Solon's reforms, see Balot 1997: 58-98. For the Classical period, see also Ober 1987: 192-247. For rising wages, political commitments, and chattel slavery in Archaic Attica, see Scheidel 2008: 115-119; Zurbach 2013: 632-643.

[32] Figueira (1991: 132-142) calls these settlements "patronal" colonies, which were replaced in the fifth century by imperial colonies. Kallet (2013: 53) points out that individuals, such as Kimon, still played an important part in fifth-century imperialism. The difference was that individuals now could make use of a vast navy. For the Peisistratids in Thrace and the northern Aegean, see Sears 2013: 46-68.

[33] Hdt. 6.34-8. Herodotus wrote that Miltiades was disillusioned by Peisistratos' consolidation of power, and then recruited a private army of willing Athenians to join him on an expedition to the Chersonesos. On the peninsula, he walled off the isthmus for protection, and soon took on the title of *tyrannos*. His wealth and successes as a commander earned him the admiration of Croesus.

[34] For Elaious, see Hdt. 6.140.1. For Sigeion, see Strabo 13.1.38; Hdt. 5.94-5. For Lemnos and Imbros, see Hecataeus *apud* Hdt. 6.137-140.

work and do business. The strains of population growth mixed with Attica's notoriously poor conditions for farming meant that the Athenians had to make their import economy a priority, developing along the way highly integrated labor markets and institutions to exchange money and goods. Because the Athenians could not grow enough grain to sustain everyone, they became increasingly reliant on grain imports from across the Aegean.[35] In return, the Athenians developed and accumulated new kinds of specialization and expertise, especially in the ceramics and banking industries, to produce items that could ultimately be exported.[36] Under the Peisistratids, Athenian ceramic production began to outpace the Corinthians, and Athenian painted pottery broke into distant Mediterranean markets as far as Etruria. By the beginning of the fifth century, Athens' three deep-water harbors were already attracting merchants from all over the Mediterranean. This allowed entrepreneuring Athenians to choose a life at the center of Athens' market economy over the possibility of finding wealth abroad.

As the effects of Solon's reforms and the market economy took hold in Attica, the Athenians saw in the Spartans a model of how they could become a regional economic power without directly controlling people and land outside of Attica.[37] Since the middle of the eighth century, the Spartans enslaved the people of Lakonia and Messenia (thereafter called "helots") and divided their land into *isoklēroi* (or "equal lots").[38] The agricultural surplus from each plot

[35] For population growth, grain, and the import market, see Osborne 1992; Hansen 2006a: 43-44; Foxhall 2007: esp. 55-83; Moreno 2007: 3-31.

[36] For monetization, see Davis 2011. For specialization, see Ober 2015: esp. 158, 172-174. For Athens' ceramics industry, see Arafat and Morgan 1989; Cook 1997: 259-262; Acton 2014: 73-115. For Athenian pottery in Etruria, see Osborne 2001.

[37] For the Spartan conquest of Messenia, see Cartledge 1979; Ducat 1990a; Luraghi 2002; 2011. For Spartan exploitation of the helots and the Spartan *klēros*, see Hodkinson 1986; 1989; 1992; 2002; 2003; Ducat 1990b; Singor 1993; Alcock 2002; Figueira 2003; 2004a; 2004b. For contact between the Athenians and Spartans, see Cartledge 1979; Powell 1988. The Spartans had close contact with the Athenian tyrants. Moreno (2007: 320) suggested in passing that the Athenian exploitation of cleruchies may have been similar to Spartan helotage.

[38] The Spartan state technically owned the land, but landholders could pass on their *klēros* to their children, see Hodkinson 2000: 65-104.

sustained a single citizen family living far away in Sparta, and produced a sort of economic baseline across Spartan society. Because of their surplus of grain, the Spartans never had to rely on overseas imports of agricultural staples or even attempt to diversify their economy, as the Athenians had.[39] The Spartan empire in the southern Peloponnese was thus an empire of surpluses: the Spartans received just enough to sustain each family equally and, in doing so, to sustain their militarized society. Consequently, the Spartans showed little interest in imperial expansion for much of the Archaic and Classical periods. Even so, the Athenians witnessed firsthand just how the Spartans used coercion alone, achieved through annual violent raids, to rule over the helots from back in Sparta.[40] By coercing the helots from a distance, the Spartans remained a closed political community without having to directly govern and settle among the helots. The Spartans were thus a quintessentially Greek insular community: a politically autonomous city-state insulated, much like an island, from its neighbors.

What the Athenians saw in Spartan history was the value of coercion from a distance, but the way the Spartans actually shared imperial land was at odds with how the Athenians prioritized their merchant culture. At the end of the Archaic period, Sparta was undoubtedly the predominant Greek state and the Athenians saw it as a model for what a Greek *polis* could achieve. And because most sizeable communities in the Greek world valued insular *polis* life over federalism, Spartan coercion from a distance was also very Greek, as it were, and easily transferable to Athens.[41] But Spartan allotment emphasized the equality of outcome from empire

[39] Cavanagh 2009, with Cavanagh *et al.* 1996-2002.

[40] According to Plutarch (*Lyc.* 28), the Spartans conducted raids on the helot population each autumn to reinforce the threat of violence.

[41] This is not to deny, of course, the importance of federal political structures, which Emily Mackil (2013) has recently demonstrated. For Spartan power as a Greek model, see Cartledge 2001: 153-166. For Greek culture at the end of the Archaic period, see Hall 2002: 172-204.

for a relatively small citizen population (hence the *isoklēroi*), an outcome that the Athenians could not easily square with the growing merchant culture at Athens and the reality of private inequality for their much larger community.

To the east, the Achaemenid Persians were experimenting with a more de-centered, or even "entrepreneurial," approach to imperial land that may have appealed to Athenian ideas about private wealth and the market economy.[42] As Persian armies swept across Mesopotamia to the eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean in the second half of the sixth century, the Achaemenid king himself claimed ownership of all conquered lands. Afterwards, he divided up the land into plots of various sizes, with the majority of royal lands going to soldiers as payment for their service. The emperor collected taxes from each plot by bundling them into groups, called *hatrus*. Landholders from each *hatru* then hired "firms" of tax-farmers, who Matthew Stolper aptly called "entrepreneurs," to rent the land to local farmers. The Murašû firm, for example, collected rent from sub-tenant farmers in kind, sold the produce on the market, then paid the landholders their rent in silver.[43] Persian soldiers were free to live away from their plots, and could pay the imperial land tax with silver provided for them by the firms. Though Persian land tenure invited a kind of imperial absenteeism, the Persians still reinforced rural areas such as Greek Anatolia with a thin, but inescapable military presence.[44]

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[42] For exchanges between the Athenians and the Achaemenid Persians, see Balcer 1984; Carradice 1987; Miller 1997; Raaflaub 2009. For the Persian empire in Anatolia, see Sekunda 1985; 1988; Balcer 1991; Bakir 2001; Dusinberre 2003; 2013; Delemen 2007; Roosevelt 2009.

[43] For "entrepreneurs" and empire in Achaemenid Persia, see Stolper 1985. Stolper (1985: 26-27) explained that imperial "taxes paid in silver favored the transformation of fiefs from subsistence allotments into cash-producing rental properties. Absentee ownership of estates required local management…The Murašû firm provided such a service." For a recent overview of the Persian empire, see Wiesehöfer 2009.

[44] For Persian garrisons in Anatolia, see Dusinberre 2013: 86-113. For the fortified stronghold of Şahankaya in northern Lydia, see Roosevelt 2009: 118-120. Roosevelt (2009: 110-115) showed how Persian land tenure led to a rise in rural settlements in greater Lydia.

Though living on the opposite side of the Aegean, the Athenians were in contact with their fellow Ionians in Anatolia who experienced firsthand the Persian empire of entrepreneurs and rentiers. From their short-lived alliance with Persia in 507 and their role in the Ionian Revolt, the Athenians must have learned how Persian land allotment accommodated state and entrepreneurial interests: on the one hand, the Persian state collected a central imperial tax by sharing some of the proceeds with firms of tax farmers; on the other hand, Persian soldiers received rents from imperial lands granted through royal charter.[45] Unlike the Spartans, the Persian state was willing to invest in imperial lands, both institutionally and militarily. Furthermore, this was not just an empire of agricultural surpluses: Persian landholders received their rents in coin, which placed them within a monetized market of exchange. Though the Athenians, like the Spartans, would come to favor coercion from a distance, their familiarity with private forms of wealth and a market economy invited them to think about imperial land in a way more in line with the Persians.

Finally, technological and political developments at the end of the Archaic period in Attica helped the Athenians make coercion from a distance a reality, but also forced the elite among them to extend shares of imperial land to the masses. As the Achaemenids extended their empire westwards through Anatolia and the Levant, and then into the eastern Mediterranean with their command of the formidable Phoenician navy, the Athenians started to replace pentekonters with triremes in the 520s. With the new warships came greater demands for material, manpower, and storage: requirements for wood more than doubled, and the size of

[45] During the democratic coup of 508/7, the Athenians sent an embassy to Sardis to make an alliance with the Persians against the Spartans, see Hdt. 5.73. For the Ionian Revolt, see Cawkwell 2005: 61-86.

crews nearly quadrupled.[46] Consequently, as naval warfare scaled up, Athenian elites found it more difficult to recruit and supply overseas expeditions on their own. But after the democratic unification of Attica in 508/7, and then the investment in a new navy of two hundred triremes in the 480s, the Athenians had the violent means to confiscate more land.[47] As we will see, over time the Athenians' commitment to naval power allowed them to confiscate land far away from Athens without also having to garrison every corner of the Aegean Sea. In the immediate aftermath of the democratic coup, the high levels of intensive power generated by Kleisthenes' reforms pushed Athens outwards in a burst of imperial energy, leading to the Athenians' first imperial confiscations at Chalkis in 506, and again shortly thereafter on Salamis.[48]

At the end of the sixth century, the Athenians were just starting their transition from city-state to empire, a process that would unsettle the eastern Mediterranean for over a century. By exploring the Archaic origins of Athenian land allotment, we saw that elite competition under the Peisistratids taught the Athenians that imperial sources of wealth could exist in the absence of the state and that private inequality was built into Athenian society. We also saw how the Athenians drew from their imperial neighbors to devise an alternative way of thinking about imperial land than the settler colonialism of their contemporaries: a kind of imperial absenteeism that united

[46] For secondary state-formation in Athens, the adoption of the trireme, and the politics of scaling up, see Davies 2013: 49-50; Kallet 2013. With the transition from pentekonters to triremes, Davies (2013: 50) estimated that wood requirements would have risen from 10 to 25 tons, and crews would have risen from 50+ to 200 per ship. Also, the triremes would have needed new ship-sheds and equipment storage at Piraeus. For the importance of Macedonian timber for the Athenian fleet, see Bissa 2009: 111-140; Meiggs 1982: 126-130, 188-217.

[47] For opportunism, see Davies 2013: 61. For Kleisthenes' reforms at Athens, see Ober 1996: 32-52; Anderson 2000. For the proceeds from the Laureion mines used to build triremes after 483, see Hdt. 7.144. For the navy, see Jordan 1975; Morrison *et al.* 2000; Strauss 2000; 2004: xvii-xxi; Lovén 2012; De Souza 2017; Gabrielsen 2017. For sea power as democracy-friendly form of warfare, see Strauss 1996; 2009: 224.

[48] For Chalkis, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.1. For Salamis, see *IG* I^3 1. But because of its proximity to Athens, Salamis became an "unofficial" part of Attica and never joined the Delian League, see Taylor 1997; Hansen 2004. This explains their taxes and military service (*IG* I^3 1, *l.* 3).

Spartan coercion from a distance with an entrepreneuring infrastructure adapted from the Persian east. As we follow the story of Athenian land allotment into the fifth century, a period when Athens matured as a metropolitan center, we can see how this alternative approach to imperial land became desirable to elites and entrepreneurs who did not want to give up their standing at Athens or who, alternatively, wanted to benefit from the perks of Athens' markets. The Archaic origins of Athenian land allotment presented two separate, though ultimately complementary, approaches to imperial land: Athenians could choose to become settlers in an insular colony or rentier lotholders living back at Athens. In either case, Athenian land allotment upheld the opportunistic approach to elite competition in the Archaic world: it was a decentralized process, driven more by private interests than any collective interest in controlling imperial land to benefit the Athenian state.

Even as we acknowledge that Athenian land allotment was firmly rooted in Archaic developments and Greek political culture, we must also acknowledge how the practice of allotting confiscated land to citizens emerged alongside new ideas about democracy. The democratic revolution of 508/7 was undoubtedly a transformative moment for Athenian imperialism: democracy was the energy that allowed for an Archaic phenomenon to be fully realized—it was the momentum that drove Athens' transition to territorial empire. As naval warfare scaled up and the Athenians experimented with popular sovereignty, the elites recognized that imperialism would have to involve the masses.[49] Consequently, private sources of imperial wealth were built into a democratic institution of allotment. The masses could share

[49] The elite recognition that empire and naval warfare would have to involve the masses can be inferred from Themistokles' naval law of 483/2, see Hdt. 7.144; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 22.7. The elites, including Themistokles himself, chose public investment in the navy over private gain.

more directly in the rewards of their empire, but the elites had found a way to institutionalize private wealth. Now, as we explore how Athenian ideas about imperial land matured in the fifth century, we will see how the Athenians quickly learned to prioritize their navy so they could take a passive role in their imperial territory.

3.3. *Compartmentalizing Imperial Territory*

As the Greek allied fleet sailed home from Byzantium in 478, the Athenians among them had much to be grateful for at the close of the Persian Wars.[50] Two years after Xerxes pillaged Attica, their city lay in ruins, their fields unplowed, but the survivors still commanded the Aegean's largest navy. The decision to abandon Athens and take to the sea two years before had secured their survival, and two great naval victories at Salamis and Myclae showed the promise of Athenian leadership. So when the Spartans shifted their attention to the security of the Peloponnese, the new anti-Persian coalition looked to Athens to lead the fight.[51] The Delian League, as the coalition has come to be known, was asymmetrical from the start. Though the members agreed to share the burdens of patrolling the Aegean, only Athens and a few other states actually had the capacity to maintain and deploy the warships in large numbers. Before long, most members chose to defer active duty and instead pay a tax, or rather tribute, leaving the Athenians to man the fleet.[52] This left the Athenians with a monopoly on violence in the eastern Mediterranean.[53] From it emerged a new approach to imperial territory.

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[50] For the Greek siege of Byzantium at the end of the Greco-Persian wars in 478, see Thuc. 1.94.2. Victory meant control of the Propontis.

[51] Thuc. 1.94-96. The Spartans were probably concerned with the immediate threat of the helots and restive neighbors, not the Persians.

[52] But not all rowers of Athenian triremes were Athenian: many rowers were resident foreigners who earned a wage rowing in the fleet. By the mid-fifth century, only Chios, Lesbos, and Samos were contributing ships. After revolting, the Samians lost their ships in 439

In 476, just two years after the Greeks came together in a show of unity at Delos, the Athenians began to test their navy as a tool for coercion from a distance. The first official act of the coalition was a great naval victory against the Persians at Eion, led by Kimon, son of Miltiades, of Gallipoli fame. Kimon was quick to follow the allied show of force with an Athenian show of force. On their return home across the Aegean, the Athenian navy landed at Skyros and forcefully removed from the island the local population, who Kimon accused of "piracy." Afterwards, the Athenians allotted the land to settlers, who thereafter decided to live on the vacant island and formed a new colony. Kimon then sailed to Karystos on Euboea, and forced the community there to join the league. Nearby, the island community of Naxos looked on as the tide turned against coalition members, and renounced their membership. The Athenian navy promptly set sail, laid siege to the city of Naxos, and forced the Naxians to renew their commitment. The success of the Naxian campaign set an important precedent: the promise of retaliation from the Athenian navy worked so well as a projection of force that the Athenians could enforce the regular flow of taxes and trade from back at Athens.[54] Though separated from Athens by the Aegean Sea, coalition members could count on being coerced from a distance. [55]

(Thuc. 1.117.3), and the Mytileneans lost theirs in 428 (Thuc. 3.50.1). At its height, the Athenian navy had 300 ships (Thuc. 2.13.8), which would have required some 50,000 rowers, comparable to the Carthaginian navy during the First Punic War, see Pilkington 2013: 332-333.

[53] The Athenians were comparatively sparing in their use of violence against allies. Strauss (2009: 16) argues that "Athens' problem in the decades after 479 was not that it used too much muscle against its fellow Greeks; its problem, rather, was that it used too little."

[54] For recognition that the navy was a deterrent and allowed for coercive from a distance, see Thuc. 1.142-143, 5.97; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.1-6. [Xenophon] (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2-3) wrote that the navy made coalition members remain loyal through the threat of starvation and fear.

[55] For Skyros, see Thuc. 1.98.2; Diod. 11.60.2; Plut. *Cim*. 8.3-7; *Thes*. 36.1-2; Nepos *Cim*. 2.5; Paus. 1.17.6; Ephorus *FGH* 70 191.10. For Karystos, see Thuc. 1.98.3; Hdt. 8.112, 8.121, 9.105. For Naxos and the precedent set by the Athenians' retaliation, see Thuc. 1.98.4. In 465, the Athenians sailed to Thasos to the same effect, see Thuc. 1.100.2, 1.101; Plut. *Cim*. 8.2; Nepos *Cim*. 2.2.

Because the Aegean Sea allowed them to mobilize their navy so efficiently, the Athenians chose to compartmentalize their empire: there was their own citizen territory in Attica and then there was their imperial territory of land allotments and tribute-paying allies. This distinction meant that the Athenian state—the collective interests of the Athenian political community—ended at the borders of Attica: beyond it, as we will see, the Athenians saw imperial land as something to be exploited individually and by new communities, distinct from the interests of Athenian state. Consequently, as the Delian League consolidated around Athens in the second quarter of the fifth century, coalition members could only expect to deal directly with the Athenian state in one of three ways: with traveling imperial officials, through local *proxenoi,* and, in rare cases, garrisons. These officials, and the institutions they represented, constituted the "official" Athenian empire. But the Athenian empire, still an infant at the time of its death, was not just the sum of its official structures. There were also the individual Athenians who received allotments of confiscated land in coalition territory. Each one of them made money from land confiscated by the Athenian state, but the Athenians' insular view of citizen territory left them on their own once they left Attica.

This was because the Athenians chose to populate their imperial territory with remarkably few representatives of the Athenian state.[56] The entire Delian League of around two-and-a-half million Greeks had, according to the author of the *Athēnaiōn Politeia,* no more than 700 imperial officials, each community receiving only a handful and often for very short periods.[57] The Athenians sent out four kinds of imperial magistrates: the *archontes*, who were mostly arbiters of

[56] Because Athens controlled subject states without imposing a governor, Doyle (1986: 54-81) deemed it a form of "hegemonic empire."

[57] For the approximate population of the Athenian Empire, see Ober 2015: 38, table 2.3. For Athenian imperial officials, see Balcer 1976. [Arist.] (*Ath. Pol.* 24.3) says that there were 700 imperial officials at the height of the empire.

justice; the *episkopoi*, who ensured the timely collection of tribute and supervised the establishment of new governments; the *phrourarchoi*, the semi-permanent garrison commanders; and the *kērukes*, the messengers who traveled around to introduce new Athenian decrees. Of all four groups, the only continual Athenian presence in a community was the *phrourarchoi* and their hoplite retinue, who undoubtedly won little favor among locals as an occupation force. In all, imperial magistrates, who came and went throughout the year, had little impact on daily life throughout the empire.

The Athenians had a plan to deal with local affairs when they were not around: they repurposed the old Greek institution of *proxenia* (of identifying "supportive foreigners") as an imperial institution. As elsewhere in the Greek world, a grant of *proxenia* was a public acknowledgment of friendship between the Athenians and a member of another community's elite. When the Athenians voted to grant the title of *proxenos* to a member of an allied community, the recipient had the full political weight of the Athenian state behind him—and he could shift that weight to help his standing in the community. In return, the *proxenos* was expected to defend Athens' interests, steer local opinion, and relay political intelligence.[58] For example, in 428 the *proxenoi* on Lesbos first alerted the Athenians to the Mytileneans' plans to revolt.[59]

When both imperial officials and local *proxenoi* failed to prevent opposition, the Athenians occasionally established a garrison somewhere in an unruly community's territory. In his history,

[58] For a recent treatment of the title of *proxenos,* see Mack 2015. There are more than thirty fifth-century *proxenos* decrees. *IG* I^3 110, which honors Oiniades of Skiathos *c.* 408/7, is the most complete decree. Meiggs and Lewis (1969: 276) explain that "Skiathos, though a small island in the northern Sporades and thinly populated, had a good harbor which was important to Athenian ships sailing to and from Thrace and Euxine." Because of the island's strategic utility, the Athenians could count on Oiniades as a source of local support.

[59] Thuc. 3.2.3. The Mytilenean *proxenoi* joined the Tenedians and Methymnians to warn the Athenians about the revolt. As a result, the Athenians had the opportunity to put down the revolt before it gained momentum. For a *proxenos* effecting policy, see Thuc. 2.85.5.

Thucydides gave the impression that the Athenians took a very active role in occupying their imperial territory: he calculated that, at the start of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had some 16,000 hoplites split evenly between garrisons throughout the empire and guarding Athens' fortifications.[60] But the garrisons he described in his narrative were often very small and operated mostly as staging points for the Athenians to harm the surrounding countryside. Furthermore, garrisons were rare, and often reactionary measures during wartime—only increasing in number during the strains of the Peloponnesian War. Even so, of the thirty or so garrisons throughout the empire for which we have evidence, there is no mention of a garrison in a city or territory where the Athenians confiscated land. Yet these lands were, in all likelihood, the most contentious spaces in the empire.

For that reason, modern historians tend to assume that the recipients of land allotments must have filled in for the Athenian state as imperial *garnisaires.* In this view, Athenian landholders accomplished what imperial officials, *proxenoi,* and garrisons could not. To be sure, it is easy to get this impression reading Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War. For example, Thucydides wrote that the Athenians allotted land to settlers at Histiaia (though nowhere else on Euboea) in 448 as punishment for the Euboean revolt.[61] In the absence of imperial officials, it is reasonable enough for us to assume that the Athenians used land allotment as a projection of force against unruly coalition members, like the Romans after them. But we must also recall that the Athenians began confiscating land well before the formation of the Delian League: for that

[60] Thuc. 2.13.6. For Athenian garrisons, see Nease 1949; Meiggs 1972: 206-207. Thucydides used the terms *phulakes* and *phrourioi* interchangeably, see Thuc. 4.96.9; 4.100.5. The Athenians sometimes set up garrisons inside the city of an allied state during the strains of wartime, see Thuc. 4.113.2. For garrisons as staging points for raids and incursions into the countryside, see Thuc. 1.142.4; 4.45.2.

[61] For Histiaia, see Thuc. 1.114.

reason, land allotment could not have been a simple structural response to the burden of holding together a coalition of states. Even more, there is very little evidence to suggest that the Athenians set up many garrisons before the onset of the Peloponnesian War, even in areas subjected to land allotment.[62] And as we will see on the islands of Lemnos and Euboea, when the Athenians who received land allotments came together to form a new colony outside of Attica, they only did so after forcefully removing the local community or employing its members as laborers, in which case there was no longer a state for the Athenians to guard against. Rather, the Athenians used their navy to coerce the people in their imperial territory from a distance.

It is less clear, however, what the Athenians collectively hoped to get from their imperial territory if they fought together to confiscate land but afterwards the state had little to do with it. In fact, the three best descriptions of Athenian land allotment from antiquity offer contradictory accounts of what they wanted from their imperial territory. First, the only time Thucydides ever referred directly to land allotment, he described in some detail how the Athenians experimented with different forms of landownership when they punished the Mytilenaeans for revolting in 427:

> ὕστερον δὲ φόρον μὲν οὐκ ἔταξαν Λεσβίοις, κλήρους δὲ ποιήσαντες τῆς γῆς πλὴν τῆς Μηθυμναίων τρισχιλίους τριακοσίους μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἱεροὺς ἐξεῖλον, ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους σφῶν αὐτῶν κληρούχους τοὺς λαχόντας ἀπέπεμψαν: οἷς ἀργύριον Λέσβιοι ταξάμενοι τοῦ κλήρου ἑκάστου τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ δύο μνᾶς φέρειν αὐτοὶ εἰργάζοντο τὴν γῆν.[63]
>
> After which [the Athenians] imposed on the Lesbians no more tribute; but having divided their land (all but that of the Methymnaeans) into three thousand plots, three

[62] There is only evidence for six garrisons before the Peloponnesian War, none in areas with land confiscations: Erythrae (*IG* I³ 14); Aigina (*IG* I³ 38); Megara (Thuc. 1.103.4; 1.114.1); Miletus (*IG* I³ 21, *l*. 75); Byzantium (Aristoph. *Wasps* 235-7); Samos (Thuc. 1.115.2-5).

[63] Thuc. 3.50.2 (cf. *IG* I³ 66; Diod. 12.55.10; 12.72.2). This is Thucydides' only use of *klērouchia* and its cognates. According to Diodorus (12.55.1), the Athenians wanted to prevent a pan-Lesbian *synoikismos,* hence their intervention.

> hundred of those parts [of the choicest land] they consecrated to the gods, and the rest, they assigned by lot to lotholders sent out to the island. With these the Lesbians agreed to pay in silver two *minae* a year for each allotment, and cultivated the land themselves.

After tearing down the Mytileneans' walls, and repossessing their navy, the Athenians confiscated all agricultural lands on the island (except the territory of the Methymnaeans, who had helped uncover the revolt). Afterwards, the Athenians divided the island into three thousand plots, set aside three hundred as sacred property, and "sent out" lotholders to manage the rest. But instead of working the land themselves, the lotholders rented out their plots back to the Lesbians at two *minae* a year. Though the Mytilenaeans no longer had to pay contributions to the Delian League, instead they paid a tax to individual Athenians for the privilege of working their own land. In what Thucydides described, the Athenians who received land allotments were actually rentiers and were free to leave the island because they did not have to work the land themselves.

Second, Isocrates promised in his *Panegyricus* that the Athenians in 380 had finally buried their imperial aspirations, and they no longer wanted to take land from their allies. Writing just a few years before the first summit of the Second Athenian League, he hoped that his readers would recall how the Athenians defended Greek freedom for nearly seventy years, but were scorned nonetheless:

> ὑπὲρ ὧν προσήκει τοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας μεγάλην χάριν ἔχειν πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ τὰς κληρουχίας ἡμῖν ὀνειδίζειν, ἃς ἡμεῖς εἰς τὰς ἐρημουμένας τῶν πόλεων φυλακῆς ἕνεκα τῶν χωρίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ πλεονεξίαν ἐξεπέμπομεν.[64]
>
> On account of these services it becomes all thinking men to be deeply grateful to us, much rather than to reproach us because of our system of colonization; for we sent out [lotholders] into depopulated states for their protection and not out of greed.

[64] Isoc. 4.107. For commentary and intellectual context, see Usher 1999: 298-301.

For Isocrates, the allies' critiques of lotholders were unwarranted because the Athenians were only using land in depopulated states—though he said nothing about how it was actually the Athenians who often depopulated those states in the first place. The way Isocrates remembered it, land allotment offered protection and the Athenians only did it out of concern, not personal greed. Isocrates seems to have been actively rebranding, or rather sanitizing, the memory of Athenian land allotment to match the uneasy political climate that saw Athenian leadership with suspicion. He hoped that his fellow Greeks would remember the Athenian empire as a project in moderation compared to their true enemies, the Persians. Athenian citizens may have been the most immediate beneficiaries of imperial land, but it was for the greater good of the Greek world.

Finally, Plutarch in his *Life of Pericles* styled Pericles the populist *extraordinaire* of fifth-century Athens because of how he divided up land among Attica's poor and providing wages for naval service. Writing over five centuries after Pericles' death, Plutarch saw Athenian land allotment in functional and moral terms: confiscations of land provided demographic relief to Athens' urban center, gave a sense of purpose to the poor, and established garrisons beside unruly coalition states:

> πρὸς δὲ τούτοις χιλίους μὲν ἔστειλεν εἰς Χερρόνησον κληρούχους, εἰς δὲ Νάξον πεντακοσίους, εἰς δὲ Ἄνδρον τοὺς ἡμίσεις τούτων, εἰς δὲ Θράκην χιλίους Βισάλταις συνοικήσοντας, ἄλλους δ᾽ εἰς Ἰταλίαν οἰκιζομένης Συβάρεως, ἣν Θουρίους προσηγόρευσαν. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔπραττεν ἀποκουφίζων μὲν ἀργοῦ καὶ διὰ σχολὴν πολυπράγμονος ὄχλου τὴν πόλιν, ἐπανορθούμενος δὲ τὰς ἀπορίας τοῦ δήμου, φόβον δὲ καὶ φρουρὰν τοῦ μὴ νεωτερίζειν τι παρακατοικίζων τοῖς συμμάχοις.[65]
>
> In addition to this, he dispatched a thousand lotholders to the Chersonesos, and five hundred to Naxos, and to Andros half that number, and a thousand to Thrace to settle with the Bisaltae, and others to Italy, when the site of Sybaris was settled, which they

[65] Plut. *Per.* 11.6. For a similar critique of the Athenian urban poor as lazy and "idle busybodies" in Thucydides, see Thuc. 6.82.1.

> named Thurii. All this he did by way of lightening the city of its mob of lazy and idle busybodies, rectifying the embarrassments of the poorer people, and giving the allies for neighbors an imposing garrison which should prevent rebellion.

For Plutarch, Athenian land allotments, like their Roman equivalents of the mid. Republic, involved large population movements and close contact between settlers and dispossessed. But the similarities to Rome are not surprising: Plutarch intended for his *Lives* to educate his contemporary audience in the qualities of a good statesman, and therefore he used a rhetorical strategy to emphasize the similarities between Greek and Roman history.[66] Like his Roman counterpart Fabius Maximus, Pericles' life was a delicate balance of political and military leadership at a time of imperial expansion and colonization. As such, his life was a lesson on how to govern an unruly mass of citizens—both at home and abroad—and therefore land allotment served a dual function of resolving democratic folly at home and securing empire abroad.

It is hard to reconcile Thucydides' description of Mytilene with Isocrates' and Plutarch's later reconstructions of imperial territory. On Lesbos, Thucydides described a fairly localized process of extraction between a defeated community and individual Athenian citizens. Though the Athenians lotholders initially left Athens to get their affairs in order on the island, they did not necessarily have to live on the land themselves. In contrast, Isocrates' defense of Athens' imperial territory emphasized the movement of Athenian populations from Athens to their land. Plutarch envisioned a similar arrangement, where poor Athenians settled throughout the empire and, in doing so, secured it. In Thucydides' view, Athenian cleruchies might be seen as a variation on Persian *hatrus*. But according to Isocrates and Plutarch, the Athenians approach to imperial territory was all about imperial control.

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[66] For commentary on Plutarch's *Life of Pericles*, his moral and pedagogical purpose, and his Roman context, see Stadlter 1989: xxix-lii.

Yet, as Hugo Jones pointed out long ago, if Athenian lotholders were supposed to be a sort of *ad hoc* garrison, as Isocrates and Plutarch suggested, they did a remarkably poor job: neither Thucydides, nor any ancient author, mentioned an Athenian on allotted land helping out during a revolt.[67] Though Jones' argument from silence is tempting, it does not say what the Athenians thought of their imperial territory, just what they did not think of it. More importantly, it is unclear whether Thucydides' treatment of Lesbos held for all other land allotments during the fifth century.[68] Whereas Thucydides was only describing a single occasion, Isocrates and Pericles synthesizing what they considered—or at least what they wanted their audience to consider—to be the most salient qualities of land allotment. Perhaps Thucydides described the events on Lesbos because they were exceptional.

In fact, the opposite was probably true: Thucydides was highly selective in his narrative of the Peloponnesian War and he chose individual cases to foreshadow and illustrate broader trends. As a result, he did not mention every instance of Athenian land allotment: Thucydides did not mention the land allotments on the Gallipoli peninsula or the island of Naxos, for example.[69] Just as the chilling effects of stasis at Corcyra foreshadowed the threat of political collapse at Athens, so too might the events on Lesbos have foreshadowed what the Athenians hoped to gain from their Sicilian campaign twelve years after the events at Mytilene.[70] Diodorus, for one, wrote

[67] Jones 1957: 174-175. Just a few years after confiscation land on the island of Lesbos, the Mitylenaeans were able to seize Rhoeteum and Antandrus and raid Lesbos (Thuc. 4.52). Later in the war in 411, the Chians brought about the revolt of Methymna and Mitylene (Thuc. 8.22). Also in 411, the Peloponnesian army helped all of Euboea revolt except Histiaia/Oreos, which was an Athenian settlement (8.95.7).

[68] Thucydides was very selective in the settlements he mentioned: Skyros (Thuc. 1.98.2); Amphipolis (Thuc. 1.100.3; 4.102.2); Histiaia (Thuc. 1.114.2-3, 7.52.7; 8.95.7); Aigina (Thuc. 2.27; 8.69.3); Poteidaia (Thuc. 2.70.4); Kolophon (Thuc. 3.34.1-4); Melos (Thuc. 5.116).

[69] For land allotment on the Chersonesos and Naxos in the middle of the fifth century, see Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175; Plut. *Per*. 11.5; 19.1.

[70] Nikias, in his critique of Alkibiades, argued that Athens was too far away from Sicily to exert its power on the island, see Thuc. 6.11.1.

that the Athenians were "looking forward to dividing up Sicily into allotments."[71] In Thucydides' narrative, the Athenians' campaign on Lesbos came right after Pericles' death, marking the beginning of a series of events that culminated in the disaster at Syracuse and decline of Athenian *archē*. Perhaps, then, Thucydides meant to signal that the Athenians imagined their future selves as rentier lotholders when they set sail to Sicily in 415.

From what we can tell from contemporary evidence, the Athenians were no strangers to owning land in their imperial territory from back at Athens. For example, a fragmentary inscription from Euboea dating from the 420s and the famous Attic Stelai from 414 show how private Athenians possessed agricultural land scattered all over the Aegean in the latter half of the fifth century. The first inscription recorded a lease agreement for an Athenian named Panaitios, who was renting several *temene* (or "sacred properties") from the Athenian state across Euboea.[72] Though the rest of the inscription is almost completely damaged, save the first few words on each line, you can just make out ἐν Χα[λκίδι] ("in Chalkis"), [ἐν Ἑσ]τιαίαι ("in Histiaia"), and ἐν Ἐρε[τρίαι] ("in Eretria"). For his property in Chalkis, he agreed to pay twenty drachma per year for an olive grove and land to grow wheat and vines. Likewise, the Attica Stelai recorded properties from all over the Aegean that were confiscated from Alkibiades and his fellow Hermokopidai and auctioned off in 414.[73] The register listed properties on Thasos, Euboea, and Abydos. Though it is impossible to say whether or not these were originally land allotments, what is clear is that Athenians like Panaitios would not have been able to live and

[71] Diod. 13.2.2, with Thuc. 6.18.3; Diod. 12.54.1; 13.30.1. Diodorus used the verb κατακληρουχέω to describe the Athenians' intentions.

[72] For rented land on Euboea, see *IG* I^3 418, with Raubitschek 1943: 28-33; Lalonde *et al.* 1991: 171-2; Wallace and Figueira 2013: 252.

[73] For the Attic Stelai, see *IG* I^3 422, with Pritchett and Pippin 1956.

work at each of his properties on Euboea simultaneously.[74] One of Alkibiades' co-conspirators named Adeimantos owned a farm on Thasos, and yet he too was living in Athens when he helped Alkibiades vandalize the city's *hermai* statues. For the Athenians, owning imperial land did not mean that they could not also live in Athens.

This appears to have been the case for the Athenians who had land allotments at Mytilene, where the Mytilenaeans continued to live on their land and send payments to Athens. A decade after the revolt, Antiphon wrote a speech in defense of a Mytilenaean named Euxitheos, who stood accused of murdering an Athenian named Herodes. The young man recalled how his father was forced into exile for his part in the revolt, while most Mytileneans were granted an amnesty that allowed them to continue living on their own land, so long as they kept paying their taxes:

> ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὑμεῖς τοὺς αἰτίους τούτων ἐκολάσατε, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἐφαίνετο ὢν ὁ ἐμὸς πατήρ, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις Μυτιληναίοις ἄδειαν ἐδώκατε οἰκεῖν τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ὕστερον αὐτῷ ἡμάρτηται [τῷ ἐμῷ πατρί], οὐδ᾽ ὅ τι οὐ πεποίηται τῶν δεόντων, οὐδ᾽ ἧς τινος λητουργίας ἡ πόλις ἐνδεὴς γεγένηται, οὔτε ἡ ὑμετέρα οὔτε ἡ Μυτιληναίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορηγίας χορηγεῖ καὶ τέλη κατατίθησιν… ἅπασι γὰρ Μυτιληναίοις ἀείμνηστος ἡ τότε ἁμαρτία γεγένηται: ἠλλάξαντο μὲν γὰρ πολλῆς εὐδαιμονίας πολλὴν κακοδαιμονίαν, ἐπεῖδον δὲ τὴν ἑαυτῶν πατρίδα ἀνάστατον γενομένην.[75]
>
> From the moment you punished the leaders of the revolt—of whom my father was not found to be one—and granted the other Mytilenaeans an amnesty which allowed them to continue living on their own land, he has not been guilty of a single fault, of a single lapse from duty. He has failed neither the city of Athens nor that of Mytilene, when a public service was demanded of him; he regularly furnishes choruses [to Mytilene], and always pays his taxes [to Athens]… The mistake will live in the memory of every citizen of Mytilene. They traded great prosperity for great misery, and saw their country pass into the possession of others.

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[74] Wallace and Figueira (2013: 252, with Gauthier 1973: 169; *contra* Moreno 2007: 89-90) argued that "These estates should not be thought of as part of the allotments to Tolmides' cleruchs or of the land of the Hippobotai leased after 446, neither of which would be expected to be treated as an Athenians' private property." For *IG* I^3 418, see Raubitschek 1943: 28-33; Lalonde *et al.* 1991: 154, 171-172; Polinskaya 2009: 251. For *IG* I^3 422, see Pritchett 1953: 232; Erxleben 1975: 84-85; Finley 1981: 52; Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004: 328, 332.

[75] Antiph. 5.76-77. Figueira (2008: 441-442) suggested that *klēroi* came from land owned by local elites, and the rent shifted to Athenians.

Euxitheos' testimony seemed to suggest that the Athenians were "in possession" of Mytilene, but the Mytilenaeans still lived there and worked the land. It is also curious that, throughout his extended testimony, he never once mentioned an Athenian living on the island. Rather, Euxitheos and Herodes were traveling on a ship which sailed from Mytilene to Ainos, on the southeastern coast of Thrace, where Herodes planned to sell a number of slaves, perhaps after checking on his land on Mytilene.[76] What we see is that Euxitheos knew full well that the Athenians considered Mytilene to be a part of their imperial territory and, to the Mytileaneans, that meant paying their rent to Athenian lotholders. After a decade had passed, Mytilene was no longer the prosperous city it had once been because so much of its citizens' wealth was going to the Athenians. So even though Isocrates and Plutarch liked to remember Athenian landholders taking an active role garrisoning their empire, the reality of Athenian imperial territory was much more complicated than that.

Overall, what the Athenians seem to have collectively wanted from their imperial territory was money to rebuild and invest in their metropole. Even though the Athenians had made Athens into an active economic and cultural center during the Archaic period, Xerxes' campaign into Attica in 480 left their city in ruins. It is easy to see, then, why they created a centralized tax structure whereby tribute from coalition members and most taxes from land allotments flowed directly to Athens.[77] As the Athenians increasingly relied on their navy and a small number of rotating imperial officials to enforce the regular flow of taxes and trade, they went further to entrench themselves in old ideas about what distinguished their metropolis and citizen territory.

[76] For the likelihood that Herodes was an Athenian lotholder with land at Mytilene, see Schindel 1979: 206-208; Lattimore 1987: 502.

[77] By *c.* 425-415, the Athenians went so far as to make everyone in the coalition use Athenian coins, see *IG* I^3 1453, with Figueira 1998.

It is no coincidence that Athenian popular culture at the height of the Athenian empire continually called attention to the autochthonous origins of Athenian citizens: dramatists riddled their works with stories about how the Athenians were Athenian because they could all trace their lineage back to the soil of Attica.[78] For example, Aristophanes joked in his *Wasps* that true Athenians are native to the soil, but also have a stinger.[79] On a much more somber note, Thucydides began Pericles' funeral oration by reminding the Athenians of their ancestor's devotion to Attica: he reminded them that they fought and died defending Attica because Athenians had lived and worked the same countryside continuously through successive generations up to their imperial present.[80] The growth of their empire only reinforced how the Athenians saw their own citizen territory as separate from the land they confiscated beyond it.

In the two generations after the Persian Wars, the Athenians prioritized their navy and their ideology of autochthony, a combination that allowed them to compartmentalize their empire. Though some of the Athenians who received land allotments on Euboea and Lesbos were free to live back at Athens, others became settlers and chose to live abroad at colonies such as Lemnos and Histiaia. As we will see in the cases of Lemnos and Histiaia, the new settler communities were politically autonomous from Athens, created their own popular institutions, and paid tribute just like any other coalition member. Yet even the Athenian settlers lived only where the local population was forcibly removed and their political community dissolved. In that sense, Athenian settlers mirrored the Athenians living in Attica by distancing themselves from the communities they dispossessed. For both settlers and lotholders alike, the Athenians

[78] For autochthony, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1993: esp. 1-21; 2000: esp. 13-27, 115-118; Hall 1997: 51-56. See also Introduction n. 25.

[79] Aristoph. *Wasps* 1075-1077, with MacDowell 1971: 271.

[80] Thuc. 2.36.1. Of course, other Greek communities at the time claimed autochthonous origins as well, but that was beside the point.

saw their imperial territory in terms of insularity: there was their citizen territory in which they prioritized their metropolitan interests, and then there was their imperial territory in which they prioritized their individual interests. This meant that the Athenian state played a passive role outside of Attica so long as taxes and trade continued to flow to Athens. Over time, the Athenians' approach to imperial territory became a vehicle for a particular kind of economic change: as settlers created new markets for Athenian goods produced in Attica, and land allotment transferred wealth to Athenian lotholders who then invested it at Athens, the Athenians also developed a monopoly on human capital.

3.4. *Centralizing Human Capital*

The draw of life in Attica was strong for many Athenians, even when imperial land allotments could easily have drawn them away from home. This was never more apparent than when, at the onset of the Peloponnesian War in 431, Pericles directed every Athenian living in the Attic countryside to leave their homes and move within the walls of Athens. Thucydides described how many Athenians living in the countryside hated the thought of abandoning their homes, even if it meant they would be safe in Athens.[81] Surely the threat of a Spartan invasion only increased any anxieties they might have had about leaving their homes; still, for rural Athenians who had a strong sense of place within the Attic countryside, moving away from Attica may not have been an appealing option. For urban Athenians already living in Athens or Piraeus, they may have been committed to staying there because of its economic opportunities:

[81] Thuc. 2.23-14. For the political community at Athens, see Anderson 2003. He argued that Attica became unified at the end of the fifth century as a result of elite competition that drew the countryside into Athenian affairs. For democratic sociology, see Ober 1987; 2006.

the Athenian metropolis that Thucydides and Xenophon knew was home to so many crafts, specializations, and manufacturers that people from all around the Mediterranean world traveled there to live as metics (or "resident foreigners").[82] Excavations at the Potter's Quarter, for example, have shown that the city had competing ceramic workshops of multi-ethnic craftsmen.[83] Furthermore, for urban Athenians, a strong sense of political community may have been enough to keep some from leaving home. Socrates, for one, believed that citizens entered into a sort of political contract with their broader political community, and he refused to leave Athens even in the face of death.[84] At the end of the Peloponnesian War, a friend of his named Charmides admitted that, by losing his properties outside of Attica, he actually had more time to travel abroad.[85]

The Athenians drew from this sense of metropolitanism when they imagined their imperial territory. As we have already seen, the Athenians' approach to imperial territory made it so taxes and trade flowed directly to their metropole rather than being shared or reinvested on the frontier.[86] The Athenians compartmentalized their empire the way they did because, outside of Attica, they were pursuing their private interests, so long as those interests did not negatively impact the Athenian metropole. Land allotment was thus a way for citizens to make money

[82] Thuc. 2.39.1; [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.12, with Garland 1987: 22-32, 83-95. For manufacturing at Athens, see Acton 2014.

[83] For the Athenian Potter's Quarters, see Langridge-Noti 2015, with Hannestad 1988: 222-223; Galinier *et al.* 2003; Acton 2014: 83-114.

[84] Plato, *Crito* 51c-53a. At 51d, Socrates equated leaving the state with living outside of (ἀποικέω) Athens or living in foreign *polis*.

[85] Xen. *Symp.* 4.31, with Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004: 335-6, *contra* Gauthier 1966: 65-82. For a similar episode, see also Xen. *Mem.* 2.8. In 405, the Spartan general Lysander steered the Peloponnesian fleet from one Athenian ally or garrison to another on their way to defeat Athens once and for all. Their fleet wrecked on the shores of Aigospotamoi, the Athenians had no choice but to return home and abandon their imperial territory. Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.22-28; cf. Diod. 13.105-106. For Lysanders' campaign, see Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.2; Plut. *Lys*. 13.2-3. Xenophon said that Lysander gave safe conduct to all Athenians returning. Yet when Xenophon described how Lysander sent home the Athenian garrisons and any other Athenian he saw abroad, he did not mention anything about *klērouchoi* or *klērouchiai.*

[86] It is worth recalling how Thucydides (2.13.2) thought that the strength of Athens in 431 was in its ability to accumulate revenues.

individually and to invest in their metropole collectively. As we will see, no matter how the Athenians allotted land, they seem to have always found a way for money to end up back at Athens. For the settlers who came together to create new colonies, they did so only after a military campaign broke apart the local community by enslaving or forcibly removing its residents. Afterwards, the settlers paid tribute to Athens like any other coalition member and exchanged primarily for goods produced in Athens. For the lotholders who rented their land to the people they dispossessed, I argue below that they paid a small tax to the state for the privilege of being imperial rentiers, living at Athens, and investing their earnings however they saw fit. Because the people they dispossessed directed their annual payments back to Athens, over time the lotholders also directed trade back to Athenian markets, where craftsmen, merchants, and bankers from around the eastern Mediterranean gathered to do business. The cumulative effect of these twin processes was to centralize human capital at Athens.

Judging by the amount of land the Athenians confiscated in the fifth century, more Athenian citizens probably profited from land allotment than anything else in their empire.[87] But this did not mean that all Athenians benefitted equally. As we saw at the end of the Archaic period, land allotment was a formative institution of democratic Athens, a nod to egalitarianism still two generations before Ephialtes' reforms in the 460s.[88] Emblematic of the popular buy-in to both empire and shared governance, land allotment also ensured private inequality because there were more citizens than allotments. Theoretically, the Athenians collectively owned all imperial land before they allotted it, but afterwards there is no indication to suggest that the

[87] Strauss 2009: 219. A third of all Athenian citizens may have received *klēroi*. For demographic estimates, see Jones 1957: 7, 156-157. Other forms of foreign land came from rare individual grants of *enktesis* and special dispensation, possibly through *proxenos* status.

[88] For Ephialtes' popular reforms, imperialism, and the development of democracy at Athens, see Sealey 1981; Ostwald 1986; Raaflaub 1994.

state took any part even transporting lotholders to and from their allotments. When it came to imperial land, so long as taxes and trade kept flowing to Athens, the state wanted little to do with it. Because Athenian land allotment, unlike Spartan helotage, did not guarantee an equality of outcome, it left room for entrepreneuring Athenians living in Athens to invest the rents they collected to make even more money.

This made lotholders especially important for the economic development of the Athenian metropole. Even though the Athenians collectively decided when and how to divide up the land they confiscated, allotted land became a private investment for many of those who received it. Unlike political sortition, in which citizens participated in shared governance and earned a public wage for a year, imperial land allotment was a source of income that could last a lifetime. For that reason, the Athenians seem to have treated it more like any other financial transaction than repayment for a public—or, indeed, imperial—service. For example, we know that during the fifth century the state taxed citizens who worked land outside of Attica that had been designated sacred property.[89] Panaitios, who we met earlier, paid the Athenian state an annual tax for the privilege of working—or, more realistically, hiring others to work—a farm with olive groves, wheat fields, and vines in the countryside of Chalkis. From what we can tell, Panaitios' arrangement with the Athenian state seems to have been part of a broader trend of individual Athenians leasing state-owned land for their own private use.

In fact, land leases seem to have been one of the main ways the Athenian state made money. A complete inscription dating from 418/7 recorded an initiative proposed by a certain Adosios for the state to make money by renting sacred property to double as an olive grove:

[89] For a similar lease for sacred land, see *IG* I^3 402. For how people made money from sacred property, see Papazarkadas 2010: 16-98.

> ὁπόσεν δ' ἂν ἄλφει μίσ[θ]οσιν τὸ τέμενος κατὰ τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἕκαστον, καταβαλλέτο τὸ ἀργύριον ἐπὶ τε͂ς ἐνάτες πρυτανείας τοῖς ἀποδέκ-ται[ς], οἱ δὲ ἀποδέκται τοῖς ταμίαισι τὸν ἄλλον θεὸν παραδιδόντον [κ]ατὰ τὸν νόμον…
>
> μισθοῦν δὲ βασιλέα τὸ τέμενος τοῦ Νελέος καὶ τε͂ς Βασίλες κατὰ τάδε· τὸν μισθοσάμενον ἐ͂ρχσαι μὲν τὸ *h*ιερὸν τοῦ Κόδρο καὶ τοῦ Νελέ- ος καὶ τε͂ς Βασίλες κατὰ τὰς χσυνγραφὰς ἐπὶ τε͂ς βολε͂ς τε͂ς εἰσιόσ- ες, τὸ δὲ τ[έ]μ̣ενο[ς] τοῦ Νελέος καὶ τε͂ς Βασίλες κατὰ τάδε ἐργάζεσθαι· φυτεῦσαι φυτευτέρια ἐλαῶν μὲ ὄλεζον ἒ διακόσια, πλέονα δὲ ἐὰν β-όλεται.[90]
>
> Whatever rent the sacred precinct produces in each year, let him deposit the money in the ninth prytany with the receivers, and let the receivers hand it over to the treasurers of the Other Gods according to the law…
>
> The [Archon] Basileus shall lease the sacred precinct of Neleus and of Basile on the following terms: that the lessee fence in the sanctuary of Kodros and Neleus and Basile according to the specifications during the term of the Council that is about to enter office, and that he work the sacred precinct of Neleus and Basile on the following terms: that he plant young sprouts of olive trees, no fewer than 200, and more if he wishes.

Acting on behalf of the collective interests of the Athenians, Adosios saw an opportunity to rent out sacred property to someone willing to invest the time and money to turn it into an olive grove. Whoever won the contract surely expected to turn a profit, but the Athenian state did too. Before granting the contract, the Athenian state was not getting anything from the unused land; by creating an opportunity for someone to invest in the land, it was. The Athenians may have had a similar arrangement in mind when they allotted land on Mytilene. After all, if lotholders decided to rent out their land from back at Athens, they were still benefiting from the

[90] *IG* I^3 84, *ll.* 15-18, 29-34, with Walbank 1991: 154-155. For the Athenian state making money from lesease, see *IG* I^3 1; 237; 417. For public leases in general, see Lalonde *et al.* 1991: 145-210. There were four categories of lease records. First, allotted land to which Athens retained legal title, see above. Second, land confiscated outside Attica for private use, see *IG* I^3 418. Third, land allotted for sacred use, see *IG* I^3 84**;** 386; 395; 402. Fourth, land in Attica owned by political institutions such as demes, see *IG* I^3 243; 258.

perks of life in imperial Athens, and they could be expected to make a contribution for the privilege of making easy money. A tax would have been a sign of democratic buy-in, an actual investment in Athens.

It is tempting to think that the Athenians collectively profited from settlers and lotholders in different ways: from settlers, they received tribute like any other coalition member; from lotholders, they may have received rent in the form of a tax. To support this idea is a fragmentary inscription dating from the end of the Peloponnesian War *c.* 410-404, which distinguished between lotholders and settlers—or, to be more precise, between *apoikiai* and *klērouchiai*:

[*h*εμιοβέ]λιον ὑπὲρ *h*εκ[άστ----------]
[. . . .] κ̣αρπο͂ δὲ *h*οπόσος ἂ̣[ν----------ύ-]
[π]ὲρ ἑκάστο καὶ το͂ γλεύκ[ος----------ὑπὲρ ἑκάστο ἀμφ-]
ορέος ὀβολόν, καὶ μέλιτ[ος----------μισ-]
θόσεος γε͂ς καὶ οἰκιῶ̃ κα[ὶ----------ἀργ-]
υρίο *h*ὸς ἂ̃ν μισθοῖ ἀποτε[ισάτο----------]
ίζ̣ει καὶ ἀπολαμ<β>άνει το[----------ταῖ-]
ς ἀποικίαις καὶ κλεροχία[ις----------καὶ τὸς ἀπε-]
[λ]ευθέρος κατὰ ταὐτὰ ποε[ν----------]
[.]ζοντας καὶ *h*ομονοοῦ̃ντα[ς----------ἐ-]
[πὶ] τε͂ς δευτέρας πρυτανε[ίας----------]
[. . .]ριν τε͂ς βολε͂ς τ[ε͂]ι κυ[ρίαι ἐκκλεσίαι----------]
[. .]σ̣θαι. τὰ δὲ τέλε τ̣----------][91]

Because the inscription is so fragmentary, it is hard to say much about its content. What we can say with some confidence is that, unlike contemporary Athenian historians, this state record distinguished between two different ways Athenian citizens could make money from imperial land. It also referenced different kinds of property, including *gē* (or "land") and *oikoi* (or "houses"), after mentioning some kind of *misthos* (or "payment") in silver. For that reason,

[91] *IG* I³ 237. For historical commentary, see Graham 1964: 169; Brunt 1993: 114-115; Lalonde *et al.* 1991: 155. Figueira (1991: 11) argued that "The juxtaposition suggests that these were two discrete categories into which Athenian settlements abroad were classified."

Michael Walbank concluded that the inscription likely dealt "with various kinds of tax, perhaps in land overseas controlled by Athens."[92] It is unclear who was being paid or making a payment, though it may well have been tax-farmers tasked with collecting taxes on behalf of the Athenian state. If lotholders leased their land from the Athenian state, imperial records may have had to distinguish between lotholders who owed a certain tax for their lease and settlers who had some other obligation.

In such a case, the Athenians seem to have found a creative way of allowing their citizens who won a land allotment to stay in Attica. We saw earlier how the Athenian state made arrangements to lease sacred property to individuals. We also saw at Mytilene how the Athenians let the people they dispossessed stay on the land, so long as they paid their Athenian lotholder. What the Athenians seem to have done was create multiple layers of lease agreements whereby an Athenian lotholder leased his land allotment from the Athenian state while simultaneously leasing it again to a local farmer or group of farmers. Though no contemporary author provides any details about what this might have looked like, a third-century CE Roman author named Aelian claimed to have preserved an anecdote of Athenian imperial power, immediately followed by a description of Spartan helotage. Aelian mentioned that the Athenians confiscated land from the Chalkidian elite on island of Euboea, and leased out the land to private citizens. At Chalkis, as we saw at Mytilene, the Athenian state saved some land as sacred property. Unlike Thucydides' account of Mytilene, Aelian's anecdote described how the Athenian state leased out the imperial land to private Athenians:

[92] Walbank 1991: 155.

> Ἀθηναῖοι κρατήσαντες Χαλκιδέων κατεκληρούχησαν αὐτῶν τὴν γῆν ἐς δισχιλίους κλήρους, τὴν Ἱππόβοτον καλουμένην χώραν, τεμένη δὲ ἀνῆκαν τῇ Αθηνᾷ ἐν τῷ Ληλάντῳ ὀνομαζομένῳ τόπῳ, τὴν δὲ λοιπὴν ἐμίσθωσαν κατὰ τὰς στήλας τὰς πρὸς τῇ βασιλείῳ στοᾷ ἑστηκυίας, αἵπερ οὖν τὰ τῶν μισθώσεων ὑπομνήματα εἶχον.[93]
>
> After conquering the Chalkidians, the Athenians divided their so-called Hippobotos land among lotholders, making 2000 allotments; and they made reservations for a *temenos* to Athena in the place called Lelanton and the remainder they let out at rentals at the rate shown in the *stelai* which stood against the Stoa Basileios and contained the accounts of these rentals.

Like sacred land outside of Attica, the Athenian state let out the land allotments in Chalkis at a set rate, recorded publicly in the Athenian Agora. The Athenians built the Stoa Baseileios in the last quarter of the sixth century in the northwest corner of the Agora to serve as the administrative headquarters of the Archon Basileus, who administered public leases. Though excavations at the Agora have not found any inscriptions recording lease agreements with lotholders, given the frequency of imperial land allotment during the fifth century, there could have been thousands of leases if they were not standardized, or bundled, for each region.

We can get a better sense of how these leases may have worked from the fourth-century *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, which explained the standard lease agreement procedure in some detail, beginning with the Archon Basileus. The Archon Basileus kept the leases on whitened boards, with the names of the tenants and the amounts and dates of the installments in such a manner

[93] Aelian *Var. Hist.* 6.1. It is unclear what Aelian's sources were for this passage. Unfortunately, Aelian did not distinguish between the settlements of 506 and 446. For the settlement of 506, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.1. For the settlement of 446, see *IG* I^3 40; 1502; Plut. *Per*. 11.5; Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5. Figueira (1991: 259) preferred the latter date because "The leasing out of land with records preserved in stone suggested the procedures of the full-fledged democracy and the *arkhē*, rather than the sixth-century administration." Zelnick-Abramovitz (2004: 333) noted that Aelian never mentioned any Athenians ever being sent out or visiting their allotments before the land was leased out to local Chalkidians. The editors of the *ATL* (3.296) argued that Aelian was mistaken because they did not think the state could rent out any property except sacred precincts. Their argument rested on the fact that we do not have any comparable lease agreements for imperial land allotments. However, even if they were correct, it is unclear why the Athenians would have treated sacred property on confiscated land differently from land allotted to private individuals.

that he or one of his public slaves could mark individual installments as paid and any debt canceled on the due date each year:

> εἰσφέρει δὲ καὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς τὰς μισθώσεις τῶν τεμενῶν, ἀναγράψας ἐν γραμματείοις λελευκωμένοις. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τούτων ἡ μὲν μίσθωσις εἰς ἔτη δέκα, καταβάλλεται δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς θ# πρυτανείας. διὸ καὶ πλεῖστα χρήματα ἐπὶ ταύτης συλλέγεται τῆς πρυτανείας. εἰσφέρεται μὲν οὖν εἰς τὴν βουλὴν τὰ γραμματεῖα κατὰ τὰς καταβολὰς ἀναγεγραμμένα, τηρεῖ δ᾽ ὁ δημόσιος: ὅταν δ᾽ ᾖ χρημάτων καταβολή… εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἀποδέκται δέκα κεκληρωμένοι κατὰ φυλάς: οὗτοι δὲ παραλαβόντες τὰ γραμματεῖα, ἀπαλείφουσι τὰ καταβαλλόμενα χρήματα ἐναντίον τῆς βουλῆς ἐν τῷ βουλευτηρίῳ, καὶ πάλιν ἀποδιδόασιν τὰ γραμματεῖα τῷ δημοσίῳ.
>
> Also the Archon Basileus introduces the leasing of domains, having made a list of them on whitened tablets. These also are let for ten years, and the rent is paid in the ninth presidency; hence in that presidency a very large revenue comes in. The tablets written up with the list of payments are brought before the Council, but are in the keeping of the official clerk; and whenever a payment of money is made, he takes down from the pillars… There are ten receivers elected by lot, one from each tribe; these take over the tablets and wipe off the sums paid in the presence of the Council in the Bouleuterion, and give the tablets back again to the official clerk.[94]

The process was fairly straightforward: the Archon Basileus announced that there was land to lease, the landholders registered their land, paid their tax, the Council approved it, and the receivers transferred the money to the state. In many ways, this procedure mirrored what we saw in Adosios' proposal. In that case, the Archon Basileus presided over the lease and the receivers collected the rent in the ninth prytany. And as with all Athenian financial transactions, the lease also required the leaseholder to provide the Archon Basileus several guarantors to ensure the final payment of the tax.[95] It is less clear, however, whether these procedures also held for imperial lotholders.

Though the *Athēnaiōn Politeia* and Adosios' proposal did not refer directly to leases with lotholders, the procedures they described were very similar to how the Athenians collected rent

[94] [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 47.4-48.1.

[95] *IG* I^3 84, *l. 25.* The Athenian state required guarantors to ensure that payment was received on time, in full, see Walbank 1991: 163-164.

from lotholders under the fourth-century Grain Tax Law of 374/3.[96] In the years after Sphodrias' failed raid on Piraeus in 378, the Athenians set out to reclaim some of their land allotments, and in 374/3 passed a law that farmed out the collection of taxes from the land allotments on the islands of Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros. The legislation required a group of tax farmers to supply guarantors, the contract had to pass the scrutiny of the Council, and the payment went to the receivers for allocation to the state. If tax farming under the Grain Tax Law mirrored, at least in substance, the leases described in the *Athēnaion Politaea,* and the lease of fifth-century land allotments at Chalkis passed through the Stoa Baseileios like other leases, perhaps, then, fifth-century land allotments followed a similar leasing process to what the *Athēnaion Politaea* described. It is reasonable to think that land allotments, like other public leases, came with a tax, so state revenue from cleruchies would have been lumped together with the other returns of the ninth prytany, including customs duties and the *metoikion* (or the "resident foreigners tax"). When the Athenians decided on matters of the state, they may have seen land allotments as another form of revenue.

This might explain why the Athenians were willing to lower required tribute payments from communities where the Athenians confiscated land, like at Naxos, Andros, Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos, so that the people they dispossessed would not have to pay two separate forms of imperial tax.[97] If reductions in imperial tribute were connected to the confiscation of land, the state may have made up for the lower tribute rates with the rent from the lotholders themselves—that is, a small contribution for the opportunity to profit from confiscated land. It might also explain

[96] Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 118-129; Sorg 2015. The Grain Tax Law made it so the taxes from the cleruchies were in grain, not cash.

[97] *ATL* 3.287, 294-295.

why the Athenians tried to standardize taxes on land allotments, as we saw from both Thucydides and Aelian. The Archon Basileus may have set the tax in order to ensure a certain amount of revenue for the Athenian state, and also to avoid an otherwise arduous bidding process for hundreds of lotholders.

Altogether, the likelihood that the Athenians bundled leases for land allotments, standardized how they taxed the land, and relied on tax farming all point towards a form of entrepreneurial empire like what we saw earlier for Achaemenid Persia. The Athenian state, like Achaemenid Persia, seems to have only cared whether private lotholders had enough money to pay their tax. Also like the Achaemenids, the Athenians invested their imperial revenues back into their metropole: the Athenians hired craftsmen to work on public works projects, paid citizens a public wage for their participation in shared-governance, and put on dramatic festivals like the Dionysia where the finest dramatists and artists came from all over the Greek world. Collectively, the Athenians seem to have been less concerned with the land itself than the end result: land allotment becoming a vehicle for metropolitanism.

Over time, this kind of centralized tax structure would have also helped centralize human capital at Athens. By experimenting with new ways of allowing citizens to collect imperial rents from their land allotments while also living in Attica, the Athenians ensured that more citizens remained in and around the metropole than if they had only pursued settler colonialism like other Greeks during the Archaic period. With land allotments adding to whatever surplus income lotholders may have had, many Athenians were probably more likely to specialize in a particular service or invest in their craft. One of the main reasons why the Athenian cultural revolution of the fifth century coincided with the Athenian empire was because added wealth allowed people

living in and around Athens to specialize. A wealthy, specialized citizenry had the added effect of attracting more people to Athens to do business—so much so that, in the 440s, the Athenians commissioned the renowned urban planner Hippodamos to help them reorganize and expand their commercial port at Piraeus so it could keep up with the growing population of craftsmen, merchants, and bankers.[98] The commission signaled that the Athenians recognized and appreciated how Piraeus was becoming one of the leading commercial centers in the Mediterranean: by 430, Pericles famously boasted in his Funeral Oration that Athens, unlike Sparta, was an open city, available for anyone to do business, attracting people and imports from all over the Mediterranean and beyond.[99]

Of course, the Athenians still closely guarded their citizenship, but that did not preclude them from centralizing human capital at Athens. Consider Lysias, the Athenians' beloved metic turned orator: around mid-century, his father moved from Syracuse to Athens, where he started a factory that made shields; during the Peloponnesian War, Lysias and his brother continued to expand their father's business, putting to work a hundred and twenty skilled slaves.[100] Resident foreigners were so common in Athens and Piraeus during the second half of the fifth century that the so-called Old Oligarch complained that no one could tell the difference between citizens and metics; writing a half century later, shortly after the Second Athenian League failed like the Delian League before it, Xenophon sifted through Athenian imperial history in the fifth century

[98] Arist. *Pol.* 1267b22-1268a14, with Garland 1987: 26-28.

[99] Thuc. 2.38-39: "Because of the importance of our city the products of the whole world all flow in here, and it is our good fortune to enjoy with the same familiar pleasure both our home-produced goods and those of other peoples… We keep our city open to the world and do not ever expel people to prevent them from learning or observing the sort of thing whose disclosure might benefit the enemy."

[100] Lysias, *Against Eratosthenes* 12.4-8, 19.

to find ways to attract more foreign workers to Athens.[101] He concluded that the Athenians needed to create new incentives for foreigners to live and visit Athens, which would, in turn, drive up imports and exports, prices, rents, customs duties, and so on. Though much of our evidence for how human capital became centralized at Athens is by necessity anecdotal, the link between Athenian land allotment, the development of a centralized tax structure, and the accumulation of human capital at Athens is unmistakable.

Athenian land allotment was therefore part and parcel of democratic metropolitanism. Because the Athenian masses controlled popular discourse, the elite were probably more willing to endure Kleisthenes' democracy on the condition that individual citizens, both wealthy and poor, could use land allotment for private gain. It is worth recalling how the Athenians first allotted imperial land just after the popular revolution of 508/7. By allotting land to both mass and elite, perhaps the popular leaders of the time were extending an olive branch to the entrepreneuring elite: the elite would have to yield to popular sovereignty, but they would have full access to imperial sources of wealth. Like their Archaic predecessors, the fifth-century Athenians allowed empire to be a source of private inequality. But collectively, they expected land allotment to be a vehicle for metropolitanism. As settlers and lotholders profited from their land allotments in places like Lemnos and Euboea, the Athenians put their economic power to the test: by using land allotment to undermine the economies of their commercial rivals, while simultaneously extending their markets to new colonies, the Athenians shifted the productive capacity of the Aegean in Athens' favor.

[101] [Xen]. *Ath. Pol*. 1.10; Xen. *Poroi* 3.5-6: "The rise in the number of residents and visitors would of course lead to a corresponding expansion of our imports and exports, of sales, rents and customs. Now such additions to our revenues as these need cost us nothing whatever beyond good legislation and measures of control. Other methods of raising revenue that I have in mind will require capital."

3.5. *Lemnos: Expanding Athenian Markets*

A fifth the size of Attica, Lemnos was still a titan in the Aegean, naturally poised to command trade between the Hellespont and Thrace. In the aftermath of Darius' Scythian campaign in 511, the Persians crossed over to Lemnos to control the entrance to the Black Sea and secure the island's grain production. After the Persians conquered the island, Darius appointed a governor, who managed the island's harvests by enslaving the native "Pelasgian" community.[102] Over the next generation the island fell in and out of Athenian control: Miltiades first conquered the island for the Athenians around the turn of the century, but the island seems to have been under Persian control once again during Xerxes' campaign in 480. Hecataeus wrote that Miltiades used his position in Gallipoli and the cover of the Ionian Revolt of 499 to take the island as retribution for a group of Athenian women who were kidnapped while celebrating the Artemesion at Brauron and taken back to Lemnos as concubines.[103] Miltiades forced the Lemnians from the island and, in their place, Athenian settlers moved in. Recent excavations on the island have dated changes in material culture to a generation later, contemporaneous with Kimon's expeditions in the northern Aegean after the Persian Wars.[104] The Athenians seem to have evacuated the island during Xerxes' campaign—save a small naval contingent that ultimately defected from the Persian fleet—only to return to the island after the

[102] Hdt. 5.25-27. Greek authors often used the term "Pelasgians" (Πελασγοί) to refer to any pre-Greek, local community, see Munro 1934; Lochner-Hüttenbach 1960. Unlike Herodotus, Diodorus (10.19.6) called the native Lemnians "Tyrrhenians," see De Simone 1996.

[103] Hecataeus *apud* Hdt. 6.137-140; cf. Hdt. 4.145; Diod. 10.19; Nep. *Milt.* 1-2. Peisistratus' sons sent Miltiades to the Thracian Chersonese *c.* 520 to secure the peninsula and take over the position of *tyrannos* after the murder of his brother, see Hdt. 6.34-9. The Pelasgians had allegedly ambushed a group of Athenian women in Brauron and taken them back to Lemnos as concubines, see Hdt. 4.145, 6.138.

[104] Culasso Gastaldi 2012a: 141. Inscriptions on three Corinthian helmets dedicated at the Athenian acropolis, the temple of Nemesis at Rhamnous, and Olympia may refer to the Athenian conquest of Lemnos, see *IG* I^3 518; 522 *bis*; 1466. All three record a variation of Ἀθεναῖοι ἐγ Λέμνο, and reference the conquest of Lemnos.

Persian Wars.[105] Afterwards, the Athenian settlers at Hephaistia and Myrina became coalition members and fought alongside the Athenians through the end of the fifth century.

The case of Lemnos shows how an Athenian military campaign could break apart an existing political community to make room for Athenian settlers to inhabit the land themselves. Afterwards, Athenian imperialism on Lemnos had a lot in common with what we saw with Miltiades' elite opportunism in the Archaic period: the settlers displaced a pre-existing community, divided up the land for individual use, and then kept close economic, but not political, ties with Athens. Athenian Lemnos was thus a story of Archaic imperialism in transition: the Athenian state initially paved the way for the new colonies at Hephaistia and Myrina, the settlers became citizens of new political communities, and, as we will see, exchange between the Athenians and the settlers on Lemnos helped the Athenians expand their markets, sell their goods produced in Athens, and feed their metropolitan population with Lemnian grain. The island of Lemnos makes for a particularly good case study of Athenian land allotment because its imperial history mirrored several other islands in the Aegean but, unlike most other islands, we have a fairly diverse body of historical, epigraphic, and archaeological evidence to draw from: these include continuous records of tribute payments to Athens, boundary markers from sacred properties, and evidence for imports and local production from excavations at Hephaistia, its necropolis, and rural tombs. Altogether, what we see is that land allotment on Lemnos prevented the island from becoming a commercial rival to Athens and instead turned it into a new market for goods produced in Athens.

[105] Hdt. 8.11.2. In 480, a Lemnian trireme commander named Antidoros defected to the Athenians after the first day of fighting at Artemesium. As a reward, the Athenians gave him land on Salamis, which recently became an Athenian imperial territory, see *IG* I^3 1.

The Athenian settlers who won land allotments on Lemnos became known as allies rather than Athenian citizens once they moved to the island. In fact, they were among the first to join the Delian League and they continued to pay tribute to the Athenians as coalition members. The "Lemnians," as they show up in the tribute lists, paid nine talents in 452/1, and thereafter the settlers at Hephaistia and Myrina paid separately at a reduced rate, set at a combined four and a half talents.[106] During the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides recorded the Lemnians fighting alongside the Athenians at some of most important battles of the war, like at Mytilene, Sphakteria, Amphipolis, and Syracuse: at each battle, he recorded them fighting as "Lemnians," not as Athenian *apoikoi*, *epoikoi*, or *klērouchoi*; by the time of the Sicilian campaign, Thucydides also made a point to remind his readers that the Lemnians still had the "same language and customs as the Athenians."[107] Having come from Athens, the settlers brought with them to Lemnos Athenian civic subdivision, judging from inscriptions of deceased Lemnians organized under demes like Erechtheis and Hippothontis.[108] Still, there is no reason to think that the settlers remained Athenian citizens through the fifth century.

Even though the settlers on Lemnos were no longer citizens, they continued to reinforce their shared interests with the Athenians. In Athens, once the building program on the Acropolis was underway in the 440s, the Lemnians dedicated a bronze statue of Athena: according to Pausanias, "it was the most impressive of Pheidias' works."[109] Pausanias described

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[106] For 452/1, see *IG* I^3 261.1.3. Graham (1964: 177) argued convincingly that Lemnian tribute payments do not indicate an sizeable Pelasgian population because, among other reasons, "a very considerable number of Pelasgians would have had to remain to pay nine talents."

[107] For settlers fighting as Lemnians, see Thuc. 3.5.1, 4.28.4, 5.8.2, 7.57.2; For language and customs, see Thuc. 7.57.2.

[108] Athenian civic subdivisions: *IG* I^3 1164, 1165, 1477; *IG* XII *suppl*. 337; Finley 105 in Finley 1951. *IG* I^3 1477 was a list of names grouped by tribe and was likely a list of deceased, like those found at the *demosion sema* at Athens, see Culasso Gastaldi 2008b: 278-280; 2012a: 140.

[109] Paus. 1.28.2; cf. Lucian, *Imagines* 4, 6; Himerios, *Oratio* 68.4. To Pausanias, the statue was τῶν ἔργων τῶν Φειδίου θέας μάλιστα ἄξιον.

the "Lemnian Athena" alongside three other offerings on the Acropolis worthy of note, all of which, he said, were dedicated after important milestones in the Athenians' imperial history: a bronze chariot, a *dekatē* (or "tithe") from the same Chalkidians the Athenians confiscated land from *c.* 507; a bronze Athena Promachos, a tithe from the Persians defeated at Marathon; and a statue of Pericles, whose face became synonymous with Athenian imperialism. The Lemnian Athena fit nicely among the other three: Chalkis was the first time the Athenians experimented with land allotment under the new democracy, the battle of Marathon was the first real test of the Athenian military after Kleisthenes' reforms, and Pericles probably confiscated more land than any other Athenian general. Likewise, the Lemnian Athena was a trophy celebrating the Athenians' conquest of the island. The Lemnians were indebted to the Athenians for the land from which they drew their livelihoods. It was only fitting, then, that they paid for the material and Pheidias' labor, likely with surplus income from their land allotments.

Back on Lemnos, the settlers broke from the native community and transformed the island into a new hub of economic exchange, whereby the settlers imported goods produced at Athens and sold grain from their allotments. The transformation began with the settlers making the island their own, clearly distinguishing themselves from the people they dispossessed. Emanuele Greco, who directed the most recent excavations on Lemnos, found that the second quarter of the fifth century had "i segni inequivocabili di una brusca discontinuità culturale" (unmistakeable signs of a sharp cultural discontinuity), marked by the creation of a new urban community.[110] Excavations at Hephaistia have found that the urban center was fully re-planned, with a new

[110] For cultural discontinuity on Lemnos, see Greco and Ficuciello 2012: 153. For early excavations, see Mustilli 1938; 1940. For a recent synthesis of the changes in material culture at the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth centuries, see Beschi 2000c; 2001; Greco 2008; Ficuciello 2008; Culasso Gastaldi 2012a. For Lemnos during the Archaic period, see Ficuciello 2012a; 2013: 67-195.

orientation of the buildings and the destruction of native sanctuaries.[111] The material culture of the native population disappeared in urban households and in all the island's sanctuaries: excavations have found no traces of native ceramic production—recognizable for its displays of Orientalizing sirens, winged goddesses, and sphinxes—after the first quarter of the fifth century.[112] Before local production came to a stop, Lemnian figured pottery from the late Archaic period was exported across the northern Aegean: excavations have found Lemnian exports in Samothrace, Thasos, Kavala, and Antissa.[113] This was also a time when most imported ceramics on Lemnos arrived from Corinth, Athens' commercial rival.[114] Contemporaneous with the resettlement of the urban centers and the violent destruction of the Hephaistia's sanctuaries was a change in burial assemblages: though burials dating from before the Athenian conquered the island had mostly locally sourced and Corinthian pottery, the fifth-century burials only contained imported and imitation Athenian black-figure vases, especially Athenian *lekythoi*.[115]

For example, during excavations at the necropolis of Hephaistia, grave 44 dating from the second quarter of the fifth century had an assemblage of imported Athenian goods. It included black-figure *lekythoi,* a bronze mirror, a terracotta doll, and an *epinetron*. This last item was a ceramic cover that protected a woman's thigh while she worked wool, and was often

[111] Ficuciello 2013: 217-248. The Athenian settlers also built a new wooden theater in Hephaistia sometime during the second half of the fifth century. The settler community likely met in the theater on the hill of Hephaistia to celebrate festivals and receive messengers from Athens and elsewhere. For the native sanctuary of Hephaistia before the Athenian conquest, see Beschi 2006b; 2007. For the suburban sanctuary of Kabirion during the fifth century, see Beschi 1997a: 215-216; Beschi 2000b; 2000c: 133; Beschi 2005a.

[112] Culasso Gastaldi 2012: 135. For changes in burial rituals and assemblages from the necropolis at Hephaistia, see Savelli 2008a; 2008b.

[113] For Lemnian figured pottery in the late Archaic period, see Danile 2012: 84-88, with Beschi 1985: 57, 60-62; Beschi 2003: 310-313.

[114] For Corinthian imports on Lemnos, see Danile 2012: 84, 86, with Beschi 2005: 112, 137, nos. 23, 148; Beschi 2007: 140-142, nos. 3-11.

[115] Savelli 2008a: 97.

presented as a wedding gift or placed in graves of unmarried girls.[116] Though technically unrelated to Athenian land allotment, the grave assemblage suggests two things about the settlers. First, it shows that in the generation after the Athenians conquered Lemnos, the settlers were probably not just a garrison of male hoplites, but more likely a full community including families and adolescent women. In fact, the settlers and their families seem to have replaced the native community, so there was really nothing for them to defend against.

Second, and more importantly, the inclusion of Athenian imports shows how the settlers chose to import goods produced at Athens, and thus to reorient Lemnos' links as an economic hub. Of course, Athenian goods produced during the fifth century have been found in every corner of the Mediterranean, so it is not particularly surprising that they would also show up on Lemnos. Still, it is a sign that Athenian human capital remained centralized at Athens despite the movement of settlers away from the metropole. For what little evidence there is for local production, it all seems to have been produced to imitate Athenian goods. Even though the Athenians compartmentalized their empire in a way that insulated their metropole from coalition members, Athenian settlers included, they still found ways to extend the reach of their markets. As we are already starting to see in the case of Lemnos, when the Athenians destroyed an existing community and confiscated their land, they replaced it with settlers who arrived on the island already plugged into Athenian markets.

Outside of the urban center of Hephaistia, multi-generational tombs show the extension of the settler population out into the Lemnian countryside. By the middle of the fifth century, the settlers had begun to construct small *peribolos* funerary structures across the Hephaistian

[116] Savelli 2008a: 99-100; 2008b: 361-363. Women wore *epinetra* on their thighs while weaving to prevent grease from getting on their clothes.

countryside. By dating the grave assemblages at two of these tombs, recent excavations have determined that the sites were in continuous use for several generations through the fourth century. In her study of the Hephaistian *periboloi*, Daniela Marchiandi explained that "L'analisi dell'evidenza funeraria assicura la continuità dell'occupazione degli abitati specifici di Katrakyles e di Paracheiri... tra il V e il IV secolo, ad opera di generazioni successive delle stesse famiglie" (the analysis of the funerary evidence assures the continuity of occupation specifically at Katrakyles and Paracheiri… between the fifth and fourth centuries, by successive generations of the same family).[117] The multi-generational use of these sites may suggest that the families lived nearby and continued to hand down their allotments from father to son, thus ensuring that each generation would profit from the Athenian conquest of the island.

As we saw earlier for the lotholders at Mytilene and Chalkis, the settlers on Lemnos also seem to have reserved a portion of the land they confiscated as sacred property. Two boundary markers from the western side of Lemnos, found near Myrina, delimited sacred property owned by Artemis:

*h*όρος τῶ τεμ-ένως τε̂-ς Ἀρτέ-μιδος.[118]	Boundary marker of a sacred property [owned by] Artemis.	*h*όρος τεμένος Ἀρτέμι-δος τῆς ἐμ Μυρί-[νηι].	Boundary marker of a sacred property [owned by] Artemis in Myrina.

[117] Marchiandi 2008: 119. For a more thorough treatment of the *peribolos* funerary structures on Lemnos, see also Marchiandi 2003. During the fourth century, the Persians and Spartans recognized Athens' legitimate claim to Lemnos in the King's Peace, see Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.15, 5.1.31. A well-known inscription from the Athenian Acropolis dating from the early 380s records Athenian *klērouchs* on Lemnos, see *IG* II² 30; Stroud 1971: 160-165. For the history of Lemnos in the fourth century, see Cargill 1995: 12-15; Salomon 1997: 66-80.

[118] *Left: IG* I³ 1500, from Myrina *c.* 500-480; *Right: IG* I³ 1501, from Kastro *c.* 440-404. For Artemis worship on Lemnos, see Parker 1994: 345.

Though the worship of Artemis was common throughout the Greek world in the Classical period, and especially in Attica, Artemis must have had a special significance for the Athenian settlers on Lemnos.[119] After all, Miltiades claimed to have conquered the island on behalf of her worshippers. The settlers at Myrina constructed a temple to Artemis on the acropolis overlooking the harbor, and its presence there probably reinforced the Athenian imperial narrative that justified the conquest of Lemnos.[120] What exactly the settlers used the sacred properties for is unclear, but the term *temenos* found on the *horoi* refers to "a landed estate or precinct consecrated to a deity," as Irene Polinskaya put it, and could be used for agriculture.[121] The settlers may have subsidized the rituals and festivals at the temple in Myrina with the money they earned farming and leasing Artemis' sacred property on the island.

Similar boundary markers from Aigina may help shed light on the agricultural land on Lemnos dedicated to Artemis. On Aigina, like on Lemnos, the Athenians forcibly removed the local population in 430, divided up the land, and then settled on the island.[122] Also scattered across the island were some thirteen boundary markers reserving land for Apollo, Poseidon, and Athena. Not only were the boundary markers found at great distances from one another, making it impossible that they referred to a single precinct, but also they were found only in areas well suited for agricultural—as opposed to, say, the central and southern regions of the island were predominantly mountainous. This led Polinskaya to argue that "The Aiginetan

[119] Artemis worship was also prominent in Attica. For Artemis worship in Athens, for example, see Plut. *Them.* 22.1; Paus. 1.1.4, 1.19.6, 1.23.7, 1.26.4, 1.29.2. For the sanctuary of Artemis Brauronia on the Athenian acropolis, see Linders 1972; Rhodes and Dobbins 1979; Hurwitt 1999: 197-198. For Artemis worship in Brauron, see Hdt. 6.138; Paus. 1.33.1, 8.46.3. For Artemis worship in Eleusis, see Paus. 1.38.6.

[120] For the temple of Artemisia at Myrina, see Beschi 2001.

[121] Polinskaya 2009: 244, with Isager and Skydsgaard 1992: 182. She distinguished the agricultural from the cultic functions of *temene.*

[122] For the Athenian conquest of Aigina in 430, see Thuc. 1.105.2; 1.108.4; 2.27.1; 7.57.2; 8.69.3; Diod. 12.44.2; Plut. *Per.* 34.1; Strabo 8.6.16.

temene marked by Athenian *horoi* were agricultural estates that would have been allotted as part of a general distribution of land to Athenian settlers following the expulsion of the indigenous residents and the occupation of Aigina by the Athenians in 431."[123] Just as the Athenians dedicated to *Athena Polias* a portion of the tribute they collected from coalition members, the settlers on Lemnos shared a portion of the island's confiscated land with the gods who helped them confiscate the land. By fulfilling their religious obligations, the Athenians brought the gods into the imperial process and made them accomplices in the confiscation of land. The Athenian imperial practice of confiscating land and allotting a portion of it to the gods allowed the Athenians to assume a sort of imperial legitimacy from the gods. But, in doing so, they were also limiting the total number of allotments available to Athenian citizens.

The Athenians may have been more willing to allot land to the gods because temples in the Greek world were known to provide essential economic services for communities. Because temples were often subsidized by income earned from agricultural land, they were able to accumulate a great deal of money. For those reasons, Raymond Bogaert argued that temples were often the premier institutions of credit in the Greek world—a function probably inherited from the Persian east.[124] In the fifth century, there is plenty of evidence for temples as

[123] Polinskaya 2009: 264, in reference to *IG* I^3 1481-1490. She argued that co-ownership with the gods added legitimacy to the conquest.

[124] For temples as institutions of credit and banking, see Bogaert 1968, Davies 2001; 2007: 358; Von Reden 2010: 156-185. Bogaert (1968: 279) shows that temple banks were common throughout the Greek mainland, the Aegean, and the Ionian coast, but not in the western Mediterranean. He hypothesizes that the Greeks inherited the practice of sacred banks from the Persian east, where the tradition can be traced back to Third Dynasty of Ur in the twenty-first century. The temple of Athena at Lindos and the Heraion at Samos had banking operations dating back to the sixth century. Bogeart (1968: 284) argued that temple banks were popular places for private citizens to deposit money because the temples were less susceptible to theft and fires. Because property rights were not always sufficient, merchants who travelled abroad wanted their money to be secure. Temples offered a surety that was both moral and material: moral because of the inviolability of sacred places; material because temples were made of durable materials and protected secure chambers.

institutions of credit from Attica at Athens, Eleusis, Rhamnous, Plotheia, and beyond Attica at Cos, Olympia, and Delphi. Temples made loans, guarded deposits, and issued currency, which facilitated the circulation of money and the movement of capital. In most cases, Bogaert showed, withdrawals paid for religious festivals. However, merchants and travelers could go to temples to exchange their money and get loans. At Cos, for example, the Asklepeion had a *trapeza* (or "banker") for exactly that purpose.[125] A deme decree from Plotheia in northeastern Attica c. 420 described how the temples within the deme made money by making loans to individuals with capital they accrued through rents:

[ἔδ]οξεν Πλωθειεῦσι· Ἀριστότιμος [ε]-
[ἶπ]ε· τὸς μὲν ἄρχοντας τοͅ ἀργυρίο ἀ[ξ]-
[ιό]χρεως κυαμεύεν ὅσο κάστη ἡ ἀρ[χ]-
[ὴ ἄ]ρχει, τούτος δὲ τὸ ἀργύριον σῶν [π]-
[αρ]έχεν Πλωθεῦσι, περὶ μὲν ὅτο ἐστ[ὶ]
[ψ]ήφισμα δανεισμοͅ ἢ τόκος τεταγ[μέ]-
νος κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα δανείζοντα[ς κ]-
[α]ὶ ἐσπράττοντας, ὅσον δὲ κατ' ἐν[ιαυ]-
[τ]ὸν δανείζεται δανείζοντας ὅ[στι]-
ς ἂν πλεῖστον τόκον διδῶι, ὃς ἂν [πεί]-
[θ]ηι τὸς δανείζοντας ἄρχοντα[ς τιμ]-
ήματι ἢ ἐγγυητῆι. ἀπὸ δὲ τοͅ τόκο [τε κ]-
αὶ τῶμ μισθώσεων ἀντὶ ὅτο ἂν τ[ῶν κε]-
φαλαίων ὠνήματα ἦι μί[σ]θωσιν φ[έρο]-
ντα, θύεν τὰ ἱερὰ τά τε ἐς Πλωθει[ᾶς κ]-
οινὰ καὶ τὰ ἐς Ἀθηναίος ὑπὲρ Πλ[ωθέ]-
[ω]ν τοͅ κοινοͅ καὶ τὰ ἐς τὰς πεντετ[ηρί]-
[δ]ας.[126]

The Plotheians decided. Aristotimos proposed: to allot the officials worthily of the money that each office controls; and these are to provide the money securely for the Plotheians. Concerning whatever loan there is a decree or setting of interest, they are to lend and exact interest according to the decree, lending as much as is lent annually to whoever offers the greatest interest, whoever persuades the lending officials by their wealth or guarantor, and from the interest, and the rents on whatever rent-bearing purchases may have been made from capital, they shall sacrifice the rites, that is, both the common rites for the Plotheians, and for the Athenians on behalf of the community of the Plotheians, and for the quadrennial festivals.

The temples used whatever money they had on hand—and not already allocated for rituals, festivals, and taxes to Athens—to lend out to whoever would pay the greatest interest. In another inscription that records the annual finances of the temple of Nemesis nearby in Rhamnous from *c.*

[125] For the Asklepieion at Kos, see Bogaert 1968: 298.

[126] *IG* I³ 258, *ll.* 11-27, with Davies 2001: 124.

440, the single temple maintained between 48,000 and 56,000 drachmas on hand over five years.[127] Like the temples at Plotheia, the temple of Nemesis probably got most of its revenue from agricultural rents.

It is tempting to think that the temple of Artemis on Lemnos offered similar economic services to the settlers on the island. Since we do not have inscriptions from Lemnos to match those from Plotheia and Rhamnous in Attica, we cannot say definitively how the temple used the money it made from its agricultural land. But like the temples in Attica, the temple of Artemis likely was able to profit from its agricultural lands. Furthermore, the early settlers on Lemnos and any merchants from Attica doing business there would have had few other options on the island to get loans and deposit their money. A temple bank could have provided the necessary capital for new settlers to invest in their land and set up their new livelihoods: after all, most settlers would have arrived on Lemnos with only the resources that they could transport themselves. In the absence of a well-established market on the island, the new settler communities needed alternative ways of protecting their money and financing their investments, and a temple bank may have provided such a service. In that sense, the same temple that sanctified the conquest of Lemnos also facilitated the exploitation of the land by the settlers. With more available capital to invest in their land, the settlers would have been even better suited to profit from land allotment and use the money they earned to purchase goods from Attica.

What we saw on Lemnos was that Athenian land allotment, even when it involved Athenian settlers leaving Attica, had a way of expanding Athens' markets. The Athenian conquest

[127] *IG* I^3 248, with Davies 2001: 117-118. He argued that the Athenians at Rhamnous had "come to see what would otherwise be 'dead' resources locked up in the premises of a deme, or shrine, or temple, or phratry, or tribe, as resources which could be put to work."

of the island removed the native community, severed existing commercial links with the northeastern Aegean and Corinth, and reoriented trade back to Athens. Though the Athenian settlers on Lemnos became citizens of a new political community, they remained plugged into the Athenian network of exchange. They may have been on their own to start a new political community, but their economic connection to Athens ensured that they individually were set up to make a profit from their land allotments. The Athenians back at Athens were still compartmentalizing their empire, insulating their metropole from the rest of their imperial territory, but metropolitanism to them meant that they allotted land in ways that expanded their markets. As we will see, the Athenians' economic power continued to grow: by the second half of the fifth century, the Athenians were able to keep experimenting with land allotment by putting their economic power to the test on the island of Euboea.

3.6. *Euboea: Athenian Economic Power*

Rich in grain and strategically located to command Aegean commerce, the island of Euboea was the prize of the Athenian empire. Euboea sits just off the northern coast of Attica, separated from Athenian territory by a narrow channel. Only one and a half times larger than Attica, Euboea was home to thirteen *poleis*, none more than a day's row from northern Attica. Chalkis, for one, sat at the channel's narrowest point at the width of just a single trireme from ram to stern.[128] In 506, the young Athenian democracy survived a two-front invasion from the Spartans, Boeotians, and Chalkidians, and wasted little time before turning to the offensive.[129]

[128] Moreno 2007: 83. The Euripos strait is, on average, just 12 km wide. The strait is narrowest at Chalkis, where it is only 40 m wide.

[129] For the invasion of Attica by Sparta, Boeotia, and Chalkis, see Hdt. 5.72-76. For the attack on Chalkis in 506, see Hdt. 5.77.2; 6.100.2.

After defeating the Chalkidians in the field, the Athenians confiscated the land of the local elite and divided it up among four thousand lotholders. For the Athenians, Euboea was uniquely profitable—a fact soon noticed by the Persian emperor himself.[130] So, as we saw with Lemnos, Chalkis seems to have fallen out of Athenian hands during the Greco-Persian Wars. But by the middle of the fifth century, the entire island of Euboea again became a laboratory of empire: between 452 and 446, the Athenians experimented by allotting land to both settlers and lotholders in different parts of the island. Afterwards, for nearly two generations surplus grain from Euboea fed the Athenian democracy and confiscated land enriched individual citizens.[131]

If Athenian Lemnos was a story of Archaic imperialism in transition, then Euboea shows Athenian economic power at its height, when the Athenians chose freely between two forms of land allotment. Unlike Lemnos, Euboea at the time of the Athenian conquest had four highly developed economic centers at Histiaia, Chalkis, Eretria, and Karystos. Also, by then the Athenian navy had experimented with coercion from a distance for a generation after finding success at Naxos in 476 and Thasos in 465. The case of Euboea shows how the combination of economic competition on Euboea and Athenian military development created a new imperial geography on the island: though the Athenians at Histiaia followed a similar approach as the settlers on Lemnos, on the rest of the island the Athenians seem to have remained lotholders from back at Athens. Because Histiaia was the only forested and fertile region of the island, an insular colony there promised high returns; however, Athenian lotholders may have looked to the mountainous center and the barren south of the island and decided that extracting a stable

[130] Hdt. 5.31. The Persian emperor Artaphrenes agreed to attack Naxos in 500 because he could use the island to stage a campaign to take Euboea, "a large and wealthy island" (νήσῳ μεγάλῃ τε καὶ εὐδαίμονι). Darius adopted the Euboean talent for gold, Hdt. 3.89.2.

[131] For Euboea's role in the Athenian grain market, see Moreno 2007: 77-143. Euboea was Athens's main source of grain from 446-411.

rent from back at Athens was safer and more reliable. The Athenians' experience south of Histiaia was instructive: the Athenians showed how lotholders could defer direct control of confiscated land, leave the local community mostly undisturbed, and rely on the threat of their navy to collect a regular income from back in Attica. As we saw earlier, the Athenians would apply a similar approach to Lesbos in 427. Even though the Athenian state prioritized the interests of its private citizens by way of an insular colony at Histiaia and lotholders to the south, political insularity never meant economic insularity—the full strength of the Athenian economic power was on full display across Euboea.

In many ways, Euboea was unique within the Athenian empire. Together, the communities on Euboea lost more land to Athenian land allotment than any other island in the Athenian empire. Euboea was also just off the coast of Attica: according to Thucydides, when the Athenians mobilized for the Peloponnesian War, they deployed one hundred triremes to patrol Attica, Salamis, and Euboea as a single theater of operation.[132] A generation later, Isocrates still spoke of how uniquely important Euboea was to the Athenians in the fifth century: he knew well enough that Euboea had as much, if not more, resources than any other island in the Aegean.[133] But even though Euboea as a whole may have been unique, the Athenians dealt each community independently. We see this in the different ways the Athenians confiscated land, collected tribute, conducted diplomacy, and deployed their navy. Despite its unique role in the history of Athenian

[132] Thuc. 3.17.1-2. Thucydides implied (3.17.3-4) that traditional hoplite warfare and land sieges were more costly than naval patrols. Even so, a scholiast to Aristophanes' *Clouds* wrote that the Athenians, under Pericles' leadership in the mid-fifth century, "besieged" the island, focusing their efforts primarily on Chalkis and Eretria: Aristoph. *Clouds* Σ 213a: ἐπολιόρκησαν δὲ αὐτὴν Ἀθηναῖοι μετὰ Περικλέους, καὶ μάλιστα Χαλκιδέας καὶ Ἐρετριέας. πρὸς τὸ παρατέταται, ἐν ᾧ ἡ θέσις δηλοῦται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπήνεγκε τὸ παρετάθη. Moreno (2007: 102, 126-143) assumed that "this was in effect a permanent siege," a physical occupation of the entire island.
[133] Isoc. 4.107.

imperialism, Euboea is still an instructive case study because of how much the Athenians experimented on the island. On Euboea, we get to see both what distinguished and what unified the various ways the Athenians allotted land. This is made possible owing to a fairly broad range of written evidence from historical texts and popular culture, as well as recent archaeological surveys of defense structures and excavations at Karystos and Eretria.

The story goes that at about 452, the Athenian general Tolmides led an invasion of Euboea and Naxos and, after a successful campaign, allotted land to a thousand Athenians, split between the two islands.[134] The Euboean campaign was part a broader Athenian effort to confiscate land elsewhere in the Aegean: at about the same time, Athenian citizens received land allotments on Andros, Naxos, the Chersonesos, and Thrace.[135] Yet shortly thereafter, the Boeotians to the north of Euboea revolted in 447 and defeated the Athenians in the field at Koroneia. The Euboeans and Megarans took the opportunity to renew hostilities against the Athenians in 446. But after a speedy campaign across the island, Pericles put down the revolt.[136]

The Euboean revolt invited the Athenians to revisit their approach to imperial property on the island. For Eretria and Chalkis, and possibly also Karystos, the Athenian settlement meant renewed oaths of loyalty and a *homologia* (or "agreement") in the priority of Athenian interests. The Histiaians, however, who had executed a captured Athenian trireme crew, lost their land, which was thereafter merged with the coastal settlement of Oreos. For the Histiaians,

[134] For Tolmides' campaign, see Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5. Between Euboea and Naxos, Tolmides divided up land for one thousand *klērouchoi.* At the same time as Tolmides' campaign, Pericles attacked the Chersonesos, allotted one thousand *klēroi* to Athenians citizens.
[135] Plut. *Per.* 11.5; 19.1; Andoc. 3.9; Aesch. 2.175. Both Andocides and Aeschines place the Euboea allotments alongside Naxos and the Chersonesos. For the Cyclades and the Athenian empire in the fifth century, see Rutihauser 2012: 81-139. For Thrace, see Pébarthe 1999.
[136] For the Periclean settlement of Chalkis after the revolt, see *IG* I^3 40; Plut. *Per*. 11.5; Ael. 6.1.; *IG* I^3 1502. For Eretria, see *IG* I^3 39. For Histiaia, see Thuc. 1.114.1–3, 7.57.2, 8.95.7; Theopomp. fr. 387; Philoch. fr. 118; Diod. 12.7.1, 22.2; Plut. *Per*. 23.2; *IG* I^3 41; Strabo 10.1.3-4. Thucydides may have been silent about the rest of Euboea because, by comparison, what happened at Histiaia was much worse.

this imperial *synoikismos* (or "gathering together") meant that they not only lost ownership of their land to Athenian settlers, but they also had to physically relocate to Macedonia.

Looking back on the period, Andocides remembered that the Athenians held land covering no less than two-thirds of the island.[137] For him, Euboea was the crowning achievement of the Athenian empire, next to the confiscations on the Chersonesos and Naxos. Using more ambiguous terms, Aeschines also recalled how the Athenians "held" Euboea while also sending out settlers to colonies:

> καὶ πάλιν ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τούτῳ ἑπτακισχίλια τάλαντα ἀνηνέγκαμεν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν διὰ τὴν εἰρήνην ταύτην, τριήρεις δ᾽ ἐκτησάμεθα πλωίμους καὶ ἐντελεῖς οὐκ ἐλάττους ἢ τριακοσίας, φόρος δ᾽ ἡμῖν κατ᾽ ἐνιαυτὸν προσήει πλέον ἢ χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα, καὶ Χερρόνησον καὶ Νάξον καὶ Εὔβοιαν εἴχομεν, πλείστας δ᾽ ἀποικίας ἐν τοῖς χρόνοις τούτοις ἀπεστείλαμεν.
>
> In the period that followed [the Peace of Nicias] we again deposited treasure in the Acropolis, seven thousand talents, thanks to this peace, and we acquired triremes, seaworthy and fully equipped, no fewer than three hundred in number; a yearly tribute of more than twelve hundred talents came in to us; we held the Chersonesos, Naxos, and Euboea, and in these years we sent out a host of colonies.

It is hard to know what Aechines intended when he distinguished between the Athenians holding the Chersonesos, Naxos, and Euboea and the Athenians sending out colonies. He seems to have been implying that the land the Athenians held on Euboea was somehow different from the land settlers owned in colonies. We saw earlier in inscriptions dating from after the Euboean revolt that the Athenians owned land in Chalkis, Eretria, and Histiaia, both individually and as sacred property.[138] What Aeschines and the inscriptions did not make clear, however, is what this kind of landholding actually looked like—they say nothing of how the Athenians actually

[137] Andoc. 3.9.

[138] For example, *IG* I^3 418; 422; Dem. 20.115.

held the island, be it through physical control, coercion from a distance, economic power, or a combination of strategies.

Because there is no literary evidence for an official Athenian imperial presence on the island besides several itinerant magistrates, many archaeologists and historians have tried to link local developments in material culture to the initiative of Athenian lotholders.[139] Most who study fifth-century Euboea assume that Athenian lotholders must have set up *ad hoc* defensive measures near their land to help them defend it from the people they dispossessed: with the traditional citizen-garrison model as their guide, archaeologists in particular have emphasized any change in material culture that might suggest a change in occupation. As such, they have assumed that Athenian lotholders are materially distinguishable from Euboean communities because they involved a large population movement, and thus a physical occupation of the confiscated land.

To be sure, in the countryside of Karystos in southern Euboea, small fortifications started to show up alongside rural settlements during the Athenian imperial period. Recent surface surveys showing the increase of these small agricultural "towers" in the Paximadi peninsula have prompted members of the Southern Euboea Exploration Project to assume the presence of lotholders who developed a defensive network between their plots.[140] Compared to the five towers in use during the Archaic period, and six during the Hellenistic period, a total of nineteen could be dated to the period of Athenian imperialism. Excavations of the towers have

[139] Moreno (2007: 126-140) and Jensen (2011: 261-264) argued that the Athenians had controlled imperial land directly. Jensen (2011: 272) argued that Athens "preferred to assert control over Euboea directly through the implantation of cleruchies, colonies, and garrisons."

[140] Seifried and Parkinson 2014: 284, 311; Gardner and Seifried 2016*; contra* Chidiroglou 2011; Chatzidimitriou & Chidiroglou 2014. The number of towers increases sharply during the Classical period (making up 76% of the towers from the Neolithic to Ottoman period).

found mostly millstones and storage vessels, and determined that they were built on terraces, often near threshing floors. Furthermore, even the biggest structures only measured six to eight meters in diameter, though most were far smaller. All this suggests an agricultural rather than defensive purpose. Though the towers were probably never big enough to serve as defensive strongholds for either Athenian lotholders or local Karystians, together they had a commanding view of the coastline and could just as easily have helped native Karystians stay alert to Athenian naval patrols, as Chelsea Gardner and Rebecca Seifried recently argued.[141] Whether Karystians or Athenian lotholders, whoever built the towers seem to have wanted a clear view of the coast, not a command of the countryside.

From the same period, a number of burials from nearby cemeteries in western Karystos have yielded local ceramic products mixed with a large amount of luxury ceramic imports from Athens—mostly black-figure *choes* and *lekythoi*, similar to those imported on Lemnos.[142] In excavations of forty-seven graves of the Archaic to late Classical periods, Athenian ceramic imports outnumbered local Karystian potters and terracotta makers in the fifth century. But the increase of Attic wares in graves during this period, which nearly disappear during the second half of the fourth century, does not necessarily mean that Athenian lotholders were the ones importing Athenian goods. Rather, as Maria Chidiroglou concluded, the increase of Athenian imports at Karystos may be explained by the strength of the Athenian export economy and the proximity of Euboea to Athens. Karystos likely remained an economic hub during the fifth

[141] Gardner and Seifried (2016) used geospatial and view-shed analysis to argue that the towers observed the coastline. Chatzidimitriou and Chidiroglou (2014: 324) also argued that "Athenian imperialism may have led some of the local population living in the Kokkaloi area to implement measures to protect their crops and resources by taking refuge in a well-built tower, when the need arose."

[142] Chidiroglou 2011: 161-163.

century thanks to its command of the deep-sea port of Geraistos, so the presence of Athenian luxury imports is not at all unexpected. The Karystians may have remained a hub because they were plugged into the Athenian export market: after all, the Karystians, like the neighbors at Chalkis and Eretria, continued to pay tribute to Athens from the 450s up until they revolted in 413, so they may have found it worthwhile to buy into the Athenian market to keep commercial traffic moving in and out of their harbor. But because no historical author ever mentioned any Athenians living in Karystos, and we have no archaeological evidence to suggest the same, all we can say is that Athenian naval and economic power came together to pressure Karystos.

Likewise, excavations further to the west at the urban center of Eretria have dated changes in defense structures and ceramic imports to the middle of the fifth century. During the period of Athenian land allotment on the island, new fortifications were built to enclose the entire city, with a monumental west gate. As was the case for the towers in Karystos, however, it is unclear whether the Eretrians built the fortifications to defend against the Athenians, or perhaps the other way around. Excavated graves in and around the city of Eretria found more Athenian vases than at any other site in the Mediterranean outside of Attica: excavations found over a hundred Athenian *lekythoi* and another seventeen *choes* dating from the second half of the fifth century.[143] The *choes* in particular have received a great deal of attention because they appear to depict the Athenian Anthesteria festival, in which young Athenian boys received the small wine decanter to celebrate their survival through the dangers of child mortality.[144] J. R. Green and R. K. Sinclair, for example, argued that the presence of *choes* must mean that a large

[143] Green and Sinclair 1970: 523.

[144] For the Anthesteria festival, see Aristoph. *Thesm.* 746, with Ham 1999. The festival drew attention to the boys' prospective role as adult members of the community, rather than their present status as children, through the shared ritual context of a drinking banquet.

number of Athenian lotholders were living in Eretria.[145] Even so, there seems to have been more continuity than change in fifth-century Eretrian material culture: the quantity of imported Attic pottery was most abundant in the second quarter of the fifth century, and actually decreased during the third quarter. Meanwhile, what little evidence there is for local production all comes in the way of Athenian imitation vases, whereby Eretrian potters hoped to compete with the Athenian export market.[146]

Though the Anthesteria festival was popular in Athens, and *choes* was intimately tied up in the festival's celebrations, the existence of Athenian *choes* is not at all sufficient evidence to identify a community of Athenians lotholders living in Eretria. In fact, Athenian *choes* depicting the Anthesteria festival have been found much further from Athens, as far away as Rhodes, Etruria, and Spain.[147] The picture that emerges of Eretria during the period of Athenian land allotment is, again, not necessarily one of occupation: the changes in material culture at Eretria, like Karystos, can be explained by Athenian economic power. What set Eretria apart were its new fortifications—at once predictable owing to the general increase in fortifications in the generation before the Peloponnesian War, yet also noteworthy that the Athenians allowed it when they were not so lenient with Thasos in 465 and Samos in 440.[148]

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[145] From the Athenian vases alone, Green and Sinclair (1970: 525) argued that "the migration of Athenian individuals might lie behind the growing quantity of Attic pottery during the second quarter of the fifth century, the noticeable increase about the middle of the century would seem to indicate the arrival of a concentrated body of cleruchs rather than individual Athenians acting on their own initiative."

[146] Sapouna-Sakellaraki 1995: 19; Ducrey 2004: 136. Still, Ducrey emphasized that the majority of the vases from Eretria were imported.

[147] Van Hoorn 1951: 49-51. Twelve Attic *choes* were found in children's graves at Eretria (nos. 23, 112, 118, 123, 124, 158, 162, 518, 522, 523, 895). Yet among the dozen *choes* excavated in the cemetery of Spina in Etruria, four were found in children's graves (nos. 206-522, 207-523, 376-513, 518). In Rhodes a *chous* was found in the grave of a newborn baby (no. 895) and at Taranto from an infant girl (no. 930).

[148] For the destruction of Thasos' walls in 465, see Thuc. 1.100.2, 1.101; Plut. *Cim*. 8.2; Nepos *Cim*. 2.2. For Samos in 440, see Thuc. 1.115-117.

From what we have seen at Karystos and Eretria, there is nothing to suggest that Athenian lotholders actually "held" the island in any real, physical sense. Even so, the Chalkis Decree c. 446, which settled the Athenians' affairs in the community after the Chalkidians revolted, stated clearly that the Athenians entrusted the protection of Euboea to unidentified *strategoi*:

> περὶ δὲ φυ-
> λακεῖς Εὐβοίας τὸς στρατηγὸς ἐπιμέλεσ-
> θαι *h*ος ἂν δύνονται ἄριστα, *h*όπος ἂν
> ἔχε- ι *h*ος βέλτιστα Ἀθεναίοις.[149]
>
> And as to the guarding of Euboea, the generals shall take care of that as best they can in the best interests of the Athenians.

In a recent study of the Athenian grain trade during the period of Athenian land allotment, Alfonso Moreno assumed that the decree must have been referring to Athenian generals, presumably in charge of organizing Athenian garrisons on the island.[150] He drew from a series of regional surface surveys of the Euboean countryside to suggest that there was a ring of Athenian naval garrisons scattered around the island near the coast, a strategy that would have anticipated the fortification of Attica in the early fourth century.[151] For Moreno, the most compelling candidates were the forts at Vrachos near Phylla and Ano Potamia overlooking the bay of Kyme.

However, neither case can be substantiated. In fact, excavations at Vrachos found no materials that could be dated to the Classical period, despite plenty of ceramic evidence from the late Archaic and Hellenistic periods; dated material from Ano Potamia show that the hilltop

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[149] *IG* I³ 40, *ll.* 76-78. For the long debate about the meaning of the Chalkis decree, especially lines 52-57, see Gauthier 1971; Meiggs 1972: 567; Vinogradove 1973; Whitehead 1976; Smart 1977; Fornara 1977; Balcer 1978; Henry 1979; Pébarthe 2000; Giovannini 2000; Ostwald 2002; Pébarthe 2005; Sosin 2014. The consensus now is that the *xenoi* mentioned in the decree were not Athenian lotholders living in Chalkis.

[150] Moreno 2007: 119-140. He argued that there must have been a ring of garrisons in Euboea and across the channel in northern Attica.

[151] Theocares 1959; Sackett *et al.* 1966. Sackett *et al.* catalogue 92 settlement sites, covering all of Euboea. Though not complete, all major sites are covered. For the development of a system of Athenian defensive fortifications in the fourth century, see Ober 1985.

fortress did not take on its role as a prominent fortified position until the fourth century.[152] Furthermore, in a recent comprehensive survey of all known Eretrian defensive structures, Sylvian Fachard catalogued all 183 known sites between Chalkis and northern Karystia: he found that no site has any indication of Athenian occupation, and nearly every Classical site dates from the fourth century—with the one possible exception of late Archaic Vrachos.[153] Fachard concluded that a system of defensive fortifications did not develop until the fourth century, and therefore could not have been Athenian garrisons. In sum, there is no reason to assume that Athenian garrisons took an active role in policing Eretria when the evidence does not demand it.

Instead, given what we have seen about how the Athenians used their navy in the fifth century, it is more likely that the Athenians used well-known sites like Rhamnous and Oropos in Attica across the Euboean gulf, as well as the garrison at Atalante on the northern coast of Boeotia, to allow their navy to patrol the island.[154] After all, that is how Thucydides—an Athenian general who commanded the Athenian navy at Amphipolis—described the Athenians' approach to the island.[155] At Rhamnous, for example, Athenian triremes could quickly mobilize from the site's two harbors. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenians had plenty of success with amphibious raids on coastal settlements in the Peloponnese, and Euboea was probably no different.[156] Therefore, in the absence of any official Athenian garrisons on

[152] For Vrachos, see Sakellaraki *et al.* 2002: 113-115; Fachard 2012: 300-301. For Ano Potamia, see Sampson 1981, *contra* Moreno 2007.

[153] Fachard 2012.

[154] For Rhamnous, see Pouilloux 1954; Ober 1985: 135. Petrakos 1999: 161-162. For Oropos, see Thuc. 8.60.1. For Atalante, see Thuc. 2.32.

[155] Thuc. 4.104.5-6. Athenian *strategoi* commanded both at sea and on land: hence the Chalkis Decree may have referred to the navy.

[156] For example, Demosthenes conducted raids on the Peloponnese during the Peloponnesian War, see Thuc. 3.91.1, 3.105.3, 3.107.2-3.

confiscated lands, the Athenians probably relied on the unmatched power of their navy to remind allied poleis of the inevitability of retribution in the event of a revolt.

If the Athenians held as much land on Euboea as the historical and epigraphic sources suggest, historians and archaeologists should take note that there is not more evidence that the Athenians disrupted the island. As we will see in the next two chapters, Syracusan and Roman land allotment left a very clear, and often very violent, mark on the landscape. If we did not have multiple historical sources telling us that the Athenians allotted land on Euboea, we probably would not be considering it as a case study in Athenian land allotment, much less as the prize of the Athenian empire. From the 450s on, the Karystians, Eretrians, and the Chalkidians continued to pay their contributions to the Delian League, though at reduced rates beginning in 451/50, around the same time that Tolmides confiscated land on the island. Karystos and Eretria seem to have remained viable economic hubs, though ceramic evidence from the two communities suggests that they imported most of their luxury goods from Athens. Though some Athenian lotholders may well have lived on or near their land allotments at Karystos, Eretria, and Chalkis, there is no evidence to suggest that they did so in large numbers: most of them, it seems, lived back in Athens. If that was the case, land allotment at Karystos, Eretria, and Chalkis would have anticipated the arrangement Thucydides described at Mytilene in 327. The tribute payments, the imports of Athenian goods, and the lotholders living at Athens all would have fit in nicely with how the Athenians compartmentalized their empire.

Unlike the rest of the island, however, the northwestern community at Histiaia was the site of a new Athenian colony. There, Athenian settlers took an active role in re-shaping the region's human geography. During the Euboean revolt in 447/6, the Athenians dispatched a

fleet to Histiaia. When the Histiaians managed to capture an Athenian trireme, they decided to execute the entire crew. After the revolt, the Athenians inflicted upon Histiaia a more severe punishment than the other Euboean *poleis*:

> Ἀθηναῖοι τὴν Εὔβοιαν ἀνακτησάμενοι καὶ τοὺς Ἑστιαιεῖς ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἐκβαλόντες ἰδίαν ἀποικίαν εἰς αὐτὴν ἐξέπεμψαν Περικλέους στρατηγοῦντος, χιλίους δὲ οἰκήτορας ἐκπέμψαντες τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τὴν χώραν κατεκληρούχησαν.[157]
>
> The Athenians, regaining control of Euboea and driving the Histiaians from their city, dispatched, under Pericles as commander, a colony of their own citizens to it and sending forth a thousand colonists they portioned out both the city and countryside in allotments.

Histiaia and the coastal community at Oreos lost ownership of their land to Athenian settlers, and had to physically relocate to Macedonia.[158] In all likelihood, the Athenians used the execution as an excuse to settle Histiaia, which was the most fertile, and also the only forested, part of the island. Because the Histiaians refugees no longer constituted a political community, they did not have to pay taxes to the Delian League. Instead, the Athenian settlers, now technically the Histiaians, appear to have taken over the former residents' position as coalition members of the Delian League.[159]

Since Histiaia has not been excavated, we cannot yet say how the settlers' experience there mirrored what we saw on Lemnos. Nevertheless, Thucydides, Theopompus, and Diodorus all insisted that Athenian settlers did indeed dispossess and replace the native Histiaians. Hence we can safely say that the Athenians experimented with land allotment on Euboea in two distinct ways. First, as we saw earlier, Athenian lotholders held land in Karystos,

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[157] Diod. 12.22.2, with Thuc. 1.114.3; Theopomp. fr. 387; Philoch. fr. 118. Theopompus said that two thousand Athenians got allotments.

[158] Theopomp. fr. 387. For how displacing the Histiaians reshaped the region, see Jensen 2010: 135-141; 2011.

[159] Histiaia paid 1,000 dr. in 447/6. Histiaia does not appear on the lists after that, though that may be because the lists are fragmentary. During the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian settlers at Histiaia fought with the Athenians during the Sicilian campaign, see Thuc. 7.57.2.

Eretria, and Chalkis. Second, Athenian settlers moved to Histiaia, where they became coalition members and lived in their own insular colony. In neither case, however, was the Athenian state seeking to control the people its army dispossessed: rather, individual lotholders made money from their allotments, the Athenian state received tribute payments, and coalition members bought Athenian goods. Altogether, land allotment on Euboea benefited individual Athenians most, but it was also a vehicle for metropolitanism.

We can see clearly enough how the Athenians compartmentalized their empire from the way they reacted to a second Euboean revolt a generation later. When news of the Athenian defeat in Sicily traveled eastward in 413, the Euboeans took the opportunity to revolt from the Delian League. They soon won the support of the Lesbians, who shared in their experience of land allotment. In the opening days of the revolt, the Eretrians first moved to neutralize the Athenians' navy by taking the Athenian garrison at Oropos, recognizing it as a great threat to Euboea. With the Spartans now in command of northern Attica from Dekelea, the Athenians could not risk losing any more of their coalition. For that reason, the Athenians immediately mobilized another fleet from Athens to join up with the rest of the triremes already patrolling the island. When the Athenian forces joined together off the coast of Euboea, the Euboeans feared that the Athenians would blockade the island from the sea. But as the Athenian navy put in outside of Eretria to search for food, an Eretrian raised a signal for the Spartan fleet waiting across the channel at Oropos to attack. Unprepared, the Athenian fleet was routed in no time, and the sailors rushed ashore. Fleeing to the town of Eretria, the Athenians sought refuge from the Spartans, but were cut down by the residents as they entered the city. Afterwards the

Spartans helped the entire island defect from the Athenians.[160] Only Histiaia did not revolt: but the Athenian settlers there could do little to stop the revolt, and were themselves driven out from Euboea at the end of the war. For a second time in so many years, news of catastrophic defeat reached Athens.

The Athenians lost more on Euboea than just their land allotments. Going all the way back to 506, when the Athenians first confiscated land on Euboea, the island was a symbol of democratic imperialism. Aristophanes, for one, joked that Euboea looked the way it did—stretched out along the northern border of Attica—because the Athenians made it that way. In the *Clouds*, an elderly farmer named Strepsiades was amazed by all the advanced fields of knowledge Socrates taught at his 'Thinkery'—geometry, in particular, because the Athenians used it to measure out land allotments. One of Socrates' students insisted that geometry could also be used to measure the whole earth. Clearly impressed, Strepsiades responded that such a skill must be *dēmotikos kai chrēsmios* (both "democratic and useful").[161] Strepsiades went on to identify Euboea on a map of the earth, recalling how the Athenians stretched out the island under Pericles' leadership.

Though Aristophanes offered nothing more than a caricature of Euboea, in just a few lines he captured the significance of land allotment in Athenian society: land allotment was "democratic and useful" because it allowed the Athenians to rework the physical landscape to their benefit. The Athenians could joke that they stretched out Euboea because they were able to make the single island profitable for so many individual citizens. Strepsiades was amazed that

[160] For the Euboean revolt, see Thuc. 8.1.3, 8.5.1-2, 8.60, 8.95-6; Diod. 13.47.3-6. For the threat of blockade, see Diod. 13.47.3.

[161] Aristoph. *Clouds* 202-213.

knowledge could have such power. Of course, Aristophanes' audience knew well enough that land allotment was rooted in violence and coercion. Then again, they were all sitting back in metropolitan Athens, in a public theater, imagining how they could use land allotment to carve up their imperial territory.

3.7. *Conclusions*

The Athenian empire was an empire of contradictions. Within the Delian League, the Athenian state demanded loyalty of its coalition members but did very little.[162] As we have seen, the Athenian state was never all that interested in controlling an imperial territory or governing the people within it. Rather, the Athenian state pursued the private interests of its citizens by allotting land to groups of individual settlers and lotholders. Therefore, in the Greek world where cooperative and interstate institutions were becoming the norm outside of Athens, Athenian land allotment was an outlier.[163] Like the elite opportunism of Archaic period, Athenian land allotment lacked the appearance of the state, though it burst into a Classical world of interstate relations. On the one hand, the Athenians fashioned the Delian League as a relationship among states; and on the other hand, the Athenians allotted land to individual citizens.

Athenian land allotment owed its distinctive character to its origins in the Archaic period. The combination of Solon's reforms and elite competition created a new form of opportunism that put a premium on private wealth. The development of a market economy at Athens presented an alternative to settler colonialism, but economic growth only further

[162] In this regard, Athenian imperial governance in the fifth century was fairly typical of government in Greek *poleis*. Strauss (2013: 23) argued that "for all its pretensions, Classical Greek government claimed everything and did little. That is the paradox at its heart."

[163] For cooperative institutions, see Mackil 2013; Ober 2015; Blome 2015. For customs and expectations of interstate relations, see Low 2007.

embedded private inequality into Athenian society. At the end of the Archaic period, naval warfare and Kleisthenes' democratic reforms made it so more Athenians shared in the rewards of empire. At the same time, land allotment also meant that the elites had found a way to institutionalize private wealth. As the Athenians confiscated more land during the fifth century, they drew lessons from their imperial neighbors: they created a new hybrid form of land allotment that united Spartan coercion from a distance with Persian entrepreneurialism. The Athenians soon learned from their navy that they could compartmentalize their empire in order to rebuild and invest in their metropole. Over time, the Athenians developed an approach to their imperial territory where taxes and trade flowed directly to their metropole rather than being shared or reinvested on the frontier.

Altogether, Athenian land allotment helped the Athenians create a monopoly on human capital in the Aegean. By transferring wealth back to Athens, the Athenians continued to invest in crafts and specialization, which in turn attracted more craftsmen, merchants, and bankers to Athens to do business. Because Athenian settlers arrived at their allotments already plugged into Athenian markets, and Athenian economic power ensured that Athenian goods were imported even in places the Athenians confiscated land, land allotment also helped the Athenians extend their markets. In that sense, the Delian League broke down economic networks in the Aegean, and then land allotment built a new one with Athens at its center. Outside of Athens, however, it was more destructive than constructive. At Hephaistia and Histiaia, we saw how Athenian land allotment unsettled whole native communities to make room for Athenian settlers. On the rest of Euboea, we also saw how Athenian land allotment could leave native communities largely intact, but still transfer its members' wealth back to Athens while they simultaneously imported

Athenian goods. In the cases of both Lemnos and Euboea alike, the native communities learned firsthand what it meant to have Athenian leadership.

So when the first summit of the Second Athenian League convened at Athens in 377, prospective members had every reason to be cynical. For nearly seventy years coalition members could look to the Athenians for defense against the Persians, but membership to the Delian League also came with the very real possibility of losing land. The Greeks remembered Athenian imperialism not just for how it was so disruptive or so coercive in everyday life, but because Athenian power was more economic than political. Unlike the Syracusans and Romans after them, the Athenians never extended citizenship to the people they dispossessed; in practice, the Athenians were limiting the amount of people who could receive a land allotment.[164] Consequently, coalition members increasingly saw themselves on the other side of empire—always on the frontier, separate from the Athenian metropole, and never included in the imperial project. Perhaps, then, the imperial discourse at the time that marked Athens' allies as "slaves" says much more about an ideology of land and citizenship than the actual life of empire.[165] In a world where elite ideas about wealth united landownership with *eleutheria* (or "freedom"), those who had lost out to the Athenians had also lost control of their own labor.[166] In this regard, for many coalition members the Athenians were no better than the Persians.

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[164] In fact, during the fifth century the Athenians placed restrictions on who could become citizens: under Pericles' citizenship law of 451/0, both parents had to be citizens for a child to become a citizen, see [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 26.4; Plut. *Per.* 37.3-4. The Athenians also kept lists of Athenian citizens, and regularly reviewed the records to expel anyone who did not have a proper claim to citizenship.

[165] For example, Thucydides (3.10.5) wrote that the Mytilenaeans liked to think that the Athenians had "enslaved" their allies. For the freedom-slavery dichotomy, see Strauss 2008: 223. For the discourse on dispossessed communities, see Zelnick-Abramovitz 2004.

[166] *Contra* Moreno 2007: 320-321. For the elite ideal farmer, see Hdt. 2.165-167; Xen. *Oec.* 4-5; Dio. Hal. *Rom. Ant.* 2.28; Raaflaub 1983; 2004.

Even so, the Athenians were very Greek in their defense of *polis* life and closed citizenship. But that is not the whole story. The Athenians had also created an exceptionally integrated political community before they started allotting land. Even though private inequality was built into Athenian society, most citizens could still look to Athens as the source of their middling livelihood thanks to high real wages, its market economy, and metropolitan infrastructure. Essentially, the Athenians had created such an integrated metropole at the time of imperial expansion that they took for granted the frontiers beyond it. In the end, it is not surprising that the Athenians found a way to distance the state from other communities. Economic exchange may have been opening up the Greek world to increased interaction, but Athenian land allotment only reinforced the boundaries of the *polis.* If there was, after all, a logic to the way the Athenians allotted land, then the Peloponnesian War did not simply cut short the Athenians on their way to creating a Mediterranean empire in the Roman mold. This is not to say that the Athenian road to empire was doomed from the start, nor were the problems the Athenians had in securing their empire simply a failure of creativity. Had the Athenians defeated the Syracusans in 413, the ancient Mediterranean might never have gotten to know the Syracusans and Romans as we do today. Instead, Athenian land allotment is an example of how even the most promising conditions at the metropole cannot guarantee the life of an empire.

Chapter 4

THE SYRACUSANS

The Athenians took to the sea in 415 with the promise of empire awaiting them on Sicily. Brash and barefaced, the Athenians hoped to bring their empire of allotment to the western Mediterranean.[1] An armistice with the Spartans, now in its seventh year, freed them to redirect their fleet across the Ionian Sea.[2] Even so, the Syracusans expected the Athenians were overextending themselves so far from home. When the Syracusans came together on the slopes of the Epipolai heights above the city to discuss the Athenian threat, they assured themselves that the Athenian empire at war was no match for the western Greeks. For most Syracusans, the treaty of Gela a decade earlier in 424 meant that the Sicilians would join together to fight the Athenians, whose imperial pivot toward the island won them no favor.[3] Thus, Hermokrates, the champion at Gela, came before the Syracusan assembly and insisted that they send envoys to their Greek and Punic neighbors without delay.[4] He then invited his audience to behold the great distance separating them from Athens and to consider the fate of empires: the Athenians, like the Persians at Salamis, could not hope to extend their empire over so vast a distance, he argued, and their defeat would leave the Syracusans empowered to take on Sicily themselves.

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[1] For the Athenians' preparations for the Sicilian campaign and the prospect of land allotment, see Thuc. 4.65, 6.18.3; Diod. 12.54.1, 13.2.2; 13.30.1; Kagan 1981: 159-209. Officially the Athenians sailed to Sicily at the request of the Segestans, who were at war with Selinous and Syracuse. The Athenians struck an alliance with the Segestans in the middle of the fifth century, see *IG* I^3 11; Meiggs and Lewis 1969: 80-82.

[2] Thuc. 6.31; 6.43. For the Peace of Nikias in 421, see Thuc. 5.13-24.

[3] In 424, the Greek states in eastern Sicily came together at Gela to sign a peace treaty, see Thuc. 4.58-65; Kagan 1974: 265-268. In effect, Athenian imperialism had prompted Sicilian unity: the Sicilians agreed to the Syracusans' proposal to leave "Sicily for the Sicilians."

[4] For Hermokrates' speech and Athenagoras' response, see Thuc. 6.34-41, with Bloedow 1996; Fauber 2001; Mader 1993; Hinrichs 1981. He hoped that fear would make the Carthaginians join them, see Thuc. 6.34.2; cf. 1.23.6. For his career, see Grosso 1966; Westlake 1969: 174-202.

But as the Athenians sailed to Sicily, they saw the Syracusans' own imperial past weighing against them. Alkibiades had convinced the Athenians to undertake the campaign on the promise that the island was crippled with instability and *stasis* (or "civil strife").[5] He pictured its cities teeming with "mixed mobs," known more for their frequent relocations than their sense of citizenship and duty. After all, only two years after the Sicilians came together at the Congress of Gela, the Syracusans forced the Leontine elite to relocate to Syracuse after destroying their city. Afterwards, the Leontines who moved to Syracuse became Syracusan citizens.[6] The Leontines were just the most recent examples in a long history of forced relocations on Sicily dating back to the beginning of the fifth century.

So when the Athenians sized up the Syracusans, they took pride in their own closed citizenship and autochthonous imperial society.[7] The Athenians, for their part, were no strangers to forced relocations: the Lemnians and Histiaians knew this only too well. But the Athenians saw in Syracuse itself, with its the fluid borders and mixed population, the image of those places like Lemnos and Histiaia that had fallen victim to Athenian imperialism: they saw Sicily as a world destabilized by a history of relocations and land confiscations, composed of fragmented states that could be picked apart individually. Alkibiades was appealing to what the Athenians knew best: their own experience with conquest and land allotment taught them that the Syracusans' imperial past would be their undoing. In other words, the Athenians mapped the Aegean world that they had created onto Sicily. As the two Greek states made preparations for war, they saw in each other a common history of conquest and land allotment.

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[5] For Alkibiades' views on Sicilian instability, see Thuc. 6.17.2-4. Alkibiades was responding to Nikias' concern of overreach, see Thuc. 6.11.

[6] For the relocation of the Leontine elite, see Thuc. 5.4.1-5; Diod. 12.54. Dionysios allotted their land to mercenaries in 396, Diod. 14.78.

[7] For Athenian ideas about autochthony, political society, and imperialism in the fifth century, see Rosivach 1987; Loraux 1996: 27-48.

The Athenians, however, misread the imperial geography of Sicily. For the Syracusans, land allotment was also a formative institution of their community, but not in a way the Athenians would have recognized. Beginning in 483, and just two years after Gelon took control of Syracuse, successive Deinomenid tyrants transformed the city into a metropolis by resettling elite populations from nearby Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi. At first, Gelon allotted land in and around Syracuse itself to new residents, and the land they left behind remained mostly unused. Later, in 476 Hieron was the first to allot land outside of Syracusan territory when he resettled the Naxians and Katanians to Leontinoi and had Syracusan and Peloponnesian settlers take their place.[8] But the democratic takeover in 466 marked a caesura in the Syracusans' transition to empire, as the mixed residents of the Deinomenid state returned home and scattered across eastern Sicily. It was not until the aftermath of Gela in 422 that the Syracusan democrats revisited the Deinomenid approach to forced relocation and land confiscation at Leontinoi. After the Athenians' gamble on Sicily ended in total defeat in 413, and two Carthaginian campaigns on the island failed to reach Syracuse, the Syracusans picked up where the Deinomenids had left off: with Dionysios I now as their military leader, they set out on a period of rapid imperial state-formation that unsettled much of Sicily and southern Italy for a single generation.[9] In the century between Gelon's tyranny and Dionysios' death in 367, the Syracusans allotted land after forced relocations on at least twenty-one occasions (see Table 4.1, with Maps 4.1-2). After the Athenians' failed Sicilian campaign, the Syracusans succeeded the Athenians to become the leading Greek state in the Mediterranean. Much to the Athenians' dismay, Hermokrates was right.

[8] Hieron's new settlement was called Aitna, see Diod. 11.49.2. The new settler population of Aitna was a mixed community of both Syracusan and Peloponnesian recruits. Hieron is said to have transferred the dispossessed Naxians and Katanians to nearby Leontinoi.

[9] Dionysios is first attested in the sources as a supporter of Hermokrates in 408 in a failed military coup at Syracuse, see Diod. 13.75.

Table 4.1. ***Dates and locations of Syracusan land allotments in the historical sources***

Date	Location	Origin of Lotholders	Main Sources
483	Syracuse	Kamarina, Gela, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia	Hdt. 7.154-156; Thuc. 6.4
483	Syracuse	Mercenaries	Diod. 11.72-3
476	Leontinoi	Naxos, Katane	Diod. 11.49
476	Aitna	Syracuse	Diod. 11.49
422	Syracuse	Leontinoi	Thuc. 5.4.1-5; Diod. 12.54.7
405	Syracuse, Leontinoi	Gela, Kamarina	Diod. 13.111
404	Syracuse	Mercenaries	Diod. 14.7
404	Entella	Mercenaries	Diod. 14.9
403	Naxos	Sikels	Diod. 14.15.1-3
403	Katane	Mercenaries	Diod. 14.15.1-3
403	Syracuse	Leontinoi	Diod. 14.15.4
396	Leontinoi	Mercenaries	Diod. 14.78.4
395	Messene	Lokroi	Diod. 14.78.5, 14.88.5
389	Syracuse	Kaulonia, Hipponion	Diod. 14.106.3, 14.107
389	Kaulonia, Hipponion	Lokroi	Diod. 14.106.3, 14.107

In many ways, the Syracusan empire mirrored its Athenian counterpart. Like their fellow Greeks in the eastern Mediterranean, the Syracusans divided up confiscated land into plots and then allotted them to individuals for their own private use. Greek authors, for their part, used the term *klēros* and its cognates to describe Syracusan allotment, just as they did for Athenian allotment. At the height of the Syracusan empire in the early fourth century, Dionysios

commanded the largest navy in the Mediterranean and the city of Syracuse was one of the most active urban centers in the world, its massive port teaming with merchant ships.[10] And at each forced relocation and confiscation of land, the Syracusans, like the Athenians, were breaking down the political and economic networks that existed before their empire. In fact, in the generation after their Sicilian campaign, the Athenians themselves considered the Syracusans to be the predominant power in the western Greek world. In 394/3 and then again in 368/7, the Athenians recognized Dionysios as the "*archon* of Sicily," and even granted him citizenship to seal a defensive alliance against the Spartans.[11] The Athenians had finally come to recognize the Syracusans for the imperial power they had become after more than a century of land allotment.

Still, Syracusan tyrants, not democrats, were responsible for nearly every occasion of land allotment. Furthermore, the tyrants routinely allotted land to mercenaries and allies rather than actual Syracusan citizens—citizens who often came from a dispossessed community and were forced to live on allotted land at Syracuse. Despite the similarities between Syracusan and Athenian land allotment, ancient historians have shied away from comparing the two imperial histories, assuming that tyrants and democrats necessarily created different kinds of empires—that tyranny alone sufficiently explains Syracusan land allotment. To be sure, even in antiquity, Sicily was known for its frequent recourse to tyranny, and ancient authors saw tyrants going

[10] For the development of the Syracusan navy, see Diod. 11.88, 12.30, 14.41-44, 15.13, with Murray 2012: 81-84. For urbanization at Syracuse, see Morris 2006: 43-46; Evans 2009. Plato (*Letters* 7.332c), in his criticism of Syracusan urban relocations wrote that Dionysios had "united all Sicily into a single city." In the early fourth century, Syracuse may have become the first single Greek city to exceed 50,000 residents, see Morris 2006: 44. Still, Athens and Piraeus together had a larger population already in the fifth century before the Peloponnesian War.

[11] *IG* II² 18, *l.* 7; *IG* II² 103, *l.* 19-20; *IG* II² 105 + 523, *l.* 8, with Osborne 1982: 57-59; Rhodes and Osborne 2003: 48-51,160-169. For Athenian diplomacy with Dionysios after the batlle of Leuktra in 371, see also [Dem.] 12.10; Lysias 19.19-20. Ps. Demosthenes and Lysias both linked Dionysios to Evagoras king of Salamis, a supporter of Athens and the Second Athenian League, see Sorg 2015: 63-64.

hand-in-hand with forced relocations and mercenary settlement.[12] Thus the historical sources for land allotment focus on the motivations and personality of the tyrant himself, and take for granted what went on wherever he was not present. Drawing on those sources and Alkibiades' famous assessment of Sicily, historians tend to treat Syracusan land allotment primarily as an instrument of the tyrant, a simple form of remuneration for services that protected and empowered his regime. In this traditional view, land allotment had no real bearing on Syracusan society and was in no way linked to popular politics, much less democracy, even though the Syracusan democrats relocated the Leontines to Syracuse in 422. By reconstructing the story of Syracusan land allotment as one just about tyrants, it is hard to explain why Syracusan tyrants and democrats both allotted land in conquered territories to people outside of Syracusan society and then resettled the people they dispossessed back in Syrakousai to become citizen landowners.

In this chapter, I show how the Syracusans valued their imperial territory in a very different way than the Athenians, a way that cannot be explained simply by the difference between tyrants and democrats. Instead, I argue that the Syracusans saw imperial land as external to their state so that the people of their empire could become internal to their state. The Syracusans considered imperial land to be less a source of wealth than the people taken from it: hence they gave away imperial land and concentrated imperial labor. Therefore, the twin policy of land allotment and relocation was a political means to an economic end: the concentration of human capital at Syracuse. Unlike Attica, Syracusan territory had long been an underpopulated

[12] See Section 4.3. For the frequency of tyrants in Sicily, see Thuc. 1.18.1, 6.38.3; Just. 4.2.3. For the idea that there was a strong connection between tyrants, mercenaries, and empire, see Aristotle *Pol*. 3.1286b; 5.1315b; Polybius 11.13; Diod. 14.65.2–3, with Lomas 2006: 106-107.

frontier economy, which meant that there was more available land than people to work it. Despite having one of the finest harbors in the Mediterranean, the Syracusans also were not the economic power that the Athenians were at the time they began confiscating land. Quite the opposite: the Syracusans could hardly compete with their Greek and Punic rivals on Sicily, mostly exporting grain in return for manufactured goods. Over time, the Syracusans became increasingly open to giving citizenship to the people they dispossessed, so long as it meant that they could secure an empire's share of human capital back at Syracuse.

Altogether, the Syracusans thought of land allotment as a way to reshape the human geography of Sicily and concentrate human capital back at Syracuse. The Syracusans, like the Athenians before them, saw imperial land as something external to their citizen community: they were committed to the idea of the insular *polis* and its citizen *chōra,* so they kept the land they conquered as distinct and separate from Syracuse itself. Unlike the Athenians, however, the Syracusans used land allotment to transfer people, not just wealth, from the land they conquered. For that reason, Syracusan land allotment concentrated human capital more than it centralized it within a broader network: it transferred whole communities to Syracuse rather than plugging them into a Syracusan network of exchange from where they were already living, outside of Syracusan territory. At each transfer, the Syracusans undercut the productive capacity of the their rivals, increased economic activity and production at Syracuse, and quickened the pace and scope of specialization in their labor force. Outside of Syracusan territory, the recipients of land allotments received the base conditions for a new agrarian life on Sicily, but that life also required them to start over in competition with Syracuse.

Above: Map 4.1. Sicily. *Below:* Map 4.2. Southern Italy.



In what follows, I have divided the story of Syracusan land allotment into six sections. After deconstructing the sources and historiography in section one, section two surveys the Archaic prehistory to Syracusan land allotment to understand why the Syracusans were willing to trade imperial land for human capital in the fifth and fourth centuries. Based on the growth of Syracuse's commercial and military rivals, section three shows how the Syracusans externalized their imperial territory as a way to force along the economic development within Syracusan territory. Section four then shows how tyrants and democrats both naturalized the people they moved to Syracuse as a way to concentrate human capital at the metropole. Two final sections draw from recent archaeological evidence from eastern Sicily and Kalabria in southern Italy to test how land allotment undermined economic communities outside of Syracuse.

4.1. *Sources & Historiography*

The figure of the tyrant was central to Sicilian political culture. Looking back on Sicilian history before the Roman conquest of the island, Diodorus described his native island as "particularly prone to one-man rule," or *monarchia.*[13] He had in mind a very particular kind of one-man rule, one that the Greeks called *tyrannis,* and the ruler himself they called a *tyrannos,* or "tyrant." To the Greeks, tyrants were leaders who directed public affairs in their own self-interest, not the interests of the broader political community.[14] The label "tyrant" could also apply to anyone who governed through coercion and force alone. It was in this sense that

[13] Diod. 19.1.5. Diodorus uses the word μοναρχία in this instance, but then switches to τυραννίς to describe each specific example.

[14] For Aristotle's formulation of the Greek typology of *tyrannis* and *tyrannoi*, see Arist. *Pol*. 4.1295a1-24, with Luraghi 2013: 135-139. For classic treatments of Greek tyranny, see Andrewes 1956; Berve 1967; Mossé 1969. For more recent studies, see Austin 1990; Luraghi 1994; Cawkwell 1995; Anderson 2005; Lewis 2006; 2009. For the legacy of tyranny and tyrant-killing in democracies, see Teegarden 2014.

Thucydides used the term to describe the Athenians and their position at the center of the Delian League.[15] But tyranny did not necessarily preclude the existence of republican institutions: the Syracusan popular assembly under Dionysios presided over the city's finances, used sortition to fill public offices, and elected Dionysios I "*stratēgos autokratōr*," the city's head general and military leader.[16] Still, because the Greeks tended to remember tyrants more for their vices than the institutions that supported them, they saw tyranny as a particularly volatile form of governance, and communities led by tyrants particularly prone to outbreaks of *stasis*. And for good reason: Syracuse seems to have experienced more *staseis* than any other Greek *polis*, with nineteen documented cases in the Classical period alone.[17] When Alkibiades described Sicily to his Athenian audience, he saw Syracusans' frequent relocations and instability as part and parcel of tyranny and Sicilian political culture.

The historical sources for Syracusan land allotment, for their part, also implicate Syracusan tyranny in Syracusan imperialism. Writing from back in Athens, Thucydides and Herodotus both emphasized what they saw to be fundamental differences between Syracusan imperialism in the west and Athenian imperialism in the east. Thucydides, whose history is one of the only extant contemporary sources for Syracusan imperialism, digressed at the beginning of Book 6 to explain the long history of Sicilian population movements to his Athenian audience. Unlike the Athenians in the eastern Greek world who were well-known for their autochthony, , he explained, Syracusan tyrants and their neighbors had a long history of moving people in and out of their states, from one part of Sicily to another. Thucydides

[15] See Thuc. 1.122.3, 1.124.3, 2.63.2, 3.37.2, with Tuplin 1985. Aristophanes used *tyrannos* to describe the *dēmos*, see *Knights,* 1111-1114.

[16] Diod. 13.94.5–95.1, 15.20.6, 19.1.4. For discussion of republican institutions at Syracuse under Dionysios, see also Caven 1990: 159-161.

[17] Berger 1992: esp. 34-49. He studied the nineteen documented cases between the end of the Gamoroi regime in 491/0 and Timoleon.

included this digression before narrating the Athenians' campaign to Sicily precisely because he wanted to show his Athenian audience just how different a world west Greece was from east Greece, and thus just how cavalier Alkibiades was in his assessment of Syracusan power. Still, he took a lot of details for granted: he never once mentioned Syracusan land allotment by name, only referring to the movement of people from one place to another.

Herodotus was also more interested in comparing east to west Greece than describing imperial institutions. During a brief digression on the envoys the anti-Persian coalition sent to Sicily in 480, Herodotus described how Gelon made Syracuse a powerful state by relocating people from all over eastern Sicily to Syracuse with citizenship.[18] Unlike Athenian power, which rested in its democratic institutions, Syracusan power according to Herodotus rested in its ability to marshal large armies from Syracuse. Thucydides and Herodotus are invaluable for modern historians because they give a brief but contemporary view of Syracusan imperialism—albeit one directed towards an Athenian audience. However, they both wrote their histories before the most active period of Syracusan land allotment, the period of Dionysios' leadership, before it was ever clear that the Syracusans were on their way to creating an empire to succeed the Athenians. As a result, Thucydides and Herodotus leave modern historians with the impression that the only way to compare Syracusan an Athenian imperialism is to compare tyrants and democrats.

We see a similar Athenocentric approach to Syracusan imperialism in the contemporary political theorists who were, again, writing in Athens. Aristotle pointed to Dionysios time and time again in his *Politics* as an exemplary tyrant and anti-democrat. After all, Aristotle studied

[18] Herod. 7.154-156. Unlike Thucydides, Herodotus did not seem to think, or at least he made no mention, that this kind of demographic engineering was destabilizing.

under Plato, who tried his hand for a time as Dionysios' advisor only later to narrowly escape a death sentence.[19] Consequently, whenever Aristotle used Dionysios' example, or any other Syracusan tyrants for that matter, to illustrate the problems of tyranny, he did little to hide his disdain for Syracusan political culture. In each of his anecdotes about Dionysios, he focused on the tyrant himself, not any of popular political institutions at Syracuse that carried over from the fifth-century democratic regime. It would be easy to forget for anyone reading Aristotle's *Politics* that Syracuse even under the tyrants had one of the largest citizen assemblies in the Greek world.[20] Rather, for Aristotle, Dionysios was an exemplary tyrant because he did all the things the Athenians expected of a tyrant: he regularly hired mercenaries, he seemed to hand out citizenship freely, and he maintained diplomatic links to other states through political marriages. Land allotment, unsurprisingly, was nowhere on Aristotle's register. Still, because Aristotle's *Politics* weighs so heavily on how modern historians interpret Greek political culture, his portrait of Dionysios has made it difficult to see Syracusan imperialism, and indeed Syracusan land allotment, as anything but the tyrant's personal instrument of power.

Because the contemporary sources for Syracusan land allotment are nearly silent on the subject, and excavations at Syracuse so far have found nothing to rival the Athenians' epigraphic habit, our main source is the Sicilian historian Diodorus. Unlike both Thucydides and Herodotus, Diodorus offers an unbroken narrative of Syracusan history down to 380, arranged annalistically. Without Diodorus' history, we would know almost nothing about the sequence and distribution of Syracusan land allotments in the late fifth and early fourth

[19] For Plato in Sicily, see his *Seventh Letter*, though it is uncertain whether he himself wrote it. See also Diogenes Laertius, *Life of Plato.*

[20] Caven 1990: 159-161; Robinson 2011: 67-92. We do not have anything like the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* for information about government institutions at Syracuse, so Aristotle's anecdotes about tyranny remain the main sources for Syracusan political history.

centuries. Diodorus wrote his universal history to integrate Greek with Roman history, but in doing so his chronology sometimes suffered at the expense of his narrative.[21] But whereas his chronology may be shaky, his interest in land allotment was at least consistent. With few exceptions, whenever he wrote that the Syracusans defeated another state, he also mentioned whether or not they confiscated any land and what they did with it. In fact, Diodorus used κληρουχέω and its cognates more than any other author writing about Greek history. In his effort to unite Greek with Roman history, Diodorus may have seen land allotment as a common thread—after all, he was a Sicilian author writing during the Roman civil wars of the late Republic, a time when land allotment was hyper-politicized, especially on his native island.[22] Furthermore, his two main sources for Syracusan imperialism, Philistus of Syracuse (*c.* 432-356) and Timaeus of Tauromenion (*c.* 345-250), experienced firsthand two successive waves of Syracusan imperialism.[23] Philistus was a general and early friend to Dionysios; Timaeus supported Timoleon from Tauromenion, where he was *hegemōn*. Both were personally exiled by Syracusan tyrants later in life. From what we can tell from the few fragments we have of their histories, they were personally invested in the tyrants' legacies and their failings as military leaders. Drawing on those authors, Diodorus connected all land allotments directly to the tyrants, not to Syracusan society as he did for Athenian and Roman society.

Drawing on the close connection between tyrants and Syracusan political culture, modern historians have traditionally taken the tyrant himself as the central agent of Syracusan

[21] Marincola 2011: 176-177.

[22] Diodorus would have been alive for the controversial agrarian laws debated in Cicero's *De re agraria.* He also would have heard about Sulla, Caesar, and Pompey allotting land to their veterans. For Diodorus and his Roman context, see Sacks 1990; Muntz 2017.

[23] For Diodorus' sources, see Sanders 1981; 2002; Sacks 1994. For the historical works of Philistus and Timaeus, see Vattuone 2011.

land allotment. This approach treats empire, relocations, and land allotment serving the personal interests of the tyrant. As such, the history of Syracusan land allotment has traditionally been the history of Syracusan tyrants. Renewed interest in the volatility of autocratic forms of government after the Second World War led historians to see Greek tyranny as an undesirable, but sometimes necessary phase in the evolution of a *polis* on its way to a more participatory form of government. In this view, tyrants allotted land to mercenaries and allies to win their support, and thus maintain a hold on power. For example, Antony Andrewes, in his influential study of Greek tyrants suggested that Syracusan tyrants relocated dispossessed people and allotted the land they left behind to bring those areas under their personal control. Helmut Berve and Claude Mossé built on Andrewes' model by arguing that Syracusan tyrants created a personal monarchy that had no relation to the city of Syracuse and its citizens. For them, land allotment was a symptom of a tyrant's coalition of power: it allowed him to appease his coalition of mercenaries and allies while simultaneously moving unruly populations back to Syracuse where he could suppress their dissent. This model of a "tyrant-coalition" became the standard explanation for Syracusan land allotment.[24]

In the 1980s and 1990s, as many ancient Greek historians turned their focus to Athenian democratic society, the study of Syracusan society shifted away from the tyrants themselves to the

[24] See Andrewes 1956: 128-142; Berve 1967; Mossé 1969. For the influence of the "tyrant-coalition" model on later studies, see, for example, Finley 1979; Caven 1990; Berger 1991; Luraghi 1994; Péré-Noguès 1999; Ober 2015: 180, 254. According to evolutionary approach to tyranny, tyrants and their elite coalitions monopolized power in a way that allowed the broader community to conceive of it in an abstract way. This view favors the replacement of tyranny by democracy at Athens. For an overview of the traditional approaches to Greek tyranny, see Lewis 2006: 6-9. For the Athenocentric approach, Greek constitutional history, and the figure of the tyrant, see Brock and Hodkinson: 2000: 4-9. For other Athenocentric studies of tyranny, see Kinzl 1979; Cawkwell 1995; Giorgini 1993; Barcelo 1993.

fluidity of western Greek societies.[25] At the center of this shift was the recognition that Syracusan tyrants, compared to their mainland counterparts, undermined the traditional political boundaries of their own *polis* community by moving dispossessed populations to Syracuse with citizenship. In four exhaustive studies, Jakob Seibert, Nancy Demand, Riccardo Vattuone, and Alessandro Giuliani catalogued each moment of urban relocation to show how Sicilian tyrants, moreso than any mainland tyrant, relied on "demographic engineering" and political synoikism (from *synoikismos*, literally "moving in together") to secure their power at home and abroad.[26] Building on Andrewes' tyrant-coalition model, they showed how the Syracusan state was fundamentally different from Athens: in their pursuit of personal power, Syracusan tyrants freed themselves of any meaningful connection to the state, brought together a composite political community at Syracuse, and maintained close relationships with those mercenaries they settled abroad. But for all of their interest in the demographic consequences of Syracusan imperialism, they only reinforced Andrewes' regime-based focus. By taking for granted what Syracusan "control" actually looked like outside of Syracuse, they left imperial land allotment as a postscript to a story of tyrants consolidating their power at the metropole.

Other historians have pointed to the particular ethnic and social fissures on Sicily to explain Syracusan imperialism. Sebastiana Consolo Langher and Franco De Angelis have recently argued that the conditions on Sicily drove the Syracusans and their neighbors to leave behind traditional ideas of the insular *polis* community in favor of a larger "territorial state"—an

[25] Interest in Athenian democracy during this period roughly coincided with the 2,500 anniversary of Kleisthenes' popular reforms at Athens. See, for example, Ober and Hedrick 1993, 1996; Ober 1996; Morris and Raaflaub 1998; Boedeker and Raaflaub 1998, with Lomas 2006: 2.

[26] Seibert 1982-1983; Demand 1990; Vattuone 1994; Giuliani 1995. See also Luraghi 1994: 288-304; Mafodda 1990: 53-69; 1996: 71-80.

expansionist, multi-*polis* state.[27] They argued that, because the Syracusans strongly identified with other Sicilian Dorians, and because *stasis* was a recurrent problem in colonial cities, each Syracusan regime, whatever its political persuasion from Gelon to Agathocles, pursued some form of territorial state greater than the *polis* and its *chōra*. For them, the social tensions in Sicilian cities made the Syracusans prone to expand their state to bring in other Dorians and, in the process, reinforce the ethnic base of Syracusan society. A policy of relocations disrupted local alliances and shifted elite loyalties to the Syracusan regime; a policy of land allotment then expanded the Syracusan state to incorporate conquered land. In this view, when the Athenians declared Dionysios I "the *archon* of Sicily," the title was not simply a show of honor but rather a recognition that he governed a single state that included much of Greek Sicily.

In a similar approach, Schlomo Berger argued that tyrant and democratic regimes alike wanted to expand the Syracusan state.[28] What united Syracusan tyrants and democrats was their common sense of ethnic identity, but lack of political "rootedness," or sense of autochthony, as descendants of colonists. Sicilian colonists and their descendants did not have the same level of connection to their place of residence as their counterparts in mainland Greece. By emphasizing the structural continuities of the Syracusan state, Consolo Langher, De Angelis, and Berger moved away from the tyrant as the agent of empire. In fact, they saw the Syracusans not so much as imperialists, but rather as state builders. Still, this approach, like those before it, assumed strong connections between Syracuse and communities outside of Syracusan territory, but did not show

[27] Consolo Langher 1996: 218-255; 1997; De Angelis 2016: 63, 126-129. Neither of them compared how this form of multi-*polis* state might have been similar to mainland experiments with federalism, even though *koina* in Thessaly and the northern Peloponnese shared many similar qualities.

[28] Berger 1991, with Amit 1973. Still, he argued that the Syracusan tyrants violated the standard institutional practices of Greek *poleis.*

those connections: it was never clear what the Syracusans thought of land beyond the Syracusan *chōra* or how other *poleis* were affected by state building.

In the last decade, historians have begun to take a more discursive approach, looking at how land allotment figured into ideas about ethnicity, citizenship, and "integration." Kathryn Lomas, for example, has shown how Greek communities in Sicily and southern Italy allowed for a much greater level of mobility across boundaries of citizenship and even ethnicity. Because of their proximity to native Sicilians and Italiotes, western Greeks' own self-definition developed in relation to non-Greek cultures.[29] Consequently, when Syracusan tyrants allotted imperial land to "barbarian" mercenaries of Campanian or Sikel origin, they were not only subverting the very idea of the *polis*, they were also fashioning a distinctive Syracusan imperial identity distinct from Athenian autochthony. Similarly, Sandra Péré-Noguès argued that Dionysios I allotted land to his mercenaries as a way to integrate them into the Syracusan state, as Gelon had done with his mercenaries at Syracuse.[30] Though there is no evidence for mercenaries settled outside of Syracuse receiving citizenship, she nevertheless assumed that they identified with the Syracusan state through their connection to imperial land. For Lomas and Péré-Noguès, land allotment was a symptom of western Greek political culture, but still a culture that played out according to the intentions of its tyrants.

Recent interest in global and economic history has prompted some historians to study Syracusan land allotment as a process of state-formation. Ian Morris considered forced relocations and land allotment as a sign that the Syracusans, like the Athenians, were headed

[29] Lomas 2000; 2006. She did not say whether Italiote ideas about citizenship may have influenced the Sicilians, *per* Dunbabin 1948: 416. Dunbabin suggested in passing that synoikism and citizenship at Syracuse was more like Rome than anywhere in the Greek world.

[30] Péré-Noguès 2004; 2006.

down what Charles Tilly called a "capital-intensive" path to a commercial and urban state.[31] Because the Syracusans' military power rested with their mercenaries, they were essentially converting capital, acquired through rents and conquest, into coercive power. For Morris, the Syracusans' payments to mercenaries tied them to the state, and therefore the Syracusans did not have to "outsource" warfare to allies, which would have distanced the tyrant from his own source of power. The allotment of land to mercenaries then reinforced their integration into the Syracusan state, and the communities they formed were centers of imperial security. For all his important theoretical insights, Morris repackaged the tyrant-coalition model: relocations increased the tyrant's wealth and land allotment helped control hostile frontiers.

Though the study of Syracusan land allotment has continued to inspire interest among ancient historians, recent work has done little to advance our understanding of Syracusan land allotment beyond whatever the intentions of the tyrant himself may have been. For all their variety, the studies of Syracusan imperialism in recent decades have all adhered in one way or another to the tyrant-coalition model. Because ancient historians have focused exclusively on the historical evidence from Herodotus, Thucydides, and Diodorus, and those historians were themselves more interested in the tyrants than land allotment, it is not surprising that the history of Syracusan land allotment has traditionally been the history of Syracusan tyrants. But it remains unclear how land allotment figured into Syracusan society more broadly and to what extent the Syracusan community of citizens, not just Syracusan tyrants, played a role.

[31] Morris 2009: 101, 161, with Tilly 1992. Morris argued that the Syracusans were quite different from the Athenians because they never created a centralized tax base and bureaucracy to govern the state beyond Syracuse itself. Still, he suggested that Gelon and Hieron may have pioneered the Greek model of what Tilly called a "capital-intensive" state, which the Athenians later adopted under the Delian League.

This chapter moves beyond traditional regime-based approaches by de-centering the tyrant as the primary agent of empire. Tyrants may have been in power for much of Syracusan imperial history, but land allotment affected all of Syracusan society—land allotment was a Syracusan story, not just a tyrant story. Far from subverting the territoriality of the *polis* community, land allotment allowed the Syracusans to "externalize" their imperial territory by consolidating the people they dispossessed within Syracusan territory and allotting the land the left behind to people outside of Syracusan society. Like the Athenians, the Syracusans were committed to the strong connection between citizenship and the *chōra*. But unlike their Aegean counterparts, the Syracusans allotted land in their own territory (or "Syrakousai") as well as outside of it: on the one hand, they allotted land in Syrakousai to dispossessed imperial communities with Syracusan citizenship; on the other hand, they allotted the land confiscated from those communities to mercenaries and allies, who then formed new political communities separate from Syracuse. Because human capital, I argue, not land, was the most valuable commodity within their imperial territory, the Syracusans let the land they confiscated remain separate from, and external to, their own territory. The Syracusans were internalizing new citizens in a way unheard of among the eastern Greeks, but they were nevertheless committed to the idea of the insular *polis* community, where the reach of the state and its citizens mapped onto the territory of the citizen *chōra.*

Outside of Syracusan territory, the Syracusans unsettled much of the Greek west, but then forced many of those dispossessed communities to relocate to Syrakousai to make room for new settlers. The mercenaries and allies who settled on the confiscated land were on their own to build a new life, often a slow transition that, as we will see, undercut local economic activity to the benefit of Syracuse. Furthermore, Syracusan citizens themselves had no part in land allotment

outside of Syracusan territory: they may have become citizens after receiving allotments of land in the Syracusan countryside, but they could not expect to share directly in the benefits of imperial land. But because land allotment did not require any drain on the Syracusans' productive power, and it brought together an empire's share of human capital at Syracuse, it placed Syracusan citizens at the helm of the fastest growing urban center in the Mediterranean. In all, this chapter argues that Syracusan land allotment resulted in a massive transfer of imperial peoples that did more to increase production and specialization at Syracuse than build political support for the tyrant outside of Syracusan territory.

Such an approach moves beyond the regime-based approaches by asking why Syracusan land allotment took the forms it did, not treating it as a simple consequence, or symptom, of tyrants' personal struggle for power. By emphasizing the economic life of imperial communities, it can be tested against archaeological evidence from eastern Sicily and southern Italy. Syracusan land allotment put a premium on internalizing the people of empire because it emerged out of a long colonial history, a prehistory that emphasized the shortcomings of Sicilian agrarianism in the absence of the labor and markets it counted on. What we see is that the Syracusan empire was distinct from its Athenian counterpart not necessarily because it emerged alongside tyrants, but because those tyrants were more interested in the people of empire than their land.

4.2. *The Archaic Origins of Syracusan Land Allotment*

Unlike Athens, Syracuse was itself a colony, a Corinthian initiative in a push of commercial expansion in the second half of the seventh century. One of a dozen major Greek colonial sites on the island, Syracuse also grew up alongside two dozen or so native Sikel,

Sikan, and Elymian communities in the central highlands, and yet another three Punic settlements on the northwestern coast. Though Syracusan territory was well under half the size of Attica, at roughly 1,000 km^2 near the end of the Archaic period, and the Syracusans themselves founded at least one independent settler colony at Kamarina, the Syracusans seem to have mostly focused on agricultural intensification within Syracusan territory.[32] But as they began to confiscate land outside of Syrakousai at the beginning of the fifth century, they had learned that there was plenty of land already within Syracusan territory for allotment, and thus the land they confiscated was expendable and could be given to mercenaries and allies. What they lacked, however, was the labor and specialization needed to compete economically, and ultimately militarily, with their rivals in eastern Sicily. As we will see, by the end of the Archaic period, they saw imperial land as external to their state so that they could bring imperial peoples back to Syrakousai to become members of it.

In Syrakousai, a citizen community was slow to develop, which made it easier for new people to become members of the Syracusan community. For much of the Archaic period, a narrow coalition of elite Syracusans (the *gamoroi*, literally "they who divide the land") ruled over a mixed community of Greek immigrants and native Sikels held in serf-like conditions.[33] Though the earliest Corinthian colonists may have been united in a sense of political

[32] For the size of the Syracusan territory in the Archaic period, see De Angelis 2000a: 122-124; 2000b, with Dunbabin 1948: 95-112; Di Vita 1956; Cancio 1980; De Miro 1986: 571-572; Gates 1997; Muggia 1997: 58-59. For Kamarina, see Thuc. 6.5.3, with Dunbabin 1948: 104-107; Lentini 1983; Manni 1987. They founded settlements within Syracusan territory at Heloros in *c.* 700, Akrai in 664, and Kasmenai in 643.

[33] For the identification of the *gamoroi* and *kyllyrioi*, see Hdt. 7.155.2; Arist. fr. 603; *Marmor Parium* 36, with Dunbabin 1948: 55-64, 111; Loicq-Berger 1967: 35-37; Lepore 1970: 142-147. Herodotus wrote that the Syracusans held the *kyllyrioi* as *douloi*, or slaves. The first group of Corinthian colonists likely drove out most of the native Sikels from the area, and those who remained were held in a form of slavery, the details of which remain unclear. It is tempting to draw parallels between Syracusan *kyllyrioi* and the Spartan helots, see Section 3.2.

community and Dorian ethnicity, later generations of immigrants did not fully share in that community and only hardened the existing oligarchy.[34] The Syracusan state, like the Athenian state before Solon, was really just a narrow coalition of landowning elites. But unlike Athens, Syracuse did not have an early watershed moment like Solon's reforms that pushed Syracusan society to develop a cohesive citizen community. In the absence of a strong sense of citizenship, and because only the elite really constituted the state, Syracusan society allowed for a level of cultural heterogeneity unseen in Attica. For example, unlike their Aegean contemporaries, the Syracusans do not seem to have adopted any communal forms of mortuary practice; instead, excavations of both urban and rural burials during the Archaic period show high levels of local variation and a range of symbolic systems.[35] Even before the first Syracusan tyrants, a narrow conception of the state and a fluid sense of what it meant to be "Syracusan" made Syracusan society more open to new members.

Meanwhile, elite Syracusans were becoming immensely wealthy putting local labor to work on Syrakousai's grain-rich countryside, a trend that checked any desire they may have had to look beyond the Syrakousai for more land and new sources of wealth. Though Syracuse itself began as a small coastal settlement, and after a generation its territory extended only 35 km south to a small outpost at Heloros, the territory continued to grow over the course of the seventh and sixth centuries into sparsely populated, non-Greek borderlands. By 500, Syrakousai covered the entire southeast corner of Sicily south of the Anapos river and east of the Hyrminos

[34] The Syracusans came from Corinth, a Dorian community, see Thuc. 6.3.2, with Braccesi and Millino 2000: 23-27; De Angelis 2016: 71-73.

[35] Jackman 2005: 21-62. She drew similar conclusions for Selinous and Metaponto as well. By way of comparison, I. Morris (2009a: 159-160, with Morris 1989) argued that, "Starting around 700 B.C.E., Aegean Greeks [namely Athens] tended to represent their cities in their death rituals as single, homogeneous communities, each sharing a unified symbolic system to which all buriers adhered."

river, an area of some 1000 km^2.[36] Within those borders, the land was particularly well suited for agriculture, and received nearly twice as much rainfall as Attica. Franco De Angelis has estimated that up to 80-90% of Syrakousai was cultivable, more than twice as cultivable as Attica, giving it a carrying capacity of up to 144,000 people: though under half the size of Attica, it could actually sustain more people.[37] For that reason, Syracuse was well known in antiquity for its agricultural surpluses.[38] With its massive Great Harbor, much larger than the Kantharos Harbor at Piraeus (see Figures 4.1-2), Syracuse was naturally poised to command grain shipments between northern Africa, southern Italy, and mainland Greece. The Syracusan elite took advantage of Syracusan agriculture by exporting grain in exchange for manufactured and ceramic goods.[39] Therefore, because elite Syracusans could rely on the *kyllyroi* for cheap labor, and they also controlled the division of land and agricultural rents within Syrakousai, they did not look outside of Syrakousai for new sources of wealth, as Miltiades had in Attica. Instead, the elite continued to give land to non-elite Syracusans and new immigrants at small rural settlements within Syrakousai, such as Akrai and Kasmenai.[40] In doing so, they showed how Syrakousai was already large enough to accommodate new landholders.

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[36] Gates 1996: 8-12, 23-36.

[37] De Angelis 2000a; 2000b. By comparison, Attica was roughly 35-40% cultivable, with much less reliable rainfall, hence the growth of the Athenians' import market and their dependence on foreign grain, see Garnsey 1988: 91-93, with Osborne 1987: 33-34; 1996b: 59.

[38] Thucydides (3.86.4; 6.20.4; 6.90.4) mentioned on three occasions that Syracuse was known as a grain-producer. On the second occasion, Nikias warned the Athenians the Syracusans could count on homegrown grain, as opposed to imported grain, to sustain them. In 486, Gelon sent a shipment of grain to the Romans, free of charge, see Dion. Hal. 8.70.5. Then in 481, Gelon offered to supply the entire anti-Persian coalition with grain during the war, see Hdt. 7.158. For a note of caution on the historical sources, however, see De Angelis 2006.

[39] Lanza and Westcoat 1989: 76. It is worth noting that exchange with Corinth continued at comparatively high levels, relative to other Sicilian *poleis,* through the beginning of the fifth century, even after the Athenian ceramic industry largely took over the market.

[40] For Akrai in 664, see Fischer-Hansen *et al.* 2004: 189-190. For the hilltop site of Kasmenai in 643, see Fischer-Hansen *et al.* 2004: 205-206. Kamarina seems to have been an independent *polis,* and fell out of favor with Syracuse shortly after its foundation, see Cordano 1987.





Left: Figure 4.1. The Syracusans harbors. *Right:* Figure 4.2. The Athenians' harbors.

Together, a fluid citizen community and elite agriculturalism led wealthy Syracusans to find new ways of increasing the labor force in Syrakousai. By the sixth century, high agricultural rents and intra-elite competition allowed the *gamoroi* to marshal labor and materials to such an extent that temple building at Syracuse, like at Selinous, Akragas, and Gela, began to outpace mainland Greece.[41] At Syracuse, for example, the *gamoroi* ordered the construction of two colossal Doric temples for Apollo and Olympian Zeus. The vast wealth that allowed for Syracusan temple building came from an abundance of fertile land in Syrakousai. But unlike Attica, Syrakousai in the Archaic period was an underpopulated "frontier economy," which

[41] For intra-elite competition and temple building in Sicily, see Mertens 2006: 90-256. For labor and temple building, see De Angelis 2003a: 140-143, 163-169. For the Apollonion and Olympieion, see Boardman 1980: 172-173; Fischer-Hansen *et al.* 2004: 229. By comparison, in Athens the Peisistratids ordered the construction of the Old Temple of Athena and started the Olympieion, see Hurwit 1999: 99-136.

meant that there was more available land than people to work it.[42] The Syracusan population was, after all, originally a small colonial population, and therefore demographic growth and subsequent immigration was slow to populate Syrakousai.[43] By the end of the Archaic period, the urban population of Syracuse numbered roughly 2,400-6,500, and the total population of Syrakousai reached roughly 7,500-20,000—the upper limit still nearly eight times smaller than Attica.[44] So even though the *gamoroi* were able to accumulate high agricultural revenues, the control of labor, not land, was the real source of their wealth. Consequently, when they went to war with their colony Kamarina in *c.* 552, and in defeat the Kamarinaians vacated the city, the Syracusans did not resettle it, which would have only reduced their own labor force.[45] The Kamarinaian campaign set an important precedent: when a Syracusan military campaign broke apart a political community, they would not necessarily resettle the land.

As most Sicilian states transitioned from oligarchies to tyrannies in the sixth century, and the neighboring states of Akragas and Gela became imperial states, the Syracusans inherited a model of indirect empire that allowed them to continue investing in their own territory. Beginning with Phalaris' takeover of Akragas in 570, one Greek state after another adopted tyranny in a rush of peer-polity interaction.[46] Afterwards, many of those states also tried to

[42] De Angelis 2010: 37; 2016: 55-57, with Powelson 1988: 308-310; Allen 1997: 145-146. De Angelis explained that, "for the early Greek *poleis* in Sicily to thrive, it was vital to concentrate populations and to minimize their movements, so that economic exploitation could take root."

[43] For demographic growth, see De Angelis 2000a: 139, with Muggia 1997: 56-115; Scheidel 2003: 131-135, with Beloch 1886: 261-305.

[44] De Angelis 2016: 143. By comparison, in 500 Athens had a population of roughly 20,000 and Attica roughly 150,000, see Morris 2006: 39.

[45] The evidence for Kamarinaian history in the second half of the sixth century is very sparse. According to Thucydides (6.5.3, with Philistos *FGrH* 556 F5), the Syracusans expelled the Kamarinaians from the city after some sort of *apostasis*. In *c.* 491, Hippokrates of Gela resettled Kamarina after defeating the Syracusans at Heloros. However, excavations suggest that some residents may have remained on site: the habitation zone and Archaic burials show no signs of rupture in the sixth century, see Lentini 1983: 5-6; Pelagatti 1976–77: 523–526; 1978.

[46] De Angelis (2003a: 39) suggested that native forms of authoritarian government may have influenced the growth of island's Greek states.

expand across Sicily. For example, under Phalaris' (r. 570-554) leadership, the Akragantines conquered much of central Sicily, extending Akragas' reach as far north as Himera on the northern coast of Sicily.[47] To the east, Kleandros (r. 505-498) and Hippokrates (r. 498-491) of Gela followed a similar path on the eastern seaboard of Sicily. Hippokrates conquered Leontinoi, Naxos, Zankle, and Kallipolis, took their inhabitants as slaves, and carried away whatever moveable property they left behind.[48] After conquering each city, he often installed a new figurehead as tyrant, such as Skythes at Zankle and Ainesidemos at Leontinoi, and allowed them to govern it as an independent *polis*.[49] In his rapid conquest of eastern Sicily, Hippokrates readily employed Sikel mercenaries.[50] When he went to repopulate those cities that he had conquered, he allotted imperial land to people outside of Geloan society—to his mercenaries and immigrants from mainland Greece, such as the Samians at Zankle and the Arkadians at Kamarina.[51]

Hippokrates was creating a kind of indirect empire: he refounded cities with new landholders drawn from outside Gela and their tyrants were only connected to Gela through military commitment. He was more interested in the labor and moveable property he could take from other communities than the actual control of their land. This approach to imperial coercion was distinct from its Athenian counterpart because it was premised on personal contacts rather than naval mobility. Since Gelon, Syracuse's first tyrant, was himself a cavalry commander under Hippokrates, he got to witness firsthand just how this particular approach to imperial

[47] For Phalaris, see Arist. *Pol.* 1310^{b}28; *Rhet*. 1393^{b}11; Polyaen. 5.1; Diod. 19.108.1-2, with Luraghi 1994: 21-49; Adornato 2006; 2012.

[48] For Kleandros and Hippokrates, see Hdt 7.154-155; Polyaen. 5.6, with Dunbabin 1948: 376-406; De Miro 1962; Luraghi 1994: 119-186.

[49] For Skythes, a tyrant from Kos, at Zankle, see Hdt. 6.23-24, 7.164.1. For Ainesidemos at Leontinoi, see Hdt. 7.154.1; Paus. 5.22.7.

[50] Dunbabin 1948: 416; Griffin 2005: 115-116. Polyaenus (5.6) mentioned Sikel mercenaries from Ergetion in Hippokrates' employment.

[51] For Samians at Zankle, see Hdt. 6.23; 7.164.1. For Arkadians at Kamarina, see *Anth. Pal.* Appendix, Epig. 43, with Griffin 2005: 116-117.

territory could work.[52] He also witnessed how a community needed more than agricultural labor to transform a city into a metropole.

The arrival of Gelon at Syracuse set in motion a series of economic and demographic changes that rapidly transformed Syracuse into a metropole ready to compete with its commercial rivals. With the rise of Athenian and Punic trade networks in the sixth century, Syracuse found itself at the crossroads of Mediterranean trade.[53] Despite having one of the Mediterranean's finest harbors, Syracuse was nevertheless a secondary power on Sicily, importing most all manufactured goods, primarily from Corinth, Rhodes, and Etruria, in exchange for agricultural surpluses.[54] This was a time when nearly every other major Greek community on Sicily was developing some sort of *ergastēria* (or "production workshops") to fuel exchange: Syracuse is the only major site on the island for which there is no archaeological evidence of industry and manufacturing dating from the Archaic period.[55] Though the Syracusan elite may have had cheap agricultural labor, they did not have the kind of human capital that could outfit imperial centers like Gela, Akragas, and Selinous—much less Athens—with the tools of war. But in 485 Gelon, having succeeded Hippokrates as tyrant of Gela, took advantage of a short-lived democratic coup at Syracuse to set himself up as the first tyrant of Syracuse.[56] He had inherited a Sicilian empire from Hippokrates at Gela, which had more fertile land than Syracuse, but he chose to leave Gela to his brother Hieron so that he could claim

[52] Hippokrates served under Gelon as *hipparchos*, see Hdt. 7.154-155.

[53] For Phoenician and Punic trade, see Pilkington 2013: 77-129. For Mediterranean interconnectivity, see Broodbank 2013: 506-592.

[54] For imports from Corinth and Rhodes, see Dunbabin 1948: 61-62, 227-245. For Etruria, see Hencken 1958; Loicq-Berger 1967: 176-177.

[55] For evidence of industry and manufacturing at Selinous, Akragas, Gela, Megara Hyblaia, Naxos, Zankle, see Fischer-Hansen 2000. Because the modern city of Syracuse sits on top of the ancient site, it is possible that excavations have not yet found the Archaic workshops. The early Archaic craters found at the Fusco cemetery at Syracuse may have been local productions, see Pelagatti 1982: 148.

[56] For the democratic coup and the disorder that followed, see Hdt. 7.155; Arist. *Pol.* 1302^{b}25-33; Diod. 10.26, with Dunbabin 1948: 415-416.

Syracuse for its harbor.[57] Gelon brought with him half the urban population of Gela and all the Kamarinaians, who he gave Syracusan citizenship. With the transition at Syracuse to Gelon's tyranny also came a transfer of imperial energy: in 483, the Syracusans conquered the Megarians and Leontinoi and relocated their elites to Syrakousai, leading to the first land allotments in Syrakousai to people dispossessed by Syracusan militarism.[58] In the process, Syracuse built up a navy of at least two hundred triremes, one that would have rivaled Athens' fleet, and equally capable of coercion.[59]

In what followed, Syracusan land allotment unsettled much of eastern Sicily and southern Italy for over a century. Sicilian political culture and agriculturalism had taught the elite at the top of Syracusan society that forced relocations and land allotment in Syrakousai could bring them high agricultural rents at home. They also learned from their imperial neighbors at Gela that they did not have to follow up imperial conquest with state colonialism: they used land allotment to form new dependent communities drawn from people outside of Syracusan society. The growth of neighboring states in eastern Sicily, and other Mediterranean powers like Athens and Carthage, also revealed to them what the city of Syracuse was lacking: the skilled labor and specialization needed to scale up economically and militarily. Consequently, the Syracusans would allot land in two different ways: within Syracusan territory to people who became Syracusan citizens and outside of Syracusan territory to people from outside of Syracusan society.

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[57] For the size and boundaries of the Geloan *chōra,* see De Angelis 2000a: 136-138. Though no ancient source said explicitly why Gelon moved from Gela to Syracuse, the main differences that distinguished Syracuse from Gela were its harbor and its position on the eastern seaboard of Sicily. For the development of the Syracusan harbors, see Evans 2009: 16-20.

[58] Hdt. 7.156.2. Gelon forced them to move to Syracuse, but he gave them citizenship and land in return, likely to increase the city's wealth.

[59] Hdt. 7.158.4. Herodotus wrote that in 480 Gelon offered to supply the anti-Persian coalition in Greece with two hundred triremes. For the development of the Syracusan navy in the fifth century, especially the expansions under Gelon and Hieron, see Corretti 2006.

The transition to tyranny at Syracuse was a transformative moment for Syracusan imperialism: Tyranny brought with it from Gela the coercive capacity to create an empire. By limiting land allotment to mercenaries and allies in nearly every case, it also ensured that most Syracusans would not directly profit from land outside of Syracusan territory. Even so, we will see that the tyrants' approach to imperial territory became so engrained in Syracusan society that Syracusan citizens under the democracy and later under Dionysius I continued to move people within Syracusan territory to become citizens.

4.3. *Externalizing Imperial Territory*

As the Syracusans adjusted to life under Gelon after 485, they could do little but watch as Syracusan territory filled with new people from around eastern and central Sicily. Alongside the new residents from Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi, Gelon also gave citizenship to ten thousand of his mercenaries—likely those who helped him conquer Megara and Leontinoi in the first place.[60] Among the mercenaries were immigrants from the Peloponnese, three of whom are known from their dedications at Olympia and Delphi.[61] One man by the name of Phormis wrote on a statue at Olympia that he was "an Arkadian of Mainalos, now of Syracuse." Presumably he fought for the Syracusans, and afterwards moved to Syracuse and became a citizen.[62] Under

[60] For Gelon's career at Syracuse, see Mafodda 1990; 1996. For the ten thousand mercenaries settled in Syrakousai, see Diod. 11.72.3.

[61] Demand 1990: 48-49. An Arkadian from Mainalos named Phormis dedicated a statue of himself dressed as a warrior at Delphi, see Paus. 5.27.2. Another Arkadian from Mantinea named Praxitiles dedicated two statues at Olympia, see Dittenberger and Purgold 1896: no. 266. A final Arkadian named Agesias commissioned Pindar to celebrate his victory at Olympia, see Pind. *Olym.* 6.6. At Selinous, an Arkadian living at Gela named Alexias made a dedication to the goddess Hekate during Gelon's early rule, see Guarducci 1953: 209-211. It is possible that Gelon employed mercenaries such as Alexias and then settled them at Syracuse after he moved from Gela.

[62] Gelon married the daughter of Theron, tyrant of Akragas, to secure a political alliance with central Sicily's strongest state, see Diod. 14.63.3, with Luraghi 1994: 260-262. For the Battle of Himera in north-central Sicily, see Hdt. 7.166-167; Diod. 11.20-26; Pind. *Pyth.* 1.71-80.

Gelon, the urban population of Syracuse increased to roughly 15,000-24,000, and the total population of Syrakousai may have reached as much as 100,000, still far below Attica.[63] In 480, just five years after Gelon moved to Syracuse, the Syracusans and their Akragantine allies defeated the Carthaginians at the Battle of Himera—according to Herodotus, on the same day the Athenians defeated the Persians at the Battle of Salamis. Just as Salamis was proof to the Athenians that their navy was the key to coercing their allies, Himera showed the Syracusans that imperial territory was less important than the people they took from it.

Between Gelon's conquest of Megara and Leontinoi in 483 and Dionysios' death in 367, Syracusan tyrants continued to allot land outside of Syracusan territory to people from outside of Syracusan society. They gave it either to mercenaries from the Peloponnese and Campania or to their Lokrian allies from southern Italy after Dionysios secured a marriage alliance with on of their leading families.[64] The only time Syracusan citizens ever received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory was at Aitna, a new colony founded by Hieron in 476 on land taken from the Katanians. There, Diodorus wrote that Hieron "allotted the land not only of Katane, but also much of the neighboring lands which he added to it, to a sum of ten thousand settlers"—one half from Syracuse, the other from the Peloponnesus.[65] In all likelihood, the rapid demographic growth at Syracuse under Gelon allowed Hieron to experiment with colonialism, like the Athenians did at Lemnos around the same time. Still, Aitna was an outlier: the next century of

[63] De Angelis 2016: 184. It is difficult to give population estimates for Athens at the same time. Still, by the mid-fifth century, Athens had a population of roughly 60,000-65,000 and Attica roughly 300,000-350,000, see Morris 2006: 42, with Hansen 1986; 2004: 636.
[64] Peloponnesians at Aitna in 476, Tyndaris in 396, and Messene in 395 and again in 369; Campanians at Entella in 404, Katane in 403, Aitna in 396; Sikels at Naxos in 403 and Tauromenion in 396; unnamed mercenaries at Leontinoi in 396 and at Tauromenion in 392. Lokrians at Messene in 395, Kaulonia in 389, Hipponian in 389, and Skylletion. Dionysios' first wife, Hermokrates' daughter, died in 405, see Diod. 13.112.4. In 398, Dionysios married twice: Doris of Lokroi, see Diod. 14.44.6-7; Andromache of Syracuse, see Diod. 14.44.8.
[65] Diod. 11.49.2; Pind. *Pyth.* 1.30-31. According to Pindar, Hieron chose Aitna's site for its "fruitful land" near the slopes of Mt. Aitna.

tyrants and democrats never again allotted land to Syracusan citizens outside of Syracusan territory. Instead, they kept giving it away. This was because, I argue, the Syracusans had a different view of imperial territory than the Athenians.

Unlike the Athenians, who compartmentalized their empire to direct taxes and trade from imperial land back to Athens, the Syracusans needed imperial people more than imperial land. After Kleisthenes' reforms, the Athenians naturalized the resident foreigners living Attica all at once and, by the time they began confiscating land, they already had a robust market economy: what they wanted was land and the money they could make from it.[66] The Syracusans, however, had plenty of available land in Syrakousai, but not enough people and skilled labor to take full advantage of it. In a way, we can think of what the Syracusans were doing as forcing along in stages what had already happened at Athens: they were naturalizing new citizens, investing in human capital, and transforming their city into a metropole. From what we can tell, the people they moved within Syracusan territory all became citizens and, as citizens, they could also expect to receive land in and around Syracuse. Like Athenian citizens, Syracusan citizens participated in land allotment, just only within Syracusan territory. As we will see, the Syracusans still restricted their citizenship to those living within Syracusan territory, despite the Syracusan political community being more fluid than what we saw in Attica. In that sense, the Syracusans were not all that different from the Athenians because they were also upholding the territoriality of the Greek *polis.* What distinguished them, however, was how they externalized their imperial territory: by moving dispossessed people within Syracusan territory, and then allotting land to them as citizens, the Syracusans were trading imperial land for imperial people.

[66] For naturalization of foreigners at Athens after Kleisthenes' reforms, see Arist. *Pol.* 1275b36–37; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 21.4. with Kagan 1963.

Gelon first moved the communities from Gela, Kamarina, Megara, and Leontinoi to Syracuse as a way to compete with his Greek and Punic rivals on Sicily, but also with Athens. Already in Herodotus' *Histories* we see Athens and Syracuse set up as rivals and competitors: the story goes that the Athenians defended the eastern Greeks from Persian invaders at Salamis on the same day that the Syracusans defended the western Greeks from Carthaginian invaders at Himera. Both commanded navies of two hundred triremes, if we take Herodotus at his word. In the years after Himera, Hieron styled Syracuse as a cultural center to rival Athens, inviting Aeschylus from Athens to perform *The Persians* and then *The Women of Aitna,* which commemorated the conquest of east-central Sicily. He also invited the likes of Simonides and Pindar, both lyric poets from the eastern Mediterranean. Syracuse, he hoped to show, was on its way to becoming a city that could compete on the Mediterranean stage.[67]

But after the democratic coup in 467, it seems that many of the Syracusans who became citizens under Gelon and Hieron either left or were forced to leave Syracuse by the *archaioi politai* (or "original citizens").[68] Excavations at Kamarina, which Gelon destroyed after moving its residents to Syracuse, have found that both the city and countryside were totally redesigned along a new grid pattern around the middle of century, likely by the Kamarinaians who returned home.[69] Back at Syracuse, the remaining citizens divided up their territory among themselves:

> αἱ δὲ πόλεις σχεδὸν ἅπασαι πρὸς τὴν κατάλυσιν τῶν πολέμων ὁρμήσασαι, καὶ κοινὸν δόγμα ποιησάμεναι, πρὸς τοὺς κατοικοῦντας ξένους διελύθησαν, καὶ τοὺς φυγάδας καταδεξάμεναι τοῖς ἀρχαίοις πολίταις τὰς πόλεις ἀπέδοσαν, τοῖς δὲ ξένοις τοῖς διὰ τὰς δυναστείας ἀλλοτρίας τὰς πόλεις ἔχουσι συνεχώρησαν τὰ ἑαυτῶν ἀποκομίζειν καὶ κατοικεῖν ἅπαντας ἐν τῇ Μεσσηνίᾳ. αἱ μὲν οὖν κατὰ Σικελίαν ἐν

[67] De Angelis 2016: 188-190.

[68] Diod. 11.72.3. In this passage, Diodorus referred to the Syracusan citizens naturalized under Gelon and Hieron as *xenoi* (or "foreigners").

[69] Di Stefano 2006: 168; Mertens 2006: 352-353; Pelagatti 2006: 48. See also the reconstructed plan of Kamarina in De Angelis 2016: 113.

> ταῖς πόλεσι στάσεις καὶ ταραχαὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον κατελύθησαν, αἱ δὲ πόλεις τὰς ἀπαλλοτρίους πολιτείας ἀποβαλοῦσαι σχεδὸν ἅπασαι τὰς ἰδίας χώρας κατεκληρούχησαν τοῖς πολίταις πᾶσιν.[70]
>
> Virtually all the cities, in their eagerness to put an end to these wars, with one accord agreed to come to terms with the foreigners living in their midst. They then took back the exiles and returned the cities to [the descendants of] their original settlers. All those foreigners who, at the behest of their former rulers, had been left in possession of cities not their own, they gave permission to take with them their own goods and to settle in Messenia [in the Peloponnese]. Thus the civil strife and disorder that had prevailed throughout the Sicilian cities was brought to a close; and the cities themselves, after driving out the forms of government which foreigners introduced, with almost no exceptions divided up their territories into allotments among all their citizens.

With a tyrant no longer in charge at Syracuse, the Syracusan citizens first moved to get larger shares of land within Syracusan territory.[71] They were able to do so, Diodorus implied, because Gelon and Hieron had given land to the people they moved to Syracuse—land which was now available again for allotment. But even though Syracusan citizens now controlled the allotment process, they also triggered a period of demographic, and probably also economic, decline: as hundreds, if not thousands, of naturalized citizens left Syracusan territory, much of the activity that made Syracuse a rival to Athens in the first quarter of the fifth century also dissipated. We saw in the last chapter that it was around this time that Lysias' father moved his business from Syracuse to Athens, which was fast becoming the economic center of the Mediterranean. According to Diodorus, in 439 the Syracusans invested what they could from their wars against the Sikels to build a new navy of one hundred triremes.[72]

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[70] Diod. 11.76.5-6. Green (2010: 78 n. 98) pointed out that, at the time, "Messenia was still in revolt against Sparta; thus the deportees, almost all experienced mercenaries, must have been welcomed by Sparta as a useful instrument in helping to put down the insurrection."

[71] According to tradition, so much property was changing hands, resulting in so many court cases, that a Syracusan named Corax tried to formalize Greek rhetoric for the first time, see Cic. *Brut.* 46.

[72] Diod. 12.30.1. Diodorus was referring to the war against Douketios, who died in 440, see Diod. 12.29; Jackman 2006. Still, Thucydides wrote that the Syracusans in 426/5 were still making preparations "to avoid being any longer excluded from the sea by a few vessels."

But in the generation after the democratic coup, the Syracusan citizens watched as Athenian economic power began to overtake Sicily. A shipwreck off the coast Gela, for example, dating from the third quarter of the fifth century was carrying a cargo full of almost nothing but Attic fine wares and transport amphorae.[73] By 433, the Athenians had secured a political alliance with the Leontines—the Syracusans' closest neighbors to the north—no doubt to further their interests on the island.[74] Just a few years later, in 427 the Syracusans went to war with the Leontines, and the Athenians sent a fleet of twenty triremes to test the Syracusans' battle readiness.[75] As the war dragged on, the Leontine masses began to call for the re-allotment of their territory, as the Syracusans had done after 467. In turn, the Leontine elite in 422 "came to an agreement with the Syracusans," according to Thucydides, "abandoned and laid waste their city, and went and lived at Syracuse, where they were made citizens."[76] Neither Thucydides nor Diodorus said whether or not the new citizens received land allotments within Syracusan territory, or any kind of property for that matter, but it is hard to think that the Leontine elite would have moved to Syracuse without the promise of land in some form. Under growing pressure from the Athenians, the Syracusan democrats did what just a generation earlier was unthinkable: they transferred people from outside of Syracusan territory back to Syracuse to become citizens.

The Syracusans in 422 were, in effect, reaffirming the approach to imperial territory that first developed under the Syracusan tyrants. Athenian economic and military power may have

[73] De Angelis 2016: 292-294, with references in n. 388.

[74] *IG* I^3 54. The Athenians may have already been planning an expedition to Sicily, and were hoping to count on logistical aid from Leontinoi. The Athenians also may have hoped such a treaty might convince the Syracusans to stop supporting their Spartan enemies.

[75] Thuc. 3.86. According to Thucydides, the Athenians sent the fleet also to prevent the Syracusans from sending grain to the Spartans.

[76] Thuc. 5.4.3. See also Diod. 12.54.7. Diodorus wrote that the Leontine elite agreed because they saw no end to the war with Syracuse.

prompted the Syracusan democrats to reconsider why they deported naturalized citizens after the democratic coup: back in 467, they wanted to establish a new political identity, which meant they had to mark a clean break from the tyrant regime.[77] A generation later, however, they began to see imperial land as the Deinomenids had before them: they hoped to get from their imperial territory the human capital to compete with their commercial and military rivals. Judging by how the Syracusan democrats expelled the naturalized citizens after 467, they seem for the time to have been doing what the Athenians were doing—closing off their citizen community from other imperial communities. But the Syracusan democrats became more willing to allow new people to move to Syracuse to become citizens probably because they came to see again that it was an efficient way to transform their city into a metropole. Yet in return, they had to share the land within Syracusan territory.

The Athenian expedition to Syracuse probably only reinforced for the Syracusans how precarious their power was on Sicily. After all, it was the Spartans, not the Syracusans, who turned the tide of the war against the Athenians in 414. In victory, a Syracusan populist named Diokles managed to convince the Syracusan elite to let public offices be filled by sortition—bringing Syracusan democracy more in line with Athenian democracy.[78] The Syracusan democrats could have used their new power to pursue a different approach to imperial territory. But when the Carthaginians marched on Syracuse in 405, the Syracusans came together in their assembly and elected Dionysius *stratēgos autokratōr*.[79] Within the first year, the entire communities

[77] Thatcher (2012: 89) emphasized a clean break in Syracusan political identity at the beginning of the new democratic regime in 466.

[78] Diod. 13.34.4. See also Arist. *Pol.* 1304a 27. Aristotle said that Diokles was the one who changed Syracuse from a *politeia* to a *dēmokratia.*

[79] Diod. 13.94.5–95.1. According to Diodorus, the Carthaginians were marching on Syracuse, so the Syracusan democrats were willing to take a risk and hand over military leadership to Dionysios. Diodorus did not say, however, that they gave up the institution of sortition.

at Gela and Kamarina relocated to Syracuse.[80] Then, after making peace with the Carthaginians, Dionysios divided up Syracusan territory among Syracusan citizens, including the foreigners and slaves he naturalized:

> τῆς δὲ χώρας τὴν μὲν ἀρίστην ἐξελόμενος ἐδωρήσατο τοῖς τε φίλοις καὶ τοῖς ἐφ᾽ ἡγεμονίας τεταγμένοις, τὴν δ᾽ ἄλλην ἐμέρισεν ἐπ᾽ ἴσης ξένῳ τε καὶ πολίτῃ, συμπεριλαβὼν τῷ τῶν πολιτῶν ὀνόματι τοὺς ἠλευθερωμένους δούλους, οὓς ἐκάλει νεοπολίτας.[81]
>
> As for [Syracusan] territory, he picked the best of it and distributed it as gifts to his friends and to higher officers, and divided the rest of it equally to both foreigners and citizens, including under the name of citizens the manumitted slaves whom he designated as new citizens.

After being elected by Syracusan citizens, Dionysios was doing what both tyrants and democrats had done at Syracuse by allotting land within Syracusan territory to citizens and foreigners, who also became citizens. In 403, Dionysios brought what was left of the Leontines back to Syracuse to become citizens; he did the same for the Kaulonians and Hipponians in 389, and the Rhegians in 387.[82] Under Dionysios, Syracuse had an urban population of roughly 50,000, and Syrakousai probably reached, or even exceeded, its carrying capacity of 144,000.[83] Since Diodorus attributed all foreign policy decisions to Dionysios, it is hard to say whether or not he had the support of the Syracusan citizens in each case.[84] What we can say, however, is that land allotment under Dionysios continued to reinforce the territoriality of the Syracusan

[80] Diod. 13.111. They relocated because their cities were destroyed. Some of them seem to have returned home, see Diod. 13.113-114.

[81] Diod. 14.7.4.

[82] For the Leontines, see Diod. 14.15.4; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.5; Kaulonians and Hipponians, see Diod. 14.106-7; Rhegians, see Diod. 14.111.

[83] For demographic estimates of Classical Syracuse, see Morris 2006: 44. Beloch (1968 [1886]: 281) put Dionysios' Syracuse at 100,000.

[84] It is difficult to say what the Dionysios' relationship was with the Syracusan citizens who elected him. Diodorus, for one, had a certain Theodoros speak out against Dionysios, saying that he "enslaved" the Syracusans, see Diod. 14.66. However, Stroheker (1958: 16-18), Sanders (1981: 401-408), and Caven (1990:160-172) have argued convincingly that Dionysios was probably not as bad as Diodorus makes him out to be. It would not be surprising that Diodorus had a negative view of Dionysios if he was drawing information from Timaeus, who wrote in Athens with an anti-Syracusan bias.

citizen community: the foreigners who received land within Syracusan territory also became citizens. And as we will see shortly, land allotment was also what transformed Syracuse into a metropole that could compete commercially and militarily with Athens and Carthage.

Outside of Syracusan territory, Dionysios gave away the land he confiscated to mercenaries and foreign allies, both from outside of Syracusan society. Those who received land allotments seem to have become citizens of a new community where they were living, alongside the other recipients. In 395, for example, Dionysios allotted the Messenian countryside, which had been depopulated during a Carthaginian campaign a year, which left it open for Dionysios to confiscate. Dionysios refounded Messene as a heterogeneous community of Lokrians, Medmaians, and exiles from mainland Messenia, who may have fought as mercenaries for Dionysios.[85] Afterwards, the Rhegians went to war against Dionysios, claiming that he getting ready to could cross over to Italy.[86] Though Dionysios may well have been using Messene as a staging area for an Italian campaign, the residents of Messene thereafter fought as "Messenians" alongside Dionysios' mercenaries.[87] Later, when the mainland Messenians relocated to Tyndaris, Diodorus wrote that they "enrolled many to [Tyndarite] citizenship, and they speedily came to number more than five thousand citizens."[88] In the two cases of Messene and Tyndaris, at least, the recipients of land allotments became citizens of a new community, which probably made them institutionally separate from Syracusan citizens. In effect, Dionysios was preserving the cultural link between citizenship and property ownership, what Lisa Eberle has

[85] For the Carthaginian campaign, see Diod. 14.57. For Dionysios' refoundation of Messene in 395, see Diod. 14.78.5, with Raccuia 1981.

[86] Diod. 14.87.1. The Rhegians offered asylum to whomever Dionysios had exiled or dispossessed during his prior Sicilian campaigns.

[87] Diod. 14.87.2. Diodorus described a short battle when the Messenians and Dionysios' mercenaries successfully fought off the Rhegians.

[88] Diod. 14.78.6.

called "communities of place."[89] For Dionysios, this link held for both Syracusan territory as well as the communities outside of it where he allotted land to mercenaries and allies.

Unlike Athenian cleruchies and colonies, Syracusan land allotments outside of Syracusan territory do not seem to have had much of an institutional connection to the imperial center. Of course, it is possible that there seems to be less of a connection because there are fewer historical and epigraphic sources for Syracusan land allotment: the historical sources, for their part, do little to clarify the relationship between the recipients of those land allotments and the Syracusan state. As we will see in the next section, the sources for Syracusan imperialism in the Classical period make no mention of imperial taxes on allotted land or contributions from people settled on allotted land. Authors from the Roman period were actually under the impression that there was no large-scale imperial taxation on Sicily until Hieron II's agricultural tax, commonly known as the *lex Hieronica* of the mid-third century, a century after Dionysios I's death.[90] In the place of a centralized system of imperial taxation that connected center to periphery, the Syracusans must have counted on plunder to finance future campaigns—much like the Romans were doing at that time in central Italy.[91] Neither is there any evidence for imperial officials, like the *archontes* and *episkopoi* of the Athenian empire. Though the absence of imperial officials is noteworthy, their absence may say more about the imperfect sources than about Syracusan imperialism itself.

[89] Eberle 2014: 13. In a recent study of Greco-Roman "exclusionary property-regimes," Eberle argued that empires "circumscribed the economic possibilities of their own citizens" by converting "political and military power into the acquisition of land for their own citizens."

[90] For the *lex Hieronica* and Syracusan standardized imperial taxation, see Cic. *Verr.* esp. 2.2.147; 2.3.14-15, with Walthall 2011; 2013. Diodorus only once mentioned a *phoros* in relation to the Syracusans: in 439, the Syracusan democrats imposed a tax on the Sikels.

[91] For the importance of plunder to the Syracusans, see Morris 2013: 291-292; De Angelis 2016: 316-317. For the Romans, see Section 5.2.

Like the Athenians, the Syracusans seem to have done little to garrison their imperial territory. From what little we can tell from Diodorus' narrative about garrisons, the Syracusans used them as mostly temporary measures, and typically only during wartime. For example, during his first campaigns in 403, Dionysios gave Katane a garrison, only later to withdraw it before allotting the surrounding land to his Campanian mercenaries. During his first war against the Carthaginians, Dionysios fortified Syracusan territory and the Leontine acropolis with garrisons before marching north to war.[92] In the same war, Dionysios placed a temporary garrison at Motya after defeating the Carthaginians, only to remove it shortly thereafter. But because the sources for Syracusan imperialism focus very little on imperial communities after the moment of allotment, it is impossible to say to what extent the relative absence of garrisons is, once again, simply a problem with the sources.

Because most modern historians tend to assume that Dionysios must have found a way to control his imperial territory, we are left with the impression that he kept close relationships with the mercenaries and allies who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory. Sandra Péré-Noguès, for one, argued that when Dionysios allotted land to his mercenaries, he was creating "un maillage serré de structures défensives qui selon les cas pouvaient être des colonies militaires ou des *phrouria*" (a tight network of defensive structures which, depending on the case, could be military colonies or garrisons).[93] In this view, land allotment integrated the mercenaries into an expanding, multi-*polis* Syracusan state. Yet this model requires us to assume that all mercenaries—even those who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory—received

[92] For the garrison at Katane, see Diod. 14.15.1; for Leontinoi, see Diod. 14.58.1; for Motya, see Diod. 14.53.5, with Pilkington 2013: 283.

[93] Péré-Noguès 2006: 486, with Péré-Noguès 1999; 2004. She suggested in passing that mercenary settlement must have integrated and assimilated the mercenaries into the Syracusan tyrant state, though she never develops how exactly this would have worked.

Syracusan citizen, based only on the fact that foreigners who settled within Syracusan territory received Syracusan citizenship.[94] But based on what we have already seen, we have no reason to conflate land allotment to mercenaries outside of Syracuse with the grant of citizenship to foreigners at Syracuse: there is no evidence to suggest that anyone living outside of Syracusan territory received Syracusan citizenship.[95] Nor is there any reason to think that there were different forms, or levels, of citizenship, as there were in mid-Republican Rome. Even at nearby Leontinoi, Diodorus wrote that in 396 Dionysios' mercenaries became "most hostile to him," so he divided up the Leontine territory among them in lieu of their pay.[96] Afterwards, the mercenaries became residents at Leontinoi and Dionysios hired new mercenaries to replace them.

From what we can tell, there was not much of a difference between the land allotments that went to mercenaries and the land allotments that went to citizens of an allied state. After 398, when Dionysios reaffirmed an old political alliance between Syracuse and Lokroi by marrying Doris, the daughter of a prominent Lokrian, all land allotments in southern Italy went to Lokrian citizens rather than Syracusan mercenaries.[97] Though Dionysios' marriage to Doris may have facilitated the transfer of land allotments to the Lokrians, there is no evidence to suggest that the new communities they formed had any more of an institutional link to Syracuse than the mercenary communities. In this sense, the Lokrians were similar to the

[94] Péré-Noguès 2004. She assumed a connection between the mercenaries Dionysios settled at Syracuse and those allotted land abroad.

[95] This is not to deny, however, that mercenaries and foreigners were a crucial part of Syracusan militarism. Under Dionysios the Syracusan army never took the field without a sizeable mercenary force, accounting for up to a third of the total army, see Parke 1981: 67-68. In the fourth century, there was no shortage of mercenaries, especially as demobilized soldiers from the Peloponnese turned westwards for employment after the Peloponnesian War, see Trundle 2004: 6, 35-37; 45.

[96] Diodorus 14.78.1-3. For the imperial history of Leontinoi after Dionysios settled his mercenaries there in 396, see Section 4.5 below.

[97] During the first Athenian campaign to Sicily, Lokroi allied with Syracuse against Athens and Rhegion, see Thuc. 3.86.2, 4.2.1. During the second campaign, Lokroi refused the Athenian fleet safe harbor, granting it instead to the Syracusans, see Thuc. 6.44.2, 7.1.1, 7.25.3.

mercenaries from Sparta and elsewhere in the Peloponnese, who were serving because of the diplomatic relationship between Syracuse and Sparta. Through land allotment, mercenaries and allies played a similar role in Syracusan imperial history: on the one hand, both fought for Syracuse because of state-level political relationships; but on the other hand, neither expanded the Syracusans' citizen territory.

Overall, the Syracusans seem to have been committed to externalizing their imperial territory by giving away confiscated land to people from outside of Syracusan society. The only way the mercenary and Lokrian landowners were really bound to the Syracusans was that they occasionally had to fight alongside the Syracusan army. According to Diodorus, when Dionysios went to war against the Carthaginians in 398, "he levied from the Syracusans those who were fit for military service, and summoned from the cities under his command their able men"—and it is reasonably to assume that the new imperial communities numbered among them.[98] In a sense, then, Syracusan imperial communities were paying tribute in the form of military levies. They were not all that different from the coalition members of Delian League, except that they could not get out of military service by paying a tax. But this last point is crucial: Athenian and Syracusan land allotment were both highly extractive, though in different ways. Whereas the Athenians compartmentalized their imperial territory so they could extract taxes and trade from their imperial land, the Syracusans externalized their imperial territory to focus on extracting people from their empire. For that reason, the Syracusans did not have anything that we could call "Syracusan cleruchies" outside of Syracusan territory: rather, Syracusan territory was itself a cleruchy, where citizens received allotments of land.

[98] Diod. 14.44.2.

Under both tyrant and democratic regimes, the Syracusans prioritized their own territory at the expense of the land they conquered, a process that allowed them to concentrate the people of their empire within their own territory. The Syracusans may not have demanded that Syracusan society remain a closed citizen community, or developed an ideology of imperial autochthony, but their approach to territory was just as stereotypically Greek as what we saw with the Athenians in the eastern Mediterranean: the Syracusan citizen community still mapped directly onto Syracusan territory. Even though Syracusan citizens never achieved the same level of political enfranchisement as their Athenian counterparts (except perhaps during the brief period between Diokles' reforms and the election of Dionysios as *stratēgos autokratōr*), what distinguished Syracusan land allotment from Athenian land allotment was not necessarily regime-type. Rather, what set the Syracusans apart was that citizens received land allotments only within Syracusan territory. By sharing those allotments with people relocated from all over their imperial territory, the Syracusans were driving a very particular kind of economic change: they were concentrating an empire's share of human capital within Syracusan territory. By transferring human capital to Syracuse, the Syracusans had found a way to transform their city into a metropole that could compete economically and militarily with Athens and Carthage.

4.4. *Concentrating Human Capital*

Syracusan territory was famous in antiquity for its fertile landscape.[99] When the Athenians came together in 415 to debate whether or not they should try to conquer Syracuse, Nikias argued that one of the Syracusans' greatest strengths was that "they grow their own grain rather than

[99] For Sicilian agriculturalism, see De Angelis 2006; Walthall 2013: esp. 1-4, with Diod. 23.1.1; Pindar *Nem.* 1.13-16; Cicero *Verr.* 2.2.2.

importing it [like we do]."[100] Under Dionysios, the Syracusans are said to have kept one million *medimnoi* of grain in storage, which was enough grain to feed upwards of 40,000 Syracusan families for an entire year.[101] The Athenians recognized just how different Syracusan territory was from Athenian territory: as we saw last chapter, they decided that a war against the Syracusans was worth it because the rewards from the land they could confiscate from them were so great. For the Syracusans, grain production was the main source of the their wealth beginning as far back as the Archaic period. By the Classical period, having so much fertile land within their territory allowed the Syracusans to share it with new citizens. More than that, the Syracusans were able to settle the full populations of large cities within their territory.

When the Syracusans imagined their imperial territory, they were mindful of their agricultural wealth as well as their commercial and military rivalries. As a result, the Syracusans' approach to imperial territory made it so the Syracusans' did not directly benefit from the land they confiscated. The Syracusans externalized their empire the way they did, rather, because they needed skilled labor and specialization more than they needed more land. As we will see, the Syracusans do not even seem to have taxed the land they confiscated, choosing instead only to require military service from the people who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory. Instead, I argue below that the Syracusans benefitted from land allotment indirectly through non-agricultural production: emblematic of Syracuse's fertile landscape, land allotment also created an influx of human capital and economic activity to Syracuse. By transferring entire merchant, craftsman, and entrepreneurial populations to

[100] Thuc. 6.20.4. As we saw earlier in Section 3.2, the Athenians relied heavily on grain imports even during in the Archaic period.

[101] Aelian *Var. Hist.* 6.12. I assume here that an average family of two adults and three children would have needed to consume roughly 25 *medimnoi* of grain per year.

Syracusan territory, and then replacing them with mercenaries or foreign allies, the Syracusans were feeding their own markets while leaving the people who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory to start over. Overall, the way the Syracusans used land allotment as a way to reshape the island's human geography shows the significance of land allotment in the absence of a centralized imperial tax structure.

Because Syracusan territory was so well known for its agricultural output, historians have long assumed that the Syracusans must have extracted some kind of agricultural taxes or rents from the land they confiscated. We saw in the last chapter that this was precisely what the Athenians and the Persians did; it would not be unthinkable, therefore, that the Syracusans did the same. In this view, land allotment would have served a very specific purpose for the Syracusans: it increased the taxable surface area of their empire. In a recent study of Sicilian economic history, Franco De Angelis suggested that "Dionysios appeared to have taxed all agricultural holdings and income [in his empire]; therefore, having more people and land under his control was another way to generate tax revenue for the large expenditures he incurred."[102] Still, from the little historical evidence that we have for Syracusan taxes during the Classical period, it is far less certain that the Syracusans were taxing the land they confiscated and allotted to mercenaries and foreign allies. To return to the assembly debate before the Athenians sailed to Sicily in 415, according to Thucydides Nikias warned the Athenians that the Sicilian states were stronger than Alkibiades was leading them to believe, in part because they also had an imperial income:

[102] De Angelis 2016: 129, with 316. He argued that imperial taxes on agricultural land helped pay for mercenaries. See also Scerra 2003.

πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ὁπλῖται ἔνεισι καὶ τοξόται καὶ ἀκοντισταί, πολλαὶ δὲ τριήρεις καὶ ὄχλος ὁ πληρώσων αὐτάς. χρήματά τ᾽ ἔχουσι τὰ μὲν ἴδια, τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἱεροῖς ἐστὶ Σελινουντίοις, Συρακοσίοις δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων τινῶν ἀπαρχὴ ἐσφέρεται.[103]

Not only are there many hoplites, archers, and javelin-throwers, but also triremes with the population to man them; they have funds, privately and also what is in the Selinountine sanctuaries; in addition, the Syracusans are offered first fruits (*aparchē*) by certain barbarians.

The "barbarians" Nikias referred to were probably the Sikels living in the mountains northwest of Syracuse: Diodorus also recorded the Sikels paying a *phoros* to the Syracusans as early as 339.[104] As we saw earlier, the Syracusan democrats fought the Sikels in the 440s, and then invested in a new navy with the money they got after defeating them. It is tempting to draw parallels to the Delian League: after all, the Athenian tribute lists also used the term *aparchē* for the imperial tax paid in coin to Athena and stored at the Acropolis.[105] But even in the case of the Delian League, tribute was not a tax on confiscated land. The Sikels may have sold agricultural surpluses to help pay the tax, but we have no reason to believe that the tax was linked to land allotments outside of Syracusan territory.

In fact, later authors were under the impression that it was not until the Hellenistic tyrant Hieron II (r. 269-215) that the Syracusans systematically collected taxes from the people living in their imperial territory. Cicero, who knew Sicily well from his service there as quaestor, argued in his third speech *Against Verres* that agricultural taxes on the island dated back to Hieron II.[106] Furthermore, in a recent study of standardized grain measures,

[103] Thuc. 6.20.4. This passage appears during the debate between Nikias and Alkibiades during the initial buildup to the campaign.

[104] Diod. 12.30.1.

[105] *ATL* 33.7; 34.7. In his commentary on Thucydides, Gomme suggested that "ἀπαρχή in the Classical period is usually… used of a tithe or production of produce, or its equivalent in money, paid to a god, i.e. to a fund kept in a temple and regarded as a god's."

[106] Cic. *Verr.* 2.3.14-15. Livy (24.21.11-2) also referred to monumental, public granaries on the island of Ortygia during Hieron's time. Pritchard (1970: 365-368) argued that Hieron's tax system may have been influenced by the Carthaginians or, more likely, the Ptolemies.

monumental granaries, and coinage from southeastern Sicily, Alex Walthall has shown how Hieron II developed a new administrative system designed to collect an annual grain-tax from the landowners living within in his Sicilian empire.[107] Under Hieron II the Syracusans actually seem to have developed a level of imperial centralization that rivaled the fifth-century Athenian empire: Walthall has shown, for example, that Sicilian dry measures dating from the third century shared formal qualities with their Athenian precedents.[108] During the Classical period, however, there is no historical or archaeological evidence for the kind of regional standardization or large-scale agricultural taxation associated with Hieron II in the Hellenistic period or the fifth-century Athenians—or any imperial taxation on land allotments, for that matter. Though it is certainly possible that the absence of any positive evidence for such a tax may be a failure of the sources, such a significant omission would be surprising.[109] As we have seen, the Syracusans' agricultural wealth within Syracusan territory may have prompted them to focus less on managing a centralized tax system than concentrating human capital.

Within Syracusan territory, however, the Syracusans had some kind of tax on economic activity. According to Diodorus, when Dionysios relocated the Kaulonians to Syracuse in 389, he exempted them from taxes because they had given up their land without a fight:

> ταύτης δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐνοικοῦντας εἰς Συρακούσας μετῴκισε καὶ πολιτείαν δοὺς πέντε ἔτη συνεχώρησεν ἀτελεῖς εἶναι, τὴν δὲ πόλιν κατασκάψας τοῖς Λοκροῖς τὴν χώραν τῶν Καυλωνιατῶν ἐδωρήσατο.[110]

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[107] Walthall 2013. For the standardized grain measures, see also Walthall 2011. For the monumental granaries, see also Walhall 2015.

[108] Walthall 2013: 12, with Lang and Crosby 1964: 39–55. There is very little evidence for standardization in the Classical period: at Gela, excavations had yielded two bronze weights from the early-fifth century, Dubois 1989: 174 nos. 152-153; Arena 1992: 25 no. 16, 26 no. 26.

[109] Morris (2009a: 161) suggested that ps.-Aristotle's *Oeconomica* would have mentioned such a tax should it have actually existed.

[110] Diod. 14.106.3. There is no evidence for any other dispossessed peoples receiving a tax emption at any point in Syracusan history.

> The inhabitants of [Kaulonia] he relocated to Syracuse, gave them citizenship, and gave them an exemption from taxes (*ateleia*) for five years; he then destroyed the city and gave the territory of the Kaulonians to the Lokrians.

Like all the other people the Syracusans relocated back to Syracuse, the Kaulonians received Syracusan citizenship. But for whatever reason, Dionysios was willing to give them an exception from some sort of direct *eisphora* tax on citizens' property or indirect tax on imports, as found in most Greek states at the time.[111] As Syracusan militarism began to scale up under Dionysios, the Syracusans seem to have been still developing an economic infrastructure to outfit their army with the tools of war. It is reasonable to assume that the people relocated to Syracuse would have indirectly contributed to the state's capacity to wage war through indirect, if not direct, taxes. After all, any increase in agricultural production and distribution would have led to more harbor dues from merchant shipping—what Nicholas Purcell has called "taxing mobility."[112] It is unclear why Dionysios would have exempted the Kaulonians from their taxes for five years, especially in 389 when the Syracusans were still fighting a costly war in southern Italy. Perhaps Dionysios and the Syracusan assembly decided that it was more important that the Kaulonians live and work within Syracusan territory than they pay taxes.

Because the Syracusans seem to have prioritized imperial relocations over imperial taxes, it is easy to conclude that they had less in common with the Athenians than other authoritarian states in the Near East that moved people around to control them more effectively. In an influential study of Greek state formation, Ian Morris argued that Syracuse "had more in common

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[111] Unfortunately, As with other financial institutions in the Classical Greek world, most of our evidence for *ateleia* comes from Athens. For the *eisphora* tax for military finance at Athens, see Thomson 1964; Rhodes 1982; Möller 2007: 375-380; Pritchard 2015: 93, 96, 103. For indirect taxes on imports, *ateleia,* and exemptions from taxation in the Mediterranean more broadly, see Bresson 2016: 293-299.

[112] Purcell 2005b: 230.

with the practices of Near Eastern kings than with those of Aegean Greek cities."[113] Josiah Ober went further to suggest that "Gelon may have borrowed the idea of transportation of populations from the Persians [who followed] a well-established west Asian imperial tradition."[114] To be sure, forced relocations were more common among the top-heavy states of the Near East than the Greek world, though Near Eastern historians tend to call them "deportations." Beginning as far back as Old Kingdom Egypt, the Hittites, Assyrians, and Persians also forcefully relocated people. In Mesopotamia, for example, the Assyrians relocated people far from their native homes to elsewhere in their empire, like the fertile Cizre Plain in the Upper Tigris River Valley over a hundred kilometers north of Aššur. In the Assyrian empire, the relocations restructured the agricultural economy by focusing labor at fertile areas. They also broke apart unruly communities and local identities by mixing them with other dispossessed populations. Yet, from what we can tell from the Mesopotamian empires, the relocations did not necessarily concentrate the dispossessed peoples at the imperial center—as was the case for the Syracusans. Quite the opposite: the relocations moved them all over each empire.[115]

Only the Hittites seem to have relocated the people they dispossessed to the imperial center at Hatti. Under Mursili II (r. 1321-1295), for example, the Hittites relocated thousands of defeated peoples to the Hittite countryside in and around Hattusa in central Anatolia. In most documented cases, the Hittites only relocated a portion of a defeated community; afterwards, the people who were relocated either worked the land of an elite estate or garrisoned a military outpost. In both cases, however, they held a semi-servile status. The Syracusans, it is worth

[113] Morris 2009a: 112. For him, the distinctive qualities of Syracusan state formation were population relocations and political marriages.

[114] Ober 2015: 179. He argued that Gelon's motives were constructive, not punitive: unlike the Persians, Gelon was creating a super-*polis*.

[115] For Egyptian relocations, see Redford 1992: 207-209. For Assyrian, see Oded 1979: 19-22; Parker 2013. For Persian, see Briant 2002.

recalling, made the people they relocated back to Syracuse full members of Syracusan society, with citizenship as well as their own land.[116]

Rather, the way the Syracusans dispossessed people of their land, allotted it to new people, and then relocated the dispossessed back to Syracuse with citizenship was without precedent. It is certainly possible that the Syracusans were inspired by events in the Near East, but they drew from a Greek political culture of allotment and citizenship to reimagine the phenomenon. Despite what we have come to expect from Athenian society, Greek political culture was actually primed to facilitate the relocation of people from one community to another, thanks to formal institutions built around naturalization and property rights. From what we have seen, the Syracusans under both tyrant and democratic regimes were open to using these institutions to internalize the people of their empire. They were open to relocations not only because new people would have brought them more indirect taxes from market activity, but also because those would have helped them expand their military: after each relocation the Syracusans could draw from a broader pool of skilled craftsmen, merchants, wage laborers, and so on to help build the tools of war.[117] By concentrating much of eastern Sicily and Kalabria's supply of human capital at Syracuse, the Syracusans could also take advantage of whatever businesses and networks of exchange the new residents brought with them. Land allotment, in that sense, was a means to an end, a way for the Syracusans to force along the growth of their metropole.

[116] For Hittite relocations, see Bryce 2005: 217-219.

[117] In this sense, Syracusan state formation, taxation, and imperialism in the late Archaic and early Classical periods anticipate C. Tilly's thesis for early modern Europe, in which he argues that "war makes the state and the state makes war," see Tilly 1992: 20-21.

We can see this clearly enough when the Syracusans were preparing to go to war once again against Carthage. According to Diodorus, in 398, just over five years since the Geloans, Kamarinaians, and Leontines relocated to Syracuse, Dionysios direct the Syracusans to organize a massive workforce to build the tools of war:

> εὐθὺς οὖν τοὺς τεχνίτας ἤθροιζεν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν ταττομένων πόλεων κατὰ πρόσταγμα, τοὺς δ᾽ ἐξ Ἰταλίας καὶ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἔτι δὲ τῆς Καρχηδονίων ἐπικρατείας, μεγάλοις μισθοῖς προτρεπόμενος. διενοεῖτο γὰρ ὅπλα μὲν παμπληθῆ καὶ βέλη παντοῖα κατασκευάσαι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ναῦς τετρήρεις καὶ πεντήρεις, οὐδέπω κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους σκάφους πεντηρικοῦ νεναυπηγημένου. συναχθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τεχνιτῶν, διελὼν αὐτοὺς κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἐργασίας κατέστησε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς ἐπισημοτάτους, προθεὶς δωρεὰς μεγάλας τοῖς κατασκευάσασιν ὅπλα.[118]
>
> At once, [Dionysios] gathered skilled craftsmen, commandeering them from the cities under his command and attracting them by high wages from Italy and Greece as well as Carthaginian territory. For his purpose was to make weapons in great numbers and every kind of missile, and also quadriremes and quinqueremes, no ship of the latter size having yet been built at that time. After collecting many skilled workmen, he divided them into groups in accordance with their skills, and appointed over them the most conspicuous citizens, offering great bounties to anyone who created a supply of arms.

Though it is unclear which exact cities were under Dionysios' *prostagma* (or "command") at the time, a direct result of relocating the Geloans, Kamarinaians, and Leontines to Syracuse several years earlier was that some of them would have numbered among those put to work building the tools of war. Even with their added labor, apparently Syracuse was still developing as an imperial center, so Dionysios also had to recruit skilled craftsmen from across the Mediterranean. Diodorus went on to explain that, in less than a year, the Syracusans and their growing workforce built or retrofitted a total of 310 warships, constructed 160 new shipsheds, repaired another 150, then manufactured 140,000 sets of shields, swords, and helmets, as well as

[118] Diod. 14.41.3-4.

14,000 breastplates.[119] Besides transforming the Syracusans' Great Harbor into one of the best-outfitted military harbors in the Mediterranean, the operation also went a long way in transforming Syracuse into a major economic center.

In a recent study of what it took to build and operate a navy in the Classical Greek world, Vincent Gabrielsen explored how navies of this size required a significant infrastructure of financial, human, material, and economic resources: from transporting timber to building storage facilities; from organizing specialized labor to training for quality control. Altogether, building a navy, he argued, would have "fuelled the economy and gave market-mechanisms an intensity and fields of action that they never had before."[120] The new shipsheds alone, with their massive stone structures and wood slipways, probably would have taken over half a million work-days of specialized labor to construct, by Jari Pakkanen's estimates.[121] The warships also would have required all sorts of specialized industries, like woodworking for the hull and masts, textile manufacturing for the sails and ropes, metalworking for the rams and anchors, and leatherworking for the oar fittings. To put this in perspective, Peter Acton estimated that it could have taken up to three thousand work-days to build just one trireme hull and fit its components, to say nothing of what it would have taken to source and transport all the materials.[122] Each ship also needed to be provisioned with grain and oil, both stored in transport amphorae—which

[119] Diod. 14.42-43. Excavations to the north of Ortygia in the Small Harbor have found eight parallel, rock-cut shipsheds, possibly dating from the early fourth century, see Basile 2002; Gerding 2013. For the Syracusans' war preparations in 398, see also Caven 1990: 88-97.
[120] Gabrielsen 2017: 429. He was speaking generally about building and operating navies, but he drew mostly from Athenian examples.
[121] Pakkanen 2013. He estimated that it would have taken the Athenians about 1.2 million work-days to construct three hundred shipsheds in the fifth century. He based his calculations on estimates of how long it probably would have taken the workers to dig the soil and bedrock, cut the bedrock, quarry the stone for the foundations and superstructure, construct the foundations and superstructure, fill the spaces between foundation blocks, construct scaffolding, set the slipway timbers, produce tiles, and tile the roofs.
[122] For triremes, see Acton 2014: 191-200. For what it would have taken to manufacture armor and weapons, see Acton 2014: 131-144.

would have numbered in the thousands if we take into account the entire fleet. The Syracusans were able to accomplish all this, according to Diodorus, because "the ablest skilled craftsmen were gathered from everywhere into one place"—Syracuse.[123]

It was probably during this period that the Potter's Quarter developed in the lower Akradina near the harbor. Excavations there have found evidence for kilns dating from the middle of the fourth century, though it is reasonable to think, given what we have seen, that manufacturing began at least a generation earlier.[124] Unlike what we saw for earlier periods, Athenian ceramic imports on Sicily were "practically nonexistent," to quote De Angelis, during the first quarter of the fourth century.[125] Though this is not surprising given the rapid decline of Athenian commerce at the end of the fifth century, it may also say something about the growth of Syracusan manufacturing. Even though the Syracusans had to hire craftsmen from around the Mediterranean to fill out their workforce, the largest influx of human capital came, I have argued, from the people who were relocated to Syracuse. Even for those who may not have lived in the actual city of Syracuse, we know from excavations at a later fourth-century farmstead at Manfria near Gela that rural sites could also double as workshops producing pottery—their "part-time occupation," as Horden and Purcell might call it.[126]

Whereas land allotment within Syracusan territory was what facilitated an influx of human capital, land allotment outside of Syracusan territory probably left the areas largely under-developed. Even though there is no archaeological evidence for actual Syracusan land

[123] Diod. 14.42.1.

[124] For the fourth-century workshops at Syracuse, see Fischer-Hansen 2000: 108-109, with Fallico 1971: 581-583, 590-594; Lagona 1972-73.

[125] De Angelis 2016: 306. It is also worth noting that this was a period when Corinthian coins began circulating in large quantities.

[126] Adamesteanu 1958: 300-333. For discussion of land allotment, farmers, and their "part-time occupations," see above Section 2.3, p. 33.

divisions outside of Syracusan territory, land allotment may well have worked like the original division of land at the time of a colony's original foundation—the *dasmos* (or "primary division"). A massive survey project of Metapontum further up into Italy on the Gulf of Tarentum, for example, found division lines of agricultural properties. In Metapontine territory, division lines dating from end of the Archaic period show a re-allotment of land, perhaps like what the Syracusans did after 467. During the Classical period the allotments were, on average, about sixteen hectares—though two-thirds of them were smaller than the average.[127] Allotments of this size were still more than large enough to keep a family at a sustenance level, and they probably could count on a small surplus. In his analysis of the settlement history of the land, Joseph Carter noted that the divided territory "developed constantly over the whole life of the colony, with properties changing hands and families being extinguished or leaving the land."[128] Hence the allotments may initially have been smaller: at Kamarina, grid lines dating from after the refoundation in 461 suggest more moderate allotments of about five and half hectares, which is more in line with the majority of the Metapontine properties (see Figure 4.3).[129] For the Kamarinaians and about two-thirds of Metapontines, the land allotments were suited more for sustenance than surpluses that could be sold at market. [130]

[127] For the survey, settlement history, and aerial photography of the Metapontine *chōra,* see Carter *et al*. 2004: 141; Carter 2006a: 91-127.

[128] Carter *et al*. 2004: 142.

[129] Di Stefano 1993–94: 1378–1381; Cordano and Di Stefano 1997: 297–299. The plots of land measure about 210m by 265m. Four farmhouses have been excavated, and each had an adjoining cemetery. For the redistribution of land at Kamarina, see Diod. 11.76.4-5; Thuc. 6.5.3. A system of roads connected the urban center to the farms, see Pelagatti 1980–81: 723–729; Di Stefano 1984–85: 762–764.

[130] Carter 2006a: 134-150. The evidence for land division and farmhouses at Metaponto is not unique: the Chersonesos in the late Classical period showed similar features, see Carter 2006a: 121-127; 2006b. In the Chersonesos, unlike at Metaponto, there were no family cemeteries. Still, the farmhouses have evidence for living quarters and domestic cults, which suggest that they could have been occupied year-round.



Fig. 4.3. Kamarina's city plan (left) and land allotments (right), Di Stefano 1993-94: 1380.

Likewise, Syracusan land allotments outside Syracusan territory probably had to be large enough to sustain the new landowners, who were on their own to start a new life. Together, the new community of landowners could not fall back on an existing market: after all, the landowners received their land precisely because the former community's economic infrastructure had already been transferred to Syracuse. Also, as we will see shortly, the Syracusans tended to destroy the city before allotting land around it. Consequently, the new imperial communities created through land allotment were more likely to focus on sustenance agriculture than economic specialization and manufacturing, especially during the first years after they settled at the site. At Syracuse, however, both new and old citizens were plugged into a growing imperial economy, where human capital was concentrated to the benefit of merchants, craftsmen, and entrepreneurs. By allotting land within Syracusan territory to new citizens and then abroad to mercenaries and foreigners, the Syracusans were increasing economic activity at Syracuse at the expense of their imperial territory.

4.5 *Eastern Sicily: Undercutting Rival Markets*

The communities of eastern Sicily probably suffered more from land confiscations than any other region in the Classical Greek world.[131] For over a century, every single community in the region of around 4,500 km^2 was unsettled and resettled at one point or another, a process that began with Hippokrates in the 490s, continued with the Syracusans under Gelon, Hieron, and the democrats, then finally took off again under Dionysios. As we saw already, after a pair of Carthaginian invasions unsettled southern Sicily in the final decade of the fifth century, the Geloans and Kamarinaians resettled at Syracuse. But soon thereafter, according to Diodorus, some of them left Syracuse for Leontinoi, and then returned home after the Syracusans made peace with the Carthaginians. In what followed, the Syracusans set out to conquer the entire eastern seaboard of Sicily.[132]

The cases of Naxos, Katane, and Leontinoi, in particular, show how Syracusan military campaigns could break apart a political community to redirect its economic infrastructure to Syracuse. Afterwards, the Syracusans left the communities outside of Syracusan territory to develop on their own: new settlers replaced the dispossessed peoples, divided up the land for private use, and then formed a new political community separate from the Syracusans. Katane, Naxos, and Leontinoi make for good case studies for Syracusan land allotment because excavations at the three sites have yielded evidence for local production and imports spanning the Classical period, which allows us to track how land allotment and population transfers may have affected economic activity, and ultimately human capital, at each site. As we will see, the

[131] The communities of eastern Sicily include Messene, Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia, Syracuse, and Kamarina. Those communities constituted an area of around 5,500 km^2, or 4,500 km^2 without Syracuse. By comparison, Euboea was just over 3,500 km^2.

[132] For the move to Leontinoi, see Diod. 13.113.4. Those who returned to their homes became Carthaginian tributaries, see Diod. 13.114.1.

archaeological data from urban and rural excavations show how the three communities were under-developed, sustenance economies: the new communities formed through land allotment were slow to recreate the levels of local production and market activity from before the Syracusan conquest.

The Naxians were victims to three separate conquests over the course of a century. After Hippokrates first conquered the Naxians in the 490s, Hieron later dispossessed them in 476 and allotted their land to new landowners.[133] After the collapse of Thrasyboulos' tyranny in 466, the Naxian refugees returned home and refounded Naxos.[134] Over the next two generations, the Naxians supported the Athenians in an anti-Syracusan coalition during their two campaigns on the island in 427 and 415.[135] However, when Dionysios first turned to the offensive in 403, Naxos and Katane were betrayed to him by elite members of the cities, after which he destroyed the two cities and sold everyone into slavery.[136] Dionysios did so, in all likelihood, to made an example of the Naxians and Katanians: anyone who resisted a Syracusan campaign could be sold into slavery; otherwise, Dionysios would offer citizenship and land at Syracuse, as was the case for the Leontines later that very year. After clearing the Naxian countryside, he gave the land to the neighboring Sikels, showing little interest at the time in settling the area with new landowners who would be loyal to Syracuse. In 392, Dionysios went to war with those same Sikels, some of whom had founded a nearby city at Tauromenion. In defeat, the Sikels gave up

[133] For Hippokrates' campaign against Naxos in the 490s, see Hdt. 7.154. For Hieron's relocation of the Naxians in 476, see Diod. 11.49.

[134] For the return in 461 of the refugees who Hippokrates, Gelon, and Hieron had dispossessed from eastern Sicily, see Diod. 11.76.3-6.

[135] Thuc. 3.86.2; 6.98.1; 7.14.2.

[136] For Dionysios' initial interest in conquering Naxos, see Diod. 14.14.1-2. For Dionysios' conquest of Naxos in 403, see Diod. 14.15.2-3. Some Naxians managed to escape from slavery and were settled by Rhegion at Mylai in 394, see Diod. 14.87.3. However, the Naxian refugees at Mylai were forced to scatter across the island when Mylai fell to Dionysios later in 394, see Diod. 14.87.3.

Tauromenion, and Dionysios used the occasion to allot land to some of his mercenaries.[137] Though Naxos had once been an active economic center in Sicily, Dionysios' land allotments did little to revitalize the city.

Though Hippokrates' initial conquest of Naxos left no clear mark on the city's physical landscape, excavations have found that Hieron gave the city a new plan before resettling it. In the second quarter of the fifth century, the city was laid out with a new orientation along an orthogonal system of narrow *insulae*.[138] The Naxian refugees who returned after 461 resettled the Hieronian city, where they developed the city into one of Sicily's premier economic centers. Excavations of the urban center have found a common destruction layer dating from the end of the fifth century, likely associated with Dionysios' conquest of the city.[139] Afterwards, there is evidence for small renovations to urban houses near the bay in the fourth century, but there were no major developments until the third century, when commercial activity returned to the city. Even though Dionysios resettled the city with new landowners, land allotment alone, it seems, was not enough to reverse the decline in market activity, as we can see from the *kerameikos* and the harbor.

Just to the north of the main urban center of Naxos was the *kerameikos* (or "Potter's Quarter") covering an area of more than 1,000 m^2 rich in clay deposits.[140] Here, local production of

[137] For the founding of Tauromenion in 396, see Diod. 14.59. For the conquest of Tauromenion in 392, see Diod. 14.87.4-14.88.4; 14.96.4.

[138] Pelagatti 1976–77: 537–543; Belvedere 1987; Lentini 1998: 72–86. The Classical city was crisscrossed by three main roads (*plataeia*) running east-west, and then smaller roads (*stenopoi*) intersecting them at right angles. In between, most *insulae* contained four houses.

[139] Lentini 2002: 224. He explained that the destruction layer had a homogenous material profile: ""I segni della distruzione sono evidenti sull'intera area urbana, e soprattutto omogeneo e della fine del V a.C. è il materiale che si rinviene negli strati di crollo. Nessuna trasformazione databile al secolo successivo si registra nel tessuto urbano, ora controllato su di una superficie più estesa." In the destruction layer excavations have found a hoard of 22 silver tetradrachms dating from the late fifth century, see Lentini 1990.

[140] For the Naxian *kerameikos,* see Pelagatti 1965: 88-89; 1968-69: 350-352; 1972: 213-215; 1980-81: 696-697, with Fischer-Hansen 2000: 103-104.

Euboean-type pottery and terracottas thrived from the early sixth century through to the end of the fifth century—however, there are no ceramics from the first quarter of the fifth century, which may suggest a break in local production concurrent with Hippokrates' and Hieron's campaigns. Excavations at the *kerameikos* have found three large kilns and adjacent workshops for working the clay. Those workshops seem to have gone out of use sometime around the end of the fifth century, as evidence for local ceramic production disappears. Meanwhile, Naxian mints, which had been producing a steady supply of coins since *c.* 460, stopped issuing new coins around the end of the fifth century.[141] Overall, the archaeological evidence from the Naxian *kerameikos* gives the impression that local production of ceramic wares dropped off after Dionysios dispossessed the Naxians in 403, but remained undeveloped even with the new residents. This picture is reinforced by changes in activity at the nearby harbor, located just to the southeast.

Excavations at the Naxian harbor have uncovered four monumental trireme shipsheds, and their assemblages preserve the only direct evidence on Sicily for shipping in the Classical period.[142] Prior to their destruction at the end of the fifth century, the shipsheds housed the Naxian navy, a small fleet that sailed with the Athenians in 415. Pottery from below the foundation blocks show that the ship sheds were installed sometime in the mid-fifth century by the restored Naxian democracy.[143] The slipways of the dockyard have yielded a large quantity of black glaze pottery and transport amphorae: most of the black glaze pottery date from 430-400, with only several earlier pieces from 470-460; of the 158 wine amphorae, a first group of mostly

[141] For Naxian coins, see *SNG Cop. Sicily* 485-496, with Kraay 1966; De Angelis 2016: 296-298.

[142] For the recent excavations of the Naxian harbor and ship sheds, see Blackman and Lentini 2003; Lentini *et al.* 2008; Lentini *et al.* 2009. Lentini *et al.* (2008: 354) noted that the whole complex of four slipways would have been more than ten times the size of a local temple.

[143] Blackman and Lentini (2003: 435) emphasized the Naxians' alliance with the Athenians: "It is tempting but perhaps adventurous to see Athenian inspiration, encouragement and advice in the development of a small fleet and naval installation by their Sicilian ally."

Sybarite and Massalian wares date from the first half of the fifth century whereas a second group of mostly Campanian and Lokrian wares date from the second half of the fifth century.[144] The amphorae alone show that Naxians in the fifth century were importing goods from all around the western Mediterranean. However, like local production at the *kerameikos,* there is no evidence at the harbor for a Naxian import economy in the first generation of the fourth century. In fact, the shipsheds appear to have been destroyed at the end of the fifth century: fallen tiles from the collapsed roof, an ash layer, and scatter of some fifty bronze arrowheads all date from the end of the period, likely associated with Dionysios' attack on the city in 403.[145]

Indirectly, the archaeological evidence from Naxos shows the economic effects of Syracusan imperial land allotment. Even though the Naxians were replaced in 403 by new landowners, the new residents did not restore the city's economic activity. After 403, the new residents left the *kerameikos* unused, they were passed over by merchants from across the western Mediterranean, and their harbor did not have a navy to protect it. In all likelihood, the decline in activity at Naxos can be explained by a transition to subsistence farming: for the time being, the new landowners may have worked more on their land allotments. The new Naxians could look to Syracusan land allotment as the source of the livelihoods, but land allotment also seems to have undercut Naxos as a center of local production and trade.

In many ways, the history of Katane ran parallel to Naxos. In 476, Hieron displaced the Katanians at the same time as the Naxians to make room for his new city, Aitna. Pindar, in his first Pythian ode, praised the surrounding countryside as "fruitful land," which was divided

[144] For the black glaze pottery, see Blackman and Lentini 2003, with catalogue. For the transport amphorae, see Lentini *et al.* 2009.

[145] For archaeological evidence of the destruction of the Naxian ship sheds at the end of the fifth century, see Lentini *et al.* 2008: 314-317.

among ten thousand new landowners.[146] But a decade and a half later in 461 the original Katanian refugees, like the Naxian refugees, returned home and refounded their city as Katane. After just two generations of independence, in 403 Dionysios conquered Katane, sold everyone into slavery, and settled his Campanian mercenaries at the site.[147] The Campanians only lived there for seven years before Dionysios resettled them again at Inessa further inland where, according to Diodorus, they could better protect themselves against the Carthaginians.[148]

Because the modern city of Catania sits atop the ancient city, the archaeological evidence for Classical Katane and its territory is more limited that what we have for Naxos.[149] Even so, excavations at the Piazza San Francesco yielded a large votive deposit from the temple of Demeter, with around eight thousand terracotta figurines dating from the end of the seventh century through the end of the fifth century.[150] In his analysis of the terracotta votives, Giovanni Rizza argued that there was an artistic rupture in the second quarter of the fifth century, with similar typological features and representations of Demeter and Kore continuing through to the end of the fifth century. It is tempting to attribute the transition to either Hieron or the returning Katanian refugees, but the chronology for the votives is not precise enough to make any conclusions. Still, alongside the votives were also several thousand imported ceramics from Athens, Corinth, and the Ionian coast, mostly dating from the sixth and fifth centuries.[151] It is

[146] Pind. *Pyth.* 1.30, with Donzelli 1996; Morgan 2015: 300-346.

[147] For the refounding of Katane, see Diod. 11.76.3, with Vinci 2010a; Strabo 6.2.3. For the Campanian mercenaries, see Diod. 14.15.1-3.

[148] Diod. 14.58.2. Dionysios resettled the Campanians as an emergency measure in anticipation of the imminent Carthaginian invasion. Inessa also went by the name Aitna because the Hieronian refugees from the original Aitna fled there in 461, see Diod. 14.14.2; Strabo 6.2.3.

[149] For the Katanian *chōra,* see Manganoro 1996a. Because there has not been a surface survey, his analysis relies on written sources.

[150] For the votive deposit, see Rizza 1960; 1996. The excavations of the votive deposit at the Piazza San Francesco filled 1,200 *cassettes.*

[151] For the Archaic and Classical ceramics from the sanctuary of Demeter, see Pautasso 2009; Kerschner and Mommsen 2009. The Neutron Activation Analysis method helped identify centers of production for ceramics imported from the eastern Mediterranean.

significant that, of the nearly 700 known Athenian imports excavated from Sicily dating to the Archaic period, 284 came from Katane.[152] The majority of the Athenian imports found at Katane date from the second quarter of the sixth century (105 total) and the first quarter of the fifth century (110 total). Though the number of imports found at Katane is certainly not directly representative of the city's actual import economy, in all likelihood Katane played a central role in the distribution of Athenian wares in Sicily.

The absence of ceramic and terracotta wares from the first half of the fourth century suggests that Katane, like Naxos, had lost its position as a central Sicilian economic center. After all, the Campanians only lived at Katane for seven years after Dionysios dispossessed the Katanians, and afterwards the urban center fell out of use until the middle of the fourth century.[153] So even though Katane had a nice harbor and was naturally suited to command trade across the Ionian Sea, the new Campanian landowners had little time to take advantage of the area before Dionysios resettled them further inland. And though it is impossible to say how and to what extent they used their land allotments at either Katane or Inessa, the new landowners were likely no more productive than their neighbors at Naxos.

Further to the south, the urban center of Leontinoi sits just 45 km to the northwest of Syracuse, and 10 km inland from the eastern seaboard of Sicily. The story goes that around 483, Gelon overtook the area, removed the city's elites to Syracuse, and enslaved everyone else.[154] A few years later in 476, Hieron conquered the nearby Naxians and Katanians, and relocated them

[152] Giudice 1996. In the study, Giudice analyzed by quarter-century the painters represented and their parallels elsewhere on Sicily.

[153] In 353, Kallippos, Dion's murderer, took the city, see Plut. *Dio* 58.4. There is no literary evidence for Katane between 396 and 353.

[154] Hdt. 7.156.3. Herodotus wrote that Gelon dispossessed the "Euboeans in Sicily," which refers to the Chalkidian colonists at Leontinoi. Prior to his conquest of Leontinoi, Gelon had conquered Megara Hyblaia, which physically separated Leontinoi from Syracuse, see Thuc. 6.4.1-2; Hdt. 7.156.2. For excavations at Megara Hyblaia and evidence of its destruction, see Vallet *et al.* 1976; 1983.

to Leontinoi, making it a community of refugees.[155] After Thrasyboulos' fall from power, the Leontines returned to Leontinoi for a short-lived period of independence, emboldened for a time by an alliance with the Athenians.[156] But, as we saw earlier, shortly after the conference of Gela in 424, which brought together the Sicilian Greeks in common cause against the Athenians, the Leontine elite came to an agreement with the Syracusans, destroyed their city, and moved to Syracuse to become citizens.[157] For the next few decades, Leontinoi again became a community of people dispossessed by war: Diodorus called it a city "full of refugees and foreigners: even before it was again resettled in 405, this time by refugees from Akragas, Gela, and Kamarina fleeing the Carthaginians.[158] Then in 403, after Dionysios enslaved the Naxians and Katanians, the mixed residents at Leontinoi hoped to avoid a similar fate so they agreed to resettle at Syracuse.[159] Seven years later in 396, Dionysios divided up the Leontine countryside and allotted it to his mercenaries:

> τοῖς δὲ μισθοφόροις ὡς μυρίοις οὖσι τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔδωκεν ἐν τοῖς μισθοῖς τὴν τῶν Λεοντίνων πόλιν τε καὶ χώραν. ἀσμένως δ᾽ αὐτῶν ὑπακουσάντων διὰ τὸ κάλλος τῆς χώρας, οὗτοι μὲν κατακληρουχήσαντες ᾤκουν ἐν Λεοντίνοις.
>
> He offered to his mercenaries, who numbered about ten thousand, in lieu of their pay the city and territory of the Leontines. To this they gladly agreed because the territory was good land, and after portioning it out in allotments they made their home in Leontinoi.[160]

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[155] Berger 1991: 135; Vanotti 1995; Frasca 2009: 99.

[156] For the Leontines' alliance with the Athenians in 433, see *IG* I^3 54, with Wick 1976. See also Thuc. 3.86, 4.24.9; Diod. 12.53, 12.83.

[157] Thuc. 5.4.2-3. For the conference of Gela in 424 and the resulting political breakdown at Leontinoi, see Thuc. 4.58-65, with Dreher 1986. See also Diod. 12.54.7, 13.95.3, 14.58.1. The Athenians used the relocation of the Leontine elite as one of their main motives for the second Sicilian campaign in 415, see Thuc. 6.33.2, 6.48.1. Diodorus says that Leontinoi had become a sort of *ad hoc* Syracusan garrison (*phrourion*): for example, Dionysios used Leontinoi as a staging ground from which he became tyrant at Syracuse, see Diod. 13.95.3.

[158] Diod. 13.95.3. The Akrgantines, Geloans, and Kamarinaians decided to settle at Leontinoi instead of Syracuse, see Diod. 13.113.4.

[159] Diod. 14.15.4. Diodorus explained that in 403 the mixed residents at Leontinoi, "expecting that they would receive no help and reflecting on the fate of the Naxians and Katanians, were struck with terror in fear that they would suffer the same misfortunes."

[160] Diod. 14.78.2-3, with Rizza 2002. Because Dionysios was cash poor, he worried that his mercenaries were preparing to depose him.

In antiquity, Leontinoi was known for its fertile landscape at the foot of Mt. Etna: according to legend, Herakles himself is said to have "marveled at the beauty of the plain."[161] So even though Dionysios was cash-poor and unable to pay his mercenaries in 396, the promise of land and a new life at Leontinoi was a good bargain. For much of its history, however, Leontinoi was also known as a center of non-agricultural production.

At Leontinoi, the late Archaic period before the first Syracusan conquest, marked an efflorescence in Leontine local production.[162] From the sanctuary of Alaimo just outside of the urban center, excavations have yielded over 200 complete ceramic vessels, produced locally, as well as nearly 250 Corinthian imports, and others from Etruria—all from just the one site.[163] From the same site, there is also ample evidence for local terracotta and metal production, all in late Archaic contexts.[164] However, evidence for local production falls off completely in the fifth century in both urban and rural settings. In his synthesis of Leontine material culture, Massimo Frasca recently concluded that the Syracusan conquests disrupted local production, a disruption that lasted until the fourth century when distribution of Leontine wares picked up again.[165] Despite having a larger population after Hieron's relocations, the new labor force does not seem to have helped with non-agricultural production. Furthermore, there is little evidence for new building during the fifth century. Rather, reuse of the Archaic walls, sanctuaries, and cemeteries was much more the norm.[166]

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[161] Diod. 4.24.1.

[162] For an overview of Leontine history, see Gula 1995. For recent syntheses of the excavations at Leontinoi, see Frasca 2003; 2009.

[163] For the excavations at the sanctuary of Alaimo at Leontinoi, the catalogue of finds, and analysis, see Grasso 2008; Frasca 2009: 75-77.

[164] For terracotta production, see Frasca 2009: 91-96. For metallurgy and weaponry, with a catalogue of finds, see Grasso 2008: 133-140.

[165] Frasca 2008: 113.

[166] For the walls, sanctuaries, and cemeteries, see Frasca 2008: 108-112, *contra* Rizza 1955. For the sanctuaries, see also Rizza 2003.

During the fifth century, the bulk of Leontine material culture comes in the form of ceramic imports from Athens. Still, all the Attic imports date from the second and third quarters of the century, and cease altogether at the beginning of the last quarter of the fifth century—concurrent with the short-lived period of Leontine independence, and ending at about the same time as when the Syracusan democrats relocated the Leontines to Syracuse.[167] Among the Attic ceramic wares, there were four well-preserved red-figure *kraters*, and many other *lekythoi*. However, there is a two-generation gap beginning in the final quarter of the fifth century for which there is absolutely no evidence for local production or imports. This was at a time when neighboring states like Gela and Kamarina were still importing ceramics from Attica, at least up until they were relocated to Syracuse. Ceramic production only picked up again in the second quarter of the fourth century, with the Lentini-Manfria group beginning sometime in the 360s, and taking off during the 340s.[168] Meanwhile, the Leontines began to build new monumental *epitymbia* tombs, suggesting an increase in material wealth a half century or so after Dionysios allotted the land to his mercenaries.[169]

Like Naxos and Katane, Leontinoi had a tumultuous history in the Classical period as Syracuse's neighbor. At Leontinoi, the frequent relocations resulted in breaks in local production and the import economy—breaks that even continued for the generation after Dionysios allotted land to his mercenaries. As elsewhere in eastern Sicily, the new landowners were on their own to start a new community outside of Syracusan territory. If there were, in fact, ten thousand

[167] For Athenian ceramic imports, see Orsi 1930; Frasca 2008: 113-114. Because of the low overall number of Athenian imports, it is impossible to say, as Frasca (2008: 119) did, that the Leontines' treaty with the Athenians had any effect on the ceramic import market.
[168] For the Lentini painter and the Lentini-Manfria group, see Trendall 1967: 583-614. In his analysis of the Lentini painter, Trendall concluded that "He probably began his career before the time of Timoleon and was active during the third quarter of the fourth century."
[169] For the fourth-century dating of the *epitymbia* tombs in the southern necropolis, see Rizza 1955: 291-292; Frasca 2008: 137-139.

Campanian mercenaries who received land allotments at Leontinoi, then each new landowner could only have received about six and half hectares of land: De Angelis has recently estimated that Leontine territory was about 830 km^2, though only about 664 $km^{2,}$ (or 66,400 hectares) was cultivable.[170] Allotments of this size would have been comparable in output to the fifth-century farms found at Kamarina. Therefore, most of the new landowners at Leontinoi after 396 were probably small-scale farmers, producing little to no surpluses. Consequently, it is not surprising that there is little archaeological evidence for non-agricultural production at Leontinoi in first half of the fifth century.

What we have seen is that Syracusan land allotment was the shared history of Naxos, Katane, and Leontinoi. But unlike Athenian imperialism, Syracusan imperialism does not have a clear story for who benefitted from imperial land allotment. In the opening years of Dionysios' tyranny, the Naxian countryside went to Sikels, the Katanian countryside to Campanians, and the Leontine countryside to mercenaries. In all three cases, the new landowners received the base conditions for a new agrarian life in Sicily, but that life also required them to start over in an under-developed economic community. For Dionysios, imperial land allotment allowed him to satisfy his debts—both financial and political—to his mercenaries and foreign allies. It also reshaped the human geography of Syracuse itself as economic activity moved south to the growing urban center: in the early fourth century Syracuse reached a population of nearly 50,000 through forced relocations, and was fast becoming one of the Mediterranean's leading economic centers, rivaling Athens and Carthage.

[170] De Angelis 2000a: 128-129, with De Angelis 2016: 226-234. Most of Leontinoi's territory is volcanic and sits below an elevation of 300 m.

Though the territories of the eastern Sicilian communities were confiscated and divided up time and time again, the recipients did not command the best agricultural land on the island: in fact, the Syracusans seem to have had their eyes on Sicily's low-hanging fruit and none of the big prizes. For example, the territory of Naxos and Katane were less than 60% cultivable—compared to Gela and Akragas, at 86 and 87%, respectively—and all six eastern communities (Messene, Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, Megara Hyblaia, and Kamarina) together had less cultivable than Gela and Akragas on the southern coast of Sicily.[171] Still, the smaller eastern Sicilian communities, though not agricultural titans, were big importers from the east. Consequently, competition with Carthage in southern Sicily, combined with the relative strength of the eastern communities' markets, probably put the north more in line with the Syracusans' interests.[172] When the eastern Sicilians, like the southern Italians after them, relocated to Syracuse, the land they left behind remained external to Syracusan territory.

4.6. *Kalabria: Exchanging Land for Trade*

As the Syracusans marched north in 396 after taking Naxos, the Messenian countryside before them was deserted, its fields unplowed since the Carthaginian invasion a year before. Like the other eastern Sicilian communities, Messene received new landowners, all beneficiaries of Syracusan land allotment. At Messene, the new landowners arrived from Lokroi and its colony Medma, both Greek communities on the Italian side of the Strait of Messina.[173] At just 3 km wide

[171] De Angelis 2000a. The six *poleis* have about 308,940 hectares of cultivable land; Gela and Akragas have about 333,600 hectares.

[172] For economic competition between Carthage and Syracuse in the Classical period, see Pilkington 2013. For Carthaginian markets and monetization in the western Mediterranean, see Frey-Kupper 2014; Prag 2010, with Brenot 1992; Dietler 1997; Cutroni Tusa 2000a; 2000b.

[173] For the new landowners at Messene, see note 86 above.

at its narrowest point, the channel separating Sicily from mainland Italy was one of the busiest waterways in the Mediterranean: through it travelled the lion's share of commercial shipping between the Tyrrhenian and Ionian Seas, and also mainland Greeks on their way to the western Mediterranean.[174] The Porticello shipwreck, which sank *c.* 415-385 just north of Rhegion, opposite Messene, shows just how crucial the channel was for shipping at the time of Dionysios' campaigns: in a single cargo were amphorae from the Chalkidiki and Bosporos in eastern Greece, others from Punic Sicily and southern Italy, three life-size bronze sculptures, and lead ingots from the Laurion mines in Attica.[175] It was probably because Messene commanded the western seaboard of the channel that Dionysios moved quickly to repopulate the site before the Carthaginians or Rhegians could do the same. From then on, all Syracusan land allotments north of Naxos up through Kalabria in southern Italy went to the Lokrians.

The Syracusans were no strangers to Italian political and commercial life. Already in the Archaic period the Syracusans were trading with the Lokrians on the Ionian coast of Kalabria: a merchant ship sailing just outside of the Syracusan harbor in the late Archaic period sunk with a cargo of Lokrian amphorae.[176] Under the Deinomenids, the Syracusans reaffirmed their commercial interests by joining the Lokrians in a war against the Rhegians.[177] Even after the Lokrians offered asylum to Thrasyboulos after the collapse of the Deinomenid tyranny, the Syracusan democrats upheld the alliance with the Lokrians through both Athenian campaigns

[174] In 433, the Athenians went to war with the Corcyraeans against the Corinthians, in part, to protect their trade in western Greece.

[175] For the Porticello shipwreck, see Eiseman and Ridgway 1987; Parker 1992: 333-332, with De Angelis 2016: 292-293. The small ship had a hull of roughly thirty tons. Eiseman and Ridgway (1987: 33) argued that the ship wrecked c. 415-385, whereas Parker (1992: 333-332) argued that it may have been wrecked sometime closer to the mid-fifth century judging by the artistic style of the sculptures.

[176] Parker 1992: 293; Albanese Procelli 1996: 99. For the distribution of amphorae in Archaic Sicily, see Albanese Procelli 1997: 4-5.

[177] Pind. *Pyth.* Σ 1.99a, 2.36c. In 477, the Rhegians under the tyrant Anaxilas attacked Lokroi and Hieron came to the Lokrians' aid.

to Sicily.[178] Dionysios carried the alliance into the fourth century by taking a Lokrian wife in 398. Afterwards, when the Syracusans crossed over into Italy, they continued to internalize the peoples of their empire by giving away the land they confiscated in southern Italy to the Lokrians. The region makes for a useful case study because we can pull from urban excavations at Kaulonia and Rhegion, rural intensive survey of Kaulonian territory, and Diodorus' unbroken narrative of the Syracusans' campaigns. Altogether, the material shows how the economic effects of Syracusan land allotment in eastern Sicily also held true for land allotment in southern Italy. More than that, it allowed the Syracusans to maintain their oldest trading partner in western Greece while also transferring the region's human capital to Syracuse.

Through Syracusan land allotment, Lokrian citizens received land all over Kalabria at Kaulonia, Hipponion, and Skylletion. In effect, Dionysios left Kalabria to the Lokrians. In doing so, Lokroi became one of the wealthiest Greek communities in southern Italy at the expense of nearby Rhegion, Kaulonia, and Kroton.[179] For the Syracusans, the alliance with Lokroi may have helped them scale up their navy. As we saw earlier, when Dionysios was preparing to go to war against Carthage in 398, he retrofitted Syracuse's double harbor with new ship sheds and build a new navy of three hundred warships. To do so, he called on his Italian allies for timber:

> ἀκούων γὰρ ὁ Διονύσιος ἐν Κορίνθῳ ναυπηγηθῆναι τριήρη πρώτως, ἔσπευδε κατὰ τὴν ἀποικισθεῖσαν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνων πόλιν αὐξῆσαι τὸ μέγεθος τῆς τῶν νεῶν κατασκευῆς. λαβὼν δ᾽ ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας ἐξαγωγὴν ὕλης, τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις τῶν ὑλοτόμων εἰς τὸ κατὰ τὴν Αἴτνην ὄρος ἀπέστειλε, γέμον κατ᾽ ἐκείνους τοὺς χρόνους πολυτελοῦς ἐλάτης τε καὶ πεύκης, τοὺς δ᾽ ἡμίσεις εἰς τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἀποστείλας παρεσκευάσατο ζεύγη μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὴν θάλατταν κατακομιοῦντα, πλοῖα δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὑπηρέτας πρὸς τὸ τὰς σχεδίας ἀπάγεσθαι κατὰ τάχος εἰς τὰς Συρακούσας.[180]

[178] For the Lokrians during the first Athenian campaign, see Thuc. 3.86.2. For the second Athenian campaign, see Thuc. 6.44.2; 7.1.1; 7.25.3.

[179] For Lokroi, see Costamagna and Sabbione 1990; Costabile 1992; Del Monaco 2013. For the Kalabria region, see De Sensi Sestito 1989.

[180] Diod. 14.42.3-4. Dionysios recently conquered Naxos and Leontinoi on either side of Mt. Aitna, so he had direct access to its timber.

> For, hearing that triremes had first been built in Corinth, he was intent, in his city that had been settled by a colony from there, on increasing the scale of naval construction. After obtaining leave to transport timber from Italy he dispatched half of his woodmen to Mount Aitna, on which there were heavy stands at that time of both excellent fir and pine, while the other half he dispatched to Italy, where he got ready teams to convey the timber to the sea, as well as boats and crews to bring the worked wood speedily to Syracuse.

The southern-most tip of Kalabria is famous, even to this day, for its dense coniferous forests. Within just 10 km of Lokroi, the Lokrian countryside is split by four rivers that flow down from the coniferous interior, which could have served as exit points for timber exports. Dionysios may have looked to the Lokrians, his closest allies in Italy, and their natural supply of timber when he was building his new navy. In a sense, the Syracusans may have seen Lokroi much as the Athenians did Macedonia for much of the fifth century: as a source of timber. But unlike the Athenians, Dionysios did not seem to have used the Syracusan navy to protect citizens' land allotments or any other private sources of wealth outside of Syracusan territory.

Soon after the Syracusans made peace with the Carthaginians in 396, a peace that would hold until 383, Dionysios took his empire of allotment to southern Italy.[181] Before sailing to Italy in 389, Dionysios entered into an alliance with the Oscan-speaking Lucanians in the southern Apennines, who had recently conquered Poseidonia and Laos in Campania, just 300 km south of Rome.[182] After wintering in Sicily, a Syracusan navy sailed north to support the Lucanians in their conquest of Thurii, an Athenian colony bordering Lucanian territory to the south.[183] But the Thurians had recently entered into an alliance themselves, a defensive coalition of Italian Greeks, the second "Italiote league," formed in 393 to protect Kalabria from the Lucanians to the north

[181] Diod 14.100.1. Diodorus wrote that Dionysios was already planning "to take hold of" (προσλαμβάνω) the Italian Greeks at this time.

[182] Diod. 14.100.5. The Lucanians had recently conquered Poseidonia and Laos, see Strabo 6.1.3; Diod. 14.101.3. See also Section 5.5.

[183] Diod. 14.101-102.

and the Syracusans to the south.[184] In 389, Kroton, Kaulonia, and Rhegion joined Thurii in a growing regional fight against the Lucanians and the Syracusans, who were also supported by Lokroi. As elsewhere in the Greek world, the Italian interstate system tended towards the balance of power among smaller states: when faced with a growing Syracusan power, the smaller states banded together.[185]

The Syracusans entered into an alliance with the Lucanians precisely because a coordinated Italiote league might further threaten commercial activity moving through the Strait of Messina. In his first attempt to control the channel in 390, Dionysios was defeated at Rhegion by a formidable Italian navy, numbering among it sixty warships from Kroton.[186] Even though the Syracusans could count on the Lokrians for regional support in southern Kalabria, the formation of the Italiote league pooled the members' collective resources and expanded the theater of operations northward up the Tarentine gulf coast. But after 390, and with Lucanian support in the north, the Syracusans were able to divide the Italian Greeks' forces, allowing them to pick off Kaulonia and Rhegion in the south.[187] Though the Lucanians benefitted in the north just as the Syracusans did in the south from a divided Italiote league, the Syracusans sustained their alliance with the Lokrians with the promise of land allotments.

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[184] Diod. 14.91.1, with Wonder 2012: 130; Fronda 2015. The Italian Greeks formed the alliance after Dionysios' failed attack on Rhegion and the Lucanians moved into Campania. Not to be confused with the coalition of 393, the Italian Greeks created a similar defensive alliance nearly two generations earlier after the Athenians founded Thurii in 444/3, see Polybius 2.38-39, with Wonder 2012: 137-138.

[185] For the balance of power in the Greek world, see Strauss 1991. For the Mediterranean interstate system, see Eckstein 2006: 37-78.

[186] Diod. 14.100.1-4. Kroton appears to have been the *hegemon* of the Italiote league after Thurii's defeat, see Wonder 2012: 144-145.

[187] Diod. 14.102.3. Diodorus wrote that "Dionysios hoped that, if the Italian Greeks were embroiled in war with the Lucanians, he might appear and easily make himself master of affairs in Italy, but if they were rid of such a dangerous war, his success would be difficult."

In 389, the Syracusan army crossed over to Italy and first moved against the Kaulonians. Though the Italiote league managed to send an army to draw Dionysios away from his siege of Kaulonia, the Syracusans defeated the Italians in the field at the Eleporos river.[188] But before returning to Kaulonia, the Syracusans marched on Rhegion. Having just been defeated in the field, the Rhegians came to an agreement with Dionysios in return for their lives: they paid three hundred talents of silver and handed over their entire navy of seventy warships.[189] At Rhegion, the Syracusans were following in the Athenians' footsteps of monopolizing naval power. Afterwards, the Syracusans returned to Kaulonia and, in defeat, the Kaulonians agreed to relocate to Syracuse with citizenship.[190] Dionysios ordered the city be destroyed before he gave the land to the Lokrians. Like its predecessors in eastern Sicily, Kaulonia received new landowners from outside Syracusan society, who were on their own to found a new community.

Afterwards, the new landowners at Kaulonia set out to rebuild the city and work the countryside. As at Naxos, the urban center of Kaulonia was refounded with a new orientation along an orthogonal plan. But excavations of the city's fortifications have shown that the new landowners were slow to rebuild the city: though excavations have found that the sixth-and fifth-century circuit walls were destroyed at the beginning of the fourth century, the new walls surrounding the city date to the mid-fourth century, at least two generations after city was refounded.[191] Unfortunately, there is little else in the way of archaeological evidence from the city dating from the Archaic and Classical periods that can help shed light on the new landowners.

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[188] Diod. 14.104.4. The Italians sent an army from Kroton, though the Rhegians appear to have supplied soldiers to the army as well.

[189] Diod. 14.106.3. In defeat, the Rhegians feared what the Syracusans might do to them, perhaps with the Naxians and Katanians in mind.

[190] Diod. 14.106.4.

[191] Tréziny 1988: 209-210; 1989: 155-157. Dionysios II may have refounded the city again in 357, see Diod. 16.10.2, 16.11.3; Plut. *Dion*. 26.7.

A recent intensive survey of the Kaulonian countryside suggests that the new landowners may have been small-scale farmers like their contemporaries in eastern Sicily. The survey found that, though fourteen of the total seventeen sites in the survey areas were new to the Classical period, the number of total sites only increased by three.[192] The sites from the Classical period were mostly small, located near the coast, and on sites not previously occupied.[193] Though the surveyors did not see much of a decrease in the total number of sites between the fifth and fourth centuries, by the Hellenistic period, the number of sites had decreased to thirteen and, again, were mostly new sites.[194] In his analysis of the sites, Antonio Facella argued that the discontinuity between the fourth and third centuries was very different from what intensive surveys found at nearby Kroton and Metaponto, where settlement patterns only increased in the fourth century—more in line with the kind of agricultural intensification that might be expected of a Greek colony during the Classical period.[195] It is possible that the changes to Kaulonia's rural settlement may actually have been caused by a move towards urbanism rather than a demographic or agricultural decline. Still, the kind of decline and discontinuity in the fourth century suggests that the new landowners at Kaulonia, compared to their neighbors to the north, may have struggled to take advantage of the countryside.

After Kaulonia, the Syracusans turned to the remaining Italian Greek states in southern Kalabria. In 389, Hipponion and Skylletion to the west and east of Kaulonia received the same treatment as Kaulonia. At Hipponion, Diodorus says that the Syracusan army "marched on

[192] Facella 2011: 312, with Parra 2001; 2004; Parra and Facella 2011; Facella 2012. Parra and Facella (2011: 538) list eight "uncertain" sites.

[193] Facella 2011: 315, with table 4. Facella suggested that the sites were probably small farms, but unfortunately none were excavated.

[194] Facella 2011: 312-313.

[195] Facella 2011: 315-316. For Kroton, see Ruga *et al.* 2005: 153. For Metaponto, see Carter 2001: 786, 790-791; 2006: 225-227, 229-232.

Hipponion, removed its inhabitants to Syracuse, destroyed the city, and divided up its territory among the Lokrians."[196] Afterwards, according to Strabo, Skylletion became a part of Lokrian territory.[197] The Syracusans then turned south to Rhegion. Because the Rhegians had recently lost their navy, the Syracusans blockaded their harbor, driving up the price of grain sixty fold, and let starvation set in.[198] After holding out for two years, in 387 the Rhegians finally gave in: Dionysios ordered the six thousand survivors be relocated to Syracuse and ransomed for a *mina* each—those who could not pay their personal indemnity became slaves as further punishment for the long siege.[199] Like the other Kaulonia and Hipponion, the city of Rhegion was destroyed, but it seems to have remained deserted for another generation: excavations have dated all public architecture to the mid-fifth century.[200] By not allotting the Rhegian countryside to the Lokrians, Dionysios may have been limiting any possible disruptions to movement through the Strait of Messina. Furthermore, the destruction of Rhegion marked the death of the second Italiote league.[201] With the combined populations of Kaulonia, Hipponion, Skylletion, and Rhegion relocated to Syracuse, and the Lokrians in possession of their land, the Syracusans had little use for their alliance with the Lucanians. So Dionysios broke the alliance, and ordered a wall be built across southern Kalabria, stretching from Skylletion on the Ionian coast to just

[196] Diod. 14.107.2. See also Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 20.7. The Lokrians had fought against the Hipponians back in 422, see Thuc. 5.5.3.

[197] Strabo 6.1.10. Strabo used the verb προσορίζω, which means "to include within the boundaries"—in this case, of the Lokrian *chōra.*

[198] Diod. 14.111.1. According to Diodorus, a *medimnos* cost three *mina* (or roughly 300 drachms) at the peak of the blockade. On average, a family of five would have consumed about 25 *medimnoi* of grain per year, with an income of roughly 300-400 drachms. The market price for grain varied in the fifth century from 5-6 drachms per *medimnos*, see Ober 2015: 95. Therefore, the Rhegians in 389 were spending a year's wages for the equivalent of about two weeks of grain, at sixty times the usual market price.

[199] Diod. 14.111.2-4.

[200] Strabo 6.1.6. Dionysios II refounded the city *c.* 360. See also Costabile 1978; Martorano 1985; Hansen and Fischer-Hansen 1994: 72-74.

[201] It is unclear what happened to Kroton at this time. Dionysios may have "captured" Kroton as well, see Dion. Hal. *Ant. Rom*. 20.7.

north of Hipponion on the Tyrrhenian coast.[202] What lay south of the wall was Lokrian territory; the former inhabitants, Syracusan.

In 387, the Syracusans had a foothold for what might have become an Italian empire. But that Italian empire, for the time, was in Italian hands—that is, the Syracusans continued to relocate the Italian Greeks to Syracusan territory but give away their land to the Lokrians. The Syracusans were supporting their oldest political and economic allies in Italy by removing all competition in southern Kalabria and increasing the agricultural surface area at their disposal. In return, the Syracusans repossessed Kalabria's share of human capital. Even though Dionysios remained tyrant of Syracuse for another twenty years, Hipponion and Skylletion were the last of Syracuse's imperial land allotments in the Classical period, at least as far as we can tell from the historical sources. The Syracusans continued to pursue their commercial interests in the eastern Mediterranean, first by founding a series of naval stations and *emporia* (or "trading settlements") along the Adriatic such as Issa and Lissos, and possibly Adria and Ankon as well.[203] And to good effect: Syracusan currency from the early fourth century has been found at nearly thirty sites along the Ionian and Adriatic coasts, as far north as Oderzo in northeastern Italy.[204] The Syracusans also went on a raiding expedition along the Etruscan and Corsican coasts in 383.[205] On their way to Corsica, the Syracusans raided Pyrgi, the coastal *emporion* of Caere just 55 km northwest of Rome, and took off with 1,500 talents of silver. The Syracusans' fundraising in the

[202] Strabo 6.1.10. Strabo wrote that the wall was never finished because some unnamed Greeks from the north stopped the construction.

[203] Diod. 15.13-14; 16.5. For Dionysios, the Syracusan colonies in the Adriatic, and the possibility of an "Adriatic empire," see Beaumont 1936: 203; Woodhead 1970; Braccesi 1977; Amat-Sabattini 1991; Cambi 2002; Ceka 2002; D'Andria 2002; Gorini 2002; Lombardo 2002; Cabanes 2008. For Ankon, see Strabo 5.4.2. For Adria, see Theopomp. fr. 128; Tzetzes *ad* Lycophr. 631; *Etym. Magn*. 18.54–57.

[204] Gorini 2002: 204; *SNGCop*. 720-722.

[205] Diod. 15.14.3-4; Strabo 5.2.8. At Pyrgi, the Syracusans plundered the temple, defeated the Pyrgians, and took with them prisoners for ransom and any other movable property they could find. Unfortunately, neither Diodorus nor Strabo said what happened on Corsica.

Tyrrhenian financed a new war in western Sicily against the Carthaginians, which they carried on in fits and starts until Dionysios' death in 367. For the time, trading and raiding, not land allotment, was lucrative enough to fund Syracusan militarism. Perhaps all the relocations back to Syracusan territory had accomplished what the Syracusans considered the goal of land allotment: transferring human capital back to Syracuse.

In the end, the Syracusans handed over their Italian empire to the Lokrians. Though many historians of Syracusan imperialism have imagined that the Syracusans achieved a kind of direct control over southern Italy, when Diodorus wrote that Dionysios wanted "to take hold of the Italian Greeks," he may have been referring to how the Syracusans relocated them back at Syracuse, not the actual effects of imperial control or land allotment. The verb προσλαμβάνω could also quite literally mean "to take in":

> κατὰ δὲ τὴν Σικελίαν ὁ τῶν Συρακοσίων τύραννος Διονύσιος σπεύδων τῇ κατὰ τὴν νῆσον δυναστείᾳ καὶ τοὺς κατ᾽ Ἰταλίαν Ἕλληνας προσλαβέσθαι, τὴν μὲν ἐπ᾽ ἐκείνους κοινὴν στρατείαν εἰς ἕτερον καιρὸν ἀνεβάλετο.
>
> In Sicily Dionysios, the tyrant of the Syracusans, hoping to take hold of the Italian Greeks along with the power that he [already] held on the island, postponed the general war against them to another time.[206]

For the Syracusans, land allotment and human capital were the twin foundations of their empire. But land allotment also meant that the regions that lost out to Syracusan militarism could only be controlled indirectly through the threat of violence: in Italy, the Syracusans took what they wanted—the people of empire—and left the Lokrians to look after the rest. Though land allotment only indirectly benefitted the Syracusan economy, the Syracusans owed much of their continued success to their imperial partnership with the Lokrians. At Kaulonia,

[206] Diod. 14.100.1. In Oldfather's Loeb translation, he translated προσλαμβάνω as "annex," giving the impression of some kind of control.

Hipponion, and Skylletion, the Syracusans exchanged land for trade with the Lokrians. Because the Syracusans could stand to give away surplus land, they externalized the imperial land in return for timber and military support.

4.7. *Conclusions*

The Syracusan empire was not much to look at. Unlike the empires of Hellenistic and Roman Sicily, the Syracusan empire in the Classical period did not produce the kinds of physical monuments to imperial control that historians have come to expect of ancient empires. In fact, for much of the Classical period, Syracusan imperialism was much more destructive than it was constructive outside of Syracusan territory in the areas where the Syracusans confiscated land.[207] As we have seen, it did not come with the usual trappings of imperial control, like taxation, imperial officials, or garrisons because, I have argued, the Syracusans externalized their imperial territory. Even so, the Syracusans used land allotment to create an imbalance of power in eastern Sicily and southern Italy, where new landowners committed to fight for Syracuse, but were on their own to build a new political community. Land allotment was the shared history that connected the Syracusans' imperial territory to all the relocated people living and working at Syracuse.

The story of Syracusan land allotment began in the Archaic period: a long pre-history of political synoikism, combined with an economy geared more towards agrarianism than industrial production, made Syracusan society open to the kinds of demographic relocations that came at

[207] Diod. 16.83.1; Plut. *Tim.* 22.4-6. Talbert (1974: 146) argued that "Archaeology has now confirmed the view of the ancient sources that from 405 to *c.* 340 much of southern Italy was ruined, undeveloped and under-populated." For recent critiques of this view, see Bonacasa *et al.* 2002; De Angelis 2016: 129-133, 218-219.

the business end of so many military campaigns. At the beginning of the fifth century, the Syracusans inherited a model of indirect empire, which made it so few Syracusans received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory. At the same time, as Syracusan militarism scaled up, so too did the Syracusans' need for non-agricultural production and a broader labor force. Further into the fifth century, the Syracusan democrats continued to see imperial land as external to the state so that imperial peoples could become internal to the state—a trend that continued through to Dionysios. The Syracusans had learned that they could build up Syracuse with an influx of labor, skilled craftsmen, and market activity. The Archaic origins of Syracusan imperialism presented two forms of land allotment: one that infused Syracusan society with dispossessed imperial peoples; another that created an indirect empire that was separate from Syracuse. For the Syracusans, land allotment was always about the people of empire.

In the Classical period, few Syracusan citizens ever received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory, a source of wealth reserved instead for mercenaries and citizens of allied state. In eastern Sicily, the Syracusans broke apart political communities by relocating the defeated populations back to Syracuse and then allotting their confiscated land to mercenaries at Aitna, Entella, Katane, Naxos, Leontinoi, Tyndaris, Tauromenion, and Messene. After 396, the Syracusans treated the defeated communities in a similar way before giving away their land to the Lokrians at Messene, Kaulonia, Hipponion, and Skylletion. Only at Megara Hyblaia in Sicily and Rhegion in Italy did the Syracusans leave the urban center unsettled. In every case of Syracusan land allotment, the Syracusans directed the heavy hand of their army to break up a political community and relocated the dispossessed peoples back to Syracuse, as either citizens

or slaves. Even though new communities made up of new landowners often sprang up in their place, those communities were still separate from Syracuse.

What we have seen, then, is that Syracusan land allotment remade the western Greek world at Syracuse. By giving land and citizenship to dispossessed people within Syracusan territory, and then allotting their land to mercenaries and foreign allies, the Syracusans were taking hostage the economic infrastructure of eastern Sicily and southern Italy. At Syracuse, the effects of demographic growth and specialization helped the Syracusans get to work building the tools of war. Outside of Syracusan territory, at places like Naxos, Katane, Leontinoi, and Kaulonia, land allotment offered the new landowners a new life, but they could not fall back on an existing market. Likewise, archaeological evidence from those imperial communities suggests that land allotment was a drain on Syracusan imperial territory.

When the Athenians recognized Dionysios as the *archon* of Sicily in 394/3, they had every reason to assume that, as the Syracusans' military leader, he commanded the Greeks on the island. Just a year after another successful Syracusan campaign to Messene, the Athenians were not about to make the same mistake they did in 415 when they misjudged Sicily's imperial history. After a decade of warfare, the Syracusans had internalized the collective populations of eastern Sicily, and they were preparing to turn northward to southern Italy. The Athenians recognized Dionysios' position of power not because he directly controlled every city he defeated, but because the Sicilian Greeks were quite literally his to command from Syracuse. The Athenians could only look on as the Syracusans internalized an empire's share of human capital. They also learned how Syracusan land allotment ensured that there were no other Greek community in eastern Sicily that could compete, either militarily or economically. In the end, the imperial

discourse that elevated Dionysios' power probably says more about his ability to marshal resources at Syracuse than the actual reach of his tyrant state through the western Greek world. Despite all of the fighting and suffering, the Syracusans did little to physically expand the Syracusan citizen community or its territory. In this regard, the Syracusans were not all that different from the Athenians.

But whereas the Athenians confiscated land to create private forms of wealth, the Syracusans saw confiscated land more as a political means to an economic end: to build up Syracuse and Syracusan society. To be sure, political synoikism was nothing new in the Mediterranean world: it was a fairly common way for states to stay economically or militarily competitive. The well-known examples of Rhodes in 408/7, Megalopolis in 368, and Kos in 366/5, to name a few, were part of a much wider phenomenon.[208] Consider also the legendary rape of the Sabine women in Rome or the creation of Attica under Theseus.[209] And after the expulsion of the tyrants in Athens, Kleisthenes naturalized foreigners and slaves in one blow by enrolling them in his tribes.[210] Athens and Syracuse were, therefore, variations on a theme. What sets Syracuse apart was how naturalization was an on-going process, at least until 387, and how it always came at after a military conquest. The Syracusan history of land allotment and human capital also helps reinforce our understanding of why the Athenians went to great lengths to keep their citizens at Athens: the Syracusans may have been accumulating and concentrating the kinds of human capital and market presence that the Athenians could count on, and did not

[208] For voluntary and involuntary relocations in the Greek world, see Moggi 1976; Demand 1990; Hansen and Nielsen 2004: 115-119.

[209] For the rape of the Sabine women, see Livy 1.9; Plut. *Rom.* 15. In a recent narrative synthesis of Roman history, Beard (2015: 67) argued unconvincingly that the rape of the Sabine women "reflected Roman political culture's extraordinary openness and willingness to incorporate outsiders… No ancient Greek city was remotely as incorporating as this." For Attica under Theseus, see Thuc. 2.16.1.

[210] Arist. *Pol.* 1275b36–37; [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 21.4.

want to lose, already in the middle of the fifth century. The Athenians and Syracusans were both privileging the metropolis at the expense of their imperial territoriality, and using imperial land as a mechanism for state building.

Because the Syracusans focused on their war against the Carthaginians after 383, and the political breakdown after Dionysios' death made way for an imperial breakdown, there is no way to tell whether the Syracusans were finished with their empire of allotment at the time of its death. On the one hand, Syracuse and its markets may have grown enough by the time of Dionysios' Kalabrian campaign that there was no more need for land allotments, at least within Syracusan territory. On the other hand, Syracusan militarism had always relied on confiscated land as a form of remuneration, and the Syracusans showed no signs of retiring from Mediterranean battlefields. After Kalabria, the Syracusans showed interest in Adriatic markets and they continued to push ever-further north up the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, past Campania all the way up to Etruria. When the Syracusans raided Pyrgi on the southern coast of Etruria in 383, just 55 km away the Romans were just setting out on their own transition from regional city-state to territorial empire. From then on, the Mediterranean's three empires of allotment shared a common history.

Chapter 5

THE ROMANS

The Syracusans sailed up the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy to Etruria in 384, emboldened by their recent gains in eastern Sicily and Kalabria. Just three years after handing over the land they confiscated in Italy to the Lokrians, the Syracusans set their sights on Pyrgi, the wealthy *emporion* of Etruscan Caere, known for its trade with the Carthaginians from Sardinia.[1] Less than 50 km to the east were the ruins of Veii, Rome's Etruscan neighbor. A decade had passed since the Romans destroyed the city: since then, the Romans gave citizenship to the surviving Veientines, divided up their territory, and finished allotting the land to Roman citizens by 387.[2] Later that same year, the Romans survived what would be the worst attack to their metropole until the final years of the Republic when an army of Gallic mercenaries ransacked the city of Rome.[3] When the Syracusans raided Pyrgi and took off with 1,500 talents of silver, those same Gauls are said to have fought alongside them as mercenaries.[4] By 384, the paths of Syracusan and Roman militarism took both states to war against the Etruscans, a course that might have ended with a clash between the two empires—the Syracusans, arriving in central Italy at the

[1] For the Syracusan campaign to Pyrgi, see Diod. 15.14.3; Strabo 5.2.8. For trade at Pyrgi with the Carthaginians, see the Pyrgi Tablets, with Pilkington 2013: 197-201; Michetti 2016. On the west coast of Sardinia, Tharros was likely the closest Carthaginian colony to Etruria.

[2] For the conquest of Veii, see Livy, 5.30.7; Diod. 14.102.4. For the grant of citizenship to the surviving Veientines, see Livy 6.4.4. For the allotment of the *ager Veientanus* to Roman citizens and the creation of four new Roman citizen tribes, see Livy 6.5.8; Diod. 14.16.

[3] The "Varronian" tradition dates the sack of Rome to 390, but Polybius dated it to 387, the same year as the Peace of Antalkidas in the eastern Mediterranean and the siege of Rhegion by Dionysios, see Polybius 1.6.1, with Beloch 1926: 140; Walbank 1957: 46-47, 185-186. For fourth-century Greek authors writing about the sack of Rome, see Theopompus *FGrHist* 115 F.317; Plut. *Cam.* 22.2-3, citing Heraclides Ponticus and Aristotle.

[4] For the Gallic mercenaries and the Syracusans, see Justin 20.5.1-6; Strabo 5.2.3; Diod. 14.117.7, with Sordi 1960: 62-72; Cornell 1995: 316. However, it is impossible to tell from the sources whether or not the Syracusans had a hand in the sack of Rome, as Sordi suggests.

heels of a century of violence and relocations; the Romans, a fledgling state still experimenting with imperial land allotment at Veii. But with Rome already stripped of its moveable property, the Syracusans chose to leave Italy behind for bigger prizes on Corsica.

Their city pillaged, the Romans quickly turned to the offensive to secure their territory, with campaigns against the neighboring Etruscans, Aequi, and Volsci. Afterwards, the Romans founded colonies on allotted land at Satricum and Setia in Volscian territory and then Sutrium and Nepet in southern Etruria, all before the end of 383.[5] The Romans also extended a form of dual citizenship, an *hospitium publicum* (or "public hospitality"), to the citizens of Caere—an agreement between two states still reeling from the raids of the prior decade.[6] The agreement with Caere anticipated the grants of *civitas sine suffragio* (or "citizenship without the vote") to defeated communities in the later fourth century: on the one hand, citizens of Rome and Caere enjoyed all the private and commercial rights of the other state; on the other hand, they were free of its obligations, military participation in particular, for the time being. Together, land allotment, colonization, and an increasing citizen community became the telltales of Roman imperialism in the mid-Republic. Looking back on the period, Cicero celebrated Roman colonization: "it is worthwhile to recollect the diligence exhibited by our ancestors, who established colonies in such suitable places to guard against all suspicion of danger, that they appeared to be not so much towns of Italy as *propugnacula imperii*"—projections of imperial power.[7] Like the Athenians in 478 and the Syracusans in 413, the Romans recovered from the shock of 387 and went on to confiscate

[5] Harris 1971: 43-44. For Satricum, see Liv. 6.16.7. For Setia, see Vell. 1.14. For Sutrium, see Diod. 14.98.5. For Nepet, see Liv. 6.21.4.

[6] Livy 5.50.3; Gellius 16.13.7; Strabo 5.2.3. It is possible, as some historians have argued, that the agreement between Rome and Caere was an early, if not the first, instance of *civitas sine suffragio,* see Sordi 1960: 36-49; Harris 1971: 45-47; Eckstein 2006: 251-252. However, the two states probably just agreed to extend some of the rights of citizenship, see Humbert 1978: 29-32; Cornell 1995: 320-321.

[7] Cic. *De Agr.* 2.73. See also Appian *B. Civ.* 1.1.7.

their neighbors' land. But unlike their Greek predecessors, the Romans achieved a form of durable imperial stability that lasted, in one way or another, for a thousand years. To Cicero and his contemporaries, the peculiar Roman mixture of land allotment, colonialism, and citizenship was part and parcel of the Romans' "success."[8]

And for good reason. From the beginning of the Republic, the three institutions formed the engine of Roman imperialism. Within a decade of the republican coup of 509, the Romans began to transform the Italian countryside as new landowners from Rome settled near or among defeated communities. At first, the Romans of the early Republic allotted land near the borders of Roman territory, often in collaboration with their Latin neighbors, in an effort to reinforce their place in the porous flatlands of western Latium.[9] Later, between the 390s and the outbreak of the First Punic War in 264, the Romans allotted land to form new colonies on at least twenty-seven occasions, though mostly after the defeat of the Latin League in 338 (see Table 5.1, with Maps 5.1-5). What emerged was a multi-layered system of citizenship and imperial territory: there were four small "Roman" colonies that were little more than garrisons where the residents had full Roman citizenship; the remaining twenty-three had varying levels of partial, or "Latin," citizenship, which also required military participation.[10] In other cases, the Romans extended Roman territory by allotting land (the so-called "viritane allotments") without forming a new colony, as at Veii: in these places, the rural communities were still politically administered by the

[8] Harris recently argued that the same three conditions were the basis of Roman power in the mid-Republic, see Harris 2016: 23-33.

[9] For the early Roman colonies, see Cornell 1995: 301-304. For the Pontine region to the south of Rome, for example, see De Haas 2011. This may have been a similar process to what we saw with the Peisistratid consolidation of Attica and Syracusan intensification under the *gamoroi.*

[10] The Romans did not, in fact, make a strong distinction between the two forms of colonies. Rather, the distinction is a product of modern scholarship, see Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 15. For the distinction between "Roman" and "Latin colonies," see Broadhead 2007.

urban center of Rome. Wherever the Romans did not establish a colony, or the land did not become privatized through viritane allotment, the land was open for public use—the *ager Publicus.* During the period between the conquest of Veii and the First Punic War, Roman land allotment transformed central Italy as tens of thousands of Romans moved away from Rome.

Table 5.1. ***Dates and locations of Roman land allotments in the historical sources***

Date	**Location**	**Type**	**Main Sources**
495	Velitrae, Signia	Colony	Livy 2.31.4; Dion. Hal. 7.13-14
492	Norba	Colony	Livy 2.34.6; Dion. Hal. 7.13.5
467	Antium	Colony	Livy 3.1; Dion. Hal. 9.59.1-2
442	Ardea	Colony	Livy 4.9-11
418	Labici	Colony	Livy 4.47
393-387	Ager Veientanus	Viritane	Livy 5.30, 6.4; Diod. 14.102.4
395	Vitellia	Colony	Livy 5.29.3
393	Circeii	Colony	Diod. 14.102.4
385	Satricum	Colony	Livy 6.15.12-13
380s	Sutrium, Setia, Nepet	Colony	Livy 6.21.5; Vell. 1.14.2
383	Ager Pomptinus	Viritane	Livy 6.21.4
338	Ager Latina, Ager Falernus	Viritane	Livy 8.11.13-15
334	Cales	Latin Colony	Livy 8.16.13-14
329	Tarracina	Roman Colony	Livy 8.21.10-11
328	Fregellae	Latin Colony	Livy 8.22.2
314	Luceria	Latin Colony	Livy 9.26.1–5; Diod. 19.72.8
313	Saticula, Suessa Aurunca, Pontiae	Latin Colony	Livy 9.28.7-8
312	Interamna Lirenas	Latin Colony	Livy 9.28.8; Diod. 19.105.5

303	Sora, Alba Fucens	Latin Colony	Livy 10.1.1-2
299	Narnia	Latin Colony	Livy 10.10.1–5
298	Carseoli	Latin Colony	Vell. 1.14
295	Minturnae, Sinuessa	Roman Colony	Livy. 10.21.7-10; Diod. 19.101.3
291	Venusia	Latin Colony	Vell. 1.14.6
289	Hadria	Latin Colony	Liv. *Per*. 11.7
289	Sena Gallica	Roman Colony	Poly. 2.19.12, 2.21.7-8
273	Cosa, Paestum	Latin Colony	Livy *Per.* 14.8; Vell. 1.14.7
268	Ariminum, Beneventum	Latin Colony	Livy *Per*. 15.5; Vell. 1.14.7
264	Firmum	Latin Colony	Vell. 1.14.8
263	Aesernia	Latin Colony	Vell. 1.14.9

Even as far back as the fifth century, allotment was central to Roman political culture: besides dividing up land, allotment also set voting procedures, assigned magistrates' responsibilities, and decided military commands. But since the Romans used popular election instead of sortition to fill public offices, far more Romans received land allotments than ever held public office in the mid-Republic. It was in the allotment of land, then, that the Romans most resembled the Athenians and Syracusans. Though even there, land allotment drew far more Romans away from their metropole than the total number of Athenians and Syracusans who moved away from Athens and Syracuse combined. Because the Romans went on to form an empire that spanned the Mediterranean, historians tend to focus less on how land allotment emerged as an institution during a period of political and economic crisis than how, by Cicero's time, the movement of Roman settlers had become the hallmark of Roman state power. In doing so, they take imperial success as their object of inquiry, explaining how the Romans used land

allotment to become so powerful.[11] The lure of success is itself ancient: Polybius, for one, began his history with the simple question of how did "the Romans subjugate the whole inhabited world to one rule, a thing never done before, in less than fifty years?"[12] Historians have long given credit to land allotment for Rome's ultimate success in Italy: what we find in nearly every history of the mid-Republic is that it lifted the poor from poverty to fight in the legions, it carried Romans out into their empire to project the unruly frontier, and it created communities to integrate the defeated. In other words, land allotment was an instrument of imperial control.

To be fair, the orderly division of the Italian countryside was one of the most iconic symbols of Roman imperialism when Cicero and Polybius were writing. Besides, the checker-board landscapes and elaborate foundation rituals described by surveyors centuries after the mid-Republic give the impression that a centralized strategy land allotment "remained basically unchanged for centuries," as Edward Togo Salmon imagined.[13] For that reason, historians have been tempted to use evidence for land allotment from the later Imperial period to fill out earlier periods—evidence that only reinforces the idea that the Romans were uniquely prepared to create a Mediterranean empire. In recent years, however, archaeologists have begun to chip away at the traditional view: we are beginning to see all sorts of local variations to colonial landscapes and continuity with defeated communities, both of which only seem to challenge the idea that there was ever a single model of Roman colonization in the mid-Republic.[14] But those advances have

[11] For the most influential studies in this vein, see Salmon 1969; Sherwin White 1973; Hopkins 1978; Humbert 1978; Harris 1979; Mouritsen 1998; Scheidel 2004; Eckstein 2009, with Section 5.2. For recent textbook examples, see Potter 2014: 60-82; Beard 2015: 131-168. Recent interest in processes of social integration only reinforces a triumphalist reading, see Jehne and Pfeilschifter 2006; Roselaar 2012.

[12] Polybius 1.1.5, with Walbank 1957: 40. For a recent iteration of this same framework, see Lomas 2018: vii.

[13] Salmon 1969: 10. For land divisions, see Dilke 1971; Chouquer *et al.* 1987; Gargola 1995; Campbell 2000; Chouquer and Favory 2001.

[14] For example, see Terrenato 2001; Bispham 2006; Pelgrom 2008; De Haas 2011; Robinson 2013; Pelgrom and Stek 2014; Bellini *et al.* 2014.

left Roman historians with a new historical problem: it is hard to explain why citizens were moving out into their imperial territory at a rate unseen among the Athenians and Syracusans and yet why they may also have been fairly independent of the Roman state.

In this chapter, I show how Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic can be understood only if we stop trying to explain how it contributed to imperial success in the long run. This is because, I argue, the Romans who hoped to receive land allotments saw imperial territory as an escape from the elite economy at Rome, so their movement away from Rome decentralized Roman power in the short term. Whereas the Roman warlords who led Rome's armies hoped that confiscating land might add to their political prestige and project Roman power, most Romans moved away from Rome to their allotments to take advantage of the economic opportunity, not necessarily for the good of the empire. By the mid-Republic, Rome's competitive political elite of old patrician families and upwardly-mobile plebeians distinguished themselves above all by their achievements in war and, by extension, the land they confiscated. For them, land allotment won them *nobilitas* (or "heroic renown") among their peers back at Rome, and thus the prestige to win higher office. But the Roman citizens who actually received land allotments were mostly craftsmen, merchants, and laborers, and when they moved out across Italy they took their skilled labor to existing communities outside of Roman territory. As more Romans took advantage of existing networks of exchange and economic structures, land allotment actually became a vehicle for economic diffusion and regionalism.

Therefore, what really set Roman land allotment apart from the Athenian and Syracusan approaches was that it transferred so much of Rome's human capital away from the center. As we will see, land allotment did more to decentralize Roman territory than concentrate human capital

back at the metropole, as we might expect from the Athenian and Syracusan cases. Rather, the dispersal of human capital into rural areas reoriented existing regional networks of exchange around Roman business centers spread around central Italy. Though Rome certainly grew as an imperial center, it was not the only center of Roman exchange. Because Roman settlers shared a kind of commercial citizenship with other communities, they could took advantage of existing economic networks to specialize and produce for regional markets as well as the Roman market. Gradually, as Rome's elite competed to confiscate more land, land allotment created a new form of intensive imperialism because Roman human capital became entrenched all across Italy.

Map 5.1. Central Italy, with the four case studies discussed in Sections 5.5-6



Above: Map 5.2. Latium. *Below:* Map 5.3. The Tyrrhenian coast of central Italy.





Above: Map 5.4. Campania and Northern Lucania. *Below:* Map 5.5. Southern Etruria.

In what follows, I have divided the story of Roman land allotment into six sections. After deconstructing the sources and historiography of Roman land allotment in section one, section two surveys the prehistory to Roman land allotment to understand why so many among the Roman elite were willing to give away land away from Rome. Based on the slow pace of agrarian reform and social enfranchisement at Rome, section three then shows how the recipients of land allotments came to see imperial territory as an escape from the elite economy at Rome. To explain the movement of Roman citizens away from Rome, section four shows how Roman human capital reoriented existing networks of exchange as landowners worked to take advantage of already developing central Italian economy. Two final sections look to recent archaeological evidence from the Liri Valley and then Cosa and Paestum to test how land allotment created regional economic centers.

5.1. *Sources & Historiography*

To the Romans, sortition was as old as republicanism. From the beginning of the Republic, the Roman brand of republicanism was highly aristocratic, but the elite offices of the consuls, praetors, and military tribunes held authority because sortition decided all matters of voting procedure and military command.[15] Even in the fifth century, the *sortes* was a religious auspice, an ideological guide that subordinated the personal ambitions of patrician families to the broader political community.[16] It tempered elite competition and relaxed political coalitions: as a non-personal procedure after election, it put magistrates on an equal footing and settled

[15] For sortition and public office in the early republic, see Stewart 1998. For the mid-Republic, see also Taylor 1966; Rosenstein 1995.

[16] Stewart 1998: 1. She argued that the Romans saw the lot as the consent, or permission, from Iuppiter Optimus Maximus for public action.

contests through procedure, not politics.[17] But outside the governing elite, sortition was also at the center of social conflict in the early Republic, what historians often call the "Struggle of the Orders." Because much of Roman territory in the fifth century was public land, and tradition holds that Rome's patrician landowners held much of it, the plebeians regularly pushed the state to the brink of collapse to get shares of public land for private use. The literary sources record twenty-five occasions between 486 and 367 when the plebeians wagered their military service and political consensus for allotments of land.[18] As we will see, time and time again sortition made and unmade the Roman state during the mid-Republic: one the one hand, far more Romans received land allotments than ever held public office at Rome; on the other hand, the Romans who put their names in to get a land allotment hoped to move away from the Roman community and escape the elite economy at Rome.

But because the Roman state ultimately survived its republican growing pains, the ancient historical sources construct a continuous narrative of successful transitions: aristocratic republicanism to broad political enfranchisement; Italian crisis to imperial power. Reading them we get the sense that, once the Romans managed to get their political affairs in order at Rome in the mid-fourth century, they burst outward into central Italy as a robust imperial power, using land allotment to great effect along the way. The two main historical sources for Roman land allotment in the early and mid-Republic are Livy and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, both Augustan historians writing at the end of the first century BCE, some three centuries removed from the subject. Livy (*c.* 64 BCE–9 CE) wrote a continuous narrative history of Rome from Romulus to

[17] Rosenstein 1995: 45-48. For elite competition and political coalitions in the early and mid-Republic, see Terrenato 2014.

[18] Cornell 1995: 270-271, with refs. to Flach 1994. He argued that some details in the literary tradition may have been unhistorical, but it is unlikely that the entire tradition was an invention, as some historians have argued, see Niese 1888; Beloch 1926: 344; Olgivie 1965: 340.

Augustus, telling a highly glorified story of Rome's rise to empire from humble beginnings. Only a fourth of the entire work survives, but the first ten books are extant and take the narrative down to 293. Though Livy often relied on moralizing anecdotes and speeches to advance his narrative, and his purpose was more didactic than reconstructive, he gives us a chronological structure for the study of individual cases of land allotment. Livy's main source for land allotments in the mid-Republic was the *Annales Maximi,* the state archives recorded each year by the Pontifex Maximus since the fifth century.[19] Drawing on the annalistic records, Livy often made note of the location, context, and number of Romans who received land. For example, Livy wrote that "a senatorial decree was passed [in 396] that seven *iugera* of Veientine land be apportioned to every plebeian."[20] From statements like this, Livy's history helps modern historians know where to look for land allotments and who received them.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus (60-*c.* 7 BCE) also wrote a narrative account of Rome's early history, though an unbroken narrative is only extant up to 443. Livy and Dionysius agreed on most details, in large part because they relied on the same sources. As a prequel to Polybius' history, Dionysius' narrative focused on the virtuous behavior that, over time, allowed the Romans to conquer an empire.[21] In speech after fictional speech, Dionysius emphasized how the Romans resolved social conflict through public deliberation, not civil war as the Greeks so often did. Because, in his view, the Roman character and the problems it overcame were timeless, he often narrated past events with anachronistic details. For example, his account of the Struggle of

[19] The *Annales maximi* were the official state archives of magistrates, military campaigns, notable events, and colonies, recorded annually by the Pontifex Maximus, see Cic. *De. Orat.* 2.52. For the *Annales* and their reliability as a source for Livy, see Cornell 1995: 13-18.

[20] Livy 5.30.8.

[21] Dion. Hal. 1.5.2-3. In this sense, he also echoes the proem to Polybius' history in which the historian tries to explain Roman success.

the Orders clearly mimicked the accounts of the Gracchi, as in the description of Sp. Cassius' attempts to redistribute the *ager publicus* in 496: the anachronism emerges when we are told that the plebeians and "Latin allies" were the ones who received allotments, at a time when the Romans had no allies but Latins.[22] Like Livy, Dionysius helps us fill out the chronological structure of, but not the intentions behind, land allotments.

Where Livy and Dionysius both saw a continuous history of political enfranchisement through land allotment, other authors like Cicero, Appian, and Gellius saw a success story of citizen-garrisons. Like Livy and Dionysius, Cicero (106-43 BCE) constructed a romanticized past to serve the present: he argued in his *De lege agraria* that the Romans of the mid-Republic allotted land to create *propugnacula imperii*—and he could claim that it was a successful program precisely because Roman dominance in Italy was unquestioned in 63 BCE.[23] In what amounted to a thinly veiled critique of Caesar's populism, Cicero's critique of the agrarian law required a very particular imperial logic: if land allotment back in the good old days was meant to create colonies in service of the empire, but the recipients of the land nowadays could very well be more loyal to men like Caesar than the Republic, then the privatization of public lands would actually endanger Rome—land allotment would hand over strategic positions to military commanders, who could then march on Rome. In effect, Cicero reinforced the idea that land allotment in the mid-Republic was deliberate and served a very specific purpose in service of the state.

Two centuries further removed from the subject, Appian and Gellius gave similar accounts of Roman centralization. In his account of the Roman civil wars, Appian (95-165 CE)

[22] Dion. Hal. 8.71-76, with Gabba 1954; 1991: 152-189; Capanelli 1981; Pelling 2007: 252-257; Roselaar 2010: 27. Cornell (1995: 271, n. 112) argued that "Latin allies" was used in the Gracchan period, but anachronistic for 486 when the Romans had no allies but Latins.

[23] See above, n. 7, with Jonkers 1963; Vasaly 1988.

showed the benefits of monarchy by stressing the risks of divided power. To get to the root of the problem, he pointed to the decline of the citizen-farmer in the late Republic, a trend he saw to be the unintended consequence of an otherwise noble program of land allotment. Early on, he argued, "The Romans, as they subdued the Italians successively in war, seized a part of their lands and built towns there, or enrolled *klērouchoi* of their own to occupy those already existing, and used them as garrisons."[24] Unlike the *latifundia* of the late Republic, mid-Republican land allotment created stability. For an author writing about Rome's civil wars, stability was all-important. A rough contemporary of Appian, Gellius (125-180 CE) included in his antiquarian work a passing note on the relationship of colonies to the Roman people: in his view, colonies were *quasi effigies parvae et simulacra* (or "small copies and likenesses") of the Roman people.[25] Though the short passage did not carry much weight for Gellius, it gave rise to the idea among modern historians that the physical landscape of Republican colonies emulated the city Rome. In doing so, Gellius added to the romanticized views of Livy and Dionysius that the recipients of land allotments moved out into Italy primarily to project Roman power.

A final source for Roman land allotment is the colorful, but highly technical writings of the *agromensores* (or "land-surveyors").[26] A collection of practical, mathematical, religious, and legal texts, compiled in the fifth century CE as the *Corpus agrimensorum,* preserves an unparalleled look into the world of land allotment: for example, the nuts and bolts of surveying; setting the field boundaries; the procession of the new landowners in military formation under

[24] App. *B. Civ.* 1.1.7, with Hopkins 1978: 1-8. Appian wrote in the first sentence of the work that there were frequent disputes about land allotments in the early Republic, but conflict always ended in restraint and mutual concessions, unlike the breakdown in the late Republic.
[25] Gell. *NA* 16.13.9, with Bispham 2000: 157-58; 2006: 78-85; Sewell 2014. For the interpretation of archaeological evidence with Gellius' formula as a model for centralization and diffusion, see esp. Salmon 1969: 18; Brown 1980: 12; Coarelli 1998: 75; 2005: 24-38.
[26] Dilke 1971; Gargola 1995; Campbell 2000; Chouquer and Favory 2001. For the surveyors, see Moatti 1993; Chouquer 2010.

a banner; marking out the town walls; the division of the land by lot. All this gives the impression that the Roman countryside was a checkerboard of orderly allotments—that once the Romans conquered the locals, they also conquered the landscape. Though some of the authors, like Frontinus (40-103 CE), were writing at the time of the Flavians, many of the texts date from much later. Because there are no historical sources to check whether or not the details of the *Corpus agromensorum* hold for Cicero's lifetime, much less the early or mid-Republic, the collection is a tantalizing, but nevertheless highly problematic source for earlier periods: it remains unclear from the historical sources to what extent the Romans had a centralized, orderly system of land allotment in the mid-Republic.

Altogether, the ancient literary sources for Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic share a common theme: the Romans expanded into Italy with a deliberate plan that put the recipients of land allotment to work in service of a centralized Roman state. But the authors of those sources lived in a very different world, a time far removed from the debates of the mid-Republic. This is not to say that they were necessarily misinformed or they knowingly misrepresented the past. Rather, the role of land allotment had changed dramatically by the late Republic and the Imperial period, and the authors may have given meaning—and, indeed, coherence—to the imperial past so they could think with it alongside their present circumstances. Whereas the Livy and Dionysius' narratives help us reconstruct the chronology and geographic distribution of mid-Republican land allotments, the passing analyses of Cicero, Appian, and Gellius are less helpful: they are reductive caricatures that tell us more about the author's time than the mid-Republic. But because Livy and Dionysius left their readers without much analysis of what land allotment meant in Roman society beyond, perhaps, the intentions

of the Roman elite, it is understandable that modern historians have turned to Cicero, Appian, Gellius, and the *agromensores* to fill in the gaps. Consequently, historians have tended to ask the same questions about land allotment that were popular among the ancient sources. For that reason, as we will see, the study of Roman land allotment remains tethered to an ancient tradition of Roman success.

Drawing on the close connection between republican sortition and the success of the Roman empire, modern historians have traditionally taken a top-down, statist perspective to the study of Roman land allotment. With three distinct historiographical approaches, this perspective sees land allotment, and the colonies on allotted land, as deliberate instruments of the imperial center. First, in the most influential study of Roman colonization of the twentieth century, Edward Togo Salmon argued that the Romans allotted land at strategic points in Italy so that people loyal to Rome would occupy the site, and then defend the area on behalf of Rome—much like Cicero's view.[27] Drawing on the Allied advance up western Italy during the Second World War, he argued that the Romans surely would have recognized strategic sites for their defensive positions, as the Allies had. Excavations at Cosa and Alba Fucens and aerial photography of centuriation after the war in the 1940s and 1950s reinforced Salmon's view that Rome had a heavy hand in all colonial affairs: the apparent regularity of colonial city planning and the evenly divided rural landscapes fit nicely with the ancient traditions of Gellius and the *agromensores*. Consequently, he assumed that evidence from the high Imperial period could be exported back in time to explain mid-

[27] Salmon 1969. For a recent discussion of Salmon's study, its historiographical tradition, and its impact, see Pelgrom and Stek: 2014b. Pelgrom and Stek showed the how the historiographical tradition of Roman defensive colonization went as far back to Machiavelli's *Discorsi* (1531). For Salmon, strategic points included enemy frontiers, points of advance, roads, river crossings, mountain passes, and sea ports, see Salmon 1967: 212; 1969: 57. For the influence of the Second World War on his interpretation, see Salmon 1956: 99 n. 2.

Republican land allotment.[28] In his excavation reports from Cosa, Frank Brown only added to Salmon's centralized view of land allotment by emphasizing the physical similarities between Cosa and Rome: their public spaces, temples, and so on.[29] In effect, Salmon argued that the Roman elite used land allotment to defend their empire. This model of a "garrison-replica" remains the standard explanation for Roman land allotment.

Whereas Salmon tried to minimize socio-economic and cultural causes in favor of military strategy, a second group of historians has tried to tie land allotment to the Struggle of the Orders. Writing in the aftermath of Italian national unification, Italian scholars like Ettore De Ruggiero, Ettore Pais, and Plinio Fraccaro admired how land allotment allowed the Romans to maintain a very delicate socio-economic and demographic equilibrium.[30] These historians were building off of a centuries-old tradition dating back to Machiavelli and Sigonius which held that land allotment relieved Rome from demographic overload, thereby limiting the risks of civil strife; the land allotments then lifted the urban poor from poverty, making them financially eligible to fight in Rome's wars; in doing so, land allotment promoted the virtues of an idealized citizen-farmer-soldier and a sense of unity and commitment to the Roman state.[31]

More recently, Tim Cornell in a meticulous study of early Rome retold the story that land allotments were the Romans' solution for social conflict.[32] Though the socio-economic perspective usefully fuses what the historical sources say about land allotment to the well-

[28] Salmon 1969: 20.

[29] Brown 1951; 1980: esp. 1-18; Brown *et al.* 1960; 1993. For Cosa and its countryside as a "typical Latin colony," see Salmon 1969: 29-39. For colonies' "mimetic" relationship to Rome, see Libsius, *Admiranda, sive, de magnitude Romana* (1598); Beloch 1880: 154; Mommsen (1912).

[30] De Ruggiero 1896; Pais 1923; 1924; 1928; Fraccaro 1939; 1940; 1956, with historiographical comments in Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 26-30.

[31] For the socio-economic perspective, see Macchiavelli, *Discorsi* (1531); Sigonius, *De antique jure Italiae* (1560). For land allotment creating peasant-soldier communities with civic virtues, see also Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur et de leur decadence* (1734).

[32] Cornell 1995: 268-270; 301-304. For the importance of socio-economic and demographic causes, see also Crawford 1971 and Oakley 2002.

trodden tradition of patrician-plebeian conflict in early Rome, it focuses only on how the Roman elite intended to deal with their internal problems through imperialism—an imperial logic that, in turn, relied on more land allotments to produce even more soldiers. In effect, Cornell and his predecessors began to question how the recipients of land allotments may have benefited from moving away from Rome, but relied on the same narrative of elite agency that animated Salmon's model.

Meanwhile, a third group has emphasized the cultural impact of Roman land allotment. In this approach, land allotment carried Romans out into their empire to integrate their new subjects. The cultural approach shares a lot in common with what we saw with the first approach: while Salmon stressed defense through militarism, the cultural approach draws from ideas about "Romanization" and shows how the Romans placated their enemies, little by little, by creating new communities on allotted land with the people they defeated. Whereas earlier historians like James Reid and Frank Abbott emphasized the civilizing effects of land allotment on non-Roman communities, more recently Mario Torelli argued that the Romans sent new landowners to live alongside the local elites at Paestum, thus "Romanizing" them.[33] Like the socio-economic approach, the cultural approach foregrounds the strategic effects of acculturation: together with the Roman recipients of land allotments, the defeated people would also be more willing to fight for Rome. Though land allotment certainly played a role in the creation of a Roman Italy, the cultural approach still assumes, or at least implies, that the Romans moving away from Rome intended to unify Italy even in the early years of the

[33] Reid 1913; Abbott 1915; Torelli 1999: esp. 3. For the link between land allotments and military service, see Rosenstein 2004: esp. 61; 2006; 2012; Eich and Eich 2005; Scheidel 2006; Jehne 2006.

Republic. In other words, it takes the end product—a culturally unified Italy—and explains how it got that way, with all the benefits of hindsight.

As helpful as the three approaches to Roman land allotment are for historians, each cannot answer why, for example, the Romans did not compartmentalize their imperial territory like the Athenians or externalize it like the Syracusans. In the end, the top-down approaches assume that the Romans did what they did because they were just better imperialists. But it remains unclear whether or not there was anything uniquely Roman about Roman land allotment. More than that, all three approaches tend to start from the assumption that Roman imperialism was a net positive: after all, Salmon likened the Romans to the Allies in the Second World War. Before him, Roman historiography in Western Europe from Montesquieu to Mommsen was steeped in the idea that empire is fundamentally a civilizing mission: it was all too common for historians to focus on success because their own societies were so deeply embedded in Roman political culture.

To begin deconstructing the traditional approaches to land allotment, in the last decade or so historians have returned to the basic question of what it meant in the mid-Republic for Romans to own land. Dominic Rathbone deconstructed the continuum between private ownership of allotments and the *ager publicus* in Italy to argue that private property was the first legal category of land tenure at Rome, probably beginning as early as the sixth century BCE.[34] Unlike the more communal, state-owned public land, land allotments transferred all ownership of the land to the landowner himself. In his view, Roman imperialism tended towards "privatization" because most public lands ended up being allotted at some point. Since Rathbone, Saskia Roselaar has shown

[34] Rathbone 2003. For the early Republic, Rathbone emphasizes the Twelve Tables for evidence of individual property, see Section 5.2.

that public land was not just a temporary legal category between conquest and allotment: rather, conquered people often continued to use their own land, though it was technically Roman public land—a reminder of their economic dependence on Rome.[35] Still, Rathbone's line of inquiry leads to another set of questions: why were the Roman elite, unlike the Athenians, willing to transfer full ownership of allotted land from the state to the individual and then not demand a tax; and why did the Roman elite, unlike the Syracusans, allow those individuals to move away from Rome? For historians who assume a story of success, the answer is clear enough: the Roman elite made a calculated decision to give away land to individuals so that they could then defend Rome, in one way or another.

In recent years, archaeologists have begun to question the role of the Roman state during the mid-Republic. Drawing on postcolonial theories of resistance, appropriation, hybridization, and identity, Nic Terrenato, Guy Bradley, and Edward Bispham, have chipped away at the statist model of Roman colonization by showing, on the one hand, high levels of local variation among Roman colonial landscapes and, on the other hand, high levels of local continuity from pre-to post-conquest.[36] Jeremia Pelgrom, Tymon De Haas, and the Cambridge *Roman Colonial Landscapes* project, among others, have continued to "go local" as a way to show the great variety of urban and rural imperial landscapes in the mid-Republic.[37] What has emerged is a sense that Roman land allotment and colonization was far from a one-sided, top-down imperial project. Instead, in their view, Roman landowners had to collectively "negotiate" new

[35] Roselaar 2010: 37.

[36] Terrenato 2001b; 2005; 2014; Bradley 2006; Bispham 2000; 2006. See also, more broadly, Bradley and Wilson 2006; Patterson 2006a; Termeer 2010. For a recent example of a local-level study of a single colonial landscape to the same effect, see Robinson 2012; 2013. For the importance of postcolonial theory to recent deconstructions of the instrumentalist approaches, see Pelgrom and Stek 2014b: 11.

[37] Pelgrom 2008; 2014; Pelgrom and Stek 2014; De Haas 2011; Bellini *et al.* 2012; 2013; 2014. See also Stek 2009; Stek G.-J. Burgers 2015.

relationships with local communities, resulting in something altogether distinct from Rome itself. Though this approach certainly does not mean to deny the violence and asymmetries of power inherent to Roman imperialism, its revisionist perspective tends minimize the very real exploitative intentions behind land allotment and the arrival of settlers in favor of the continuities with defeated communities.

Even though the recent push to decenter Roman imperialism has carefully deconstructed the *dirigiste* model of Roman colonization, there has been little interest in building a new understanding of land allotment. By decentering the agency of the Roman state to good effect, we have nearly lost Roman agency altogether. Consequently, there is no alternative to the instrumentalist explanations of success. Instead, historians are left with a set of contradictions: the Roman elite had a plan even in the mid-Republic for how to defend its empire, but that plan seems to have had little continuity from one place to another; the Romans strategically conquered the Italian countryside, but rural settlements had more in common with what was there before the Roman conquest than Rome itself; the Romans sent out thousands of new landowners to defend their empire at new colonies in the fourth century, but at a time when the Roman state was in political and economic crisis; Roman land allotment in the early Republic followed the same rules and rituals as the Augustan period, but there is no evidence for centuriation before the First Punic War. The list goes on. Historians are left without a clear understanding of how land allotment fits into Roman imperialism.

This chapter moves beyond explanations of success and reconsiders why so many Romans wanted to move away from Rome to their land allotments before there was ever an abstraction like "The Roman Empire." In the mid-Republic, Rome's political elite won prestige

at home for projecting Roman power outside of Rome, but that does not mean that the Romans who actually moved out to their land allotments had the same thing in mind. Rather, I argue that land allotment began as compromise between Rome's generals, who had a lot to gain in political prestige at Rome from the act of confiscating land, and the plebeians, who hoped to make more money by moving away from Rome's elite economy. Those who received a land allotment saw it more as an economic opportunity because they could take advantage of existing economic structures outside of the narrow elite economy at Rome. Unlike the Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans who moved away from the metropole still had a form of commercial citizenship, which, I argue, put them at an advantage over existing communities by reducing transaction costs. Roman landowners could also rely on the agricultural staples already being produced by existing communities so they did not have to start over and create new networks of production and exchange. Altogether, Roman land allotment was different from Athenian and Syracusan land allotment because it was profitable for most landowners to move away from Rome and, perhaps more importantly, the Roman generals who were confiscating the land thought it was in their interest as well.

What we will see, therefore, is that in the century before the First Punic War, the Romans conquered much of central Italy, then allowed many of their own citizens to move out across it. With the movement of Romans away from Rome also came a massive transfer of human capital—quite the opposite of what we saw in the last chapter with the Syracusans. Unlike the Athenians and the Syracusans, the Romans almost always allotted land in places where members of the defeated communities continued to live, if not live nearby. Over time, this led to Roman human capital becoming entrenched all across Italy, as communities of Roman landowners reoriented

regional networks of exchange around themselves. As we will see, this was made possible because the Roman state had developed in such a way before the first land allotments that many Romans could, and wanted to, move away from Rome.

5.2. *The Archaic Origins of Roman Land Allotment*

Like Athens, Rome was an inland settlement: 24 km from the coast, the earliest settlement overlooked movement across the Tiber river at Tiber island, a natural crossroads for trade moving up and down the west coast of Italy. Like Syracuse, Rome grew up in a melting pot of sorts: one of the thirty or so Latin communities, Rome also came in contact with Etruscans to the north, Osco-Umbrians to the east, and Campanian Greeks further to the south. In the highly-competitive world of central Italy, Roman territory was probably no more than 800 km^2 at the end of the Archaic period—still smaller than Syrakousai and little more than a third the size of Attica at the time of each state's imperial transition.[38] For the Romans, this meant that access to land and economic opportunity within Roman territory remained limited to a narrow elite of patricians, who were likely Rome's early landowning families. Meanwhile, during the sixth and fifth centuries the patricians became increasingly wealthy from raiding Rome's neighbors, which relied on their ability to marshal soldiers not land. Over time, I argue, the patricians learned that land and labor outside of Roman territory were expendable but Roman soldiers were not. Plebeians, therefore, could move away from Rome to their land allotments so long as they would still mobilize to fight in the Roman army from time to time. As

[38] For the size of Roman territory, see Cornell 1995: 204-209, 320, with Beloch 1926: 314-320; Fulminante 2014: 105-170. Rome was fairly large by regional standards in Latium. Rome's neighbors at Tibur and Praeneste were roughly 350 and 250 km^2, respectively.

the Romans faced one crisis after another in the fifth century, Roman citizens became increasingly willing to move away from Rome across central Italy if it meant they could do better than they were doing within the elite economy at Rome.

The Romans, like the Syracusans, were slow to develop a strong sense of political community, which made it easier for them to bring in members of other communities without disrupting the idea of the state. The top of Roman society in the Archaic period was a loose coalition of landowning families (the *gentes*, or "clans"), who collectively granted military authority to a single king.[39] Because of Rome's precarious standing in central Italy, that coalition was famously open to political synoikism to fill out their ranks. In fact, the legendary rape of the Sabine women is likely a vestige of a much longer tradition: inscriptions from southern Etruria from the seventh and sixth centuries show how individuals and whole groups moved in and out of Roman society in a kind of elite horizontal mobility. For example, Demaratus of Corinth moved to Etruscan Tarquinia and his son later became the fifth king of Rome; consider also the Claudii, a powerful family numbering in the hundreds that migrated into Latium sometime around the end of the sixth century.[40] The practice set an important precedent for Roman relations with other states: by the fifth century, the Romans extended certain commercial rights to their Latin neighbors under the *foedus Cassianum* to facilitate mobility among the Latin elite.[41] Like the Delian League, the "Latin League," as it came to be known, began as a defensive alliance. But unlike the Athenians, the Romans extended reciprocal commercial rights to their allies: anyone could draw up legal contracts, own property, or exchange citizenship in allied

[39] Smith 2006; Terrenato 2007a; 2011; Armstrong 2016a: 50-72. For *gentes* and land, see Capogrossi Colognesi 1980; Hermon 2001: 53-56.

[40] Ampolo 1976-77: 341; Cornell 1995: 124-125, 157-158, 174-175; Smith 1996: 210, 237-238; 2006: 161; Bradley 2006: 165-166; Terrenato 2011.

[41] Cornell 2000; Smith 1995: 212-213. For the *foedus Cassianum* and the Latin League, see Cornell 1995: 293-301. See also Section 5.3.

states. Consequently, a tradition of Roman "open society" helped pave the way for political synoikism, but also the movement of people and their labor in and out Rome.[42]

Meanwhile, Roman warlords fought wars to increase the agricultural surface area available to their *gentes.* This affected Roman territory in two ways: it expanded Roman territory but also limited access to it. Later Roman kings like Servius Tullius (r. 575–535), took the Romans to war against neighboring Caere, Tarquinia, and Veii and confiscated some of their land for public use; the patrician Fabii then seem to have continued the war against the Veientines into the fifth century with the support of "all the members of their clan," staking their claim to some of the public land.[43] Wealth from agricultural rents, however, remained concentrated in the hands of the patrician landowners: the historical sources mention time and time again the use of *nexum* (or "debt-bondage," similar to what was saw in Athens' before Solon's reforms) for agricultural labor, a practice that continued well into the fifth century.[44] Because the *gentes* controlled access to public land, and the landowners at the top of those *gentes* were becoming rich from agricultural surpluses, patrician warlords continued to wage wars to gain access to more land rather than invest in non-agricultural production at Rome.[45] So what began as a small settlement of little more than 150 km^2 in the early Archaic period increased to 800 km^2 by the end of the sixth century.[46]

[42] For the term Roman "open society," and mobility among the elites of central Italy in the Archaic period, see Ampolo 1970-71; 1976-77.

[43] For Servius Tullius, see Livy 1.42.2; Dion. Hal. 4.27. For the Fabii and Veii, see Dion. Hal. 9.15; Livy 2.49, with Armstrong 2016a: 145-146.

[44] Though elite displays of wealth in the sixth century changed from "princely" tombs to public temples, the economic structure creating that wealth did not, see Smith 1996: 186-189. For debt-bondage, see Livy 2.23.8; 2.24.7; 2.25.3; 2.27.1; 2.31.8; 7.19.5; 8.28.2; Dion. Hal. 3.1.5; 4.9.8. *Nexum* featured prominently in the Twelve Tables, see e.g. Table 6.1. For intensification, see Armstrong 2016a: 148-157.

[45] For the *gentes* and Roman wars, see Capogrossi Colognesi 1994; Franciosi 1999; Motta and Terrenato 2006: 229-230; Terrenato 2011; Drogula 2015: 18-33; Armstrong 2016a: 86-93.

[46] Confiscating land from neighboring states was fairly common, see Livy 1.11; 1.15.5; 1.33.9; 1.38.1; 1.53.2; Dion. Hal. 3.6.1; 3.28.6; 4.27.6.

Still, of the roughly 25,000-35,000 Romans, few of them actually owned land and the patrician landowners were in no hurry to do anything about it.[47]

Together, Roman "open society" and patrician agriculturalism greatly limited access to land within Roman territory, but the transition to republicanism in the fifth century created some of the legal institutions that individual Romans later would use to own land outside of Rome. Though the republican coup of 509 formally transferred sovereignty to the Roman people, it did little to disrupt the patricians' monopoly on public land.[48] In fact, political and economic change came very slowly at Rome. The republican coup was in no way a watershed moment like Kleisthenes' reforms in Athens: only after a "proto-republican" period, to borrow Harriet Flower's periodization, in which the plebeians marched out of Rome in 494 (the first such popular walkout, or "secession"), won political representation through democratically elected tribunes, and then pressured the Roman elite for half a century, did they get written laws on land use and debt.[49] What emerged in *c.* 451/0 was the Twelve Tables, which mostly seems to have been an attempt to normalize individual property rights.[50] Under the new republic, political participation depended on a person's individual property (their "*census*"), and because land was the predominant form of property at the time, the Twelve Tables focused heavily on agricultural life—field boundaries, damage to property, exchange of produce, capital loans, and so on. Whereas roughly a third of the laws concerned land and individual property, there is no mention

[47] For urban and rural population estimates of Rome at the end of the Archaic period, see Ampolo 1980: 15-31; Cornell 1995: 206-207.

[48] For the elite monopoly of public land, and the long battle for access to the land, see for example Livy 2.61.1–4, 3.1.1–2, 3.30.1, 4.36.1–2, 4.48.2–4, 4.51.5–6, 4.58.12, 6.5.4–5; Dion Hal. 5.68.1, 6.95.3–4, 7.4.5, 8.69–8.75, 10.36.2, with Roselaar 2010: 26-28.

[49] Flower 2010: 48-49. For the transition, see Armstrong 2016a: 129-146. For debt, see Vanderpuy 2017. For secessions, see Bradley 2017.

[50] For the economic implications of the Twelve Tables and the emphasis on individual property, see Kaser 1956: 234; Kauffmann 1964: 51; Diósdi 1970; Capogrossi Colognesi 1980; 1988; Cornell 1995: 272-292; Smith 1996: 191-192; Rathbone 2003: 138-139; Roselaar 2010: 22.

of commercial transactions, non-agricultural production, or land belonging to the state or *gens*. The impression we get is that the Romans, perhaps moreso than the Athenians or Syracusans, privileged individual ownership over state and collective ownership.[51] The republican reforms did a great deal to secure individual property, but the patrician landowners did nothing to systematically divide up or share the land within Roman territory. Consequently, individual land ownership became an institution that the Romans would export to conquered land.

The push to secure individual property came at a time when what appear to have been a series of internal and external crises in the fifth century made many non-landowning plebeians more willing to leave Rome for land outside of Roman territory. Though it is hard to say anything about fifth-century Rome with any certainty, the patchwork of historical sources and material culture all seem to point to a period of crisis and experimentation.[52] For much of the fifth century, the magistrate lists (the "*Fasti*") show little regularity in political offices: one year the Romans might elect consuls and the next consular tribunes. The irregularity of public office holding may have resulted from elite competition in an aristocratic republic, or perhaps a reaction to a long sequence of military setbacks. Beginning shortly after the Romans allotted land at Velitrae, Signia, and Norba in the 490s, the Volsci, Aequi, and Sabines all regularly invaded Roman territory for much of the fifth century; the Romans even had land confiscated from them on a number of occasions.[53] What began as a military crisis soon became an economic

[51] Rathbone 2003. Cicero later argued that the main purpose of the Roman state was to defend property rights, see Cic. *Off.* 2.73, 2.78.

[52] For a recent reconstruction of fifth-century Roman history in broad terms, see Smith 2017.

[53] For the Volscians under Coriolanus confiscating land from the Romans, see Dion. Hal. 8.10.2. See also Dion Hal. 5.65.3; Livy 2.15.6. For Osco-Umbrian movements and other migrations throughout the Italian peninsula in the fifth century, see Pallottino 1991: 97-110. Some of the most famous characters in Livy's account of the early Republic were involved in the wars defending Rome from invading armies. For example, under Cinncinatus, the Romans fought off the Aequi. Consider also Coriolanus, who invaded Rome with the Volsci.

crisis: all historical and archaeological evidence for public building and temple dedications at Rome cease after the first quarter of the fifth century; agricultural output declined so much, it seems, that the Romans repeatedly sent out embassies to buy grain from Etruria and even Syracuse.[54] As the young republic navigated these crises, the plebeians walked out of Rome twice again in the fifth century, in 449 and 445. On each occasion the plebeians were showing the patrician landowners that they were willing to break from the Roman state.

Finally, as the Roman state struggled through the fifth century, Roman warlords and their *gentes* continued to raid neighboring communities but not confiscate much land for allotment. Since the beginning of the fifth century at least, Roman militarism was mostly just predatory raids on movable property, with little continuity from one year to the next.[55] It was probably in this sense that Livy said there was "neither stable peace nor open war" in the region.[56] In fact, certain families could dominate the military magistracies in any given year, and their *gens* stood in for what might be called the "Roman army."[57] This may have given the Romans room to experiment with what to do on the rare occasions they confiscated land during the fifth century. After Titus Quintius Capitolinus and his army confiscated land from the Volscians at Antium in 466, Dionysius said that the Antiates worked the land themselves and paid Roman lotholders a fixed sum from their produce.[58] Titus Quintius' experiment soon failed: a year later, another Roman general raided the town a second time after the lotholders allegedly joined the Antiates and the

[54] For the decline in public building, see Cornell 1995: 266. For poor agrarianism, see Garnsey 1988: 168-181; Morel 2007: 495-496. For grain imports from Syracuse, see Livy 2.34-35; Dion. Hal. 7.1-2, 7.12-15, 7.20, 8.70.5; Plut. *Cor.* 16. For grain from Etruria, see Livy 2.34.

[55] For warfare as "brigandage," see Cornell 1995: 309. For *gentes* and raiding, see Rawlings 1998; Armstrong 2016a: 98-102, 214-215, 218.

[56] Livy 2.21.1; 2.26.1.

[57] For the public office and the *gens*, see Stewart 1998: 72-73; Armstrong 2016a: 174-175. For military tribunes, see Pinsent 1975: 45-50.

[58] Dion Hal. 9.50.2; 9.60.1-3. Dionysius called the Roman landowners at Antium "*klērouchoi*." Apparently this arrangement did not work: Antium fought against the Romans for most of the fourth century until they were defeated in 338, see for example Livy 6.6-7; 8.12-14.

Volsci against Rome.[59] Afterwards, the Roman elite seem to have been more interested in raiding movable property than confiscating land for themselves further from Rome: it was not until 442 at Ardea and then 418 at Labici that the Roman elite in the Senate allotted land again. Even though the Romans seem to have been fighting all the time during the fifth century, they do not seem to have confiscated very much land. By the fourth century, as we will see, many Roman citizens were eager to get a land allotment and move away from Rome.

Unlike the Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans began their transition to empire in fits and starts over the course of the fifth century, only accelerating after the conquest of Veii. What we have seen from the Archaic origins of Roman land allotment is that Roman territory was dominated by an elite economy which left little room for the plebeians to own land, much less to compete with the patrician landowners. A political culture of horizontal mobility, commercial citizenship, and individual property rights gave the Roman plebeians every reason to want land allotments, even if it meant they would have to move away from Rome and fight in the elite's wars. Land allotment in early Roman history was thus a recognition that most Romans could not, in fact, share equally in Roman economic life, at least as the patricians at Rome knew it. As we will see, land allotment seems to have home increasingly common as the plebeians won more and more political concessions after the middle of fifth century and into the fourth and, by direct consequence, as political prestige became increasingly measured by military achievement than inherited patrician status.

But even with popular institutions on the rise at Rome, land allotment had a very different relationship with republicanism in Roman society than what we saw at Athens and

[59] Dion. Hal. 10.20-21.

Syracuse: land allotment did more to decentralize the Roman community than insulate it within a single territory. Roman citizens were wagering their participation for land allotments, though at the same time those allotments took them far away from Rome. In that sense, land allotment made and unmade the Roman state.

5.3. *Decentralizing Imperial Territory*

The generation of Romans who saw their city ransacked in 387 rebounded from the disaster with a series of land confiscations and political reforms. In less than a decade, the Romans founded at least four colonies, divided up the *ager Pomptinus* into viritane allotments, added four new rural tribes, and granted full citizenship to the community living at Tusculum—the first *municipium* (or "self-governing community of Roman citizens").[60] In 367, after another two decades at war, the Roman plebeians also won a political victory: the Licinio-Sextian Laws, as they are commonly referred to, eased debt payments, put limits on how much public land any one Roman could use, and required at least one consul, and thus one military commander, be plebeian.[61] The Roman plebeians hoped the laws would allow more of them to benefit from the territory they fought and died for; with a plebeian consul in office, they also hoped to have more say in when and where they fought. For almost four decades afterwards, we hear almost nothing of land allotment: it seems that the reforms may have satisfied some of the demand for confiscated land, at least for the time being.

[60] The four new rural tribes were Arnensis, Sabatina, Stellatina, and Tromentina. For citizenship at Tusculum, see Livy 6.26.8.

[61] For the Licinio-Sextian Laws, see Livy 6.35-42, with Cornell 1995: 332-340. The laws made it so any interest paid on a loan would be deducted from the principal, thereby relieving some of the debt. Over the next two decades, the Romans continued to pass more laws putting legal caps on interest rates, normalizing debt repayment procedures, and creating enforceable penalties for usurers.

Then, after the Romans defeated the Latin League in 338, and granted citizenship to various communities across central Italy, the Romans set out to confiscate land like never before: between 338 and the First Punic War, as many as one hundred thousand Romans received land allotments in what amounted to one of the most dramatic transformations of human geography in Greco-Roman history.[62] It was during this period, when the patricians and plebeians first began to share the republic, that a new elite political class of *nobiles* emerged, with patricians and wealthy plebeians numbering among them. Consequently, "the values of the new elite," as Harriet Flower explained, "were defined in terms of achievements in war and personal merit, rather than by inherited status."[63] As Roman political culture became increasingly centered on the *nobiles* competing for military prestige, the generals among them took the Romans to war nearly every single year during this period. Each confiscation helped the commanding general distinguish himself from his peers.

Yet beyond the elite world of *nobiles,* most plebeians seem to have chosen to move away from Rome instead of using their improved political standing to make Roman territory work more to their benefit. Even though the plebeians were now able to hold higher offices, most Romans still had little to do with the political process at Rome. Unlike the Athenians or the Syracusans after Diocles' democratic reforms, the Romans used popular election rather than sortition to fill public offices—hence the importance of prestige. For that reason, most plebeians who actually made it to high office were already well known and, by necessity, quite wealthy. The Romans used sortition only to determine things like the order in which voting groups cast

[62] For 338, see Livy 8.11-14, with Cornell 1995: 350, Map 7. For population estimates, see Afzelius 1942: 153-192, with Section 5.4 below.

[63] Flower 2010: 51-52. For the values of the *nobiles*, see also Harris 1979: 28-31.

their vote in the popular assemblies.[64] Taking lots also helped officials who held the same rank (or "collegial magistrates," like consuls and military tribunes) divide the responsibilities set out for them by the Senate.[65] For Roman officials, the politics of the lot was simple enough: it made sure that the elites at the top of republican society cooperated within the state's institutions when competition would otherwise have pitted them against one another.[66] It put limits on rivalries and settled political contests. But whereas political sortition mediated action within the Roman community, the Romans who put their name in for land allotment were choosing, in most cases, to actually move away from it.[67]

So unlike the Athenians and Syracusans who thought of their imperial territory as a way to concentrate economic activity at their metropole, the Roman elite allowed their fellow citizens to move out into their imperial territory at an unprecedented rate in Greco-Roman history. Because Rome's elite won prestige from confiscating land wherever they campaigned across central Italy, and their political careers were fixed to life at the Roman metropole, they seem to have been more than willing to give confiscated land far from Rome to plebeians. The *nobiles*, Rome's new warlords, had good reason to give away the land: they could count on the settlers to protect their new home and, by proxy, secure the general's victory for generations to come. For

[64] For political sortition in early Republican Rome, see Taylor 1966: 70-72; Staveley 1972: 154-156; 230-232; Nicolet 1980: 257-258; Rosenstein 1995; Stewart 1998: 22-38. For the logistics of magistrates drawing lots, see Plaut. *Cas.* 345-346, 388-390; *Tabula Hebana* 23.

[65] The magistrates placed small wooden tokens in a water pitcher; someone then tipped the pitcher and whoever's token poured out first got the responsibility. The Romans still used sortition to determine military commands in the mid-Republic, see Livy 7.25.12, 8.1.2.

[66] Because political sortition played such an important social roll among the Roman elite, historians have written Roman history as if that land allotment also sorted out the social conflict between the patricians and plebeians. The traditional story goes that the patricians allotted land to avoid social collapse and the plebeians were more than happy to take them up on their offer. However, there is no reason to assume *a priori* that the same logic held for both political sortition and imperial land allotment.

[67] In the mid-Republic, a period when political sortition was an elite institution, most Romans' first experience with sortition would have been land allotment. For many of those Romans, land allotment would also have been their last experience with sortition at Rome.

the settlers, they moved out into an expanding network of existing communities with commercial citizenship, which made it easier for the Romans who settled in Roman colonies to do business and exchange among them. Each community of settlers was able to become its own hub connected to the existing communities around them.

We can think of this in terms of what network theorists call a "decentralized" network, in which there is no single hub through which most activity moves, but rather any number of hubs with their own "hub-and-spoke" arrangement (see Figures 5.1-2).[68] This is not to say that Rome was just another hub among many: a decentralized network only means that not all nodes (or, in this case, communities in central Italy) run directly to a single hub—Rome, which was already the largest city on the peninsula, despite its frequent brushes with crisis. Compared to the way the Athenians and Syracusans constructed their imperial territories, the Romans were creating one that was fairly decentralized. What distinguished the Romans, therefore, was that they allowed so many citizens to create new communities out among existing ones across central Italy. Over time, those communities became new regional hubs of exchange outside of the Roman center.



Left: Fig. 5.1. An idealized model of a "centralized" network, which approximates what we saw in the Athenian and Syracusan cases. *Right:* Fig. 5.2. An idealized model of a "decentralized" network.

[68] Figures 5.1-2 adapted from Baran 1964: 2.

As we saw earlier, our historical sources for Roman land allotment were mostly interested in how the Roman elite thought about land allotment: with the benefit of hindsight, it was clear to them that land allotment was a very centralized strategy of imperial expansion dating back to the earliest days of Rome. In one instance, Dionysius wrote that Romulus, the legendary founder of Rome, included land allotment in a larger plan to expand and strengthen the Roman state:

> τρίτον ἦν ἔτι Ῥωμύλου πολίτευμα, ὃ πάντων μάλιστα τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀσκεῖν ἔδει, κράτιστον ἁπάντων πολιτευμάτων ὑπάρχον, ὡς ἐμὴ δόξα φέρει, ὃ καὶ τῆς βεβαίου Ῥωμαίοις ἐλευθερίας ἦρχε καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἀγόντων οὐκ ἐλαχίστην μοῖραν παρέσχε, τὸ μήτε κατασφάττειν ἡβηδὸν τὰς ἁλούσας πολέμῳ πόλεις μήτε ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι μηδὲ γῆν αὐτῶν ἀνιέναι μηλόβοτον, ἀλλὰ κληρούχους εἰς αὐτὰς ἀποστέλλειν ἐπὶ μέρει τινὶ τῆς χώρας καὶ ποιεῖν ἀποικίας τῆς Ῥώμης τὰς κρατηθείσας, ἐνίαις δὲ καὶ πολιτείας μεταδιδόναι.[69]
>
> There was yet a third policy of Romulus, which the Greeks ought to have practiced above all others, it being, in my opinion, the best of all political measures, as it laid the most solid foundation for the freedom of the Romans and was no slight factor in raising them to their position of hegemony. It was this: not to slay all the men of military age or to enslave the rest of the population of the cities captured in war or to allow their land to go back to pasturage for sheep, but rather to send out lotholders to possess some part of the countryside and to make the conquered cities Roman colonies, and even to grant citizenship to some of them.

Here, Dionysius referred to the Roman recipients of the land as *klērouchoi*, their colonies as *apoikiai*. Dionysius seemed to think that two main features of Roman imperialism distinguished it from its Greek counterparts. First, the Romans allowed most of the people they defeated to keep living where they were, sometimes even with a form of citizenship. Second, the Romans only confiscated part of the defeated people's land, which meant that Roman settlers would have moved in among them. Together, he thought, the policy allowed them to increase the size of their army and then go on to conquer an empire. Though it is highly unlikely that any such strategy

[69] Dion Hal. 2.16.1.

existed at the time of Romulus, or that there was any way for Dionysius even to have known about it in the first place, the passage is remarkable for what he took for granted. He rightly concluded that the movement of Roman settlers out among defeated communities was quite different than what the Greeks were used to doing, but what exactly Roman *hegemonia* looked like across Roman territory he did not say.

From what we can tell from the passing accounts of land allotment in Livy's history, the Romans often plundered the countryside and confiscated only part of the land. The Romans took one-third to two-thirds of the defeated peoples' land, but almost never the entire countryside.[70] By the fourth century, at least, the Roman state took ownership of all confiscated land because the Roman army won it—it was *ager publicus populi Romani*.[71] The land could stay this way for a long time: it could be years before the Senate actually allotted the land. Until then, the defeated community could continue to use the land, though it was technically no longer their legal property. Public land was also available to the Romans, as had always been the case for public land, though only elite Romans probably had the capacity to make use of it.[72] Only when the Senate decided to part with the land was it divided up into allotments. In some cases, the land became Roman territory, and thus the *ager Romanus* grew in size: this happened when the Senate allotted the land as viritane allotments and the recipients were enrolled in a new citizen *tribus* (or "tribe").[73] Far more often before the First Punic War, the land remained separate from the *ager Romanus*, and therefore administratively separate from Rome: this

[70] Rosealaar 2010: 31. For example, in 340 the Romans took two-thirds of Privernum, see Livy 8.1.3; in 303 the Romans took one-third of Frusino, see Livy 10.1.3. Aside from these relative terms, Livy seldom mentioned how much actual land the sum amounted to.

[71] Roselaar 2010: 25, 31-32.

[72] There may have been a small agricultural tax, paid in kind, for use of public land, see Appian *B. Civ.* 1.1.7, with Roselaar 2010: 90-95.

[73] For Roman citizenship and the creation of new tribes in the mid-Republic, see Taylor 2013; Cels-Saint-Hilaire 1995; Humm 2006.

happened when the Romans recolonized an existing city or founded a new one. In yet other cases, the Romans founded small coastal settlements and the settlers remained Roman citizen: this was very rare before the First Punic War, and altogether only amounted to 1,500 or so people by the middle of the third century.

Though the historical sources never said how the Senate decided among the three different forms of land allotment, the hodgepodge geography of the Romans' imperial territory had no clear, centralized logic to it: an existing community's territory could be surrounded on all sides by Roman territory, a new colony founded at some distance from Roman territory, or a colony founded within an existing community's territory but still politically separate from it.[74] In each case, the recipients of the land could be Roman, a member of an allied community, or even a member of the defeated community. What emerged, in nearly every case, were mixed communities of some sort, with commercial and political connections predating the Roman conquest to other nearby communities besides Rome. Politically, Roman citizens could become citizens of a new community, foreigners could become Roman citizens, and after 338, both Romans and non-Romans could find themselves somewhere in between with what has become known as "Latin status," where they were part of a new colony but had the same commercial rights as members of the former Latin League.

Even though it was the Senate that decided when to allot land, Roman citizens could choose to put in their names for land allotment. In 334, the Roman Senate decided to found a colony at Cales in northern Campania. According to Livy's account:

[74] For a helpful map that attempts to make sense of the citizen geography of Rome's imperial territory, see Cornell 1995: 382, Map 9.

> Factoque senatus consulto ut duo milia quingenti homines eo scriberentur, tres uiros coloniae deducendae agroque diuidundo creauerunt K. Duillium T. Quinctium M. Fabium.[75]
>
> The Senate passed a resolution authorizing two thousand five hundred men to be enrolled for the colony, and the senators then appointed K. Duillius, T. Quinctius, and M. Fabius as a board of three to lead the colonies to their land.

In this episode, as with others in the mid-Republic before and after it, the Senate delegated the task of allotting the land to a commission of three Roman officers.[76] The commissioners were likely selected from members of the Roman elite who may have also commanded the military campaign that confiscated the land in the first place. Further back in Livy's history, in 467 a distant relative of Titus Quinctius bearing the same name confiscated land from the Volsci after defeating them in the field. He was then in charge of the commission responsible for dividing up the land. After deciding how many allotments there would be, "those who wished to receive land," Livy wrote, "were ordered to hand in their names."[77] Both Livy and Dionysius agreed that, in 467, not enough Roman citizens put in their names because they preferred land near Roman rather than far away from it. Because Antium would have been further south than any other Roman settlement in 467, and the crises of the fifth century had only begun to disrupt Roman society, it is possible that some Romans were waiting for a better opportunity. But by 334, there is

[75] Livy 8.16.14

[76] Livy also mentioned commissioners for the *ager Pomptinus*, see Livy 6.21.4; also Suessa, Pontiae, and Interamna Sucasina, see Livy 9.28.

[77] Livy 3.1.4-7, with Dion. Hal. 9.59.2. From Romans choosing to put their name forward for an allotment, see also Cic. *Pro Caecina* 98. Only once did an historical source record land allotment as mandatory. In 494 the Senators apparently forced every Roman to put in their name for land at Velitrae, itself a former Roman colony just southeast of Rome, see Livy 2.31.4; 2.34.6; Dion Hal. 7.13.4-5; Plut. *Cor*. 12.2-13.2. The story goes that Velitrae was nearly wiped out by the plague right when Rome's grain supply was running low. But because many Romans feared the plague, and few actually put in their name for land, the Senators decided to force the issue. When the Romans first decided to sort out the land at Velitrae, land allotment was voluntary, like at Antium; when not enough people actually put in their name, the Senators made it mandatory.

no indication that the Roman plebeians still held out for land within Roman territory. By then, most plebeians were choosing to leave Rome.

For the Roman citizens who chose to leave Rome, land allotment was both political and economic. When Livy actually specified who among the Romans received land allotments in the early and mid-Republic, he always singled out the plebeians; as for Dionysius, he twice referred to the *dēmos* (or "the people") and, in another case, the *polloi kai penētes* (or "the masses and the poor").[78] Even though Dionysius was writing in Greek, and he does not seem to have had a single stand-in term for "plebeian," his extant books mostly only covered the period before the plebeians really existed as a formal political group—which really only happened once the Licinio-Sextian Laws formalized the two groups by requiring one consul be plebeian. The plebeians were, for the most part, synonymous with the poor and disadvantaged in the early Republic, but by the middle of the fifth century they had formed their own positive identity relative to the patricians and their clients. By forming their own assembly (the *concilium plebis*), making collective resolutions (*plebiscita*), and electing their own officials, the plebeians were a state within a state.[79]

The plebeians may have come together at a time of crisis to wager their military participation for political reform, but they also formed the most expansive socio-economic coalition in Rome. Since a few patrician *gentes* held a monopoly on political offices by the middle of the fifth century (a process often referred to by ancient historians as the "closing of the

[78] For example, see Livy 4.11; 4.48; 5.30; 6.21.4; 8.11; 8.16.13-14; Dion Hal. 7.27-8; 8.73.3; 8.75.4. According to the literary tradition, the plebeians first came together as a social group within the complex Roman social hierarchy in c. 494 at the First Secession from Rome.
[79] Cornell 1995: 256-265. For the description of the plebeians as a state within a state, see Mommsen 1887: 3.145, with Livy 2.44.9; 3.19.9. For the plebeians in the fifth century, see Richard 1978; Raaflaub 1993; 2005a.

Patriciate"), all new citizens were plebeian, regardless of their wealth.[80] Even after the rise of the *nobiles*, most plebeians who chose to put in their names for a land allotment were still making two kinds of statements. First, a political one: the plebeian "state" was less connected to Rome than it was to its constituent members, who had already proven at the First Secession that they were willing to walk out of Rome. Second, an economic one: by actually moving away from Rome, as we will see, they hoped to take advantage of existing networks of exchange and commercial citizenship to become an elite where no elite yet existed.

Among the plebeians, however, it is unclear who actually received land in the mid-Republic. Modern historians tend to assume that the recipients of land allotments were more often than not members of the *proletarii,* the Romans who had little or no property and could not afford the arms and armor to fight in the army. The logic holds that, since the three main political concessions of the fourth century after the Licinio-Sextian Laws focused on debt, the *proletarii* were the ones most affected by debt, and the debt laws came just before an increase in the number of land allotments, then land allotments were also probably concessions to the *proletarii*.[81] Arnaldo Momigliano offered a slightly different interpretation, arguing that the plebeians who received land in the late fifth and fourth centuries were mostly "artisans, laborers, merchants, and smallholders too poor to qualify for [regular] legionary service"—precisely because they were the ones who did not own much or any land.[82] In yet another view, Peter Brunt, among others,

[80] For the "closing of the patriciate" in the fifth century, see De Sanctis 1907: 234-235; Cornell 1995: 252-256; Armstrong 2016: 160-161. The wealthy Plautii from southern Latium moved to Rome, where they held the consulship five times between 358 and 329. To the patricians, the Plautii were plebeians, but they were nevertheless wealthy. For the Plautii in the fourth century, see Terrenato 2014: 47-53.

[81] The Romans passed laws in 367, 357, 347, and 326 on the subject of debt. The first, the famous Licinian-Sextian Laws, was the most transformative and indeed most remembered by later Romans. For the *proletarii* receiving land allotments, see Salmon 1969: 15, 120-121.

[82] Momigliano 2005: 176. For this reason, he suggested that the plebeians probably did not fight in the legions in the early fifth century.

argued that the recipients of land allotments were more likely military veterans who received land as payment for their service, and were already equipped to defend the land.[83] His argument works well with the fact that land commissioners in the mid-Republic often included, from what we can tell, the same general who confiscated the land in the first place.

But if the recipients could be veterans, and the *assidui*, not the *proletarii*, made up the core of the Roman infantry, then it follows that the *assidui* would have received land as well.[84] It is also possible that the Romans made a distinction between who could receive land outside the *ager Romanus*: perhaps *proletarii* received land in the relatively stable regions still governed by the Roman state whereas the better-outfitted *assidui* received colonial land allotments. But since no historical source ever specified which plebeians actually received land, it is reasonable to conclude that anyone—save, perhaps, elite members of the patrician *gentes*—could put in their name for land allotments.[85] What united them all was their movement away from Rome.

Outside of Rome, the recipients of land allotments remained connected to Rome in two main ways. The first was through military service. Like the communities formed through Syracusan land allotment, Roman settlers were still liable for military service, so they had their own levies and fought as *socii* (or "allies"). Like the Romans' Latin allies since the beginning of the fifth century, settlers could be called on to fight in the legions.[86] Unlike the Athenians, but

[83] For the recipients of land allotments as military veterans, see Brunt 1971: 392. See also Rosenstein 2004: 82-88; Erdkamp 2011: 111-114.

[84] For census qualifications of the *assidui,* see Rathbone 1993.

[85] Gabba 1988: 20; Pelgrom 2012: 30. Of the *assidui* who received allotments, Gabba argued that most would have been younger men.

[86] The Romans fought alongside their Latin allies since the *Foedus Cassianum* at the beginning of the fifth century. For Latin military levies in the fourth century, see e.g. Livy 6.10.6, 7.25.5-7. For military participation, see Scheidel 2006a; Jehne 2006. Many historians have seen the connection between military participation and land allotment as the key to Rome's success: the Roman army confiscated land, the Senate divided it up, and the recipients continued to fight for Rome alongside defeated peoples, so Roman manpower kept on growing. For recent treatments of military integration, see Jehne and Pfeilschifter 2006; Rosenstein 2006; 2012; Roselaar 2011; Erdkamp 2011.

like the Syracusans, the Romans never accepted payment from their allies and settlers in the place of military service—probably because much of Italy was not yet using coinage.[87] Military service, rather, was their tribute. For that reason, Rome's military levies grew rapidly in the fourth century, thanks in part to land allotments which may have helped some settlers afford arms and armor to fight in the infantry. For the settlers who managed to become local elites in their new community, and in doing so commanded their levy in Rome's wars, they also became responsible for distributing the spoils of war among their community. Fighting in Rome's wars could be remarkably profitable, especially for the new elite.[88] The ability to levy armies from each community undoubtedly made Rome a centralized power.

The second way in which the recipients remained connected to Rome was through citizenship, which had the opposite effect. Because most Roman citizens could not afford to travel all the way to Rome to participate regularly in popular assemblies, and those who, after 338, had *civitas sine suffragio* could not participate anyway, their citizenship mostly granted them commercial rights. These included the right to make legal contracts and own property, relocate and move freely from one city to another, and marry someone from another city with similar citizen status.[89] These rights may have connected everyone they covered back to Rome because the rights were technically Roman rights, but they also made it easier from Roman settlers to connect to other communities around them. To start with, contracts that were

[87] Coarelli 2013; Harris 2016: 32. Instead, the Romans' revenue came from indirect taxes on economic activity, rents and fees from public lands, and wartime levies (*tributum*) on, or rather loans from, soldiers who were not conscripted, see Tan 2015; Rosenstein 2016.
[88] Even so, there is evidence that some settlers turned against the Roman state. The settlers at Velitrae attacked Roman territory on and off throughout the 380s and 370s, and they even joined forces with the Volsci against the Romans, see Livy 6.12.6, 6.17.7, 6.36.1.
[89] We know that these commercial rights were especially important at the time because after the Romans defeated the Latin League in 338, they deprived the communities they saw to be the worst offenders from marrying and trading among each other, see Livy 8.14.10.

enforceable from one city to another could have helped drive down the transaction costs of doing business with people from other cities: with the certainty of legal recourse, merchants may not have had to increase their prices artificially to offset risks.[90] The ability to move freely from one city to the next also would have facilitated exchange with neighboring communities. By taking steps to facilitate exchange broadly across the Romans' imperial territory, commercial citizenship may even have given settlers the ability to specialize what they were growing on their land, and make more money in the process. Taken together, these commercial rights likely put settlers at an economic advantage compared to those who received land allotments within Athenian and Syracusan imperial territory. Those advantages, however, only existed because the Romans decentralized their imperial territory, making it easier for settlers to do business with the communities around them.

This is not to deny that Rome was the fastest growing market in central Italy. The Romans started building roads across central Italy near the end of the fourth century to expedite the movement of armies but also the transport of goods by land.[91] A small, fortified settlement at Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber river began protecting the flow of goods to Rome from the sea beginning earlier in the century, though excavations have not found any port facilities for transshipment dating from the mid-Republic.[92] Excavations at Rome's river harbor, Portus Tiberinus, and the Forum Boarium have found that the area best known for commerce saw a new phase of construction during this period: for example, construction began on the Temple of Portunus, dedicated to the god of harbors, overlooking goods moving in and out of the Portus

[90] For transaction cost theory, see North 1990: 27-35; Eggertson 1990: 3-32. For recent studies in ancient history, see Kehoe *et al.* 2015.

[91] For Roman roads, see Wiseman 1970; Coarelli 1988b; Laurence 1999. For the individual initiatives to build roads, see Bradley 2014.

[92] Meiggs 1973: 19-23; Cornell 1995: 385.

Tiberinus.[93] Yet all this was happening, it is worth remembering, despite what we have seen to be the decentralizing effects of land allotment.

During the period between the destruction of Veii and the First Punic War, the Romans continued to expand their own territory as tens of thousands of them also moved out into their imperial territory across central Italy. Unlike the Athenians, the Romans only compartmentalized their imperial territory by creating layers of citizenship. But even there, whether a community was a Roman *municipium*, a Roman colony, or any other community with *civitas sine suffragio* could change from one valley to the next. In that sense, it was not nearly as insular as either the Athenian or Syracusan citizen communities. Even the Syracusans, who brought defeated people back to Syracuse to become citizens, still kept their own territory separate from their imperial territory. In a way, the Romans were doing what the Syracusans were doing at Syracuse—bringing together different groups of people into one citizen community—only on a much smaller scale and at various places all across their imperial territory. For Rome's elite, confiscating land at the end of a successful military campaign was a way for them to distinguish themselves from their peers and advance their political careers. Yet for the Romans who received the land allotment, they chose to leave Rome probably because it meant they could escape the elite economy at Rome. Over time, as Rome's elite compromised with the plebeians to decentralize their imperial territory, the movement of Roman settlers meant that Roman human capital dispersed out across central Italy and became entrenched within existing networks of exchange.

[93] Coarelli 1988a: 113-127. Portunus was originally associated with keys, and later the storage of grain and other goods from the harbor.

5.4. *Dispersing Human Capital*

In the two generations after 338, the Romans continued to march across central Italy to fight more distant battles in Samnium, Etruria, Umbria, Campania, and Magna Graecia. As they defeated more people, and then signed them up for military service, the Roman army kept getting bigger and bigger. From the census numbers Livy cites in his history, the Romans had some 250,000 citizen-soldiers ready to fight during the Samnite Wars.[94] After each battle they won, the generals returned to Rome rich with the spoils of war, slaves, and, perhaps most importantly, *nobilitas*.[95] Meanwhile, the plebeian's "desire for land," as Livy described it, seems to have only increased despite the political reforms of the mid-fourth century.[96] Aside from the wealthy plebeians who were joining a new political class of *nobiles* at Rome after 367, thousands of Romans were using their new political enfranchisement to leave Rome for land allotments.

What we see, then, is that the Romans conceived of their imperial territory in a way that generated both centripetal and centrifugal forces. Roman land allotment, in particular, was a story about the latter, especially when compared to the Athenian and Syracusan approaches. The Romans decentralized their imperial territory the way the did, I argue, because the settlers moving away from Rome hoped to take advantage of existing economic structures and networks of exchange. No matter how many Roman citizens moved away from Rome to project Roman power, as the elite hoped they would, Roman land allotment was doing more to disperse human capital out around new business hubs than concentrate it back at Rome. As we will see, Roman setters did not receive much more land than their Athenian or Syracusan counterparts, but they

[94] 250,000 in 323, see Livy 9.19; 262,321 in 293, see Livy 10.47. Roman manpower increased considerably, at least twofold, after 338.

[95] Livy used *praeda* and *spolium* over 350 times in Books 6-10. For *nobilitas,* see Harris 1990: 504; Hölkeskamp 1993; Armstrong 2016: 278-279.

[96] Livy 6.6.1.

could take advantage of existing communities to "intensify specialization": with agricultural staples already being produced when they arrived, they could choose to specialize their agricultural production for sale on regional markets or produce manufactured goods with less competition than they were used to at Rome. Roman land allotment was able to extend Roman power across central Italy partly because it was dispersing Roman human capital across existing networks of exchange.[97]

The period after the Latin War was remarkable for its demographic movement away of Rome. Years ago, Adam Afzelius tried to estimate how many Romans received land allotments during the Republic by taking the numbers Livy recorded and then extrapolating from those, and the amount of cultivable land within each territory, to get estimates for the occasions Livy did not provide an exact number of allotments.[98] The estimates are only rough approximations, but they give us a rough idea of what was going on. By Afzelius' estimates, between 338 and the beginning of the First Punic War in 264, around 70,000 Romans and their families received land allotments at nineteen new Latin colonies, which accounted for around 7,000 km^2 of land.[99] This began at a time when the Roman "core"—the urban center at Rome and its hinterland—had around 125,000 adult men.[100] In the same period, Roman territory was also expanding: the *ager Romanus* grew from

[97] The image historians often depict of Roman land allotment is a highly idealized one of orderly centuriation—a sense that once the Romans conquered the locals, they also conquered the landscape. In this view, the recipients of land allotments lived in town and travelled out to their farms each day; in doing so, they could defend the kind of civic life the Romans were so well known for. Likewise, Roman city-state culture replaced whatever indigenous village life existed before, see Toynbe 1965: 105-115. See also Hayes and Martini 1994: 36; Attolini *et al.* 1991: 144; Arthur 1991: 100. For critiques of the "agro-town" model, see Garnsey 1979, with Pelgrom 2008: 342-344. For Garnsey, the urban centers of colonies were too small to support the number of actual landowners.

[98] Afzelius 1942, with territory sizes based on figures in Polyb. 2.24. See further Cornell 1995: 381; Scheidel 2006a; Pelgrom 2012: 33-41.

[99] Afzelius 1942: 153-192, with Cornell 1995: 351, 380-385, esp. Table 9. Livy only gives an exact number of recipients for Cales, Luceria, Interamna Lirenas, Sora, Alba Fucens, and Carseoli; the numbers for the other thirteen Latin colonies can only be estimated.

[100] Scheidel 2006: 6, with Afzelius 1942. He estimated that around a fourth to a third of the total population lived in the city of Rome.

roughly 5,500 km^2 to 27,000 km^2—about twenty percent of the Italian peninsula, though much of the land was "Roman" only in name.[101] Within the *ager Romanus*, somewhere between 20,000 and 30,000 Romans and their families probably received viritane allotments; by extending citizenship to many of the existing communities in what became Roman territory, Roman territory went from supporting a total population of roughly 347,300 to 900,000. This would have put the entire Roman military coalition of Roman citizens, Latins, and allies somewhere around two million, still less than the two-and-a-half million of the Athenian empire in the mid-fifth century.[102] Altogether, up to three times as many Romans may have received land allotments outside of Roman territory as they did within Roman territory. Even for those who received viritane allotments, the location was often further away than some of the colonies: the recipients who made up part of the new tribe Falerna in 318 moved all the way to the bay of Naples.

Tim Cornell has suggested that many of the recipients must have been non-Roman allies, even though the sources for the mid-Republic say nothing of the sort: he argued that "It is unlikely that the Roman population on its own could have withstood such a drain on its citizen manpower."[103] Such a "drain" certainly would have been disruptive to any pre-modern state, but perhaps that means that Rome's elite and the plebeians each had good reason to pursue this type and degree of land allotment. Even if a third of the recipients were in fact non-Roman—though there is no reason to think this—and a total of around one hundred thousand people received land allotments away from Rome during the period, then as much as half of the original core male population still moved away from Rome. To be clear, the mid-Republican

[101] *Ibid.* The *ager Romanus* increased to 1,582 km^2 after the conquest of Veii in 396. Until 338, the main addition was the *ager Pomptinus.*

[102] For the number of viritane allotments, see Cornell 1995: 380; Oakley 2005: 663-665. For total population estimates, see Afzelius 1942: 153.

[103] Cornell 1995: 367. See also Scheidel 2004: 10; 2006.

diaspora took place over the course of two generations. But each year, migration still would have outpaced natural demographic growth at Rome: the rate of movement to land allotments was, until then, unique to the Mediterranean.[104]

Also unique, at least when compared to the Athenians and Syracusans, was how the Roman settlers moved into valleys and plains where there were plenty of people were already living and communities already established. It is worth recalling how Athenian settlers only founded colonies after destroying the existing community and the Syracusans moved everyone back within Syracusan territory before allotting land. The Romans, however, do not even seem to have confiscated all the land from a community. Some members of the existing community surely died fighting the Romans. Others may have been enslaved. Yet most people probably had to make due with less land, or none at all. As we will see below, Roman settlers at Fregellae and Interamna shared the Liri Valley with several Volscian communities, like Arpinum and Casinum; the settlers at Paestum shared the plain with Lucianians in and around the city and more down the coast at Elea and Roccaglorisa; the settlers at Cosa shared the valley with Etruscans at Vulci and Orbetello. Of course, the Romans did not share the land as equal partners: we should not lose sight of the fact that the Romans confiscated land only after a military defeat and with the threat of more violence hanging over the settlement. Roman settlers arrived at their allotments as conquerors. Afterwards, they took advantage of existing networks.

Once they arrived at their new homes, Roman settlers received land allotments of varying sizes. Many historians have assumed that the actual size of land allotments at colonies was bigger than viritane allotments: in return for more land, the logic holds, the Roman poor

[104] Pelgrom 2012: 35, with Scheidel 2003; Osborne 2004: 164. Migration at a rate of 0.4-0.8%, with natural growth at a rate of 0.2-0.3%.

agreed to garrison the unruly frontier in new colonies. According to Livy, the size of viritane allotments was incredibly small, ranging from two to seven *iugera* (equal to about one half to just under two hectares). At Veii in 393 the allotments were seven *iugera*; in the *ager Falernus* in 339 the allotments were only three.[105] Because a family could not subsist on so little land, these landowners may have used public land as well: as people got further from the Roman core, public land may not have been nearly so competitive, especially after 367.

As for the size of allotments at colonies, the historical sources give no details for any Latin colony before the Second Punic War. Later, in the second century, the size of colonial land allotments was conditional on military rank, but still much larger than any viritane allotment of the fourth century: at Copia in 193 infantry got twenty *iugera* and cavalrymen got forty *iugera* (about five and ten hectares).[106] There is no reason to assume that the size of allotments after the Second Punic War was representative of allotments in the fourth century: not only was there less aggregate demand for land after the Second Punic War because so many soldiers had died, but also the Roman victory increased the supply of confiscated land. Livy was probably using different sources for the fourth and second centuries anyway, so he may not have had access to the same details for both periods. But because Livy did, on occasion, record how many settlers signed up for a certain colony in the fourth century, and we can estimate about how much land was available for those colonists, we do not need to rely solely on comparative data from the second-century for fourth-century colonial land allotments.

[105] For Veii, see Livy 5.30. For the *ager Falernus*, see Livy 8.11. For a synthesis of all known allotment sizes, see Pelgrom 2008: Fig. 1.

[106] By this time, there was little to no property qualifications for military service. For Copia, see Livy 35.9. The size of allotments seems to have increased with time: at Bononia in 189, infantry received fifty *iugera* and cavalrymen got seventy *iugera*, see Livy 37.57.

Land allotments around colonies may have been bigger, but probably not by too much. In the Latin colonies founded before the First Punic War, anywhere from 2,500 to 6,000 settlers received land allotments. At Cales in 334 and Luceria in 314, there were 2,500 recipients; at Interamna Lirenas in 312, Sora in 303, and Carseoli in 298, there were 4,000 recipients; at Alba Fucens in 303, there were 6,000 recipients (see Table 5.2).[107] Since Cales commanded around 100 km^2, each recipient could not have had more than four hectares. For the 265 km^2 at Interamna, there was only enough for about six-and-a-half hectares for each recipient and his family. For the 420 km^2 at Alba Fucens, only seven hectares. But this does not account for public land, uncultivable areas, and whatever land was left for any existing communities, so the amount would have been even smaller. Unfortunately, physical evidence for centuriation lines cannot help us determine the size of land allotments: Pelgrom has meticulously re-evaluated the evidence for Roman centuriation and shown that there is no evidence for it, or any plot divisions for that matter, before the First Punic War.[108] Still, with the data available to us, it seems as though the recipients of Roman colonial allotments were receiving about the same amount of land as the Syracusan mercenaries at Leontinoi. If they had been working under the same conditions as their Syracusan counterparts, the recipients of Roman colonial allotments may have had only enough land for subsistence farming.[109] But unlike those who received land allotments in Syracusan territory, the Roman settlers entered existing economic networks.

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[107] Livy only gives numbers for six of the nineteen colonies before the Second Punic War. For Cales, see Livy 8.16.14. For Luceria, see Livy 9.26.5. For Interamna Lirenas, see Livy 9.28.8. For Sora, see Livy 10.1.2. For Carseoli, see Livy 10.3.2. For Alba Fucens, see Livy 10.1.2.

[108] Pelgrom 2008: 365-367; 2012: esp. 96-128, *contra* Castagnoli 1956; Hinrichs 1974; Chouquer *et al.* 1987; Carandini 2002: 121-123. This does not mean that they were not dividing up land into orderly plots yet, just that we should be cautious about using later evidence.

[109] A family of five would probably have needed about five and a half hectares for subsistence, see Rosenstein 2004: 66-68. See also Salmon 1969: 72, n. 110; Galsterer 1976: 47. This amount assumes that the farmers used crop rotation, leaving part of the land fallow.

Table 5.2. *Number of land allotments recorded in Livy and estimates of maximum size* [110]				
Date	Latin Colony	Number of allotments	Estimated Size of Territory	Estimated Maximum Size of Land Allotment
334	Cales	2,500	100 km^2	4 ha
314	Luceria	2,500	790 km^2	31 ha [111]
312	Interamna Lirenas	4,000	265 km^2	6.5 ha
303	Sora	4,000	230 km^2	5.75 ha
303	Alba Fucens	6,000	420 km^2	7 ha
298	Carseoli	4,000	285 km^2	7 ha

Roman settlers often arrived in rural landscapes already worked by small farmers. In recent years, archaeologists have begun to find that Roman land allotment could not have been responsible for agricultural intensification in central Italy: Terrenato argued that, beginning in the fifth century and continuing through the third century, rural Italy experienced a major transition from nucleated urban centers to dispersed small farms, what he called "Hellenistic farms."[112] Years ago archaeologists first observed this trend in central Italy, so it seemed reasonable enough to assume that Roman land allotment was the catalyst. Surveys in the Cecina valley in western Tuscany and the Biferno valley in eastern Samnium, however, have shown that agricultural intensification actually predated the Roman conquest, and the first several generations of Roman landowners had little, if any, material impact on rural settlement organization.[113] In one survey after another, a wider trend has emerged: according to Terrenato, "What was a local phenomenon

[110] Territory sizes from Cornell 1995: 381, Table 9, slightly modified from Afzelius 1942.

[111] This estimate is probably highly inflated given that Lucerian territory, in Afzelius' estimates, also included the steep mountains to the west all the way until Apulia meets Samnium, see Roselaar 2010: 303, n. 36. The allotments were probably only in the fertile valley.

[112] Terrenato 2001a; 2012. He called them "Hellenistic farms" to emphasize how broad phenomenon was in the central Mediterranean.

[113] For regional survey of the Biferno valley, see Barker 1995; Robinson 2012; 2013. For the Cecina valley, see Terrenato and Saggin 1994.

of limited proportions became a global trend affecting the entire central Mediterranean."[114] Though the full scale of this transformation is still coming into focus, the picture is clear enough: agricultural intensification in central Italy may have prepared rural landscapes for the arrival of new Roman landowners more than those landowners physically reshaped it. In other words, Roman land allotment was a process of reconfiguration: as we will see, Roman settlers could take advantage of existing networks instead of trying to create brand new ones.

Ongoing research on colonial landscapes by Pelgrom and Stek has gone further to show that the majority—up to eighty percent—of new landowners probably lived outside the actual urban centers in small agricultural villages, in part because the urban centers were far too small to accommodate the number of Roman settlers. In his synthesis of survey evidence for fourth- and early-third century Roman colonies, Pelgrom found that "Third-century sites are not scattered evenly over the territory, as is often expected, but are predominantly clustered together and separated from each other by large tracts of unoccupied land."[115] Survey around Interamna Lirenas (f. 312), for example, found sites with consistent, heavy scatters covering six hectares about 5 km away from the urban center; 7.5 km outside Venusia (f. 291) was a similar settlement scatter at Masseria Allamprese which covered around three hectares; 2.5 km outside of Suessa (f. 313), excavations have revealed an ashlar wall similar to the urban center's perimeter wall dating from the first generation of landowners, and it may well have enclosed a

[114] Terrenato 2012: 147.

[115] Pelgrom 2008: 348, with 2012: 129-152. See also Pelgrom and Stek 2013; 2014a; Stek 2014c; 2015; Pelgrom *et al.* 2015; Stek *et al.* 2015. This model of agricultural villages works well with the growing evidence for rural economic life in later Roman periods: the *Roman Peasant Project,* for example, has excavated a number of small surface scatters in southern Etruria and found that in every case they were not, in fact, small houses associated with individual farms, but rather agro-processing or ceramic production sites, see Ghisleni *et al.* 2011; Vaccaro *et al.* 2013; Bowes *et al.* 2011; 2013. They argued that these rural work sites were accessed from agricultural villages.

small settlement.[116] The list goes on.[117] According to Pelgrom and Stek, the landowners living in the scattered agricultural communities likely saw the urban centers more as economic and cult "service centers"—in effect, a central place where the new landowners visited from time to time, but did not live. As we will see, evidence that part of the existing communities continued to live in the conquered territory is unmistakable, which may have meant that the "service centers" became hubs for them as well.[118]

If Roman settlers moved into areas where people were already farming, and they were able to centralize exchange in the area at their colonial hub, they may also have been to specialize what they were growing on their land allotments. Take, for example, seven *iugera* of farmland, which was still probably less than Roman settlers were getting at colonies. Imagine a farmer dedicating those seven *iugera* (or about 1.75 hectares) to grapes: if each hectare yielded 25 hL in a growing season, which is reasonable for pre-modern viticulture, he could produce around 44 hL per year. Now, the plebiscitum Claudianum of 218 restricted Rome's elite from owning ships that could transport more than 300 amphorae of wine: André Tchernia calculated that it would have taken about ten to twenty *iugera* of vines to produce that much wine.[119] In a good year, then, the farmer could produce maybe 200 amphorae per vintage from his seven *iugera*. If he could sell these on the market wholesale, he and his family would be well above subsistence, probably earning well more than the two *minae* the Athenian lotholders collected

[116] For Interamna, see Hayes and Martini 1994: 230, site 526. For Vinuesia, see Pelgrom *et al.* 2015. For Suessa, see Arthur 1991: 40.

[117] For a survey of "clustered" sites, or village settlements, outside of colonial urban centers, see Pelgrom 2012: 131-141, with 200-214.

[118] For discussion of the indigenous communities in colonial territories, see Bradley 2006: 171-177; Pelgrom 2008: 354-357; 2012: 153-187.

[119] For the plebiscitum Claudianum, see Livy 21.63.3. For grape-yield estimates, see Tchernia 2016: 150-173, with Cato *Agr.* 11.1. I am grateful to Nathan Pilkington for bringing to my attention what it would have meant for Roman settlers to "intensify specialization."

from their allotments at Mytilene after 428.[120] This is, of course, only speculative, but the lesson is important: the Roman settlers may not have intensified agriculture in the regions they moved to, but they may have intensified specialization. By taking advantage of Rome's commercial citizenship, they could, potentially, grow what their land was best suited for—grain, grapes, olives, and so on—instead of only growing crops to sustain their family.

By the end of the third century, in fact, Greco-Italic amphorae from Etruria, Latium, and Campania—areas all worked heavily by Roman settlers—were starting to break into Mediterranean markets in vast quantities carrying wine and oil.[121] This was still a far way off from our period, where markets were still fairly regional, as we will see. Even so, it is reasonable to think that the arrival of Romans settlers and their human capital out in the rural areas of central Italy helped intensify specialization within those areas. If Momigliano was right that the Roman settlers were mostly artisans, laborers, merchants, and small-scale farmers, a view generally shared among historians, then specialization probably had something to do with the Roman human capital being transferred away from Rome to the communities the Romans defeated in war.[122] What Philip Kay has called "Rome's economic revolution" emerged out of a Roman trade network structured, in part, by the movement of Roman settlers away from Rome

[120] If we assume, for the sake of argument, that later prices from Pompeii held true generally (when a half liter of wine went for 1 *aes*) and wholesale value was about three-fourths the price of table wine, then each hectoliter was worth 140 *asses*, see De Simone 2017: 39. 44 hL would then go for 6600 *asses*, which could buy 235 *modii*, or over 2000 liters of wheat, which would have put the farmer well above subsistence. 6600 *asses,* or 660 *denarii,* would have been considerably more valuable at Rome than 2 *minae,* or 200 *drachmae* at Athens.

[121] For trade, see Morel 1989: 479-480; Loughton 2003: 179. For the distribution of Greco-Italic amphorae, see Will 1982; Tchernia 1986.

[122] For example, this view of plebeians is accepted throughout Raaflaub 2005a. Some plebeians probably would have had enough property to qualify for military service in some capacity because, as Raaflaub (2005b: 197) recognized, "Had the plebeians consisted only of poor farmers, herdsmen, day laborers, craftsmen, and traders, their movement would have been crushed at the first opportunity."

to their land allotments.[123] By transferring much of Rome's human capital out into rural areas, where some existing communities continued to exist, Roman land allotment was disruptive in a much different way than Athenian and Syracusan land allotment: over time, it created regional economic hubs instead of concentrating economic activity at the metropole.

Back at Rome, Rome's elite do not seem to have made much of an effort to reverse the effects of migration away from Rome, likely because colonization played into their view of imperial territory. On a few specific occasions, the Romans moved part of a defeated community back to Rome, in a move that seemed to resemble the Syracusan population transfers. In 338, after the defeating the Latin League, the Romans forced the senators at Velitrae to move to Rome:

> In Veliternos, ueteres ciues Romanos, quod totiens rebellassent, grauiter saeuitum: et muri deiecti et senatus inde abductus iussique trans Tiberim habitare... in agrum senatorum coloni missi, quibus adscriptis speciem antiquae frequentiae Velitrae receperunt .[124]
>
> The people of Velitrae, Roman citizens of old, were severely treated for having revolted so often. Their walls were demolished, and their senate removed from the town and its members ordered to live on the other side of the Tiber… Colonists were dispatched to the farmlands of the senators, and when these were enrolled Velitrae appeared again to have the dense population of its early days.

The Romans did the same for the senators at Privernum a decade later in 329.[125] In the fourth century, the west bank of the Tiber was not technically a part of Rome because it lay outside the *pomerium*, the city's formal boundary separating *urbs* from *ager*. But because of its easy access to trade up and down the Tiber, Transtiberim was home to many of the city's merchants and craftsmen.[126] So when the Romans transferred the senators from Velitrae and Privernum to

[123] For "economic revolution," see Kay 2014. For the economic integration of rural communities over time, see De Haas and Tol 2017.

[124] Livy 8.14.5-7, with Urso 1998. See also Livy 1.29.1, 1.33.1, 3.29.6; Dion. Hal. 2.55.6, 3.38.2, 3.50.3, 5.36.4, 6.20.5, 6.32.1, 6.55.1, 6.91.4.

[125] For Privernum, see Livy 8.21.9.

[126] Coarelli 2008: 335-336. Transtiberim maintained its "working-class character," as Coarelli called it, through the high Imperial period.

Transtiberim, they were putting them among the same kind of people who would soon be taking ownership of their land. Unlike the Syracusans, the Romans only moved senators, elites who could not replace the plebeians' labor but could, in time, become members of Rome's elite.

Instead, much of Rome's population growth in the fourth and early third centuries probably came from a massive influx of slaves, the result of annual campaigning in Italy. Livy, in his tenth book, recorded the Romans enslaving around 70,000 people during the first decade of the third century.[127] As the Roman empire grew in the mid-Republic, the slave population increasingly became the source of human capital at Rome as Roman citizens moved across central Italy. Unlike the Athenians and Syracusans, the Romans reconfigured rural landscapes, but did not always completely transform them. With the help of commercial citizenship, Roman settlers became entrenched within existing networks of exchange by taking advantage of the connections to nearby communities—in a way unseen among the Athenians and Syracusans.

5.5. *The Liri Valley: Roman Business Centers*

In the generation after 338, the Romans allotted land almost exclusively in the inland valleys connecting southeastern Latium to western Samnium and northern Campania.[128] Beginning with Cales in 334, the Romans allotted land at one colony after another, scattered in between defeated communities and new Roman tribes. During this period of transition, no region

[127] For the influx of slaves to Rome in the late fourth and early third centuries, see Cornell 2000a: 46; Scheidel 2005a. For slave totals in Livy's tenth book, see Oakley 1993: 24. The growing importance of slavery was implicit in 357, when the manumission of slaves became taxed, see Livy 7.16.7. According to Cornell, by the end of the century, freedmen constituted a major part of the plebeian population at Rome, see Cornell 2000a: 46. For general population growth at Rome in the fourth and third centuries, see Starr 1980: 15-26; Cornell 1995: 385-394; 2000a: 46-47. The Romans built the Aqua Appia in 312 and the Aqua Anio Vetus in 272 to accommodate population growth.

[128] New Latin colonies southeast of Rome after the Latin settlement: Cales in 334, Fregellae in 328, Luceria in 314, Saticula in 313, Suessa Aurunca in 313, Pontiae in 313, Interamna Lirenas in 312, and Sora in 303. New tribes southeast of Rome: Oufentina and Falerna in 318.

saw more Roman settlers arrive than the river valley between the Aurunci and Meta mountains, known as the Liri Valley. About 100 km southeast of Rome, the Liri Valley was at the center of the main inland corridor between central and southern Italy. Though the valley was originally home to various Osco-Umbrian communities—Volsci to the northwest and Aurunci to the southeast—the land quickly became one of the main sources of conflict between the Romans and Samnites. The story goes that, shortly after making a treaty with Alexander of Epirus, who had crossed over to Italy and was at war with the Samnites, the Romans allotted land in 328 to form the colony Fregellae, taking its name from the community of Volsci living there.[129] The Samnites had recently destroyed a Volscian settlement in the valley, so the arrival of new Roman landowners provoked a war (the "Second Samnite War") between the Romans and Samnites that ground along for another twenty-four years. After the Roman defeat at the Caudine Forks in 321, the urban residents at Fregellae had to evacuate when the Samnites stormed the city, only to return again in 313.[130] A year after they returned, they were joined by another 4,000 landowners who received land allotments at the new colony Interamna Lirenas 25 km down the valley.[131] Not long before, the Roman Senate approved the creation of the new tribe Oufentina on the other side of the coastal range, consisting of viritane landowners and enfranchised locals from Privernum.[132] Altogether, the region was the first major outlet for Roman settlers outside of Latium.

[129] For the Romans' treaty with Alexander of Epirus, see Livy 8.17. For the founding and naming of Fregellae, see Livy 8.22.1, 8.23.

[130] For the battle at the Caudine Forks, see Livy 9.2-6. For the evacuation of Fregellae, see Livy 9.12. For the return, see Livy 9.28.1-3.

[131] For the founding of Interamna Lirenas, see Livy 9.28.7-8; Vell. 1.14.4.

[132] Livy 9.20.6, with Taylor 2013: 55-56. The tribe Oufentina extended down to small coastal "Roman colony" at Tarracina, founded in 329, see Livy 8.20.9. The Romans had confiscated from Privernum two-thirds of their land in 341, divided up the land as viritane allotments the following year, then enfranchised the Privernates after moving their elite to Rome in 329, see Livy 8.1.3, 8.11.13, 8.20.9. At some point after 329, Privernum was designated a *praefectura*, a formal venue where Roman citizens, who were not members of a Latin colony and thus administered by Rome, could take care of legal business and do business, see Festus 262 L, with Knapp 1980.

The cases of Fregellae and Interamna, in particular, help us see how Roman land allotment dispersed Roman human capital across the rural areas of central Italy. The two colonies make for good case studies of Roman land allotment because, aside from Livy's history, we have both excavated material from the urban centers and rural survey data from several decades of fieldwork. From that data we can get a better idea of where the Roman landowners settled into the valley, what they were producing, and perhaps also what they were trading for. Understanding the archaeological sources is complicated, however, by the fact that the Romans did not force the Volscians to move out of the valley. As we will see, the Romans and Volscians do not seem to have formed distinct and separate communities. Rather, survey data, ceramic analysis, and the historical sources all seem to point in the same direction: the Roman settlers were building off of indigenous settlement patterns, creating a network of small agricultural villages dispersed throughout the Liri valley among the Volsci who inhabited the area before them. Altogether, what we see is that the urban centers of Fregellae and Interamna became economic business centers where Roman settlers and Volscians occasionally came together to trade and do business.

At Fregellae, the urban center was neither large enough to accommodate the landowners nor was it built to defend them. Because the Samnites had destroyed the prior Volscian settlement, the Roman settlement had to be built from scratch; in fact, excavations at Fregellae have found no trace of an earlier Volscian settlement below it. The actual urban center of Fregellae sat on a plateau of some 80 hectares, though the British excavators have shown that the earliest settlement probably only covered a small fraction of the plateau along the newly

built *via Latina*.[133] The British team also determined that the city's circuit wall was not built until the late third century, likely during the Second Punic War.[134] Beforehand, the settlement may have had a partial wooden palisade: in Livy's account of the Samnite takeover of the city in 320, the Samnites were able to sneak into the city at night without being detected, and some of the residents managed to escape through a gate of some sort.[135] But because the early defenses left no material trace, there is no way to determine the actual size of the original settlement. By way of comparison, Interamna never exceeded 25 hectares, and Livy wrote that 4,000 settlers and their families received land: if the urban center was intended to house them all, there would have been over 600 people per hectare—an impossible amount by pre-modern standards.[136]

Even if Fregellae occupied the entire plateau, and 4,000 settlers and their families lived on site (though Livy does not mention the exact amount), there would have been around 200 people per hectare—again, an impossible amount.[137] Rather, only a fraction of settler community and a small elite probably lived in town: though excavations have found no trace of any small or densely-packed houses, the Italian team excavated a large elite house dating from the beginning of the third century.[138] At first glance, it seems as though the town of Fregellae

[133] Crawford *et al.* 1985: 85. See also Wightman and Hayes 1994: 35, who assume that the earliest arrivals occupied the entire plateau.

[134] Crawford and Keppie 1984: 33-35. They suggested that the colonists must have built the circuit wall quickly because "the southern end rested directly on natural clay, the northern end on a dense fill of clay with pebbles, fragments of pottery and fragments of tile."

[135] Livy 9.12.

[136] A density of 640 people per hectare assumes each family had four members, which is still probably lower than average, see Rosenstein 2004: 66-68. By way of comparison, the New York City borough of Manhattan in 2015 had an average of about 278 people per hectare.

[137] Because Livy does not specify the number of settlers at Fregellae, historians typically assume that it received the same amount as Interamna because the two colonies occupied territories of about the same size, at roughly 305 and 265 km^2, respectively, see Cornell 1995: 381, with Afzelius 1942. Sora in 303 and Carseoli in 298 also received 4,000 settlers, and they occupied 230 and 285 km^2, respectively.

[138] Monti 1998: 63. This one elite house happens to be the only residence of any size found in any Latin colony dating from this period. In all likelihood, building and urban expansion during the second century probably destroyed any trace of the first houses built on site.

was probably less of a densely inhabited garrison than a central point outside of which the majority of the landowners lived.

But even if Fregellae was a central point, the first landowners may have used a nearby Volscian fortress for defense in times of war, at least during the Samnite Wars. In his account of two Samnite campaigns in the Liri valley, Livy mentioned an *arx Fregellana* (or "citadel of Fregellae") distinct from the town of Fregellae, which was less of a target for the Samnites: the British and Italian teams both identified the fortified hilltop position at the modern town of Rocca d'Arce about 8 km to the north as the most likely candidate.[139] The site also sat about midway between Fregellae and Arpinum, a Volscian community that received *civitas sine suffragio* in 303.[140] Because Rocca d'Arce has a commanding view of the valley, and looks down from steep cliffs in all directions, it is a natural defensive position. This probably explains why material from the site show continuous use since the Bronze Age. Nearby, the Canadian team that surveyed 6.5 km^2 of mountainous territory below Rocca d'Arce found seven Republican sites from the early colonial period.[141] Still, for most of the year, the Roman settlers probably had little reason to go to the *arx Fregellana*, even less so than town of Fregellae itself.

In fact, three separate surface survey projects have found that most of the landowners in the *ager Fregellanus* were probably living in the countryside in what appear to be small agricultural villages. Between 1978 and 1998, a Canadian project surveyed roughly 13 km^2 east of Fregellae and 6.5 km^2 to the northeast, a British project surveyed 9 km^2 to the west of the

[139] Livy 9.28.2; 9.31.13. For Rocca d'Arce as the *arx Fregellana*, see Crawford and Keppie: 23; Rocca d'Arce, see Monti 1990; Monti 1998: 48.

[140] For Arpinum, see Livy 9.44.16, 10.1.3, 38.36.7. Also in 303, Roman settlers received allotments to the north at Sora, see Livy 10.1.1-2.

[141] Zone 2 in Hayes and Martini 1994, fig. 27.

settlement, and an extensive Italian project surveyed another 100 km^2.[142] In all three projects, the teams found that the early Republican sites tended to be clustered together, in what were in all likelihood small villages or clusters of worksites. For example, in the Canadian survey, sites 86-87 and 90-92 in Zone 2, all sites with ceramics from the early colonial period, were clustered together some 10 km east of Fregellae; in the British survey, sites 51, 52, and 54 were clustered some 5 km in the opposite direction; and in the Italian survey, the same goes for sites 33-38 about 1 km to the northwest.[143] Unlike the urban center, the new landowners did not start from scratch at these sites: the British team, for example, found extensive ceramics dating from the pre-Roman, Late Iron Age period at the clusters in Zone 2. Though it is impossible to tell whether or not the Romans shared these sites with any Volscians, either a favorable topography or the existing settlements made the new landowners want to settle there. Some of the new landowners, at least, were living outside the urban center, joined together in clusters across a very old landscape.

Furthermore, some of these rural sites may have been centers of non-agricultural production. Though excavations at Fregellae have found no traces of kilns, ceramic production, or manufacturing of any kind, rural areas are not quite so ambiguous. The Canadian survey found a high concentration of black slip ceramics (distinct from Campanian black gloss) at sites 21 and 22 clustered about 5 km east of Fregellae: during the early colonial period, the scatter at site 22 covered about half a hectare whereas site 21 was just a minor site; by the end of the

[142] For the Canadian project, see Hayes and Martini 1994. For the British project, see Crawford *et al.* 1986. For the Italian project, see Monti 1998. For a recent synthesis of the three surveys, with a focus on settlement patterns and density, see also Pelgrom 2012: 202-203.

[143] Hayes and Martini 1994: 181-182, with fig. 27. Crawford *et al.* 1986: 44-50, with fig. 2. Monti 1998: 97, with fig. 85. See also Pelgrom 2008: 349-350. The Canadian team (Hayes and Martini 1994: 70) observed that a trend of "nucleated settlement" continued from the Early Iron Age through the end of the third century. In a similar statement, the British team (Crawford *et al.* 1986: 50) observed that "the pattern of settlement in the territory of Fregellae was not so much one of single farms, but one of something very close to villages."

Republic, site 22 had gone out of use whereas site 21 ballooned in size and was producing large quantities of amphorae from several kilns (recently unearthed, coincidentally, by the construction of a railway).[144] Though site 21 has not been excavated, and there is no evidence for an on-site kiln to match the later one from site 22, it is possible that both were production sites, and production consolidated at site 22 over time to supply the increased amount of agricultural produce from nearby farms. Petrological analysis of the black slip ceramics from the area found that the full range of inclusions could be found locally, which led the team to conclude that "most, perhaps all of the pottery may very well therefore be local."[145] The same goes for coarse wares, like at site 80 in the foothills below Rocca d'Arce. Aside from the evidence for local production, the survey teams found no trace of transport amphorae from Campania or Latium dating from the fourth or third centuries.

The combination of these two conditions—the local inclusions and no evidence for imports—led the Canadian team to conclude that "The overall impression given by this material is one of rural self-sufficiency, not much influenced by ceramic trends elsewhere…The fine-quality black-gloss wares of the northern Campanian sites have not been recognized among the survey finds; this reinforces the general picture of minimal outside contacts in Republican times."[146] But this critical assessment needs to be qualified. We should not expect to find a lot of evidence in the Liri Valley for imports from this period because it was not an area for elite consumption but probably more one of production for elites. Roman settlers were probably trading transport amphorae full of oil and wine with their neighbors in and around

[144] Hayes and Martini 1994: 152-153, 175-176, with fig. 22. Though site 22 has not been excavated, the kilns are "present in [a] rail-side ditch."

[145] Williams 1994: 161. Though a similar range of inclusions have been found elsewhere in central Italy, local production is more likely.

[146] Hayes 1994: 127.

the valley, with some ending up down river, even all the way to the coast by way of the lower Liri River (modern Garigliano River).[147] It was there, at the mouth of the Liri River, that the *via Appia* led through Minturnae after 295. What we are missing, rather, is the bullion, probably bronze bars (either *aes rude* or *aes signatum*), that the Roman settlers probably received in exchange for the goods they were producing on their land allotments.

Though the Roman settlers seem to have mostly lived outside of the urban center, the landowners dispersed throughout the rural villages probably came together at the urban market at Fregellae. The urban center was fairly small in the early colonial period, and its public monuments like the Curia and Comitium had not yet been built. Even so, Fregellae had an enormous forum: at 145 by 55 m, Fregellae's public marketplace covered some 8,000 m^2.[148] The forum has gained a certain level of notoriety among archaeologists because Filippo Coarelli, whose team most recently excavated the site, found two parallel lines of post-holes: these, he concluded, held poles that joined together by rope to turn the forum into a urban polling place—a colonial equivalent of the Roman *saepta* in the Campus Martius.[149] But Coarelli's focus on urban political life took for granted the forum's importance as a market, and just how big the forum actually was compared to colonial marketplaces in the Classical Greek world. In fact, Roman fora in the mid-Republic were more often used as spaces for people to conduct business, especially in colonies and prefectures where there were no specialty "niche" markets like there were at the

[147] Van der Mersch (2001: 187-193, with Olcese 2017) argued for a similar process in Campania after the arrival of Roman settlers in the *ager Falernus* in 338. He suggested that more Greco-Italic amphorae were produced to keep up with specialized wine production.
[148] Excavations at the Curia and Comitia have found that the monumental phases date from after the Second Punic War, see Coarelli 1998: 57. However, the same excavations found that Fregellae's forum dates from the first generation of the colony, see Coarelli 1998: 56.
[149] Coarelli 1998: 56. For the debate on the function of these post-holes in colonies, see Mouritsen 2004; Coarelli 2005. In his critique of Coarelli's interpretation, Mouritsen argued that "There was no urban parallel to the political use of the forum envisaged in the Latin colonies. This interpretation in effect applies the structure of the Saepta to the forum, while giving it the functions of the Comitium."

growing metropolitan center of Rome.[150] For the Sicilian cities where a marketplace has been identified and measured, none comes close to Fregellae: in the Classical period, centuries after they were founded, Kamarina had a marketplace measuring about 4,500 m^2 and Megara Hyblaia and Selinous about 5,000 m^2 each.[151] All three cities were major trading centers with the eastern Mediterranean and had significantly larger urban populations than any Roman colony in the late fourth century. The new landowners at Fregellae built the forum, it seems, to accommodate more market activity perhaps than some of Sicily's major trading centers.

Even though Fregellae's forum may have doubled as a polling place several times each year, the urban market would have been active far more often. Because the forum straddled the *via Latina*, all traffic up and down the valley, and indeed between Rome and Campania, passed directly through the market.[152] Traffic from long-distance trade through the forum may have been fairly low in the colony's early years, judging by the lack of Campania wares, but Fregellae was probably geared more for bringing together regional economic activity than it was for military garrisoning. If most of the landowners were dispersed throughout the *ager Fregellanus* in small agricultural villages, then the urban marketplace was probably the main link that united them. Consequently, most days of the year they may have had more to do with Volsci living in the valley and at Arpinum than they did with any formal political community at Fregellae.

In many ways, Interamna developed parallel to Fregellae. Just 25 km southeast of Fregellae, the urban center of Interamna also sat in the middle of the valley astride the *via*

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[150] For the forum as a marketplace and the importance of economic activity to fora more generally, see Akaiturri 2008: 26-27, 31-32. For "niche" markets, see the *forum piscatorium,* Livy 26.27.2-3; the *forum holitorium,* Livy 21.62.2-4; more generally, Varr, *Ling.* 5.146.

[151] For the agora at Kamarina, see Di Stefano 1993-4: 1370. For Megara Hyblaia and Selinous, see De Angelis 2003: 20, 36; 2015: 83-84.

[152] For the route the *via Latina* took through the Liri Valley and a topographic survey of Fregellae and its environs, see Ferraby *et al.* 2008.

Latina. When the landowners from Fregellae returned in 313, they were joined a year later by another 4,000 who received land allotments further down the valley. Like Fregellae, Interamna was never home to all the landowners: at 25 hectares at its greatest extent, Interamna could only conceivably hold about a sixth of the landowners and their families.[153] At Interamna, the forum occupied a space of roughly 4,500 m^2, about half the size of the one at Fregellae, though still comparable to its Greek counterparts in Sicily.[154] If the two colonies had roughly the same number of landowners, and the colonial fora were designed first and foremost as polling places, as Coarelli argued, it is difficult to explain why the two fora were such different sizes. But if the urban centers were more suited to be business centers, the discrepancy may shed light on the relationship between Fregellae and Interamna: since Interamna was the second colony in the area, and the urban center was not replacing an indigenous site, whereas Fregellae shared the space with a Volscian community, it would make sense that Interamna would have a smaller marketplace. In this sense, the two urban centers may have had marketplaces to match their particular economic circumstances.

Like at Fregellae, Interamna seems to have been surrounded by agricultural villages. Two separate surface survey projects have found that major sites outnumber minor sites, and most of those minor sites were found in clusters.[155] East of Interamna, the Canadian survey found no sites for about 5 km, at which point there are several clusters: for example, site 296

[153] For urban Interamna, see Bellini *et al.* 2012. This carrying capacity assumes 120 people per hectare, following Pelgrom 2008: 343.

[154] For the forum at Interamna, see Bellini *et al.* 2014b.

[155] In Zones 5-7 of the Canadian survey, there were 11 minor sites compared to 15 major sites dating from the early colonial period, see Hayes and Martini 1994: 173-236, with fig. 43. By the Late Republic, the relationship between minor and major sites had inverted: the same survey found 31 minor sites and 12 minor sites dating from after the 200. Preliminary results from the recent Cambridge survey seem to support the Canadian survey's findings, though the full report is unpublished, see Bellini *et al.* 2012: 359.

covered about 2 hectares with black slip and coarse wares dating from the early colonial period, and was surrounded by another half-dozen smaller sites.[156] The same survey found almost no trace of continuity with pre-Roman settlements: there were hardly any ceramics dating from the Late Iron Age before the Roman landowners arrived in the valley. But this is not surprising: whereas Livy regularly identified who owned the land in a particular region before the Romans confiscated it, he said nothing for Interamna. In fact, in the passage where Livy wrote that communities of Aurunci and Volsci had owned the land at Suessa and Pontiae, respectively, he said nothing for Interamna when he mentioned it a sentence later.[157] From what we can tell, Even though the Roman landowners at Interamna did not move into an area with an existing settlement pattern, they may have followed the lead of their neighbors at Fregellae and formed agricultural villages outside of Interamna.

Like elsewhere in central Italy, land allotment at Interamna would have created the conditions for a sustenance economy had the settlers not been situated within a network of existing communities. According to Afzelius' estimate, the *ager Interamnas* covered about 265 km^2, and Livy recorded a total 4,000 landowners, so each landowner could not have received more than 6.5 hectares. Parts of the Liri Valley were also uncultivable: though the highlands on either side of the valley and the terraces along the Liri and Gari rivers were fertile, between them were swamplands unsuitable for agriculture.[158] Those landowners may have had even less land to work with, about the same amount as the Syracusan mercenaries at Leontinoi. There,

[156] Hayes and Martini 1994: 205, with fig. 43. During the survey, the owners of the field claimed that there was a cemetery on the site.

[157] Livy 9.28.7-8. In 313, the Roman Senate decided to allot land at Suessa, Pontiae, and Interamna, but for some reason that Livy did not mention, the Senate decided to delay the land allotments at Interamna for a year. Suessa was just another 25 km down the valley.

[158] Martini 1994: 6-8.

the land was much better than what the Roman landowners had in the Liri Valley, and it still remained an underdeveloped sustenance economy for at least a generation after the Syracusan mercenaries arrived.

But even though the size of land allotment at Interamna may not have been any better than at Leontinoi, the main difference between the landowners at Interamna and their counterparts at Leontinoi was their relationship with the Volsci already living in the valley. Unlike Syracusan land allotment, Roman land allotment did not require the existing communities be moved elsewhere. Though there is no evidence for Volsci living at the same sites as the new landowners, there were Volsci living further up the valley around Fregellae and others living just 10 km away to the northeast at Casinum. When the Samnites took Casinum during one of their many campaigns in the valley during the late fourth century, the Volsci who fled the city and later returned may have received partial Roman citizenship, as was the case for the Volsci at Fundi and Formiae just on the other side of the Aurunci mountains in 330.[159] Compared to what we saw with the Athenian and Syracusan approaches, Roman land allotment likely created very different economic relationships with the new communities that came in contact with Roman settlers.

Indirectly, Fregellae and Interamna show the effects of Roman colonial land allotment. Unlike Syracusan land allotment at Kaulonia, for example, Roman land allotment at Fregellae and Interamna created a network of small agricultural villages dispersed across the Liri Valley, often among the Volsci who inhabited the area before them. In the two generations after the

[159] For the Samnite conquest of Casinum, see Varro *Ling.* 7.29, with Salmon 1967: 26, 49. For Fundi and Formiae, see Vell. 11.14.3. In his account of Hannibal's march through the valley, Livy included Casinum in a list of other communities like Suessa and Allifae that had citizenship, see Livy 26.9.2-3.

new landowners arrived at their land allotments, the rural communities of landowners remained fairly self-sufficient from Rome, judging from local ceramic production and the absence of any material evidence for long-distance imports. In fact, the landowners living in the rural villages may have had more contact with local Volsci than they did with the formal political communities of Fregellae and Interamna. More often than not, those urban centers probably functioned as business centers where the landowners and the indigenous communities could come together to trade and do business. Altogether, the Romans who chose in 328 and 312 to put their names in for a land allotment in the Liri Valley chose to leave Rome behind—an act that did more to create economic links and regular points of contact with the Volsci living in the valley than it did to extend the Roman state. So in the case of the Liri Valley, Roman land allotment took a share of Rome's artisans, laborers, merchants, and small-scale farmers, and plugged them into a Volscian landscape. What emerged were the beginnings of regional economic networks far away from Rome.

5.6. *Paestum and Cosa: Reorienting Regional Markets*

During the first generation of the third century, the pace of allotment seems to have slowed as the Romans fought one war after another across central Italy in Samnium, Etruria, and Umbria.[160] Then in 280, a Greek army led by Pyrrhus of Epirus marched up the Liri Valley from Campania, ravaging the Fregellaeans' land along the way.[161] In that same year, the

[160] For the third-century wars in Samnium, see Salmon 1967: 255-292; Cornell 2004; Scopacasa 2015: 146-153. For Etruria and Umbria, see Harris 1971. In the first quarter of the third century, the Romans founded Latin colonies at Narnia in 299, Carseoli in 298, Venusia in 291, and Hadria in 289. There is no evidence for viritane allotments during this period, and no new tribes were formed between 299 and 241.

[161] For the Pyrrhus' invasion of Italy, see Franke 1989; Lomas 1993: 48-53. For Pyrrhus' campaign at Fregellae, see Florus *Epit.* 1.13.24.

Romans went to war with the Etruscans from Volsinii and Vulci just north and northwest of the Roman landowners at Sutrium.[162] In both cases, the Roman settlers learned just how dangerous life outside of Rome could be. Still, more Romans continued to put their name in for land allotments: after Pyrrhus withdrew from Italy in 275, the Romans picked up where they left off and allotted land for the first time since the end of Third Samnite War (298-290). In 273, Roman settlers formed two new colonies on the Tyrrhenian coast: one at the centuries-old city of Paestum in southern Campania, the other at a brand new site named Cosa in central Etruria.[163] At the time, the land at Paestum and Cosa were the furthest south and north on the Tyrrhenian coast the Romans had allotted land. As the Roman army extended its reach to ever more distant battlefields, so too did land allotment take Roman citizens ever further from Rome.

Though twin colonies by birth, Paestum and Cosa had little in common. On the one hand, the actual urban center of Paestum was originally a seventh-century Greek colony, later conquered by the Lucanians, and then shared with the Romans: settlement at Paestum was mixed, considerably large, and culturally heterogeneous. On the other hand, Cosa was a brand new settlement built on land confiscated from Vulci, though 30 km west of the Etruscan center: settlement at Cosa was isolated, small to start, and culturally Roman. For most historians and archaeologists, then, the story of Paestum and Cosa is one of opposites: "The two colonies evidently served different purposes," as John Pedley explained it, "Cosa served as a deterrent to hostile Etruscans, while Paestum was perhaps the outward manifestation of a peaceful alliance

[162] The only evidence for the Roman campaign against Vulcientes is the *Fasti Triumphales*, see *CIL* 1.2.2.

[163] For Paestum and Cosa, see Livy *Per*. 14.8; Vell. 1.14.7. According to the *Periochae* to Livy, the lost books 12-14 all contained accounts of Roman wars against the Etruscans and Lucanians, which presumably led to the land confiscations for Paestum and Cosa in 273.

between Lucanian aristocrats and Rome."[164] To be sure, Paestum and Cosa show just how varied and contingent Roman colonization could be, and how the elite at Rome had no single way of organizing landowners nor any single precondition for land allotment.[165] In fact, there was probably as much variation between Paestum and Cosa as there was between any two places where the Athenians or Syracusans allotted land.

Even so, the cases of Paestum and Cosa show how Roman land allotment, despite all the variation from one colony to the next, had one common theme: Roman land allotment centralized existing regional economies around Roman business centers. Put another way, the Roman landowners reconfigured regional networks of exchange in a way that put themselves at the center. During the early third century, the city of Rome continued to grow as a metropolitan center, but Roman land allotment disrupted economic networks outside of Roman territory in a way that privileged regional exchange—that is, the bulk of trade did not flow directly through Rome, as was the case at Athens and Syracuse. The cases of Paestum and Cosa are particularly insightful because over a half-century of urban excavations and rural survey at the colonies themselves and the existing settlements around them can help us track how production and networks of exchange changed over time. The data from these projects suggest that the growth of these Roman business centers was true for non-agricultural production as well as agricultural production; the conditions for both, I argue, resulted from the dispersal of Roman human capital into the region. As we will see, land allotment took new landowners out into the countryside around Paestum and Cosa, where they focused regional economic activity back to a

[164] Pedley 1990: 115. For a similar sentiment, see also Curti *et al.* 1996: 173; Torelli 1999: 43.

[165] In this regard Bispham, Pelgrom, Stek and others (see notes 36-37) were right to critique the "statist" model of Roman colonization.

Roman economic hub. Whereas the cases of Fregellae and Interamna showed us how land allotment could create agricultural villages that put settlers in contact with existing communities, Paestum and Cosa then show how, over time, those settlers could reconfigure the region's economy around themselves. What we see, therefore, is that Roman land allotment was particularly Roman because it reconfigured rural Italian life around Romans, not the metropolitan center of Rome.

The Roman settlers who arrived at Paestum in 273 entered a very old and already flourishing landscape. The site was originally a Greek colony from Sybaris, founded in the seventh century as Poseidonia. For two centuries the city thrived, judging by its three massive temples and public architecture.[166] Sometime around the turn of the fifth century, the Lucanians from southern Samnium took the city and renamed it Paistos. Despite the Lucanian takeover, the city seems to have retained at least part of its Greek community, judging from how red-figure vase painting, votive offerings at Greek sanctuaries, and use of the Bouleuterion all continued as before.[167] In the century between the Lucanian and Roman conquests, the countryside saw a drastic increase in rural sanctuaries and cemeteries, which some archaeologists have interpreted as an increase in wealth, rural habitation, and perhaps also agricultural intensification.[168] It is impossible to say how well these mapped onto actual settlement patterns since there have been no diachronic field survey projects in the area, and the

[166] For the pre-Roman history of Poseidonia-Paistos, see Pedley 1990: 21-112.

[167] For Greek continuity into the Lucanian period and excavations of the Greek site, see Greco and Theodorescu 1980; 1983; Pedley 1990: 97-112; Cipriani and Longo 1996; Wonder 2002; Crawford 2006; Isayev 2007: 110-117. In her study of Lucanian material culture, Isayev (2007: 114) argued that the Lucanian conquest "reflects not a separate isolated group of Italians who have taken over a Greek territory but rather a community which has incorporated itself into the life of the Greek city, and brought with it new socio-cultural trends."

[168] For sanctuaries and cemeteries as proxies for settlement and land tenure, see Pedley 1990: 99; Crawford 2006: 62; Gualtieri 2013: 377.

sanctuaries and cemeteries are all chance finds.[169] Still, Paestum and its place in northern Lucania make for a valuable case in Roman land allotment: because there have been extensive excavations at the urban center at Paestum as well as at a nearby Lucanian settlement at Roccagloriosa, it is possible to track changes in trade and non-agricultural production, and also how an influx of new Roman landowners may have affected exchange in northern Lucania.

Before the Roman landowners arrived, Lucanian Paistos was one of the leading economic centers on the Tyrrhenian coast of Italy, with trade connections all over the western Mediterranean. In the generation after Dionysios' death at Syracuse, a number of Sicilian potters, vase painters, and craftsmen moved to Paistos, and transformed the city into a leading production center: more than a thousand red-figure vases have been found in southern Italy and Sicily from the single workshop of Asteas and Python (*c.* 360-330) at Paistos.[170] Excavations at the Porta Marina on the western edge of the city have revealed an industrial area for the production of pottery in use during the second half of the fourth and early third centuries; kilns and molds for terracotta production from the same period have been found in the city center, along with hundreds of terracotta figurines made with local clay.[171] Excavations at the Bouleuterion, still in use through the Lucanian period, found it filled in with industrial waste dating mostly from the early third century, such as ceramic fragments, misfired terracottas, and broken bellows—all signs of industrial production.[172] Furthermore, many of the fourth century tombs found scattered throughout the countryside included all kinds of luxury goods and displays of wealth, like

[169] There has been only one field survey in the territory of Paestum, and it focused entirely on the Greek Archaic period, see Skele 2002.

[170] Asteas and Python signed many of their vases. For vase painting at Paistos, see Trendall 1952; 1987: 54-174; Pedley 1990: 109-112.

[171] For Porta Marina, see Greco 1988: 85. For production, see Greco and Theodorescu 1980: 20-21; 1987: 156-157; Ammerman 1993: 15-22.

[172] For the fill of the Bouleuterion, see Greco and Theodorescu 1983; Pedley 1990: 80. The Bouleuterion was apparently still in use through the end of the fourth century: excavations found an Oscan inscription, though written in Greek, of a magistrate dedication.

Tanagra figurines imported from mainland Greece, amber jewelry, and elaborate wall frescos.[173] Altogether, the material evidence from Paistos before the Romans' arrival gives the impression that the city was a major center of production and Mediterranean trade.

The same can be said for the Lucanian settlement at Roccagloriosa, an inland settlement 60 km southeast of Paistos on the Cilento peninsula. The Lucanian city, which covered some 15 hectares, developed around the same time as production ramped up at Paistos, judging from the fortification walls and habitation area, which all date to the second quarter of the fourth century.[174] Excavations at Roccagloriosa, like at Paistos, show that it too was a center of Mediterranean trade, albeit on a smaller scale. Excavations have found extensive evidence for craft production and metallurgy, including kilns, pottery wheels, terracotta molds, and pieces of slag; ceramic workshops, for their part, were producing Tarentine imitation wares.[175] Amphorae found at Roccagloriosa dating from the fourth and early third centuries seem to suggest that its inhabitants were importing goods from all around the Mediterranean, from as far away as mainland Greece and North Africa.[176] Though the ceramic evidence shows that Roccagloriosa regularly traded with Magna Graecia and Sicily to the south, there is no evidence for trade with Paistos or Campania to the north.[177] Like the cities of eastern Sicily before Dionysios' conquest, Paistos and Roccagloriosa were plugged into Mediterranean markets.

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[173] For cemeteries and tombs around Lucanian Paistos, see Pedley 1990: 99-108; Pontrandolfo 1987; Pontrandolfo and Rouveret 1992.

[174] For the fortifications and habitation area at Roccagloriosa, see Gualtieri and Fracchia 1990; Gualtieri 1993b; Isayev 2007: 119-120.

[175] For ceramic evidence from Roccagloriosa, see Fracchia 1993; Gualtieri and Fracchia 1990: 161-164. For metallurgy, see Wayman 1993.

[176] For trade and amphorae at Roccagloriosa, see Arthur 1990; Fracchi 1990; Gualtieri 1993c: 338-341, with Tables I-II. Of the 117 amphorae found during excavations at Roccagloriosa, 11 came from mainland Greece, 67 from western Greece, 29 from Punic workshops (mostly with Tunisian fabrics), and 10 with unknown origins.

[177] Despite extensive excavations, there is no positive evidence at Roccagloriosa for trade with Campania or the Lucanians to the north before the mid-third century, only a few examples of shared formal qualities, see Fracchia 1990: 219-278; Arthur 1990: 278-286.

But unlike the uprooted communities of eastern Sicily, the Lucanians of Paistos did not move away before the Roman landowners moved in. At least not all of them. Inscriptions found during excavations suggest that some of the Lucanians were enrolled as colonists of Paestum. Three inscriptions dating from the middle of the third century list the quaestors at Paestum, and the names are a mix of Oscan-Lucanian and plebeian names.[178] On the one hand, there were quaestors with names like Vibius, Megonius, and Bracius, all names of Oscan origin. On the other hand, there were also Latin names like S. Sextius, L. Claudius, and L. Statius.[179] Apparently the citizens of Roman Paestum included both plebeians, who received land allotments, as well as Lucanians. Because the fourteenth book of Livy is not extant, there is no way to know just how many Romans received land at Paestum. By Afzelius' estimate, the territory of Paestum was enormous: at 540 km^2, it was about the same size as Fregellae and Interamna put together.[180] Paestum may have been so big because there was already a large Greco-Lucanian community. Alternatively, the Roman army may have confiscated more land, so there were more allotments. Either way, land allotment at Paestum did not displace the whole community living there.

Like the urban centers of the Liri Valley, Paestum too was a business center for the new landowners. Even though the Romans settlers entered an already-thriving city, they refocused the regional economy around themselves. When they arrived, the Roman colonists replaced the existing agora with a new forum measuring about 8,000 m^2, almost identical in size to the one at

[178] *ILP* 139-141, with Arcuri 1986. See also Torelli 1999: 76.

[179] The first came from the same *gens* as L. Sextius Sextinus Lateranus, plebeian consul in 366. The *gens* Sextius is also attested in inscriptions from the Esquiline hill in Rome, where the Plebeians often held their assembly during the Republic and disposed of their dead, see Arcuri 1986: 7. The second was a member of the Claudii, who immigrated to Rome in Archaic period, and had plebeian families who used the name Lucius, see Cic. *ad Fam* 3.4-6. The third was related to T. Statius, plebeian tribune in 475, see Livy 2.52.

[180] Afzelius 1942: 191. In 273, Paestan territory would have been the second largest colonial territory, behind Venusia at ca. 800 km^2.

Fregellae. But unlike at Fregellae or Interamna, the Paestan forum was surrounded by a ring of shops dating back to the first generation of the colony (see Figure 5.3). Yet excavations at the forum show a stark drop-off in ceramic material dating from the third century: dating from the fifth and fourth centuries were several hundred examples of fine wares and amphorae that could be sold on the Mediterranean market, whereas the early Roman period had only four examples of fine wares and no amphorae.[181] Jean-Paul Morel has suggested that Paestum had its own workshop producing bowls with *petites estampilles* (or "small stamps"), a new form of stamped black gloss pottery originally produced around Rome, and spread through Italy by the Roman diaspora.[182] In all likelihood, the Roman landowners brought this craft with them from Rome and set up a modest workshop at Paestum. However, the vast majority of ceramics dating from the third century are utilitarian wares, 22 in total, likely made at Paestum.



Fig. 5.3. The forum and shops at Roman Paestum, Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 17-18, fig. 1.

[181] For ceramics from the fifth and fourth centuries, see Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 119-147. For ceramics from the Roman period, see Greco and Theodorescu 1987: 147-154. In fact, there are only four pieces of fine ware that can be firmly dated to the third century.

[182] Morel 1969: 100, with Fracchia 1990: 233-234; 1993: 268.

The drop-off in ceramic materials from the third century may well be more a problem of preservation than economic change. After all, it is unclear why the settlers would have invested in a massive new marketplace if they were not producing much for trade. Yet based on what we have seen, another possible explanation is that they were no longer producing for the same Mediterranean markets, choosing instead to specialize agricultural production for regional and Roman markets. This still does not explain the total absence of transport amphorae, which would have been used to sell wine, oil, and also grain. But if the settlers were focusing on specialized agricultural production, and amphorae were now being produced outside the urban center as we saw at Fregellae, there may not have been much ceramic production in the city for urban excavations to find anyway.

To the south, the Lucanians at Roccagloriosa were becoming increasingly caught up in the changes at Paestum. Two decades before the Romans confiscated land at Paistos, the Roman army went to war with Elea, a Greek colony on the coast about halfway between Paistos and Roccagloriosa.[183] After defeating the Eleates, the Romans made a defensive agreement with them, as they had with dozens of other states in central Italy by the third century.[184] Though the Romans did not confiscate any land from Elea, perhaps because the region is so mountainous, the entire Cilento peninsula was affected in one way or another by the arrival of Roman landowners at Paistos in 273: Elea was bound to Rome by treaty, but the rest of the peninsula, Roccagloriosa included, seems to have been pulled away from its Mediterranean network

[183] Livy 10.44.8-10.45.11. According to Livy, the Romans went to war because the Eleates had supported the Samnites in the Third Samnite War. According to Strabo, Elea was originally a Phokaian colony, and managed to survive the Lucanian conquest of the region, see Strabo 6.1.2.

[184] The Eleates contributed ships to the Roman war effort during the First Punic War, see Polybius 1.20.14, with Walbank 1957: 74–75.

towards the new Roman center to the north. By the middle of the third century, evidence for overseas trade from Roccagloriosa all but disappeared. Excavations have shown that ceramic production continued at Roccagloriosa, but mostly of a new series of thin-walled grooved bowls, similar in form and composition to several found during excavations at Paestum from the same period.[185] Excavations also found examples of bowls with *petites estampilles*, produced with stamps imitating the one from Paestum.[186] Finally, field survey of the countryside around Roccagloriosa found that there were far fewer sites in the third and second centuries, though a dozen or so larger sites further away from the urban center remained in use.[187] Altogether, economic activity in and around Roccagloriosa in the generation after the Romans arrived at Paestum transitioned away from Mediterranean markets to more regional exchange with the Romans to the north.

Land allotment at Paestum did much more than transfer ownership of land from Lucanians to Romans. Because many of the Roman settlers were probably artisans, laborers, merchants, and farmers before allotment, land allotment also affected the production and movement of goods in the region around Paestum. When the Romans arrived, at least part of the Lucanian community at Paestum and Roccagloriosa remained on site, though their economic lives were reoriented towards the Roman colonial center. Because Roman settlers probably owned much of the agricultural surface area in the region, and thus probably also much of the region's wealth, the Lucanian communities seem to have stopped producing the specialized items they had been before the Roman conquest. Instead, they may have worked as laborers in Roman fields

[185] For the thin walled grooved bowls, see Fracchia 1990: 233, 261 no. 218; 1993b: 267-268; Greco and Theodorescu 1980: fig. 42, no. 37.

[186] Fracchi 1990: 233, 257-259 nos. 200, 206, 207.

[187] For settlement patterns at Roccagloriosa, see Fracchi and Ortolani 1993: 235; Gualtieri and Fracchia 2001: 127-159; Isayev 2007: 122.

or used whatever land they still had to grow agricultural staples to sell at the Paestan market. Over time, they probably became more and more dependent on a new economic network centered at Paestum. Though these last points must remain speculative for now, Paestum seems to have gone from being a major center of Mediterranean trade and non-agricultural production to a center of regional agricultural exchange so the settlers could specialize what they were growing. In other words, they replaced a broader Mediterranean network with a more regional—and, for them, more profitable—one with themselves at the center.

Meanwhile, 450 km to the north another group of Roman settlers were starting a new life from their land allotments at Cosa. Like Paestum, Cosa was a coastal settlement set within a very old landscape. But unlike Paestum, Cosa was a brand new settlement: though the Romans confiscated the land for Cosa from the Etruscan city of Vulci, the settlers chose to build a new city some 30 km to the west instead of moving to the existing settlement, as their contemporaries at Paestum had done, even though Vulci was also highly urbanized and the region's most active economic center. Beginning as far back as the eighth century, trade with Sardinia, southern France, and further afield made Vulci one of Etruria's wealthiest cities.[188] By the sixth century, Vulci commanded a half-dozen or so cities, including the nearby cities of Orbetello, Doganella, and Saturnia to the west. Despite its importance, Vulci is almost entirely absent in historical texts. Still, generations of archaeologists have helped fill out the region's history, with extensive fieldwork at Vulci and Doganella, as well as an ambitious intensive survey project of some 160 km^2 of the Albegna valley. Because Cosa has been excavated more than any other Latin colony, the region is an ideal case study alongside Paestum.

[188] Steingräber 1981: 183-203; Sgubini Moretti 1993.

The Roman settlers at Cosa, as with those at Paestum, stepped into a region with a thriving export economy. At Vulci there was a pottery industry dating from as far back as the late seventh century, with the prolific Orientalizing workshops of the Painter of the Swallows, originally from as far away as the eastern Mediterranean, and the Bearded Sphinx Painter from Corinth.[189] Bucchero and black-figure pottery in the sixth century and red-figure in the fifth from Vulci was making its way to southern France all the way down the Iberian peninsula. At Vulci, viticulturists and craftsmen coordinated their production to produce one of the Mediterranean's leading wine export industries, with local wine shipped in large shipping amphorae as far away as the Atlantic coast of Spain.[190] Even as Syracusan and Carthaginian militarism in the fifth and fourth centuries was isolating Vulci from its southern trade routes, judging by the general decrease of Etruscan wares in the Mediterranean, luxury goods from Vulci still made their way across the Mediterranean: excavations at the Athenian Acropolis found a tripod imported from Vulci during the fifth century.[191] As at Lucanian Paistos, the material evidence from Etrurian Vulci shows that it too was a major center of production and Mediterranean trade.

In the countryside to the west of Vulci, the city of Doganella was also thriving as a regional center of production. The joint Italian and British team that surveyed the site found that the Etruscans inhabited around 70 hectares spread out over an area of 240 hectares, making it one of the largest settlements in central Italy at the time.[192] Like Vulci, Doganella was an inland settlement, located some 6 km from the coast. But whereas the craftsmen at Vulci produced fine

[189] For the Painter of the Swallows, the Bearded Spynix Painter, and foreign craftsmen at Vulci more generally, see Camporeale 2013: 890-891. For ceramic production, see Ambrosini 2013: 950-957; Morel 2007: 493-495; Gran-Aymerich and Turfa 2013; Camporeale 2016: 75.

[190] For viticulture at Vulci, see Camporeale 2016: 77. See also Gras 1985b; Sourisseau 1997; Spivey and Stoddart 1990: 55; Morel 2007: 493.

[191] For the decline of Etrurian markets in the fourth century, see Camporeale 2016: 80-82. For the tripod at Athens, with Turfa 1986: 73.

[192] Perkins and Walker 1990: 65, 122.

wares as well as amphorae to transport wine, those at Doganella focused mostly on the mass production of amphorae. Within the urban center, field survey found hundreds of amphorae with a fabric unique to the city, likely produced at the four kilns located near the southern end of the city.[193] Sherds of hundreds more were scattered throughout the lower Albegna Valley, showing a wide regional distribution of Doganella production.[194] Because the lower valley was also where the grape production was strongest, Philip Perkins and Lucy Walker, who led the survey of Doganella, figured that the amphorae produced at Doganella "were traded in their own right and were used to bottle the wine on the farms, or they were redistributed from the city filled with the very wine produced in the country."[195] Also at Doganella, excavations found evidence for metallurgy, including copper, iron, and lead slag, lead ingots, and a foundry.[196] Doganella was a productive center to rival Vulci. But since the earliest traces from Doganella date to the end of the sixth century, at least a century after ceramic production took off at Vulci, competition likely made Doganella more of an agricultural center, its ceramic industry dependent on viticulture. Together, the Etruscan centers in the Albegna Valley were geared to produce agricultural surpluses and luxury goods for export on the Mediterranean market.

When the Roman settlers arrived in 273, they decided to center their land allotments around a new urban center rather than share an existing one, as their contemporaries at Paestum had done.[197] They chose a site atop an uninhabited hill next to the sea, some 15 km south of Doganella and 30 km west of Vulci. As was the case for Paestum, there is no way of knowing how

[193] For the amphorae, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 41-45, 71-72. Survey and excavations have not found any complete amphorae.

[194] For the distribution of the amphorae, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 71-72, 124. For the catalogue of finds, see Perkins 1999: 139-140.

[195] Perkins and Walker 1990: 72.

[196] For the slag and ingots from Doganella, see Perkins and Walker 1990: 49-52, 70-71. For the bronze foundry, see Gentili 1968: 116-117.

[197] Excavations at Cosa have found no trace of any earlier settlements atop the Ansedonia hill, see Brown 1980: 8; Fentress *et al.* 2003: 13.

many Romans received land allotments at Cosa; however, the urban center was considerably smaller than Paestum. At 13 hectares, Cosa was a ninth the size of Paestum; its forum measured some 3,300 m^2, less than half the size of the one at Paestum, and with no adjoining shops.[198] As at Fregellae and Interamna, the urban center at Cosa remained highly undeveloped for the first generation or so: to the excavators' surprise, as Elizabeth Fentress confessed, "no evidence for the third-century colony was recovered…the fact that no building of the third century is known from Cosa is indeed remarkable."[199] Likewise, excavations have found almost no trace of urban activity from the early colonial period; for example, there are almost no utilitarian wares at all dating from before the later third century.[200] The main exception is the evidence at Cosa for local production of bowls with *petites estampilles*, similar to those at Paestum: excavations in the south of the city found some 42 examples in a style distinct from those found near Rome, leading Enrico Stanco to suggest that there may have been a workshop at Cosa during its first generation.[201] But even with a small ceramic workshop, Cosa, like Fregellae and Interamna before it, was probably more of an agricultural business center than anything else.

This was probably because land allotment in the valley seems to have also reoriented the region's economy. The Albegna Survey Project found that, before the Romans arrived, the valley was fairly densely inhabited on sites mostly connected to Doganella's wine industry. But in the generation after the Romans arrived, about a half of those sites, which had been continually occupied since the fifth century, disappeared. This is probably because the

[198] For the size of Cosa and its forum, see Brown *et al.* 1994: 9; Carandini 2002: 105. The forum's layout dates to the colony's foundation.

[199] Fentress *et al.* 2003: 13. For a similar sentiment, see Scott 2008: 207. Scott concluded that the third century material culture "show the development of the essentials for political and religious activity in the colony but not the activities of a large resident population."

[200] For utilitarian wares, see Dyson 1976: 173.

[201] For the bowls with *petites estampilles,* see Scott 2008: 26-27, 36-46. For the possibility of a local workshop, see Stanco 2009: 66-67.

Etruscans at Doganella abandoned the city in the first quarter of the fourth century, probably sometime after the war in 280 against the Romans.[202] If the economy at Doganella was primarily centered around wine exports and amphorae production to transport that wine, and the Romans confiscated much of the agricultural land in the lower valley, then the arrival of the Roman landowners would have irreversibly undercut the city's economy.

Consequently, amphorae from Doganella no longer appear in the valley, and with them the last signs of their wine industry. But other Etruscan sites within the valley remained in use: a cluster of 19 sites in the Valle d'Oro some 4 km from Cosa formed around an old Etruscan kiln site.[203] Survey at the site found all kinds of coarse wares and ceramic wasters dating back to the sixth century.[204] Though it is impossible to say who was working at the site, the Romans could have used the goods produced there just as the Etruscans before them, which may help explain why the site continued to be used well into the Roman period. Surrounding it, Roman settlers probably worked land allotments no bigger than 16 *iugera* (about 4 hectares), as Mariagrazia Celuzza estimated based on later centuriation patterns.[205] By replacing Doganella with Cosa as the main business center for agricultural exchange, this still may have been enough for the settlers to specialize in viticulture and slowly take over the wine industry.

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[202] For settlement patterns in the Albegna valley, see Perkins 1999: 30-39; Carandini *et al.* 2002: 85 tav. 8, 115 tav. 14, with site catalogue: The latest pottery dates from the first quarter of the third century, see Perkins 1999: 25. Further up the valley from Doganella, the city of Saturnia seems to have been actually destroyed, judging by the destruction layer from the same period found during excavations.

[203] For early Roman sites in the Valle d'Oro, see Carandini *et al.* 2002: 117, tav. 16. For the kiln site at CAP46, see Perkins 1999: 25, 195.

[204] For the coarse wares, see Perkins 1999: 118-138. Unfortunately, the catalogue of finds is organized only by type, not also by site.

[205] Carandini *et al.* 2002: 122-123. Pelgrom (2008: 365) has convincingly argued that the centuriation at Cosa cannot be dated with any certainty to the third century. The surveyors noticed that the *limites* did not align with the via Aurelia, which passes through Cosa, and was built in 241. Celuzza and others have assumed that the *limites* must have predated the via Aurelia because their orientation does not match the path of the road. However, the *limites* in the *ager Campania*, which post-date the via Appia, do not align with the road.

Over time, the Albegna Valley again became known for its wine-export industry. Excavations at the Roman villa at Settefinestre, built around the middle of the first century BCE, have revealed an enormous operation, with hundreds of stamped amphorae, 80 dolia for wine fermentation, and three wine presses.[206] This kind of production was only possible with the help of slave labor, and upwards of 500 *iugera* (about 125 hectares) of land to work with.[207] Though much had changed at Cosa between the initial allotment of land in 273 and the villa economy at Settefinestre over two hundred years later, Settefinestre was an extreme example of intensified specialization—what land allotment within a network of commercial citizenship began in the fourth century. It was because land allotment reoriented exchange within the region around Cosa, I argue, that specialized wine production was able to expand so much in the second and first centuries. Still, this likely would have been a fairly slow process. The earliest amphorae found during excavations in and around Cosa came from the harbor down the hill, and only three date from the third century.[208] For several generations after 273, exchange was probably much more regional, and less oriented towards Mediterranean markets, judging by the lack of evidence for transport amphorae for several generations after the Romans arrived. Again, this may well be a problem of preservation, but it also may suggest that much of the Etruscan population still living in and around the valley were now producing agricultural staples for local consumption while the Roman settlers, or at least some of them, specialized in what they were producing.

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[206] Will 1979; Brown 1980: 71; Carandini 1985a. For Settefinestre and the villa economy, see also Hoyer 2009. For wine presses and dolia, see Rossiter 1981. About 10 percent of the stamped amphorae bore the stamp of merchant named Sestius (SES, SEST, or SESTI), whose amphorae have also shown up in shipwrecks off the coast of Marseilles and elsewhere across the western Mediterranean.

[207] For the land worked from Settefinestre, see Carandini 1985a: 1.168. Another estimate puts it at around 250 *iugera,* see Rathbone 1981: 12. The land worked from Settefinestre amounted to the land allotments of several dozen of Cosa's original settlers, most of whom would have struggled without wage or slave labor to work much more than 4 hectares anyway.

[208] McCann 1979; Will 1987: 217. Excavations at the harbor found just three Greco-Italic Type 1c amphorae, all three of them imported.

This may help explain why the Etruscan centers that remained in the region after the Romans' arrival show signs that they too were caught up in the economy centered at Cosa. Unlike Doganella, the Etruscan center at Orbetello, just 5 km northwest of Cosa, shows signs that it was inhabited well into the Roman period. At 17 hectares, the Etruscan center was larger than Cosa, though little is known of its history because a modern city sits atop the ancient site.[209] Still, limited excavations have found black gloss wares with *petites estampilles*, which likely came from the first generation of colonists at Cosa.[210] Likewise, at Vulci, evidence for local ceramic production dropped significantly by the middle of the third century, with no evidence for the kind of amphora production the city was known for prior to the Roman conquest. At the same time, examples of Roman black gloss with *petites estampilles* start showing up in abundance.[211] The changes in ceramic production at Vulci led Gianfranco Gazzetti to conclude that "L'artigianato ceramico sembra subire una crisi" (ceramic craftsmanship seems to have suffered a crisis).[212] Regardless of whether the Roman black gloss was produced at Rome or at Cosa, in all likelihood the Roman wares flowed through Cosa to Orbetello and Vulci. So even though Cosa had little in common with Paestum, it too reoriented the region's economic outlook from Mediterranean markets to regional exchange.

What we have seen at Paestum and Cosa suggests that Roman land allotment reoriented existing regional economies around Roman business centers. Though the archaeological data is far from conclusive, it seems reasonable to think that the dispersal of Roman human capital

[209] For Orbetello, see Carandini 1985b: 91-94; Perkins 1999: 23. Brown (1980: 8) suggested that the Etruscan center at Orbetello, which dated back to the Archaic period, may have originally been called Cusi or Cusia in Etruscan, hence the name Cosa for the Latin colony.

[210] Ciampoltrini 1995.

[211] Carandini 1985b: 59-63. Sgubini Moretti (*apud* Carandini 1985b: 59) observed that the black gloss had a "fabriche romane consistenti."

[212] Carandini 1985b: 62.

undermined existing production and replaced it with what I have called "intensified specialization," which would have worked more to the benefit of the Roman settlers anyway. Some settlers were probably specializing in things like wine and olive oil production. Others were probably producing pots to distribute that wine and olive oil. They could do so only because they could rely on enough of the existing communities, and maybe also some of their fellow settlers, to grow agricultural staples, which were sold at the Roman business centers. With the help of their commercial citizenship, the settlers probably found it relatively easy to see their goods to regional elites and to consumers back at Rome, where demand only continued to grow. Over time, the settlers reoriented economic activity around themselves before they could start meeting demand back at Rome. When we compare what the Romans were doing in central Italy to the Athenians' and Syracusans' imperial territory, the Italian peninsula appears to be remarkably regional, even as the Roman army was becoming ever more powerful.[213]

5.7. *Conclusions*

During the Romans' transition to empire, land allotment made and unmade their state. On the one hand, land allotment was the central part of how non-elites experienced the Roman state: far more Romans received land allotments than ever held public office in the mid-Republic. In this sense, land allotment was more central to Roman political culture than it was to Athenian or Syracusan culture. On the other hand: the majority of Romans who put their name in for a land

[213] In his analysis of Italian ceramics during the fourth and third centuries, Morel (1988: 51) argued that there was no "colonial preference" for Roman goods, that Roman colonists did not seem to import Roman goods any more than they traded with the existing communities closer to them. He argued that "la diffusion des produits romains ne reflète pas la colonisation…On n'observe donc pas de lien direct entre le commerce des produits artisanaux et la colonisation." For regionalism in the third century, see Morel 1989: 484-485.

allotment ended up moving away from Rome and giving up their right to vote. In fact, between 338 and 264 more Romans received land allotments far from the Roman state than all the Athenians and Syracusans who received land allotments in the Classical period combined. For many of those Romans, land allotment meant that they would live among, and sometimes even as fellow citizens with, people who were defeated by the Roman army.

As we saw for Athenian and Syracusan land allotment, the way the Romans allotted land in the fourth and third centuries had a lot to do with how their community developed through the contingencies and crises of the Archaic period. Beginning as far back as the sixth century, the Romans had grown used to people moving in and out of their community, so long as the elite could restrict access to the agricultural economy within their territory. By the middle of the fourth century, Rome's new political class of *nobiles* won prestige from military victories and, by consequence, confiscating land from the people they defeated. What emerged was a sort of compromise between Rome's elite, who competed for prestige among each other, and the plebeians, who hoped to take advantage of an expanding network of commercial citizenship across central Italy. As a result, Roman land allotment became the primary catalyst for movement away from Rome, a trend that took Romans and their human capital away from the imperial center at an unprecedented rate in the history of Mediterranean empires up to that point.

What distinguished Roman land allotment was that it dispersed Roman human capital across the Roman's imperial territory: the Romans who received land allotments moved away from Rome and then used their commercial citizenship to rework existing networks of exchange to their benefit. At places like Fregellae and Interamna, we see how the settlers made their colony into a central hub in the Liri Valley for exchange among Romans and non-Romans. At places like

Paestum and Cosa, we also saw how the settlers reoriented existing production and distribution networks so they could specialize what they were growing and exploit the region's wealth. Consequently, the dispersal of Roman human capital across the rural areas of Italy created imperial territories that were not necessarily imperial peripheries in the same sense as Athenian and Syracusan imperial territory—that is to say, they were not subject to the same kinds of centralized exploitation from back at a metropole that fueled Athenian and Syracusan imperialism. Instead, the Romans were creating a much more intensive, and indeed exploitative, kind of empire by entrenching Roman human capital within the regions where defeated communities continued to live.

If we think back for a moment to when the members of the Latin League went to war against Rome in 340, it is easy to see how they thought the Roman state was expanding at their expense. In the generation since the crisis of 387, the people of central Italy saw how Roman power came first and foremost through violence, and was continually reinforced through oppressive bilateral treaties; but most days of the year, Roman power was more local, more decentralized across a network of exploitative economic hubs. Far away from Rome, Roman settlers created economic communities with defeated peoples in a way that, over time, their economic lives became implicated with one another. To be sure, this is not to say that Roman land confiscation was any less heavy-handed than its Greek predecessors, or that the Romans' arrival allowed defeated peoples to "debate" the terms of their imperial relationship with Rome. In no way should Roman land allotment be sanitized. The movement of Romans away from Rome was still premised on the confiscation of land, which was only ever possible at the business end of a military campaign. And just because non-elite Romans were leaving Rome to start a new life,

often in areas where members of a defeated community continued to live, the defeated people had no say in the matter. As Emmanuele Curti mused, "it would be interesting to see if modern colonized peoples would accept the term 'debate' as a description of their relationship with colonial powers."[214] Even so, what see now is that Roman land allotment was not extractive like Athenian land allotment, nor was it unsettling like Syracusan land allotment. Rather, Roman land allotment was distinctive for what it did not do: it did not only privilege the central Roman economy over regional economies outside of Roman territory.

After the First Punic War, the Romans continued to allot land up and down both coasts of Italy through the end of the second century BCE, and then across the Mediterranean for another five hundred years. As long as the Romans continued to confiscate land from their enemies, land allotment remained a fundamental institution of the Roman state. For many modern historians, this kind of Roman mobility away from Rome to land allotments in the mid-Republic may seem unremarkable—a well-known plot in the story of Roman success. It is ironic, however, that Roman land allotment emerged as an institution at a time when the Roman state was in political and economic crisis, but by the late Republic it had become the hallmark of Roman state power. In this regard, Roman land allotment in the mid-Republic is a cautionary tale for modern historians who seek to explain Roman political culture as uniquely imperialist, or uniquely prepared to create a Mediterranean empire. In a way, Roman land allotment created an intensive form of imperialism not because it was particularly heavy-handed and controlling, rather because the elite at the top of Roman society were particularly willing to let their own citizens move across Italy.

[214] Curti 2001: 24-25.

Chapter 6

CONCLUSION

We began this study with two fanciful depictions of land allotment from Aristophanes and Ovid, who both saw power in the division of land. The two authors portrayed their surveyors as if they were conquering the natural landscape, carving it up and defining new boundaries. They also joined their power to conquer nature with a willingness to share it. Together, we are led to imagine, confiscation and allotment was what empowered citizens living in imperial republics: collectively, they had the power to control an imperial territory; individually, they had the power to exploit it for their own personal gain. For many Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, this was a central part of their citizen experience. We have now seen many ways in which their histories became intertwined, in fact, through land allotment.

Yet we have also seen many ways in which land allotment could vary greatly among the three groups, all while living in the same Mediterranean world. The full extent of those points of contact and divergence are too often neglected, I think, because land allotment was such a common expression of imperial power in Greco-Roman history. Ironically, the ubiquity of land allotment seems to have made it easier for historians to overgeneralize and flatten Greco-Roman empires, even romanticize their histories to focus more on imperial success. Even so, it is not enough to conclude simply that the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land in different ways. Rather, historical difference was always meant to be our point of departure: only by thinking through contrasts, I hoped to show, can we understand why each group allotted land the way they did.

For that reason, in the preceding chapters I have tried to reconstruct the political, cultural, and economic contexts from which the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans allotted land. By doing so, I wanted to recapture what they hoped to get from their land allotments, both collectively and individually, during their initial transition to empire—free from narratives of success and failure. I have not attempted to systematically catalogue and categorize all the technical aspects of land allotment, like how exactly each group may have measured their land allotments or managed the actual event when lots were taken.[1] Instead, I have argued that we need to consider land allotment on two much broader levels: imperial territory and human capital. I found that those two heuristics, in particular, allow us to fully appreciate what distinguished the three patterns. It has now come time to summarize what we have learned from using this approach.

When we considered the shape of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperial territory, we found that there was a logic to each that cannot be explained by strategies of security and control alone. We saw how the Athenians compartmentalized their imperial territory because they tended to think of imperial land as something to be exploited individually and by new settler communities, distinct from the interests of Athenian state. What the Athenians seem to have collectively wanted from their land allotments was money to rebuild and invest in their metropole, which is why they created a centralized tax structure whereby tribute from coalition members and most taxes from land allotments flowed directly to Athens. This was quite different from what the Syracusans were doing when they externalized their imperial territory: by moving dispossessed people within Syracusan territory, and then allotting land to them as citizens, the

[1] Not only is there not enough evidence to do so, but those kinds of details, though fascinating, are tangential the purpose of this study.

Syracusans were trading imperial land for imperial people. They externalized their imperial territory the way they did because they needed skilled labor and specialization more than they needed more taxable land. Then there were the Romans who decentralized their imperial territory: as Rome's generals returned home from war with riches, slaves, and the prestige from confiscating land, they gave away the land to hundreds of thousands of Roman citizens who hoped to take advantage of an expanding network of commercial citizenship. By creating new communities out among existing ones across central Italy, the Romans were generating more and more regional hubs of exchange outside of the Roman center. In all three cases, each group drew from their own relationship with imperial territory when they went to allot land.

We also found that each pattern of land allotment had drastically different effects on how each group accumulated and organized human capital. The Athenians, first of all, centralized human capital: because both colonies and cleruchies directed annual payments back to Athens, over time settlers and the lotholders also directed trade back to Athenian markets, where craftsmen, merchants, and bankers from around the eastern Mediterranean gathered to do business. In particular, they were able to do so by experimenting with new ways of allowing citizens to collect imperial rents from their land allotments while also living in Attica, thereby ensuring that more citizens remained in and around the metropole than if they had only pursued settler colonialism like other Greeks during the Archaic period. The Syracusans, however, only concentrated human capital: by transferring entire merchant, craftsman, and entrepreneurial populations to Syracusan territory, and then replacing them with mercenaries or foreign allies, the Syracusans were concentrating an empire's share of human capital while leaving the people who received land allotments outside of Syracusan territory to start over. In stark contrast, the Romans

dispersed human capital: the Roman settlers who received land allotments moved away from Rome and then used their commercial citizenship to rework existing networks of exchange to their benefit. By creating new business centers, land allotment entrenched Roman human capital within the regions where defeated communities continued to live.

6.1. *Rethinking Land Allotment and Human Capital*

Now, to return to my initial hypothesis at the end of Chapter 2, we are better equipped at this point to consider the relationship between land allotment and human capital. Based on my initial treatment of imperial territory and human capital theory, I hypothesized that the more politically and economically centralized a community was at the time of its imperial transition, the more likely it was to concentrate human capital at the imperial center. What I meant by "centralized" was simply that activity and decision-making be focused within a single group, living at a single place. Broadly speaking, we found the hypothesized relationship between land allotment and human capital to be mostly true. However, the important differences that distinguished one pattern of land allotment from another, can be found in the types and degrees of centralization.

As we have seen, Athenian politics was remarkably centralized thanks to the Athenian Assembly, and yet Athenian settlers still moved away from Athens, thereby dispersing some of Athens' human capital. Compared to Syracuse, there was not nearly as much available land in Attica at the time of imperial transition; also, the Syracusans' willingness to give command of all military affairs to a single general certainly made it easier to centralize economic decisions affecting land allotment. For that reason, the Athenians' pursuit of their private interests allowed

them to disperse human capital when the shortcomings of the Syracusan labor market encouraged the Syracusans to do the opposite. Even so, Athenian settlers did not reorient existing networks of exchange as the Romans did, so human capital remained centralized at Athens, but not nearly as concentrated as we saw with the Syracusans. In fact, under both tyrants and democrats, the Syracusans were the most politically and economically centralized of all three groups. Of course, I do not mean to imply that Syracusan citizens had more say in the political process, or that they spoke with one voice about matters of the state. Rather, where it mattered most for decisions about land allotment, the Syracusans were comparably centralized, both politically and economically. By comparison, the Romans were still politically and economically decentralized at the time of their imperial transition. Not only did the plebeians constitute a state within a state, but the elite economy at Rome developed out of the power of individual clans and opportunistic raiding, not some centralized economic initiative. Paradoxically, it was probably because the Romans were so decentralized at the time of their imperial transition that they created such an intensive form of imperialism. Had the Romans not defeated the Carthaginians in the Punic Wars, and had the Athenians not been defeated when they invaded Sicily, later historians may have actually puzzled over why the Romans were so willing to allot land far away from Rome rather than celebrate it as their key to success.

6.2. *Old Paradigms, New Considerations*

Our new understanding of land allotment in the ancient Mediterranean world leads us to three broader considerations about how we study Greco-Roman empires. First, questions about imperial success and failure are not helpful lines of historical inquiry when we are trying to

explain why ancient empires developed the way they did. Though historians should, without a doubt, be curious about why certain empires lasted longer than others, we should not impose on our historical sources and archaeological data narratives that only make sense in hindsight. Take the example of Athenian land allotment: many historians have tried to fit a model of Roman imperialism on Athenian history, leading them inevitably to conclude that the Athenians failed at their chance of building a Mediterranean-wide empire. But if we move beyond the premise that land allotment was universally an instrument of control, the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires start to make a lot more sense. In fact, we saw that the Athenians and Syracusans do not seem to have actually set out to create an empire in the same way as the Romans: land allotment for them was a means to a very different end than what we have come to expect from Roman history. To say that the Athenian and Syracusan empires were less successful, or less stable, than the Roman empire is to miss the point.

Rather, historians' lasting interest in stability and success may say more about us and our relationship with the Greco-Roman canon than it says about the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans themselves. Though we live today in a mostly postcolonial society, Greco-Roman empires are implicated in so many concepts central to our own political culture—like equality, justice, citizenship, foreignness, and slavery—that we seem to ask questions about the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans that we want answered about ourselves: How does a community balance its internal divisions at home with warfare abroad? How, as citizens, do we go on together successfully? How should we even define success? By learning about Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment, we have a responsibility, I think, to think critically about what it means to live in a participatory, revisable society that faces difficult decisions about citizen

identity, inclusiveness, and foreign policy. But, as ancient historians, I think we also have a responsibility to be more aware of our own hindsight so we do not overgeneralize, flatten, and romanticize Greco-Roman empires.

Second, republicanism played a necessary part in the development of Greco-Roman empires and Greco-Roman empires played a necessary part in the development of republicanism. That is to say, the development of republican institutions in the ancient world went hand-in-hand with a very specific kind of imperialism that centered around the confiscation and allotment of land. As we have seen, some historians have tried to disassociate participatory and egalitarian institutions from the realities of imperialism, emphasizing instead individual historical actor's greed and political machinations as the true engines of imperialism. Other historians have rightly emphasized the systems of anarchy and violence in the ancient Mediterranean world that seem to have encouraged imperial behavior more than any republican institutions.[2] Of course, there was a lot more going on in Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperialism than just republicanism and, historically, there have been many more states with nothing in the way of republican institutions that created empires than city-state republics. Nevertheless, we have seen that citizenship and participatory institutions played a very important role in each pattern of land allotment. And even though citizens had a different place in each empire, questions about citizenship and community remained central to land allotment at Athens, Syracuse, and Rome.

Third, economic power could be just as important as military and political power in how ancient empires developed. This may seem all too obvious to those who study early-modern joint-stock companies and modern empires, and also perhaps to historians of the later Roman Imperial

[2] For anarchy and violence, see Eckstein 2006.

period, but economic power is often overlooked and neglected for the initial period of transition. One possible reason for this is that our historical sources for economic history are notoriously bad, even by the standards of ancient history. Another reason is that ancient historians are typically not well trained to use archaeological data which, compared to historical sources, are much more representative of economic goods. A final reason is that it has only been in the last generation that questions about economic agency, intentionality, and performance have become popular among—and perhaps also feasible for—ancient historians. As we have seen in this study, many decisions that shaped the economic history of the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires many not have been intended to do as such. This makes it that much more difficult to untangle the many layers of causation that went into the development of ancient empires.

Yet with that in mind, I found that much of what distinguished the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman patterns of land allotment started to come into focus when we "people the land"—that is to say, when we start considering the recipients of land allotment in all their economic complexities. I have argued that the three patterns of land allotment are best distinguished by how they affected the accumulation and concentration of human capital: the Athenians centralized human capital, the Syracusans concentrated it, and the Romans dispersed it. Human capital is, of course, a modern concept and probably would have been foreign to Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman decision-making. Even so, we found that the movement of people to and from confiscated land could create new forms of economic power that worked alongside or even stood in for military and political power.

6.3. *Questions for Future Work*

For all that we have learned about land allotment in Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman history, I have left many questions unanswered about human capital, comparative land allotment, and the historiography of Greco-Roman imperialism. In this study, I have treated human capital as a fairly static category that moves across space: it can be accumulated, concentrated, dispersed, and so on. It would be important, I think, to consider how land allotment may have affected education, training, and health—all of which are fundamental to human capital development. For example, we could consider how human capital might develop differently at a metropole as opposed to a rural community. Richard Saller has recently shown for the later Roman Imperial period that "Cities facilitate education and, more generally, the exchange of information and ideas, because denser populations generate more interactions… Beyond formal education, cities were sites of concentrated demand that encouraged the development of specialization and sub-specialization."[3] For the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans, we could consider to what extent the recipients of land allotments had access to apprenticeships, informal imitation training, and formal education, before and after receiving land. I have also not considered how women's work and human capital fit into land allotment. Walter Scheidel has shown how hard it is to reconstruct the economic lives of women in Greco-Roman antiquity because we have almost no historical evidence to work with.[4] Even so, we could do more with comparative and ethnographic sources to consider how women impacted, and were impacted by, land allotment.

[3] Saller 2013: 80. See also Hawkins 2016: 66-129.

[4] Scheidel 1995; 1996. For a recent attempt to reconstruct how women were involved in urban production and trade, see Lovén 2016.

To continue on the topic of comparative history, we can still learn more about Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment by broadening our field of vision even further. I argued back in the Introduction that we needed to study land allotment within a highly specific context of ancient Mediterranean city-state republics, only during the periods of imperial transition. Now that we have an historical methodology for comparing patterns of land allotment, we could try to determine the relative importance of citizenship and republican institutions in Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman land allotment by comparing them to other city-states with more autocratic forms of government, like the Inca or the Third Dynasty of Ur. Looking outside of the Mediterranean would also help us consider more programmatically the role of environment and climate. In another tack, we also saw how much the Athenians, Syracusans, and Romans had to experiment with land allotment because they were confiscating land in areas with no prior history of imperial land allotment. Hence, we could test the relative importance of existing systems of imperial land allotment by comparing them to later city-state republics within the Mediterranean like Venice, whose lotholders could draw from earlier systems of land tenure. Each set of questions will help us continue to refine our understanding of land allotment.

Finally, we could do more to understand the metahistories that frame the way we study land allotment. We saw in the Introduction that comparative empires and land allotment were already important lines of historical inquiry in Machiavelli's Florence. Roman narratives of success and stability remained entrenched in many Europeans' imperial consciousness during the early modern period of global empires. We know, for example, that British classicist-turned-imperialist Thomas Smith drew lessons from Roman land allotment to model British plantations

in Northern Ireland at the end of the sixteenth century. The sense of land allotment as an instrument of imperial control became engrained in Anglophone histories of Roman colonization, as people like Smith used Roman imperialism to think with alongside British imperialism.[5] It would be important for us to consider how early modern ideas about land allotment shaped the way historians at the time wrote about ancient Greco-Roman land allotment. To understand how our standard narratives of ancient land allotment were transmitted might help us see other aspects of Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman imperialism in a new light as well.

Even though the Athenian, Syracusan, and Roman empires may not have been much to look at during their imperial transitions, I hope to have shown how comparative history can enrich the study of the distant past. By reframing our historical sources with archaeological case-studies, we have recaptured some of the many ways people in antiquity reconciled empire with citizenship and, in doing so, how land allotment helped shape the political and economic history of the ancient Mediterranean world.

[5] Canny 2001.

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